John, List: JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any noun in the English language.
In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction between a "graph" as a type and a "graph-instance" as a token, and sometimes he also advocates doing the same with "word" and "word-instance." In case anyone is somehow still in doubt about this, here are several additional relevant passages from his writings, most of which will appear in the forthcoming volume 3/1 of *Logic of the Future*. The first one also confirms that "instance" directly replaces "replica" as used in his earlier writings and gives the reason why. The third one is clearly a draft of CP 4.537 and includes yet another alternative for the name of the other (possible) member of the trichotomy for the nature of the sign itself, "phantasm," which Peirce evidently considered but promptly discarded. CSP: But by a *graph* in this system is meant, a type of a sign which according to the conventions of this system would express a proposition, this type being determinate in all its significant features that are internal, that is regardless of its concomitants, but being indeterminate in all features which are in themselves insignificant. An individual existing embodiment of such a type is called a *graph-instance*, or a[n] *instance* of a graph. I formerly called it a *replica*, forgetting that Mr. Kempe, in his Memoir on Mathematical Forms, §170, had already preempted this word as a technical term relating to graphs, and that in a highly appropriate sense, while my sense was not at all appropriate. I therefore am glad to abandon this term. (R 1589:4-5, LF 2:171, 1904) CSP: Any sign scribed on this system (which by the way is called the System of *Existential Graphs*) ... and which expresses an assertion is called *graph*, or, more accurately, an *existential graph*, whether it is disconnected or joined to other graphs. The term graph is taken in the sense of a type; and that which is actually on the paper is a *graph-instance*. But the word "scribe" is taken in such a sense that to put a graph-instance on any area is accurately described as "scribing the graph" of which it is an instance on the same area. (R 292:56[30], LF 3, 1906) CSP: By a *graph* (a word which has been overworked of late years) I, for my part, following its introducers, Clifford and Sylvester, confine to a diagram principally composed of spots and of lines connecting these spots. But in the system I am about to describe, I give the word a special meaning; and in order to explain this, I will begin by proposing a division of all signs according to their mode of being as objects simply, regardless of their significations. Dr. Edward Eggleston introduced a simple mode of expressing the quantity of matter for the press contained in any manuscript by counting the words. There will usually be found on an ordinary small octavo page a little over twenty *the*s, on the average. These, of course, Dr. Eggleston would count as twenty words or more. But in a different sense, there is but *one* word in the English language which is used as a definite article, and this word is no more printed than it is pronounced. In a literal sense, it *cannot* be printed nor pronounced; it can only govern and determine what is printed or pronounced. Its being consists in its so governing existents, while it does not itself exist. I term such a sign a *Type*. A sign which is either a single event happening once and only once, or which is an existent single thing or single collection which at one time can exist only in one place, and can *never* be in another, unless by a continuous motion thither, I call a *Token*. For the vernacular meaning of *token* is as near this meaning as a vernacular word can be expected to approach in meaning to a term of philosophy. Other languages might conveniently borrow the English word for the purpose. But a sign may be neither a Type (which is a sort of intention or element of habit) nor a Token. It may be a mere *Phantasm*, or appearance. This is the division of signs which I now propose: *Type*, *Token*, *Phantasm*. In order that a Type, such as the word *the*, should be employed, a *Token* that represents it must be spoken or written; and I propose to call a *Token* that is employed as representing a given *Type*, an *Instance* of that Type. I would also propose to continue, as we now do, to use the words *write*, *pronounce*, and the like, in such a sense that, when we put an Instance of a Type into existence on paper or invoice, we may properly speak of writing or pronouncing the Type. But since *Existential Graphs*, which are Types, are partly written and partly rather drawn, and partly, indeed, conceived as cut out with a penknife, I will use the term "scribe a graph" to mean give individual existence to a Graph-instance. (R 292b, LF 3, 1906) CSP: A proposition as expressed according to the conventions of the System of Existential Graphs is called a *Graph* which is an abbreviation for existential graph. What we thus place upon the sheet is necessarily a graph-instance and not a graph. For it would be as inaccurate and absurd to speak of a graph as being placed on a sheet of paper as it would be to speak of *word* being so placed. Every page of a book may have on it *instances* of the word 'the'; but 'the,' however, is a single word, and if it lies on any page of the book, which is that page, rather than another? A word is not an image nor a figure. It is a general type, which *governs* instances but is not identical with any of them; and so it is with a *graph*. Being a type, it cannot be put in any place. Yet just as we speak of writing a word on a sheet of paper, so we shall give the word *scribe* such a signification that to place a graph-instance on either side of the sheet shall be correctly described as "scribing" the graph itself of which what is placed on the sheet is an instance on that side. (R 490:2-3, LF 3, 1906) CSP: I must first call attention to the distinction between a Graph and a Graph-instance, which was clearly drawn in my *Prolegomena* in the paragraph beginning on p. 505 [CP 4.537]. I there drew attention to the two senses of the term "word," in one of which *the* is a single one, the only definite article in the English language, while in the other sense there may be about 250 words on the page of an ordinary book, of which number about 20 will usually be *the*s. The former I called a *Type*, the latter