Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
It was a campaign proposal named "Card Reform and Appealability" On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: > > > Which proposal# was it I'd be interested in the before/after. > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: >> Actually, I realize some of the language in my recent Cards proposal >> may be less than optimal. Specifically >> >> I use AP to call a CFJ with the text: "[A]buses of official power for >> personal gain" are "prohibited by law". >> >> Issuing a card CANNOT be done for anything that is not prohibited by >> law (see rule 2426 "Cards"). Obviously ILLEGAL things are prohibited >> by law. However, there are two things that the card rules say cards >> should be issued for, which are not otherwise ILLEGAL. That is, rule >> 2475 "Red Cards" says red cards should be issued flooding the game for >> an increase in voting power, and rule 2476 "Pink Slips" say that pink >> slips should be issued for "abuses of official power for personal >> gain". The question is, is that conduct in the absence of other >> illegality, "prohibited by law" by Pink Slips and Red Cards. Pretty >> easy textual interpretation. >> >> I bar PSS. >> -- >> From V.J. Rada >> > -- >From V.J. Rada
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 21:09 VJ Rada wrote: > It was a campaign proposal named "Card Reform and Appealability" > > On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Kerim Aydin > wrote: > > > > > > Which proposal# was it I'd be interested in the before/after. > > > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: > >> Actually, I realize some of the language in my recent Cards proposal > >> may be less than optimal. Specifically > >> > >> I use AP to call a CFJ with the text: "[A]buses of official power for > >> personal gain" are "prohibited by law". > >> > >> Issuing a card CANNOT be done for anything that is not prohibited by > >> law (see rule 2426 "Cards"). Obviously ILLEGAL things are prohibited > >> by law. However, there are two things that the card rules say cards > >> should be issued for, which are not otherwise ILLEGAL. That is, rule > >> 2475 "Red Cards" says red cards should be issued flooding the game for > >> an increase in voting power, and rule 2476 "Pink Slips" say that pink > >> slips should be issued for "abuses of official power for personal > >> gain". The question is, is that conduct in the absence of other > >> illegality, "prohibited by law" by Pink Slips and Red Cards. Pretty > >> easy textual interpretation. > >> > >> I bar PSS. > >> -- > >> From V.J. Rada > >> > > > > > > -- > From V.J. Rada >
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: > It was a campaign proposal named "Card Reform and Appealability" Oh that's why I didn't see it in the Proposal adoption lists. thx! (I also feel better because I totally ignored voting on the campaign proposals I think :P )
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, Alexis Hunt wrote: > https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 Ooooh. *very* useful...
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Which reminds me I need to work on the web publication. On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 21:16 Kerim Aydin wrote: > > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, Alexis Hunt wrote: > > > https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 > > Ooooh. *very* useful... > > > >
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
G, speaking of Github archives of things... (<3) On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:21 PM, Alexis Hunt wrote: > Which reminds me I need to work on the web publication. > > On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 21:16 Kerim Aydin wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, Alexis Hunt wrote: >> > >> https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 >> >> Ooooh. *very* useful... >> >> >> >> -- >From V.J. Rada
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Um, are you asking for my github archive? I published that last month, it's here... I've used it to search cases a couple times: https://github.com/kaydin/cases Sorry if that got lost, I'll add it as a line to my weekly report. (If you're asking when I'm going to catch up with the last ~30 cases, well, I dunno. Not before end of next week and many apologies). On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: > > G, speaking of Github archives of things... (<3) > > On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:21 PM, Alexis Hunt wrote: > > Which reminds me I need to work on the web publication. > > > > On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 21:16 Kerim Aydin wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, Alexis Hunt wrote: > >> > > >> https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 > >> > >> Ooooh. *very* useful... > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > From V.J. Rada >
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Yeah I was asking about that, and only in a slightly joking way. It's fine, obviously. On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:32 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: > > > Um, are you asking for my github archive? I published that last month, > it's here... I've used it to search cases a couple times: > > https://github.com/kaydin/cases > > Sorry if that got lost, I'll add it as a line to my weekly report. > > (If you're asking when I'm going to catch up with the last ~30 cases, > well, I dunno. Not before end of next week and many apologies). > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: >> >> G, speaking of Github archives of things... (<3) >> >> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:21 PM, Alexis Hunt wrote: >> > Which reminds me I need to work on the web publication. >> > >> > On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 21:16 Kerim Aydin wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, Alexis Hunt wrote: >> >> > >> >> https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 >> >> >> >> Ooooh. *very* useful... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> From V.J. Rada >> > -- >From V.J. Rada
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
