Edwina, List: ET: I don't agree that Peirce reduced matter to a separate entity, an isolate Secondness, ie, 'brute reaction.
No one is claiming that he did. The point is that where nothing *exists*, there *cannot be* any matter since there is nothing "which offers resistance" and "reacts against forces." By contrast, there *can be*--and according to Peirce, in the "infinitely remote" beginning there *was*--mind without matter as "a chaos of unpersonalized feeling," which is *real *but whose mode of being is *not *existence. ET: Remember his view that protoplasm not only feels but shows all the capacities of Mind. [6.255]. And his 4.551 claim that 'thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world". Indeed, and why is that? According to Peirce, precisely because matter is a peculiar sort of mind; i.e., everything has *always *been mind, but some of it eventually *became *what we call matter. ET: His dictionary definitions are intended for the general public and are not, to my understanding, part of his theoretical outlines. As Jon Awbrey rightly noted ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00217.html), Peirce's dictionary definitions are intended to record the usage of terms at the time when he prepared them. As such, they provide extremely valuable insights into their meanings where he employed them himself, since presumably he wanted his writings to be understood properly by others. ET: That is, my reading of his cosmology is that BOTH Mind and Matter co-appeared and co-evolved, working together. Neither is primordial. This is not a reading of *Peirce's *cosmology, it is an assertion of a *different* cosmology. Where does he ever *explicitly *state that "BOTH Mind and Matter co-appeared and co-evolved" or that "Neither is primordial"? As John Sowa rightly requested, "For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact quotations." Otherwise, there is no reason for anyone to treat these claims as valid interpretations of *his * thought. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Sep 27, 2021 at 12:55 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > My view is that I don't disagree with Peirce; I disagree with JAS's > interpretation of Peirce. Again, no-one, neither I nor JAS can unilaterally > declare that their analysis is 'the correct analysis of Peirce'. > > I don't agree that Peirce reduced matter to a separate entity, an > isolate Secondness, ie, 'brute reaction. Remember his view that protoplasm > not only feels but shows all the capacities of Mind. [6.255]. And his 4.551 > claim that 'thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears > in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world". > Secondness is one of the three categories, and to my understanding, ALL > three are a part of the realities and existential entities of our universe. > That is, even Secondness would include 1ns...which is feeling, an aspect of > Mind. > > His dictionary definitions are intended for the general public and are > not, to my understanding, part of his theoretical outlines. > > His theoretical outlines, as I read them, do not substantiate that Mind > was functional or operative on its own BEFORE the appearance of Matter. Nor > that Matter was functional/operative on its own BEFORE Mind. My reading of > that cosmological section is that Mind-as-Matter was functional but > without habits, without the generalizing tendency and therefore, could be > understood as not existing, since each particle might appear for only a > nano-second. See also his outline in 1.410-- > > My reading of Peirce is that a major definition of Mind is not simply its > reaching out' within what can be called Feeling [1ns] but its action of > taking and promoting habit formation. And this seems to be exactly what > happened. Peirce's outline of cosmology refers to the 'womb of > indeterminacy ' 1.412, and, by the principle of 1ns, 'flashes' appeared, > [which would be instantiations and therefore Matter in 2ns,, but without > habits [3ns]...And then habits or 3ns then developed. That is, my reading > of his cosmology is that BOTH Mind and Matter co-appeared and co-evolved, > working together. Neither is primordial. > > I am fully aware that this differs from JAS's reading, but I repeat, > neither he nor I have the right to unilaterally declare that our reading > of Peirce is 'the correct one'. We are both reading the same texts - and > our interpretations differ. > > Not much else can be said. I don't see the point of continuing this what > can only be called a DEBATE, since both of us read Peirce differently. > > Edwina > > On Mon 27/09/21 12:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > John, Edwina, List: > > Peirce provided the entries for form, matter, and mind in the Century > Dictionary. Here are his definitions of each that seem to be the most > pertinent to the current discussion. > > form, n. 8. In general, arrangement of or relationship between the parts > of anything, as distinguished from the parts themselves: opposed to matter, > but not properly to substance (unless it be the intention of the writer > to identify substance with matter). > > matter, n. 1. Sensible substance; that which offers resistance to touch > or muscular effort; that which can be moved, strained, broken, comminuted, > or otherwise modified, but which cannot be destroyed or produced; that > which reacts against forces, is permanent, and preserves its identity under > all changes. > > 2. In philos.: (a) That which is in itself nothing definite, but is the > subject of change and development, and by receiving a form becomes a > substance; that out of which anything is made. See form. Matter in this > sense (a translation of Aristotle's word ϋλη, originally wood) is termed > by the scholastics matter ex qua (out of which), to distinguish it from > matter circum quam (concerning which), or the object of any action or > power, as well as from matter in qua (in which), or the subject of any > attribute. > > mind, n. 1. That which feels, wills, and thinks; the conscious subject; > the ego; the soul. > 2. The intellect, or cognitive faculty or part of the soul, as > distinguished from feeling and volition; intelligence. > > > Peirce equates his second definition of "matter" with Aristotle's usage > (hylo-) and opposes it to his eighth definition of "form" (-morphism), such > that every substance is conceived as a composite of the two. It is form > that is the "arrangement of ... the parts of anything," i.e., "an > organizing system of matter"; he gives no such definition of mind. There > is no entry for "hylopathy," but he contributed the one for "hylopathism," > as well as the one for "sentient." > > hylopathism, n. The doctrine that matter is sentient. > > > sentient, a. and n. I. a. 1. Capable of sensation or of sense-perception; > having the power of feeling. > II. n. The mind as capable of feeling. > > > Although Peirce sometimes employs "mind" in accordance with his second > definition--where it corresponds only to cognition, rather than also > encompassing feeling and volition--when he describes matter as a peculiar > sort of mind, he is evidently employing the first definition of each. > Matter is "that which offers resistance" and "reacts against forces," while > mind is "that which feels, wills, and thinks." Moreover, by embracing > "hylopathy, otherwise called monism," Peirce is specifically affirming that > matter is a peculiar sort of "mind as capable of feeling." In fact, he > emphasizes this aspect of mind in the cosmological summary that he > provides just a few paragraphs later in the very same article. > > CSP: Such are the materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory > ought to be built, in order to represent the state of knowledge to which > the nineteenth century has brought us. Without going into other important > questions of philosophical architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort > of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. > Like some of the most ancient and some of the most recent speculations it > would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that in the > beginning--infinitely remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, > which being without connection or regularity would properly be without > existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, > would have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings > would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the > tendency to habit would be started; and from this, with the other > principles of evolution, all the regularities of the universe would be > evolved. At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will > remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and > symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely > distant future. (CP 6.33, EP 1:297, 1891) > > > According to Peirce, the beginning is "infinitely remote," not an event > that occurred a finite number of years ago, whether six thousand or 13.7 > billion. The initial state of things was "a chaos of unpersonalized feeling > ... without existence"--strictly mind, no matter. The only kind of > arbitrary "sporting" that was more than "evanescent" at first was "the germ > of a generalizing tendency," i.e., "the tendency to habit"--strictly the > psychical law, not the physical law. However, this enabled the evolution > of "all the regularities of the universe," mind becoming matter, > inveterate habits becoming physical laws. The ideal limit of this process > would be when "mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant > future"--strictly matter, no mind. In other words, "dead matter would be > merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the > free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete > death" (CP 6.201, 1898). > > These are Peirce's explicitly stated beliefs--mind is primordial, such > that matter is a peculiar sort of mind; the psychical law is primordial, > such that the physical law is derived and special; and at any assignable > date, our universe of existence is evolving from utter chaos in the > infinite past toward utter regularity in the infinite future. Anyone is > free to disagree with him about this, but not to ascribe a different view > to him. The claim that his words on the subject are hopelessly vague and > ambiguous, such that any other "interpretation" of them whatsoever must be > treated as equally valid, is patently absurd. