Jeff, list,
Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a
thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that
thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.
I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need
to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in
your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy".
Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post:
Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902
and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In
particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the
details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other
relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more
extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just
thought I'd ask.
I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.
-- Franklin
--------------------------------------------
Franklin, List,
Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your
earlier questions wasn't sent. Let me send it now, along with some
additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum." Your
questions are in quotes. Short responses follow.
A. "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate
object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant
is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents
belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I
suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent,
but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such." Point
made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce: "That said,
let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is
a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the
Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with
Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540) In all cases, the divisions are between
kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the
immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes.
Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept
that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold
classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold
account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant. In my
efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and
66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict
here. After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad
is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final
interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis.
B. "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for
the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment." I should have made it clearer that I was trying to point out
that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the qualisign is,
taken as a token instance, the sinsign that stands in relation to the
dynamical interpretant. The curved line was meant to show that it is
carried over--along with its relation to qualisign and immediate object
(percept) into the open blank.
C. A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation." There are diagrams at
work in many places. In the case of the immediate interpretant in relation
to the antecept, it is a vague diagram of future possibilities. In
relation to the ponecept, it is a diagram of past memories of those
qualities we notice in the qualisign. The immediate interpretant of the
percept is a limiting case of what I actually see now--as that is
interpreted in relation to the near past and present. As such, it is a
skeleton set of skeleton sets (i.e., a diagram of diagrams).
I have reasons for thinking that this way of diagramming the basic
relations between signs, objects and interpretant is a reasonable
approach--and that is more enlightening than other kinds of diagrams that
have been offered in the secondary literature. That, however, will require
a longer explanation.
With that much said, let's turn to the interpretation of the term
"percipuum." Here are the definitions of the Latin terms:
1. Praecipio: to advise, give counsel, give rules, instruct, teach
2. Praecipuum (Roman law): a portion received from an inheritance before
general distribution
What does this teach us about the relationships between the following
definitions and the definition of the percipuum?
3. Percipio: to understand, to be aware of the meaning of, observe, take
possession of
4. Perceive: 1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of some
object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; to
come to know by a real action of the object on the mind (commonly upon the
senses); though the knowledge may be inferential
5. Percept: the immediate object in perception
6. Perception: 1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of
the 18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the
operation or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or
resulting construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue
of a real action of an object upon the mind.
For now, I'll hold onto the initial suggestion that the percipuum is a term
for a continual process of interpretation, where the percept and perceptual
judgments are parts of that process. What parts are they? Well I am
tempted to think of the percept as a kind of starting point and the
perceptual judgment as a kind of terminal or resting point for the process
of interpretation. What might we learn from the definitions above, and the
remark that Peirce makes to the effect that praecipuum was taken as a model
for the terms percipuum, antecipuum and ponecipuum? Let's consider some
textual evidence that Peirce might be drawing out a point that is more
legal in character--just as praecipuum draws its meaning from the Roman law
tradition. Here is an oft quoted passage about the nature of assertion:
"§5. SIGNS [January 22, 1905] Now an assertion belongs to the class of
phenomena like going before a notary and making an affidavit, executing a
deed, signing a note, of which the essence is that one voluntarily puts
oneself into a situation in which penalties will be incurred unless some
proposition is true." (CP 8.313)
If this is true of assertions generally, then shouldn't we conceive of
perceptual judgments on this legal model? This certainly has a Kantian
ring to it. Here is a telling passage: "Form of cognition, in Kant's
doctrine, is that element of knowledge which the matter of experience must
assume in order to be apprehended by the mind. Kant seems to have been
thinking of legal forms which must be complied with in order to give
standing before a court. So an English sovereign, in order to be crowned,
must, as a "matter of form," swear to an intensity of loathing for Romish
dogmas which he probably regards with great coolness." (Krit. d. Reinen
Vernunft, 1st ed., p. 20)." (CP 6.362)
Notice that, on Peirce's account, the percept is largely characterized in
negative terms: "The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any
kind"; "it does not stand for anything"; "it obtrudes itself upon my gaze,
but not as a deputy of something else, not as anything"; "it would be
useless for me to say 'I don’t believe in the chair'"; "I can’t dismiss is,
as I would a fancy"; "it does not pretend to any right to be there". Even
here, in the account of the percept, things are put in legal terms. If the
percept does not pretend to any "right" to be there, then how does the
perceptual judgment put us in a position to make an assertion--even if the
judgment only consists in an assertion to oneself? The key, I suspect, is
that the percipuum is an immediate interpretation that consists of a
skeleton set--a diagram of sorts--that articulates the formal relations
between the parts of what is being perceived. This is the point that
Peirce stresses in the first definition he offers after noting Kant's
account of the form of cognition: "Kant's definitions are chiefly the
following: 'In the phenomenon, that which corresponds to the impression of
sense, I call the matter of it; while that which constitutes the fact that
manifoldness of the phenomenon is intuited as ordered in certain relations,
I call the form of the phenomenon." As such, it is the manifold of the
phenomena that we observe that stands in need of some conception so that it
might be brought into unity.
So, if percipio means "to understand, to be aware of the meaning of,
observe, take possession of," then we might understand the percipuum as the
process of interpreting what is present to mind so that one gains a right
to assert what is expressed in the perceptual judgment as a matter of
fact. When the right is conferred on the subject who is making the
judgment, the possession becomes a matter of property--personal or public.
Having explored just this much of the analogy between the legal meaning of
praecipuum and the things that Peirce explicitly says about perceptual
judgments, I think there is good reason to believe that he might very well
have been suggesting that we can understand the meaning of 'percipuum' by
drawing on these kinds of legal terms. This kind of reading fits with a
number of suggestions that Richard Smyth makes in <Reading Peirce
Reading>. In particular, look at his interpretation of the "negative"
defense that is offered for the assertions that made in perceptual
judgments. The defense or justification of the claims made in such
judgments takes the form: don't blame me, I couldn't help but draw that
judgment--I not making this up.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