I def. have been feeling the guilt, apology is sincere! :) I keep expecting caseload to go down but nope. If I haven't caught up in about 2 weeks I plan (but don't pledge) to give up Herald so I can get to it... On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: > Yeah I was asking about that, and only in a slightly joking way. It's > fine, obviously. > > On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:32 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: > > > > > > Um, are you asking for my github archive? I published that last month, > > it's here... I've used it to search cases a couple times: > > > > https://github.com/kaydin/cases > > > > Sorry if that got lost, I'll add it as a line to my weekly report. > > > > (If you're asking when I'm going to catch up with the last ~30 cases, > > well, I dunno. Not before end of next week and many apologies). > > > > On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, VJ Rada wrote: > >> > >> G, speaking of Github archives of things... (<3) > >> > >> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 1:21 PM, Alexis Hunt wrote: > >> > Which reminds me I need to work on the web publication. > >> > > >> > On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 21:16 Kerim Aydin wrote: > >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Tue, 14 Nov 2017, Alexis Hunt wrote: > >> >> > > >> >> https://github.com/alercah/ruleset/commit/201a163c824e65887964602985dda72012ec9183 > >> >> > >> >> Ooooh. *very* useful... > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> From V.J. Rada > >> > > > > > > -- > From V.J. Rada >
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 17 June 2013 09:35, Charles Walker wrote: > On 17 June 2013 09:24, omd wrote: > > > > CFJ: It is generally possible for a party to send messages. > > I did actually consider a "CAN act w/o objection/ as permitted in > constitution" clause, but thought we might need to bring back an "Acting on > Behalf" Rule for that, so I left it. > On second thoughts we do need this for parties to be able to use any assets they come across. I'd look up the old rules on this, but agora.qoid.usappears to be down. -- Walker
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 20 Aug 2013, at 19:43, Tanner Swett wrote: > On Aug 20, 2013, at 12:56 PM, Charles Walker wrote: >> Inquiry CFJ: I violated Rule 2170 by selecting the nickname "wobble" in >> ##nomic. > > The FLR contains the following annotation to Rule 2170: > >> [CFJ 2325 (called 5 January 2009): Only the selection of a nickname >> for the purposes of Agora is relevant to this rule.] > > —Machiavelli ##nomic is an Agoran forum.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 2013-08-20 at 20:35 +0100, Charles Walker wrote: > On 20 Aug 2013, at 19:43, Tanner Swett wrote: > > > On Aug 20, 2013, at 12:56 PM, Charles Walker wrote: > >> Inquiry CFJ: I violated Rule 2170 by selecting the nickname "wobble" in > >> ##nomic. > > > > The FLR contains the following annotation to Rule 2170: > > > >> [CFJ 2325 (called 5 January 2009): Only the selection of a nickname > >> for the purposes of Agora is relevant to this rule.] > > > > —Machiavelli > > ##nomic is an Agoran forum. So is agora-discussion (the same sort of forum, in fact), and it was ruled not illegal for me to select a confusing nickname for the purposes of Agora XX. (Admittedly, I tried to make it clear that that wasn't intended for the purposes of Agora as a whole.) I'd argue, though, that nicknames on ##nomic are being selected for the purpose of Freenode; many Agorans have different nicknames over there. -- ais523
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 12/21/06, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Eris wrote:
> Forget that. If I were still registered I'll allege that Goethe
> had won by paradox.
I don't think it's a paradox. At the moment, I merely made a
statement ("judgement") that is invalid, think of it as a proto-
judgement. If a newly-assigned judge agrees, all is consistent
and no paradox exists.
Oooo.
--
Taral <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"You can't prove anything."
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 12/21/06, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: King me! Congratulations. -- Taral <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "You can't prove anything." -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
OscarMeyr wrote: As I understand R1789, the CotC commands the deregistration as part of posting the WoF; the command is not directed AT the Registrar. Only the order to note the method of deregistration is directed at the Registrar. Correct, but CFJ 1594 hinges on the argument that this is enough to disqualify the message from being a WoF. Under my reading, Goethe was still a player while CFJ 1594 was being judged; the WoF wasn't posted until after the judgment was submitted and published. The order of events was as follows: 1) I assigned CFJ 1594 to Goethe. Goethe was definitely still a player at this point, because no purported WoF had been published yet. 2) I published the purported WoF and reassignment. This split the gamestate into two possible interpretations: 1594F - 1594 false, Goethe deregistered, Sherlock assigned 1594T - 1594 true, Goethe not deregistered, Goethe still assigned 3) Goethe published eir purported Judgement of FALSE. This was effective only in 1594T, and paradoxed it. 4) Sherlock published eir purported Judgement of TRUE. This was effective only in 1594F, and paradoxed it. I am therefore holding off on awarding a Win By Paradox to Murphy until this situation is resolved. Speaker Sherlock awards it, you just record that e's done so.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
3) Goethe published eir purported Judgement of FALSE. This was effective only in 1594T, and paradoxed it. Goethe's judgment that 1594 was false also is odd, because by judeing it false, it means e was deregistered upon stated that e was deregistered, thus he wasn't a player to judge the CFJ.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Quazie wrote: 3) Goethe published eir purported Judgement of FALSE. This was effective only in 1594T, and paradoxed it. Goethe's judgment that 1594 was false also is odd, because by judeing it false, it means e was deregistered upon stated that e was deregistered, thus he wasn't a player to judge the CFJ. Well, yes, that's /how/ it paradoxed 1594T. Similarly, Sherlock's purported Judgement indicated that Goethe was not deregistered, thus Sherlock wasn't the Judge (because Goethe still was).
