[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Sung, Peirce is using “mechanics” advisedly there to refer to classical mechanics as distinguished from thermodynamics. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:05 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > Clark, Søren, lists, > > Peirce said: > > " . .

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Forgetfulness Of Purpose http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17230 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/10/12/forgetfulness-of-purpose-%E2%80%A2-8/ Terms, Propositions, Arguments ==

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments (and "The union of units unites the unity.")

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:49 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >>> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler >> > wrote: >>> >>> I find CSP to be rather inconsistent with regard to the deeper >>> philosophical structures of mathematics and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 9:02 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Taking rational-ism (as rational-doesm) to be a perspective on the care and > feeding of rational concepts and not some Apotheosis of Reason with a Capital > “R”, one of the forks in the road where Peirce really does

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

I wrote and Clark replied: I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means accepting that there are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely matters of convention. Maybe I am wrong, but it seems like those are two separate claims and they must be

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

) 523-8354 > __________ > From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 > 7:09 AM To: Jon Awbrey Cc: > biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, > Propositions, Arguments > > Jon, Lists, > > I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:39 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his >> scholastic realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments (and "The union of units unites the unity.")

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > I find CSP to be rather inconsistent with regard to the deeper philosophical > structures of mathematics and its origins and the pragmatism of applied > mathematics as it relates to the conceptualization

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Terms, Propositions, Arguments: FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582 FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

List, Clark: On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his > scholastic realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or > Leibniz. I disagree. CSP's "fill in the blanks" sentences are a direct

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jon, Lists, I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means accepting that there are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely matters of convention. This can allow for truths that don't require knowledge of any specific particular instances to know, but require knowledge

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments (and "The union of units unites the unity.")

sociate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________ > From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] > Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 7:09 AM > To: Jon Awbrey > Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > Subject: RE: [PEIR

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

John, all, It is necessary to distinguish non-psychological from anti-psychological and independence from exclusion. It is impossible to make sense of Peirce's position if you start by assuming the Cartesian dualism that he rejected. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Nov 19,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments Jon, Lists, I agree that starting with Cartesian dualism will give a bad interpretation of Peirce, but I am not sure what you mean by your first distinction. Could you expand? The Cartesian position is a consequence of wha

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

shudder > at this idea). Peirce’s metaphysics is definitely not a Cartesian world with > material substance sliced off, which is pretty much Berkeleyan idealism. The > latter effectively makes ideas particulars, and is nominalistic as a result. > > > > John Collier Prof

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

To: John Collier Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments John, all, It is necessary to distinguish non-psychological from anti-psychological and independence from exclusion. It is impossible to make sense of Peirce's position if you start by a

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jon, Yes, I agree, even though I haven't read through it. It was my plan to be getting to Vol. 3, which includes the LOR, next. Then after starting Vol. 3, I decided reading precursors like Boole and De Morgan would be a good idea. Anyway, I've been sidetracked for the moment with conversations

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Re: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582 Re: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626 Franklin, Jeff, all ... In order to understand what Peirce is saying one has to understand what he is talking about. When it comes to the logic of relatives