Le 26-oct.-06, à 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be
> deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have
> a solution?
A good candidate for apriori necessity (and possibility) is provability
(and conssitency) by a lobian machine.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~march
Le 26-oct.-06, à 17:52, 1Z a écrit :
> No, I am just asking. I have even
> come up with formulations like "real in the sense
> that I am real" which avoid begging any questions about what
> kind of reality I have.
Ah OK. I guess that is the RITSIAR. I let you know that:
1) I agree matter exis
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> My brain must
> at some subconscious level have the structure of the whole sentence spanning
> a 2 second interval
> t1-t2 or else the sentence could not be generated.
It's still unclear to me from the above whether we're in agreement or
not. I'm concerned that you
Brent meeker writes:
> That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of "content" in
> an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the order of a second or
> longer, I think the order could be reconstructed from the content. But I
> also think there would be exceptions. For exa
Hi Stathis,
Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving
> against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the
> object seems to instantly jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:18, 1Z a écrit :
>> we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon
>> either computationalism or materialism.
>
> Contradiction? Haven't you previously claimed that COMP only
> makes matter redundant.
That is why I said "epistemological contradiction".
Sorry for the comment delay.
Le 23-oct.-06, à 16:49, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
>>> prove Platonism.
>>
>> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
>> by many mathematician in t
Peter Jones writes:
> > I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room example
> > rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed
> > physics).
> > You are informed that your current stream of consciousness is either being
> > generated by
> >
> >
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>> Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> But c breaks down into:
>>> c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
>>> physics
>>> and
>>>
David Nyman writes:
> > As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an
> > unnecessary complication.
> > As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
> > content. If the seconds
> > of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind,
Peter Jones writes:
> > Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What
> > would expect to
> > experience in the next moment?
> >
> > (a) nothing
> > (b) everything
> > (c) something
> >
> > (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the nex
gards,
Colin Hales
(EC still brewing!)
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
> Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 8:23 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Numbers,
1Z wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> > >> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > But c breaks down into:
> > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > physics
> > and
> > c2) I experienc
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> >> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> But c breaks down into:
> c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> physics
> and
> c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Pott
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >>
> >>
> Again, the kind of formalism that says
> everything can be brought under a single
> formal scheme (the Hilbertian
> programme) is different from the kind
> that says mathematical tru
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > > Again, the kind of formalism that says
> > > > > > everything can be brought under a single
> > > > > > formal scheme (the Hilbertian
> > > > > > programme) is different from
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>> Tom Caylor wrote:
>>
>>
Again, the kind of formalism that says
everything can be brought under a single
formal scheme (the Hilbertian
programme) is different from the kind
that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
and diff
1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > > > Again, the kind of formalism that says
> > > > > everything can be brought under a single
> > > > > formal scheme (the Hilbertian
> > > > > programme) is different from the kind
> > > > > that says mathematic
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But c breaks down into:
c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
physics
and
c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
The memory-traces
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> >
> >
> > > > Again, the kind of formalism that says
> > > > everything can be brought under a single
> > > > formal scheme (the Hilbertian
> > > > programme) is different from the kind
> > > > that says mathematical truths are dependent on ax
1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>
> > > Again, the kind of formalism that says
> > > everything can be brought under a single
> > > formal scheme (the Hilbertian
> > > programme) is different from the kind
> > > that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
> > > and different truths will
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > But c breaks down into:
> > > > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > > > physics
> > > > and
> > > > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
> > > >
>
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > But c breaks down into:
> > > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > > physics
> > > and
> > > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
> > >
> > > The memory-traces corresponding to c
Tom Caylor wrote:
> > Again, the kind of formalism that says
> > everything can be brought under a single
> > formal scheme (the Hilbertian
> > programme) is different from the kind
> > that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
> > and different truths will be arrived at under diff
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> David Nyman writes:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only
>>> experience being one at
>>> a time.
>> Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
>> However, much as I hate to comp
1Z wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> > > Brent Meeker wrote:
> > >
> > >> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
> > >> Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
> > >> reach are those of the form "It i
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
> Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What
> would expect to
> experience in the next moment?
>
> (a) nothing
> (b) everything
> (c) something
>
> (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next
> mome
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > But c breaks down into:
> > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > physics
> > and
> > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
> >
> > The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
> > configuration of matter, and so must ex
1Z wrote:
> What is "our philosophical stance"?
Well, this discussion, for example. I mean that it's all too easy to
'see' mere conceptual constructs as though they were objectively real -
e.g. IMO the 'sequence' to which Stathis is referring.
> What coordination? External time parameters, or i
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> >>> prove Platonism.
> >>
> >> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just
Stathis,
an excellent narrative. Thank you
John
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 12:05 AM
Subject: RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: (> >)
(((Preliminaries snipped
> But c breaks down into:
> c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> physics
> and
> c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
>
> The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
> configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But
> I only experience
Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
>>> prove Platonism.