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Murphy wrote: > My interpretation is that "X shall perform action Y" is equivalent to > "X is required and allowed to perform Y exactly once", unless clearly > indicated otherwise. Hmm, that's a possibility. I suppose my argument would be more appropriate if the rule said "may" instead of "shall". We'll see what a judge says. However, this raises another potential CFJ: whether the garbled message on Friday was sufficiently cogent to work, or if Saturday's message was the actual awarding of the title. There may or may not be timing issues related to this. Sherlock __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
> Sherlock, > >If the above is an example of the "garbling" when read in the > archives, all of your messages have been garbled for quite some time > (I only play from the archives, should I CFJ that none of your messages > for months have been effective because they've been garbled to me?) If it's only the archive that shows my messages with the extra characters and not the e-mails players receive, I am not sure that CFJ would go anywhere -- to my knowledge the agoranomic.org website is not a public forum. On the other hand, if some people are seeing my e-mails as garbled and others not, it could get ugly... Sherlock __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 1/1/07, Jonathan Fry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Sherlock, the agoranomic.org website is not a public forum. I feel as if someone could CFJ that statement
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Ian Kelly wrote: >I did contest that part of the judgement. I pointed out that one >possible mechanism for creating such a CFJ would be a proposal, which >would not need to change any rules as part of its effect. Duh, I misspoke. I intended to exclude the potential proposal mechanism, which of course hasn't been attempted. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Ian Kelly wrote: > I think it is clear that my announcement >must have initiated at least one case, as it met the requirements of >both R591 and R1504. I think it meets neither. You announced that you were initiating a mixed-class case. If that's not possible, then R591 refers to initiating a pure-inquiry case, so your announcement doesn't match it. Same for R1504. Your announcement only satisfies either of those rules if they allow the initiation of a mixed-class case. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 9/28/07, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I furthermore believe that your message cannot be interpreted as > > initiating two separate cases, because it was clearly not your intent > > to do so. > > Correct. Er. To clarify, I meant that your interpretation of my intent was correct. My intent, however, does not necessarily correlate to the effect of the announcement. I think it is clear that my announcement must have initiated at least one case, as it met the requirements of both R591 and R1504. Whether it in fact initiated just an inquiry case, just a criminal case, an inquiry case and a criminal case, or an inquiry/criminal case is the interesting question. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 9/28/07, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Instead, I choose to assume > that the entered judgement of IRRELEVANT is appropriate for the reason > that nobody has ever attempted to create such a case. Now somebody > has. That's true. I'd probably not judge IRRELEVANT on the same inquiry put forth now that you've attempted to create such a case. Of course, if you didn't in fact create such a case then the inquiry in question probably isn't all that much more relevant, and a better inquiry would be into whether such a case can, in fact, be created by announcement. Since the appeal hinged on the quite correct assertion that we can, in fact, break the game state in any way we want to through passing proposals, any statement of the form "X is possible" is probably superficially true. -- Geoffrey Spear http://www.geoffreyspear.com/
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 9/28/07, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ian Kelly wrote: > > I think it is clear that my announcement > >must have initiated at least one case, as it met the requirements of > >both R591 and R1504. > > I think it meets neither. You announced that you were initiating > a mixed-class case. If that's not possible, then R591 refers to > initiating a pure-inquiry case, so your announcement doesn't match it. No, it doesn't. It refers to initiating an inquiry case without reference to whether the case also has another class. An inquiry/criminal case is still an inquiry case. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Sunday 21 October 2007 14:36:27 Ian Kelly wrote: > I interpret that sentence as indicating how to perform an action > that the rules indicate can be performed "by announcement", and I > believe that was the intended interpretation. It could stand to be > clarified, though. > > -root I suggest that someone *else* make this clarification. My actions today seem rife with issues and difficulties. . . ;)
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 11/13/07, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I note that since the referent of "Beverly" is not clear, this case is > not clearly on the possibility of a rule-defined action (R2110). There is no reasonable interpretation of "Beverly" that would cause it to not be about the possibility of a rule-defined action.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 11/13/07, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > comex wrote: > >There is no reasonable interpretation of "Beverly" that would cause it > >to not be about the possibility of a rule-defined action. > > I interpret it as nonsense. I CFJ, barring Zefram, on the statement: * CFJ 1794 is an inquiry case on the possibility of a rule-defined action Arguments: There is no reasonable interpretation of "Beverly" that would cause it to not be about the possibility of a rule-defined action. Evidence: CFJ 1794's statement: * It is possible for Beverly to deregister.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