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Sep 25, 2021 at 8:39 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Mike, list >> >> Thanks for your comments. And yes- that's exactly how I view Mind, as an >> organizing system of matter - whether in crystals or protoplasm or even >> human societies. >> >> And I consider that Aristotle's 'form' and 'spirit' is analogous with >> Peirce's 'Mind'...which would include the term of 'hylopathy'. >> >> But JAS and I do differ in our interpretation of 6.24. JAS, to my >> understanding views the relation between Mind and Matter as one of >> 'idealism' where Mind is primordial. I, on the other hand, interpret that >> section - and other sections in Peirce- as 'objective idealism' and >> understand this phrase to mean that Mind and Matter are monist, i.e., >> correlates and that neither is primordial. Indeed, in my view, neither can >> 'be' without the other. ..so, it would be impossible to conclude that >> either is primordial. >> >> I think this is a big difference. >> >> And, I'd also comment that flinging quotations around isn't the answer to >> interpreting Peirce. The fact is - and this doesn't seem to be acknowledged >> - but, our interaction with the world, be it a text or a tree - is not >> direct. It's not a dyadic 'straight from the horse's mouth' method. It's >> triadic. There is always that mediation by the Representamen/Sign - and >> this means that the resultant Interpretant is imbued with out own knowledge >> base. This is why, as Peirce noted, 'to make single individuals absolute >> judges of truth is most pernicious" [W2:212]. So, neither I nor JAS can, on >> our own, declare that our reading of Peirce is 'the correct one'. All we >> can do is write them out...and leave it to others; many others. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Sat 25/09/21 12:17 AM , "sowa @bestweb.net" s...@bestweb.net sent: >> >> Mike, Jon AS, Jon A, Edwina, List, >> >> That is a good summary of the issues: >> >> MB: For a few years now I have felt it unfortunate that Peirce chose to >> use the word 'mind' for these points, since it conventionally conjures up >> images of thoughts and consciousness. If, however, one views the concept >> of 'mind' as embracing patterns and regularities (on the abiotic side, such >> as for crystals) to ones of complexity, order and 'habit' on the biotic >> side, I think we can better understand Peirce's intent of capturing the >> structure of matter as well as the laws of thought and representation. >> This interpretation, granted perhaps on the more aggressive end of applying >> Peircean thinking (as I understand it) to the entirety of existence, >> establishes a continuity that can extend from the Big Bang to thought and >> teleological purpose. Under this understanding, I see both Edwina and Jon >> as being right, though each is perhaps not expansive enough to embrace the >> other person's viewpoint. >> >> Best of all, it eliminates Two terms, which by Peirce's own criteria, >> should be arrested for failing to show their passports at the gates of >> perception and action: 'effete mind' and 'hylopathic'. >> >> JAS in response to JFS: If Peirce's writings were so inscrutable that >> what he meant, intended, and believed could not be reliably discerned from >> exact quotations, then why would we bother trying to read, understand, and >> discuss his thought at all? >> >> For most of what Peirce wrote, we can get clear interpretations that (a) >> are good enough for our own purposes. (b) are consistent with the >> mainstream results developed in the century after Peirce, and (c) help us >> better understand those new results by applying ideas we have learned >> through out studies of Peirce. >> >> But those quotations about effete mind are far below the quality of his >> best contributions. In fact, I agree with Jon A that the quotation by >> Aristotle is far superior in clearness and quality: >> : >> JA: Due to the importance of Aristotle's account for every discussion >> that follows it, not to mention for the many that follow it without knowing >> it, and because the issues it raises arise repeatedly throughout this work, >> I am going to cite an extended extract from the relevant text (Aristotle, >> On the Soul, 2.1), breaking up the argument into a number of individual >> premisses, stages, and examples. >> >> In summary, I believe that Mike's statement, quoted above, is a good >> reason for putting the terms 'effete mind' and 'hylopathic' in the bin of >> quaint and exotic terminology. Perhaps somebody someday might find a use >> for them, but nobody so far has found any reason for adopting them. >> >> John >> >>
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