>>
>> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
>> by many mathematician
David Nyman wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an
> > unnecessary complication.
> > As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
> > content. If the seconds
> > of your life were sliced up, shuffle
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
>
> > > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
>
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> > How can I fail to have similar information content
> > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> > spatially? Why doen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary
> complication.
> As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
> content. If the seconds
> of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1) 3:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
> > > > > virtual
> > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible,
> > > > > for the sake
> > > > > of this part of the argument). The
David Nyman writes:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only
> > experience being one at
> > a time.
>
> Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
> However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
> >> Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
> >> reach are those of the form "It is true that axioms => the
Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
> Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
> qualia than physicalism.
Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to
criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qual
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience
> being one at
> a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if
you have a view on the follow
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
>> Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
>> reach are those of the form "It is true that axioms => theorems".
>
> For formalists, all
1Z wrote:
> I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> How can I fail to have similar information content
> to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
> co
Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
> > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
> > available information and *respond
Peter Jones writes:
> > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
> > > > virtual
> > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for
> > > > the sake
> > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> >
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>> David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
>> ...
> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are p
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> ...
> >>> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> >>> the same consciousness.
> >> Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
> >> consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - ju
1Z wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
...
>>> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
>>> the same consciousness.
>> Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
>> consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
>> consciousness.
>
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> > are not, it must be rejected.
>
> I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not.
> The key aspect is
1Z wrote:
> Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> are not, it must be rejected.
I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad -
1Z wrote:
...
>> And
>> surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
>> experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
>> intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
>> informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, coul
Tom Caylor wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> Brent Meeker writes:
>>>
>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
>>> the
>>> future, then ipso facto you wou
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
>
> Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
> this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
> cont
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> > the
> > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> the
> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> futu
1Z wrote:
> The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
contradict your own experience, but I
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 7:21 PM
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
>
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > Discovery is not simply a matter of seeing where a particular set of
> > a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > >>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> > >>> the
> > >>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> > >>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > > It co
Brent Meeker wrote:
> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given
> some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of
> the form "It is true that axioms => theorems".
For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form.
> Brent
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > David and 1Z:
> > > > >
> > > > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> >
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> >>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> >>> the
> >>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> >>> future.
> >> That's the whole problem.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> Peter Jones writes:
...
>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
>>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
>>> future.
>
Peter Jones writes:
> > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > It could be a contingent natural law th
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >>> 1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > David and 1Z:
> >
> > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed t
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>> Tom Caylor wrote:
>>> 1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
> David and 1Z:
>
> How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> successively approach the accu
1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > >
> > > > David and 1Z:
> > > >
> > > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> > > > successively approach the accura
cause I don't want to aggravate "Father Ted".
John
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 8:43 AM
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 21:00, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
> > > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > Hi,
> > > >
> > > > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a
> > > >
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > >
> > > David and 1Z:
> > >
> > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> > > successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisi
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > > mathematical
1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >
> > David and 1Z:
> >
> > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> > successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions in the
> > linear accelerator)
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > mathematical
> > structures are exemplified, the structure corresp
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
>
> I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> mathematical
> structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
> 1 second ago)
>
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> > > >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argu
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> > may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> > dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- wh
1Z wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> > >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
> > >>
> > >> Computationali
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
> >>
> >> Computationalism entails COMP.
> >
> > Brun
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
>> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
>>
>> Computationalism entails COMP.
>
> Bruno, could you distinguish between your rema
Bruno Marchal writes:
> >> Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute
> >> all computable functions from N to N.
> >> It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does
> >> not invoke physical machine at all.
> >
> > In a sense that is true, but a
In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes:
> Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
> matter add to a merely abs
Peter Jones writes:
> > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
> >
> >
> > You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
> > Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
> > logic is sound for arithmetic.
>
> You need a UD -- a UD which e
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
> yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
> successfully.
> (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
> will wait a whole and resend them: it was message
Hi Stathis,
I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
successfully.
(Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and D
David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > > As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> > > prove Platonism.
> >
> > By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> > by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
> >
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> > prove Platonism.
>
> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
>
Lest we go yet another round in the '
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
>
> Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that
on the one hand: a belief in 'prima
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
>
> > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
>
>
> You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
> Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
> logic is sound for arithm
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
> >
> > Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal writes:
> > >
> > The UD is both massively parallel
> > and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> > execut
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> > prove Platonism.
>
> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression "
Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
Do you recall the proof I have
Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal writes:
> >
> The UD is both massively parallel
> and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> executes them all together, but one step at a time. T
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
>
> Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
> AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
> possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
> propose as
1Z wrote:
> > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely
1Z wrote:
> Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone
1Z wrote:
> Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> and highly significant.
It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
> A conflict between physi
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > > concerned, in an entirely 'relatio
301 - 400 of 669 matches
Mail list logo