comex wrote: >There is no reasonable interpretation of "Beverly" that would cause it >to not be about the possibility of a rule-defined action. I interpret it as nonsense. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Nov 19, 2007 12:36 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Mon, 19 Nov 2007, comex wrote: > > I initiate a criminal case. > > - Defendant: pikhq > > - Rule breached: 2158 > > - Action by which e breached the rule: assigning an inappropriate judgement > > to the question on veracity in CFJ 1711 > > Gratuitous argument: the assigning of an incorrect judgement is historically > the subject for an appeal, not another CFJ. An identical case is here: > > http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=1296 > > This is by strong precedent; I haven't checked that the current judicial > rules absolutely support this. The judgement in question was already appealed and overturned. I don't think e's trying to change the outcome of the case; e's just pressing charges. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Monday 19 November 2007, Kerim Aydin wrote: > Gratuitous argument: the assigning of an incorrect judgement is > historically the subject for an appeal, not another CFJ. An identical > case is here: > > http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=1296 Not quite identical. There, the issue being challenged was whether the judge had considered past judgements, not whether the judgement was in accordance with the Rules. It was dismissed based on a rule which, AFAIK, no longer exists. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Monday 19 November 2007, Zefram wrote: > comex wrote: > >- Action by which e breached the rule: assigning an inappropriate > > judgement to the question on veracity in CFJ 1711 > > This is a straightforward EXCUSED. E reasonably believed that the > judgement was appropriate. Seems more like a GUILTY --> DISCHARGE to me. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Ed Murphy wrote: > * UNAWARE, appropriate if the defendant violated the specified >rule via the specified action, but reasonably believed at the >time that e was not violating a rule This doesn't follow the structure of the other verdicts: the non-GUILTY verdicts are specified to be non-exclusive. So, for example, a judge can rule INNOCENT without having to determine whether the action was proscribed (and thus whether UNIMPUGNED might be appropriate). A corresponding version of UNAWARE would be * UNAWARE, appropriate if the defendant reasonably believed that the alleged act was not proscribed by the specified rule at the time it allegedly occurred so the judge does not have to rule on whether the act was performed or whether it was proscribed if e is sure that this defence holds. I have a problem with your criterion for the defence. It appears to make ignorance of the law an excuse, even wilful ignorance. Agoran law is not very large, and I think it is reasonable to require that everyone subject to it be aware of all relevant parts, other than the rare situations where we're *all* mistaken as to what the law is. You need to tighten the condition so that "I didn't bother looking at the result of this week's proposals" doesn't qualify. I don't think this separate verdict is necessary, anyway. If done right, it's a subset of EXCUSED. Doesn't hurt to explicate this particular excuse, of course. > * FIFTY DOLLARS AND TIME SERVED, appropriate for rule breaches >of small consequence. Has effects as defined by other rules. Yuck. >Amend the rule "Marks" to ding the ninny 5 Marks of some color (which?) >(can't do this directly in R1504 due to Power). Put an enabling clause in the "Marks" rule and add a "FINE" sentence with variable quantity of marks to be decided by the judge. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 20 Nov 2007, Zefram wrote: > I have a problem with your criterion for the defence. It appears to make > ignorance of the law an excuse, even wilful ignorance. Agoran law is not > very large, and I think it is reasonable to require that everyone subject > to it be aware of all relevant parts, other than the rare situations > where we're *all* mistaken as to what the law is. There's some specific standards set around the old version of this defense in CFJs 1408 and 1424 (although these are specific to officers, who might be expected to meet higher standards of rules knowledge than the hoi polloi). In CFJ 1408, even all of us being mistaken didn't get the officer off the hook. -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Zefram wrote: I have a problem with your criterion for the defence. It appears to make ignorance of the law an excuse, even wilful ignorance. Agoran law is not very large, and I think it is reasonable to require that everyone subject to it be aware of all relevant parts, other than the rare situations where we're *all* mistaken as to what the law is. You need to tighten the condition so that "I didn't bother looking at the result of this week's proposals" doesn't qualify. Willful ignorance should not count as reasonable. I don't think this separate verdict is necessary, anyway. If done right, it's a subset of EXCUSED. Doesn't hurt to explicate this particular excuse, of course. Upon further reflection, this suggests adding "reasonably" to the existing definition of EXCUSED, to avoid interpretations along the lines of "you could have escaped that catch-22 by deregistering". * FIFTY DOLLARS AND TIME SERVED, appropriate for rule breaches of small consequence. Has effects as defined by other rules. Yuck. Did they never show reruns of "Night Court" over there? Amend the rule "Marks" to ding the ninny 5 Marks of some color (which?) (can't do this directly in R1504 due to Power). Put an enabling clause in the "Marks" rule and add a "FINE" sentence with variable quantity of marks to be decided by the judge. What limits would you suggest? This would presumably be worded similarly to the length-of-chokey and length-of-exile clauses.