gary f., List, Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus in on just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P and Peirce which you juxtaposed.
Merleau-Ponty offers the idea that our experiences are presented as a unified whole, with synthesis occurring, not because they express a fixed quality or identity, but because they are gathered together in an 'ipseity' which remains elusive. Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of perception* [and of semiosis?] Indeed, if it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery' which prevents us from fully possessing it. On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It suggests that the true nature of something is independent of subjective interpretations or opinions. Even if people imagine, have opinions regarding, or will something to be different, the real thing's fundamental characters remain what they are. So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of reality and the limitations of human perception,' suggesting that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations, Merlea-Ponty focuses on the continual process of perception and the 'mystery' surrounding the ipseity of things; while Peirce emphasizes the intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness. Perhaps that parenthetical question as to whether 'continuous perception' is equivalent to 'continuous' (sometimes termed 'infinite' semiosis) might be worth exploring In any case, I agree that, as you commented, the two statements are consistent with each other although with a subtle difference of emphasis: M-P emphasizing the experience, Peirce emphasizing the reality underlying the experience. And, yes, James offers a decidedly psychological take on the matter, stressing the fluid and ongoing nature of knowing, suggesting that most of what we perceive and understand remains in a state of flux, never fully solidified or 'settled', and certainly not confirmed. Rather, he highlights the tendency for people to accept new experiences without much challenging or verifying them. For M-P experience is a cohesive whole since experiences are bound together by that mysterious 'ipseity'. He articulates a process of continual perception, each aspect of a thing serving as a gateway to further understanding. Peirce takes a different approach, describing the real as independent of human thought or perception: the true nature of a thing is what it is regardless of subjective interpretations or, for that matter, the opinions of communities -- even historical scientific communities. Best, Gary R On Sun, Apr 21, 2024 at 10:04 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > List, > > After so much striving for precision, perhaps a shift to the subject of > indeterminacy would be in order. The following is excerpted from Content > and Context (TS ·15) (gnusystems.ca) > <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xtn.htm#vgn>, where it includes a dozen or so > links to its larger context (omitted below). I don’t think it says anything > controversial among Peircean specialists, but it does make a salient point > about ordinary everyday communication. — gary f. > > _____________________________________ > > According to Peirce, ‘*No* concept, not even those of mathematics, is > absolutely precise; and some of the most important for everyday use are > extremely vague’ (CP 6.496, c. 1906). Genuinely informative communication > depends on taking this necessary vagueness into account. Properly > understanding any utterance requires us to interpret it with the degree of > vagueness appropriate to the situational context. To meet this requirement, > every language user has to develop a sensitivity to context at an early > age, though few are conscious of it. > > [[ The perspectival nature of linguistic systems means that as children > learn to use words and linguistic constructions in the manner of adults, > they come to see that the exact same phenomenon may be construed in many > different ways for different communicative purposes depending on many > factors in the communicative context. ]] (Tomasello 1999, 213) > > To construe is to simplify, and to simplify is to generalize: a symbol, by > referring to a *type* of experience, can thus refer to many *tokens* of > it on various occasions, including future occasions. Even proper nouns > (names of specific things, places, people etc.) are general signs insofar > as each implies the continuity of its object through time: each momentary > manifestation of the object is a token of that type, and some features of > it may vary from one occurrence to another – especially if the object is a > complex adaptive system. > > Things we talk about, whether we perceive them to be in the external or > the internal world, are already construed, categorized and “framed” by the > time we mention them. But each actual reference to them can affect our > framing habits; and these in turn affect our way of talking about them, or > hearing others talk about them. Since everyone has a history of cycling > through such loops countless times, and this history determines for each a > “natural” idiom, synchronizing reference between speakers is not always > easy. > > The upshot of this in communication is that in trying to connect words > with referents or experiences, ‘all sorts of risks are taken, assumptions > and guesses made’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 19). This is the only practical > way to reduce the many possible ‘construals’ of phenomena – or meanings of > words – to the simplicity required for the maintenance of a conversation. > > Sperber and Wilson take this as an argument against what they call ‘the > mutual-knowledge hypothesis,’ but they are using the word *knowledge* > here