Gary R., List: I agree that for Peirce, the minimum of time is an indefinite moment whose duration is not amenable to measurement, rather than a discrete instant or finite lapse. I also agree that in his cosmology, all three categories have been operative throughout all time, because time itself is part of "this Universe of Actual Existence" (RLT 162, 1898). However, I think that it is misleading to describe "that aboriginal 'moment'" as "a peculiar kind/form of singularity," because this implies that it was a *discontinuity *rather than a continuous development as Peirce describes it. For the same reason, he maintains that time had no *definite *beginning and will have no *definite *end. I discuss these and other related topics at length in my paper, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm), especially sections 3-4 and 7.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 27, 2021 at 10:25 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Among the several pertinent quotes you offered here, this one struck me as > particularly relevant to the issues being addressed in this thread: > > CSP: That first moment of time was of course infinitely long ago. But more > than that, although *it was but one moment*, it was infinitely longer > than any number of ages. It contained as great a multitude of ages as there > are points upon a continuous line. In one sense this continuum was not > time, it is true, because it all occupied but a *moment of time*. But it > was not only strictly analogous to time, but it gradually and continuously > developed into time; so that it was of one continuous nature with time. All > that follows from the principles of continuity. (NEM 4:149) Emphasis added. > > > As discussed here a while back, for Peirce the minimum of time would > appear to be the 'moment' as he defines it: both triadic and continuous. > Some commentators, including me, have analyzed time (and this first moment > is, according to Peirce, "strictly analogous to time") as involving past, > present, and future. Of course that aboriginal 'moment' was not itself time > since it represents a peculiar kind/form of singularity -- one moment only, > but analogous to time, and containing "as great a multitude of ages as > there are points upon a continuous line." Yet, it had the potential to, > and actually did, "gradually and continuously developed into time." > > As I understand it, for Peirce the moment is triadic in the sense that the > present (1ns) involves in its continuity something of the past (2ns) and > the potential of the future (3ns). *All time* is anticipated in this > ur-moment, develops from it, and suggests -- at least to me -- that the > Universal Categories were always-already 'there' from the get-go in this > 'promise' of a 'gradual' and 'continuous' development into time as in the > quotation above: "All that follows from the principles of continuity." > > Best, > > Gary R > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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