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Ed Murphy wrote: >Did they never show reruns of "Night Court" over there? No idea. I don't have a TV. I don't doubt that fifty dollars plus time served is a common sentence in the US. My problems with it as a description are that it's inaccurate (we have neither dollar fines nor pre-trial loss of liberty) and that the frequent use of "time served" as a punishment in the US is symptomatic of some major problems in the US criminal system that I'd rather we distanced ourselves from rather than attempting or pretending to emulate. My other problem is with the semantics: the nature and level of punishment ought to be set in the rule, and it would be better for it to be variable. >What limits would you suggest? A maximum of 1 VC equivalent of a common colour would form a nice continuum with the VC penalty aspect of chokey. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Dec 21, 2007 10:20 AM, Roger Hicks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I regret to inform you that Futuremyartug, though well aware of the > start and end times of your party, is prohibited from disclosing this > information due to R14968/81. However, Futuremyartug does recommend > you limit your consumption of eggnog and avoid wearing white to the > party. One of the possible quantum states arising from your Christmas > party leads to a very embarrassing situation which your colleges will > never let you forget. You could probably research the information if you try... -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Dec 21, 2007 10:25 AM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Dec 21, 2007 10:20 AM, Roger Hicks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I regret to inform you that Futuremyartug, though well aware of the > > start and end times of your party, is prohibited from disclosing this > > information due to R14968/81. However, Futuremyartug does recommend > > you limit your consumption of eggnog and avoid wearing white to the > > party. One of the possible quantum states arising from your Christmas > > party leads to a very embarrassing situation which your colleges will > > never let you forget. > > You could probably research the information if you try... > > -root > Ha! I was considering calling MKA Systems to ask about Christmas Party times when I got this message. I decided against it as I would rather not cause problems for other players by calling their places of employment. BobTHJ
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
On Wednesday 06 February 2008 5:37 Zefram wrote: > Ben Caplan wrote: > >Do I hereby initiate an inquiry CFJ on this sentence? > > No, you don't. The question-statement equivalence applies only for > the purposes of the subject of an inquiry case, not for acting by > announcement. Such is my interpretation, at least. The theory is that, if the CFJ exists and the question-statement equivalence applies, then the question is translated whole and in all contexts, thus rendering the original question effective as a statement *in general*. This causes the sentence to initiate the CFJ, affirming the hypothetical. I believe this interpretation is consistent and stable. On Feb 6, 2008 5:48 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Feb 6, 2008 4:24 PM, Ben Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > This is precisely the logical structure embodied in the assertion "This > > statement is true." Unlike "This statement is true", however, the resolution > > of the second CFJ affects the interpretation of rule 591, and therefore a > > ruling of IRRELEVANT would be inappropriate. > > > > I therefore recommend a ruling of UNDECIDABLE on the second CFJ. > > (The first CFJ, if it exists, is trivially TRUE.) > > Why UNDECIDABLE? If the first CFJ exists, then the second CFJ is > TRUE. If the first CFJ does not exist, then the second CFJ is FALSE. > There's no undecidability here. > > The analogy doesn't make sense to me either. "This statement is true" > is a tautology, not a paradox. It's UNDECIDABLE whether the first CFJ exists. A tautology is still neither clearly TRUE nor clearly FALSE. watcher -- There's no sense crying over every mistake; you just keep on trying till you run out of cake.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
On Feb 6, 2008 4:53 PM, Ben Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > It's UNDECIDABLE whether the first CFJ exists. No it isn't. The first CFJ either exists or it doesn't, depending on how the judge interprets Rule 591. > A tautology is still neither clearly TRUE nor clearly FALSE. A tautology is a proposition that is true under any interpretation of the domain. Actually, I mistyped; "This sentence is true" is a contingency, a proposition that is true under some interpretations and false under others. It's still not a paradox, which would somehow be or appear to be both true and false simultaneously. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
On Feb 6, 2008 5:04 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > A tautology is a proposition that is true under any interpretation of > the domain. Or am I confusing tautology with validity? Methinks I need to brush up on my metalogic. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