a *Token*. ... Now a Graph-instance is that the putting of which upon a sheet is expressed by saying that the corresponding graph "is scribed," which is a conventional mode of speech not intended to be analytically interpreted. In other words, it is an improper expression used for short. For a Graph is that one form which is embodied alike in all Graph-instances which have the same signification expressed in essentially the same way. (R 296:14&16-17, LF 3, 1907) CSP: By a "*graph*" I mean *the way* in which a given assertion is scribed. It is the general kind, not a single instance. For example there is in English but one single "word" that serves as definite article. It is the word "the." It will occur some twenty or more times on an average page; and when an editor asks for an article of so many thousand "words" he means to count each of those instances as a distinct word. He speaks loosely of *instances* of words as words, which they are not. Now in like manner a *graph* is one thing, and a "*graph instance*" is another thing. (NEM 3:163, 1911 Jun 22) In summary, "scribing a graph" is synonymous with "placing a graph-instance on the sheet." Accordingly, throughout his writings on EGs after 1903, Peirce is fairly consistent about using "graph" when discussing general types and "graph-instance" when referring to individual tokens. We would do well to follow his example. JFS: Mathematicians have been choosing brevity since Euclid, and they still do. Maybe so, but Peirce consistently chooses accuracy over brevity--especially for EGs, as he says in the same letter to Kehler where the last quotation above appears. CSP: I wish to draw your attention, in the most emphatic way possible, to the purpose this Syntax is intended to subserve; since anybody who did not pay attention to that statement would be all but sure, not merely to mistake the intention of this syntax, but to think that intention as CONTRARY to what it really is as well he could. Namely he would suppose the object was to reach the conclusion from given premisses with the utmost facility and speed, while the real purpose is to dissect the reasoning into the greatest possible number of distinct steps and so to force attention to every requisite of the reasoning. The *supposed* purpose would be of little consequence, and it is the business of the mathematicians to furnish inventions to attain it; but the real purpose is to supply a real and crying need, although logicians are so stupid as not to recognize it and to put obstacles in the way of meeting it. (NEM 3:168) EGs are not primarily intended to facilitate reasoning *itself *as desired by mathematicians, but to facilitate the *study *of reasoning as desired by logicians. JAS: Here Peirce explicitly denies that a graph is a "mark," which he explicitly equates with an "existent or actual individual," i.e., a token--so "mark" is plainly unsuitable for naming a different member of the same trichotomy. JFS: No. In a letter to Welby, he explicitly adopted the word 'mark' as a replacement for 'potisign' (possible sign). Except that Peirce wrote that letter to Welby in December 1908, while in May 1911--more than two years later--he stated plainly, "A *Graph*, then, as the word is used when it is plain that an *Existential *Graph is meant, is not a sign or mark or any other existent or actual individual." Hence, *this *is his final word on the matter. JFS: The word 'tone' is a special case of an auditory mark. ... Even for a spoken utterance, it would not be used to distinguish differences in the subject matter. I could say instead that the word "mark" is a special case of a visible tone. Either way, the role of a tone/mark in Peirce's semeiotic is not to distinguish differences in *subject matter* (object), but to distinguish differences in *meaning *(interpretant). Different tokens of the same type can be uttered (spoken, printed, handwritten, etc.) with different tones/marks as "indefinite significant characters" that change their *effects *on interpreters. JFS: Even for Peirce's example of a camel, the sound of a camel has been compared to a toilet flushing. Nobody would call that a tone. But it is certainly a prominent mark of a camel. Again, "mark" as used here is *not *what Peirce defines as the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." His example of "camel" has nothing to do with the *animal *that we call by that name in English, he is talking about the *word *"camel"; and for any actual *instance *(token) of that word, a tone/mark is a significant *quality *of the sound when it is spoken, the typeface when it is printed, the ink when it is handwritten, etc. JFS: His choice of 'mark' is more consistent with his definition in Baldwin's dictionary and other English dictionaries. Again, "mark" as a candidate name for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "tone" is *not consistent at all* with Peirce's definition of that word in Baldwin's dictionary. It is not a term that can be predicated of anything of which certain other terms can be predicated, it is "an indefinite significant character." JFS: We acknowledge that the definition of the word 'mark' generally refers to a physical instance. But any English word that refers to something physical can also be used to refer to the abstract form of that thing. Again, whether we choose "tone" or "mark," this term *does not* refer to the "definitely significant Form" (type) of something physical (token), but to "an indefinite significant character" of something physical. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 19, 2024 at 4:22 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Jon, > > The word 'instance' is an *OPTIONAL *term that may be added to almost any > noun in the English language. As I'm now looking out the window, I see > three tree instances nearby and many more instance of trees farther down > the hill. But the word 'instance' may be dropped when there is no need to > emphasize that distinction. Most English speakers never use the word > 'instance'. They would just say "I see three trees nearby and many more > down the hill" > > In mathematics, everything is abstract (a "might be" as Peirce would > say). But when mathematicians who speak any language draw instances of > geometrical entities (circles, triangles, hexagons...) on a blackboard or > whiteboard or paper..., they do not refer to them as circle instances, > hexagon instances, etc. They just call them circles or hexagons. Nobody > gets confused by that convention. > > JAS: Peirce *only *uses the word "graph" for "a mere form, an > abstraction, a 'general' or as I call it a 'might-be'"; and he states > explicitly that "it would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself *is > put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility." > > On that point, we are in total agreement. And since Peirce is trying to > teach his readers a totally new notation for expressing a new form of > diagrammatic reasoning, he uses that *OPTIONAL *word 'instance' to > emphasize the distinction. > > But I suggest that you look at any book on mathematics. To make the > comparison more obvious, look at books on geometry from Euclid to the > present. Most authors rarely or never use the word 'instance' when they > talk about circles or triangles they draw. > > JAS: Peirce also acknowledges the *convenience *of talking only about > graphs (or words), not graph-instances (or word-instances). > > Thank you for acknowledging what I have been saying. The only point > where there may be some disagreement is over the word 'convenience'. In > English, the default form (what linguists call the "unmarked form") does > not use the word 'instance'. They would call the addition of the word > 'instance' a "marked form" that is used for emphasis. Except for an > introductory tutorial, I believe that Peirce is being unnecessarily > pedantic. > > CSP: Any shape or combination of shapes that put on the Sheet of Assertion > would be an assertion, I term a *graph*, and your act of putting it on > any surface by writing or drawing or a mixture of the two I express by > saying that you *scribe *that sign on that *area*; and the result of > doing so, that is any single one among the inexhaustible multitude of > possible embodiments of the graph, I call a graph-instance. To illustrate > the utility of this distinction, I call your attention to the fact that we > most commonly use the word "word" with a meaning analogous to that of > "graph,"--for we say that hounds, beagles, curs, mastiffs, spaniels, > terriers, poodles, and an incredible variety of other stocks are alike > included under the *single word*, *dog*. Yet when an editor asks me to > write him a paragraph of a hundred words on some subject, he means to count > every occurrence of "the" as a separate word. He does not mean *words*, > but *word-instances*; but in this case the value of brevity outweighs > that of accuracy. In the case of graphs and graph-instances, it is quite > the other way. (R 650:10-11, LF 1:164-165, 1910 Jul 23) > > Mathematicians have been choosing brevity since Euclid, and they still > do. As for the question about how many identical graph instances occur on > the phemic sheet, that is a moot point -- because the rules of inference > allow copies in the same area to be made or erased at any time. It's > irrelevant how you count them, because you can change the count without > changing the meaning of what is on the phemic sheet. > > JAS: Here Peirce explicitly *denies *that a graph is a "mark," which he > explicitly *equates *with an "existent or actual individual," i.e., a > token--so "mark" is plainly unsuitable for naming a *different *member of > the same trichotomy. > > No. In a letter to Welby, he explicitly adopted the word 'mark' as a > replacement for 'potisign' (possible sign). That shows that he recognized > a standard practice in the English language: Use exactly the same word for > the abstract "may be" and the actual instance. He also admits that option > for its "value as brevity." > > GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist > in the orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was > angry. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker > would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. > > JFS: Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these > examples is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some > mark that might distinguish one tone of voice from another. > > JAS: No, the word "tone" in Gary's examples is used to refer to a certain > *quality *of the actual sound that is heard, which *can *distinguish one > flute from another or one utterance from another. > > We agree with everything except the tag end "or one utterance from > another". The word 'tone' is a special case of an auditory mark. It may > be used to distinguish the sound of two different flutes or certain > auditory marks of an utterance. But it is not a word that anyone would use > to distinguish marks by any other senses. Even for a spoken utterance, it > would not be used to distinguish differences in the subject matter. > > Even for Peirce's example of a camel, the sound of a camel has been > compared to a toilet flushing. Nobody would call that a tone. But it is > certainly a prominent mark of a camel. > > JAS: in my own example, all lowercase, all caps, bold, italics, and color > *can *be employed to distinguish different instances (tokens) of the same > word (type) from each other such that they have different dynamical > interpretants in their different contexts. Such an "indefinitely > significant character" is *exactly *what Peirce defines as a "tone," the > possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type" (CP 4.537). > > I agree that Peirce chose the word 'tone' for that distinction. But all > of those examples are visible marks. A word that is normally used to > describe sounds is a poor choice. The fact that Peirce himself vacillated > on this choice indicates he was not completely satisfied. His choice of > 'mark' is more consistent with his definition in Baldwin's dictionary and > other English dictionaries. We acknowledge that the definition of the word > 'mark' generally refers to a physical instance. But any English word that > refers to something physical can also be used to refer to the abstract form > of that thing. > > In conclusion, we have discussed a huge number of different issues in > Peirce's writings and in other examples. In every example (with the > possible exception of certain kinds of sounds), the word 'mark' is more > general and more intelligible for a wider audience than the word 'tone'. > > Re wider audience: Our most important audience are people in the 21st C > who do not realize the value of Peirce's writings for issues today. That > is far better topic to discuss. > > John >
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