in an absolute sense, as equivalent to objective *certainty* > (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 19-20). In reality, the common ground that people > must have in order to carry on a conversation is a network of rather vague > default assumptions. Actual conversation often consists of attempts to > render some of the ‘mutual knowledge’ more precise, but in the actual > context, there are pragmatic limits to this precision. > > William James, in typically elegant fashion, gives a more psychologically > realistic account of cognition as ‘virtual knowing’: > > [[ Now the immensely greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond > this virtual stage. It never is completed or nailed down. … To continue > thinking unchallenged is, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, our practical > substitute for knowing in the completed sense. As each experience runs by > cognitive transition into the next one, and we nowhere feel a collision > with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit ourselves to the > current as if the port were sure. We live, as it were, upon the front edge > of an advancing wave-crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in > falling forward is all we cover of the future of our path. ]] (James, ‘A > World of Pure Experience’) > > Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* takes a slightly different > perspective: > > [[ My set of experiences is presented as a concordant whole, and the > synthesis takes place not in so far as they all express a certain > invariant, and in the identity of the object, but in that they are all > collected together, by the last of their number, in the ipseity of the > thing. The ipseity is, of course, never *reached*: each aspect of the > thing which falls to our perception is still only an invitation to perceive > beyond it, still only a momentary halt in the perceptual process. If the > thing itself were reached, it would be from that moment arrayed before us > and stripped of its mystery. It would cease to exist as a thing at the very > moment when we thought to possess it. What makes the ‘reality’ of the thing > is therefore precisely what snatches it from our grasp. ]] (Merleau-Ponty > 1945, 271) > > This is, in context, quite consistent with Peirce's definition of > ‘reality’: > > [[ I define the *real* as that which holds its characters on such a > tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may > have *thought* them to be, or ever will have *thought* them to be, here > using thought to include, imagining, opining, and willing (as long as > forcible *means* are not used); but the real thing's characters will > remain absolutely untouched. ]] (CP 6.495, c. 1906) > > None of this denies that thoughts can make a difference to the *future* > character of real things. Nor does it deny Peirce's assertion that ‘we have > *direct > experience of things in themselves*’ (CP 6.95). Experience is not > knowledge, although it is *involved* in knowing, as Secondness is > involved in Thirdness, which in turn will determine ‘future facts of > Secondness.’ In the process of inquiry or of learning, what James called > ‘our sense of a determinate direction’ is a feeling of being about to know > more than we did before, or getting closer to the Truth. But semiotic > experience teaches that our knowledge is never completely determinate. > > [[ No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept; and > indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of > the Sign, and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in > Breadth and in Depth. ]] (CP 4.543, 1906) > > Any knowledge that will prove useful as guidance into the future must be > *general*, and thus indefinite in that sense. > > [[ Yet every proposition actually asserted must refer to some non-general > subject …. Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately > singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters; > namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is > assumed on all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser > environment of the utterer and interpreter of each proposition that > actually gets conveyed, to which that proposition more particularly refers > and which is not general. ]] (CP 5.506, c. 1905) > > That ‘lesser environment’ is evidently what Peirce elsewhere called ‘the > common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter’ (EP2:310), i.e. the > *commind* or *commens* (EP2:478). Its particular *subject* may be > ‘determinately singular,’ but *predicates* are always general to some > degree, so the proposition actually conveyed still involves some > indeterminacy. Thus we can't say that a proposition is necessarily and > absolutely either true or false unless we deny the reality of > indeterminacy, i.e. of both generality and vagueness. This denial is > formulated as the “principle of excluded middle.” > > [[ To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption, > namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we > could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really > either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called > the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do > not believe it. ]] (Peirce, NEM 3:758, 1893) > > Even if the dynamic Object of a symbolic utterance is a fully determinate > singular, the sign itself is still ‘indefinite as to its Interpretant’ (as > explained above). ‘No communication of one person to another can be > entirely definite, i.e., non-vague’ (CP 5.506). > > ____________________________________ > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } Everything is involved which can be evolved. [Peirce] { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