On Wednesday 06 February 2008 6:04 Ian Kelly wrote: > On Feb 6, 2008 4:53 PM, Ben Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > It's UNDECIDABLE whether the first CFJ exists. > > No it isn't. The first CFJ either exists or it doesn't, depending on > how the judge interprets Rule 591. > > > A tautology is still neither clearly TRUE nor clearly FALSE. > > A tautology is a proposition that is true under any interpretation of > the domain. Actually, I mistyped; "This sentence is true" is a > contingency, a proposition that is true under some interpretations and > false under others. Right, of course. (Personally I would describe a contingency as both true and false simultaneously, and a paradox as neither true nor false, but that's not really relevant here.) > It's still not a paradox, which would somehow be > or appear to be both true and false simultaneously. I agree that it's not a paradox, but I'm not sure that matters. I'm basically trying to argue that UNDECIDABLE is appropriate for either paradox or contingency. Hmm >From R591: * UNDECIDABLE, appropriate if the statement was logically undecidable or otherwise not capable of being accurately described as either false or true, at the time the inquiry case was initiated Is it possible that there is no appropriate judgment for this case? (I think a tautology is a statement of the form P=P.) watcher -- You are incredible, and changing the world is easy for you. I should have understood that from the start. Tycho
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
On Feb 6, 2008 5:18 PM, Ben Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I agree that it's not a paradox, but I'm not sure that matters. I'm > basically trying to argue that UNDECIDABLE is appropriate for either > paradox or contingency. Many CFJs boil down to interpretation of the ruleset. If UNDECIDABLE were appropriate for contingencies, then such cases should nearly always be judged so. What we do in practice is that the judge picks the interpretation e deems best and follows it to its logical conclusion of either TRUE or FALSE. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
> Many CFJs boil down to interpretation of the ruleset. If UNDECIDABLE > were appropriate for contingencies, then such cases should nearly > always be judged so. What we do in practice is that the judge picks > the interpretation e deems best and follows it to its logical > conclusion of either TRUE or FALSE. I can certainly see the rules being interpreted in such a way as to render an appropriate judgement of FALSE. However, I can also interpret them such that it is contingency and UNDECIDABLE: specifically if the question-statement equivalence, once established, applies out of context (which is the interpretation I have been arguing). I have difficulty in seeing this as TRUE. The undecidability I see here stems not from an ambiguity in the ruleset, but rather from an ambiguity in (the existence of) the announcement. watcher
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
On Feb 6, 2008 5:37 PM, Ben Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I can certainly see the rules being interpreted in such a way as to > render an appropriate judgement of FALSE. However, I can also > interpret them such that it is contingency and UNDECIDABLE: > specifically if the question-statement equivalence, once established, > applies out of context (which is the interpretation I have been > arguing). I have difficulty in seeing this as TRUE. If the equivalence applies, then your question is equivalent to "I hereby initiate an inquiry case" The rules say that such an announcement initiates an inquiry case, not that such an announcement might initiate an inquiry case. > The undecidability I see here stems not from an ambiguity in the > ruleset, but rather from an ambiguity in (the existence of) the > announcement. There's no question that the announcement happened. I can see it right there in the archives. The only question is whether or not it had an effect. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
> If the equivalence applies, then your question is equivalent to "I > hereby initiate an inquiry case" The rules say that such an > announcement initiates an inquiry case, not that such an announcement > might initiate an inquiry case. But the equivalence only applies if the question is the subject of an inquiry CFJ, which in this context is only true if the equivalence applies. > > The undecidability I see here stems not from an ambiguity in the > > ruleset, but rather from an ambiguity in (the existence of) the > > announcement. > > There's no question that the announcement happened. I can see it > right there in the archives. The only question is whether or not it > had an effect. Yes, of course. I had mixed up announcement with action by announcement. I should have said "ambiguity in (the performance of) the action." watcher -- There's no sense crying over every mistake; you just keep on trying till you run out of cake.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ?
Ian Kelly wrote: On Feb 6, 2008 5:04 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: A tautology is a proposition that is true under any interpretation of the domain. Or am I confusing tautology with validity? Methinks I need to brush up on my metalogic. A valid formula is a tautology, and a valid formula is one that is true in all possible interpretations. Michael.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 11:16 AM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, comex wrote:
>> The contest egregiously attempts to bribe its parties to not
>> participate in the fora, by awarding points only if they don't.
>> However, it's just a bribe. The contest is not actually prohibiting
>> participation, i.e. you could not initiate an equity or criminal case
>> against a party who initiated CFJs.
>
> I think it's probably perfectly fine unless the barrier is so high
> that it effectively prevents CFJs from being called. Here's a very
> strong argument (I think!) that it's ok: Another Right allows you to
> refuse to be a member of a contract, but contracts, by their very nature,
> offer various benefits (e.g. "bribes") to become a member. So you can
> be compensated for not doing something that it's otherwise your right
> to do.
>
Hypothetical contract:
{
This is a pledge. Parties to this pledge can't iniatiate CFJs
}
If a party to the above contract initiatied a CFJ their R101 right
would permit them to do so. However, this wouldn't free them from the
punitive damages from the judgment of an equity case, would it? The
contract is still valid even if its provision can't be enforced
equitably.
