Of course the law burdens religious exercise -- if you take religious exercise to that extreme meaning. If you choose to take it to that extreme, then you cannot be in that line of work or you must pay the penalty for engaging in that kind of work.
You can't simply ignore civil law because you don't like it. I didn't like my taxes going to the war in Iraq (and I can think of lots of other things I don't like. And I have moral objections to many things, though fewer things than those I don't like. And I think torture is violates just about every religion out there. And yet I must pay for these things I don't believe in. The social security cases and other cases were properly decided -- following the same economic rules as everyone else when you enter the market place is not a substantial burden on your exercise. If you can't do it, get out of the market and into something where you can follow your religion. Free exercise is not a free pass. Steve On Sep 29, 2012, at 10:52 PM, Walsh, Kevin wrote: > The court appears to have recharacterized the allegations in the RFRA claim > to make it easier to dismiss. > ________________________________________ > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] > on behalf of Marty Lederman [lederman.ma...@gmail.com] > Sent: Saturday, September 29, 2012 10:30 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Court Rejects Religious Liberty Challenges To ACA Mandate > > For what it's worth, here are the allegations in the complaint relevant to > establishing the alleged burden on religious exercise: > > > Plaintiff O’Brien believes that he cannot pay for and provide coverage for > contraceptives, sterilization, abortion or related education and counseling > without violating his religious beliefs. > > Plaintiffs are . . . confronted with choosing between complying with [the HHS > mandate] in violation of their religious beliefs, or paying ruinous fines > that would have a crippling impact on their ability to survive economically. > > * * * > > The Mandate coerces Plaintiffs into complying with its requirements or > abandoning integral components of the Plaintiffs’ religiously inspired > mission and values. > > Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs prevent them from providing > coverage for “all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization > procedures, and patient education and counseling related to such procedures.” > > The Mandate/Final Rule, by requiring Plaintiffs to provide said coverage, > imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion by > coercing Plaintiffs to choose between conducting their business in accordance > with their religious beliefs or paying substantial penalties to the > government. > > > On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 9:43 PM, Walsh, Kevin > <kwa...@richmond.edu<mailto:kwa...@richmond.edu>> wrote: > The court's carelessness with respect to substantial burden prevented it from > facing up to the more interesting legal question re: exercise of religion. > > I say that the court was careless because its analysis depends upon a > tendentious characterization of the nature of the religious objection. How > does someone run a business with 87 employees if his religion prohibits "an > outlay of funds that might eventually be used by a third party in a manner > inconsistent with one's values"? That kind of religious belief would make it > difficult to gas up a car and head into work, or even just to stay home and > surf the internet. Maybe, instead, the objection has something to do with > being forced by the government to pay for a particular kind of policy (rather > than pay taxes and have the government purchase the policy instead). > > In the law, there is such a thing as winning too much. I suspect that is the > federal government's view of this sloppy decision. > ________________________________________ > From: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> > [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] > on behalf of Marty Lederman > [lederman.ma...@gmail.com<mailto:lederman.ma...@gmail.com>] > Sent: Saturday, September 29, 2012 8:43 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Court Rejects Religious Liberty Challenges To ACA Mandate > > Strikingly, the court rejects the RFRA claim on the ground that there is no > substantial burden. The key reasoning, some of which might also be relevant > to several other sorts of cases (e.g., landlord cases) in which the religious > burden theory is that the provision of funds or services "facilitates" the > alleged sins of another: > > > RFRA does not protect against the slight burden on religious exercise that > arises when one’s money circuitously flows to support the conduct of other > free-exercise-wielding individuals who hold religious beliefs that differ > from one’s own. > > Indeed, if the financial support of which plaintiffs complain was in fact > substantially burdensome, secular companies owned by individuals objecting on > religious grounds to all modern medical care could no longer be required to > provide health care to employees. A district court has already rejected a > RFRA challenge to the individual mandate of the ACA as applied to plaintiffs > whose religion forbids seeking medical care. “[T]he conflict between the > [ACA’s] requirements and Plaintiffs’ Christian faith does not rise to the > level of a substantial burden... Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts > demonstrating that this conflict is more than a de minimis burden on their > Christian faith.... Finally... Plaintiffs routinely contribute to other forms > of insurance, such as Medicare, Social Security, and unemployment taxes, > which present the same conflict with their belief that God will provide for > their medical and financial needs.” Mead v. Holder, 766 F.Supp.2d 16, 42 > (D.D.C. 2011). > > Just as in Mead, plaintiffs must contribute to a health care plan which does > not align with their religious beliefs. In this case, however, the burden on > plaintiffs is even more remote; the health care plan will offend plaintiffs’ > religious beliefs only if an OIH employee (or covered family member) makes an > independent decision to use the plan to cover counseling related to or the > purchase of contraceptives. Already, OIH and Frank O’Brien pay salaries to > their employees---money the employees may use to purchase contraceptives or > to contribute to a religious organization. By comparison, the contribution to > a health care plan has no more than a de minimus impact on the plaintiff’s > religious beliefs than paying salaries and other benefits to employees. > > Under plaintiffs’ interpretation of RFRA, a law substantially burdens one’s > religion whenever it requires an outlay of funds that might eventually be > used by a third party in a manner inconsistent with one’s religious values. > This is at most a de minimus burden on religious practice. The challenged > regulations are several degrees removed from imposing a substantial burden on > OIH, and one further degree removed from imposing a substantial burden on > OIH’s owner and manager, Frank O’Brien. Because there is no substantial > burden imposed on either plaintiff’s religious exercise, plaintiffs have > failed to state a claim under RFRA. Count I of the Amended Complaint will be > dismissed. > > > On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 8:17 PM, Friedman, Howard M. > <howard.fried...@utoledo.edu<mailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu><mailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu<mailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu>>> > wrote: > > > In an important and carefully reasoned opinion yesterday, a > Republican-appointed federal district judge rejected on the merits a series > of RFRA and First Amendment challenges to the contraceptive coverage mandate > under the Affordable Care Act. More at Religion Clause > http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2012/09/court-rejects-religious-liberty.html > > *************************** > Howard M. Friedman > Professor of Law Emeritus > University of Toledo > *************************** > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to > Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu><mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>> > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others. > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to > Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others. > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Associate Director, Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice http://iipsj.org Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 http://iipsj.com/SDJ/ "I do not at all resent criticism, even when, for the sake of emphasis, it for a time parts company with reality." Winston Churchill, speech to the House of Commons, 1941 _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
