"private citizens should not have to bear the costs associated with other
citizens’ religious observance. "

Except they do. When my co-workers take time off work to observe religious
restrictions, everyone else's work increases. Sometimes noticeably. And
trying to sort between "meaningful" costs and *de minimis* costs is going
to be tricky. The difference might be drawn between third parties being
forced to subsidize a religious belief (I cannot eat ham, so you all have
to chip in for a steak sandwich) and merely being asked to bear with it.

Kevin Chen

On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 4:38 PM, Nelson Tebbe <nelson.te...@brooklaw.edu>
wrote:

>
>
>  Alan, I can’t speak for others who have been defending a principle
> against burden-shifting to third parties, but I do not believe it prohibits
> religion accommodations that result in costs to the government or to the
> public. Rather, the principle prohibits government accommodations that
> shift meaningful costs from religious citizens to other identifiable
> private citizens. And the reason for this is easy to articulate and deeply
> rooted — private citizens should not have to bear the costs associated with
> other citizens’ religious observance.
>
>  On Apr 1, 2015, at 4:07 PM, Alan E Brownstein <aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>
> wrote:
>
>  The problem I have with Jim's argument, if I understand him
> correctly, is that it seems to suggest that no religious exemption can be
> accepted if it causes any harm to a third party. (I'm not sure if Jim
> includes the general public or the public fisc in "third party.") I think
> many liberals believe (or at least they used to believe) that rights are
> expensive political goods. We protect them even if we have to incur some
> cost or harm to third parties or the public in order to do so. Of course,
> that leaves open the difficult question of determining when the price for
> protecting a right is too high. (And when we are talking about the right to
> discriminate in employment or public accommodations, leaving religious
> institutions aside, the price is almost always too high.) But I see no
> historical consensus that we only protect freedom of speech or religious
> liberty when the cost of doing so is zero. That certainly wasn't the
> understanding of freedom of speech that Justice Brandeis defended in his
> famous dissents on which contemporary free speech doctrine is based.
>
>  Indeed, the argument that we should only accept zero cost religious
> accommodations is not only inconsistent with the way we generally
> understand rights, it seems inconsistent with the way we evaluate
> government regulations generally. It is one thing to argue that we should
> reject a religious exemption when the harm or cost of granting it is too
> high. That position is consistent with the general cost benefit analysis we
> use to discuss any government decision. But why should we only accept zero
> cost religious accommodations? We routinely allow government to enact laws
> that result in some costs, burdens, and harms to third parties or the
> general public that serve a variety of purposes.
>
>  Alan
>
>
>  ------------------------------
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu <
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> on behalf of James Oleske <
> jole...@lclark.edu>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 1, 2015 12:22 PM
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* Re: Eugene's Blog Post on Liberals and Exemption Rights
>
>   The butcher example Chip gives is why I suggested last spring that the
> Court might want to read the Lee language not as an absolute rule, but
> rather, a strong presumption against exemptions in the commercial realm
> that can be overcome in "the very rare case where the basis for the
> presumption (a third-party harm) does not exist." Alas, the Court instead
> simply discarded the Lee language wholesale by saying RFRA went further
> than the pre-Smith law.
>
>  - Jim
>
>
>   On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 12:09 PM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:
>
>>  I do not think most liberals oppose exemptions for businesses per se --
>> imagine a law that compelled a butcher to carry products in conflict with
>> religious dietary laws to which the butcher and his customers subscribe.
>> Liberals oppose exemptions that impinge on the welfare of third parties --
>> Hobby Lobby (those female employees still do not have contraceptive
>> coverage) or wedding vendor exemptions from public accommodations laws
>> (those exemptions allow material and dignitary injury to potential
>> customers). U.S. v. Lee involved injury to other family members of Amish
>> employees, as well as others in the social insurance pool.
>>
>>
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