BobTHJ
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 11:21 AM, Roger Hicks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hypothetical contract:
> {
> This is a pledge. Parties to this pledge can't iniatiate CFJs
> }
This doesn't do anything. The contract can't prevent parties from
initiating CFJs; it can only prohibit.
-root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:08 PM, Quazie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The idea sounds fun. Would the players find out that they lost/gained > points per message or per week? If they learned per message would > they learn publicly or privately? (my hope would be privately per > message, but that might make it too easy to determine the rules) Not really. Even if it was per message and publicly, there is still a huge number of secret rules that might apply to a given message. If some of the rules define some objects or attributes which contestants might have, it gets even more complicated. Here's another idea, by the way: Some of the secret rules you are allowed to look at privately, perhaps by clicking a button on a webform. If you read the rule, then you might gain a huge advantage over the competition, by understanding how the contest works. However, some rules would give you very very little gain, and some are booby-trapped and will severely punish you for reading them. In this case, other contestants might know about the punishment, but not which rule a person attempted to reveal. They might then try to guess which rule the punished contestant most likely attempted to view, and avoid it. Now, if some contestants (this way or another way) gained privileged knowledge about how contest-defined objects work-- or guessed it-- then they might try to fool other contestants by performing invalid actions on purpose, or lying about things. The contest would be persued elsewhere than the public forum, so Rule 2149 would not apply. Like Mao, I guess. With all the rights I'm trying to dodge, you might wonder if this is best suited for a game independent from Agora. But I think it would be more fun when Agoran actions are a factor, and when contestants might win points.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:34 PM, comex <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Like Mao, I guess. With all the rights I'm trying to dodge, you might > wonder if this is best suited for a game independent from Agora. I'm not worried about trying to dodge rights, but a contestmaster isn't allowed to award points except as described in a public contract, so I'm not sure a contest with secret rules is even possible.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 10:34 AM, comex <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:08 PM, Quazie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> The idea sounds fun. Would the players find out that they lost/gained >> points per message or per week? If they learned per message would >> they learn publicly or privately? (my hope would be privately per >> message, but that might make it too easy to determine the rules) > > Not really. Even if it was per message and publicly, there is still a > huge number of secret rules that might apply to a given message. If > some of the rules define some objects or attributes which contestants > might have, it gets even more complicated. > > Here's another idea, by the way: > > Some of the secret rules you are allowed to look at privately, perhaps > by clicking a button on a webform. If you read the rule, then you > might gain a huge advantage over the competition, by understanding how > the contest works. However, some rules would give you very very > little gain, and some are booby-trapped and will severely punish you > for reading them. > > In this case, other contestants might know about the punishment, but > not which rule a person attempted to reveal. They might then try to > guess which rule the punished contestant most likely attempted to > view, and avoid it. > > Now, if some contestants (this way or another way) gained privileged > knowledge about how contest-defined objects work-- or guessed it-- > then they might try to fool other contestants by performing invalid > actions on purpose, or lying about things. The contest would be > persued elsewhere than the public forum, so Rule 2149 would not apply. > > Like Mao, I guess. With all the rights I'm trying to dodge, you might > wonder if this is best suited for a game independent from Agora. But > I think it would be more fun when Agoran actions are a factor, and > when contestants might win points. > If a contract included a provision that a member may lie in relation to the contract without penalty, would a lie in relation to that contract violate R 2149?
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 10:42 AM, Geoffrey Spear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:34 PM, comex <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Like Mao, I guess. With all the rights I'm trying to dodge, you might >> wonder if this is best suited for a game independent from Agora. > > I'm not worried about trying to dodge rights, but a contestmaster > isn't allowed to award points except as described in a public > contract, so I'm not sure a contest with secret rules is even > possible. > contestmaster awards points based on a members score. Score is modified in secret ways.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 11:42 AM, Geoffrey Spear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:34 PM, comex <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Like Mao, I guess. With all the rights I'm trying to dodge, you might >> wonder if this is best suited for a game independent from Agora. > > I'm not worried about trying to dodge rights, but a contestmaster > isn't allowed to award points except as described in a public > contract, so I'm not sure a contest with secret rules is even > possible. > It would be possible as a pseudo-contest via the PRS, assuming there weren't three objections. BobTHJ
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Quazie wrote: > On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 10:42 AM, Geoffrey Spear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:34 PM, comex <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Like Mao, I guess. With all the rights I'm trying to dodge, you might >>> wonder if this is best suited for a game independent from Agora. >> I'm not worried about trying to dodge rights, but a contestmaster >> isn't allowed to award points except as described in a public >> contract, so I'm not sure a contest with secret rules is even >> possible. >> > > contestmaster awards points based on a members score. > Score is modified in secret ways. "Score" is already defined by Rule 2179, so you'd need to use a different term. More importantly, the players would need to grant contesthood without direct knowledge of its fairness; the contest might require the contestmaster to avoid secret rules consciously intended to target specific players.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Quazie wrote: > If a contract included a provision that a member may lie in relation > to the contract without penalty, would a lie in relation to that > contract violate R 2149? Strong game custom holds that rules take precedence over non-rules.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, Ed Murphy wrote: > Am I alone in thinking that "abridge, reduce, limit, or remove" needs a > rather more solid definition? Well, in constitutional law, practice is that some clever judge or panel comes up with an N-part test on when a right is abridged, or reduced, or limited, or removed. We have a lot of varied precedent waltzing around the issue right now, time is ripe for someone to produce a synthesis, if anyone is brave enough. When I wrote the language, I wondered how long it would be before we wrestled with the question of precisely how many of your rights you could contractually sign away... -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, Ed Murphy wrote: > Quazie wrote: > >> If a contract included a provision that a member may lie in relation >> to the contract without penalty, would a lie in relation to that >> contract violate R 2149? > > Strong game custom holds that rules take precedence over non-rules. Equally strong custom holds that this is not true for matters irrelevant to the Rules. Intermediate items (items wholly governed by contracts, which are themselves governed by the rules: there lies gray area). Test: Will we need to prosecute every Werewolf for lying? -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, Jun 23, 2008 at 1:33 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, Ed Murphy wrote: >> Quazie wrote: >> >>> If a contract included a provision that a member may lie in relation >>> to the contract without penalty, would a lie in relation to that >>> contract violate R 2149? >> >> Strong game custom holds that rules take precedence over non-rules. > > Equally strong custom holds that this is not true for matters irrelevant to > the Rules. Intermediate items (items wholly governed by contracts, which > are themselves governed by the rules: there lies gray area). Lying to the PF is relevant to the rules no matter what the subject of the lie is. If I publicly state that France is on the moon, I'm culpable for that. > Test: Will we need to prosecute every Werewolf for lying? Only if the contest devolves into public claims of innocence, at which point it would no longer be an interesting contest. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, 23 Jun 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: > Lying to the PF is relevant to the rules no matter what the subject of > the lie is. If I publicly state that France is on the moon, I'm > culpable for that. Heh, that *is* an overly broad interpretation of that rule which should be struck down as a R101 "limitation" to forum participation. -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Ed Murphy wrote:
>comex wrote:
>> I CFJ on the statement: w/ o objection I
>
>>{{This is Agora}}(www.poolappeal.tv)
>> I CFJ on the statement: intend to rat-ify this /products.aspx
>^^
>>{{This is Agora}} report: I dont have the patent
>^^
>> I CFJ on the statement: title that may not be declined,
> ^^^
>>{{This is Agora}}In-Ground Pool Cleaners
>> I CFJ on the statement: retracted, or revoked::: (sc ope=FLR)
>^
I think you missed a bit that could be interpreted as "the scope of this
ratification is the Full Logical Ruleset".
-zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Sat, Jul 12, 2008 at 7:09 AM, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The voting period on P5405 has ended, so this would be a false statement > if interpreted as a statement (say, if it were interpreted as an attempt > to act). But the disclaimer precludes that interpretation. As I said > before, I think it's too unclear to be effective anyway. In context it > appears to merely be part of the random filler text. Somehow I missed that! I would have edited it to a real proposal number had I caught it. Oh well... Here are some other things that might be actions: Proposal: WALRUS gains the patent title of 1 3 > Quazie 4 1 2 Points. > P12. I register as Land, as described below. AI of 2 for | I submit the following AI=3D3 disinterested proposal, | Card "Contracts" v1.1 | 2 pope. Upon this announcement, that OscarMeyr should be awarded 2 Points for being the only make instead of to the Clerk of the Courts, path with eir master, and they passed two Random Repeal | Maud | 1 | 16Jul05 | ... I think the first and third might identify attempts to submit proposals... then again, submitting proposals requires a "clear indication" that they are intended to become proposals, and indeed, proposals that do not "outline changes to be made to Agora" (including some that have been distributed in the past!) technically aren't proposals.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
comex wrote: >Proposal: WALRUS gains the patent title of 1 3 > Quazie 4 1 2 Points. > P12. Not clear what the extent of the proposal's text is. >I register as Land, as described below. You can't register, and there's no description below. >AI of 2 for | I submit the following AI=3D3 disinterested proposal, | Same proposal problem, and multiple incompatible statements of AI. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Sat, 12 Jul 2008, Zefram wrote: > The voting period on P5405 has ended, so this would be a false statement > if interpreted as a statement (say, if it were interpreted as an attempt > to act). This is really niggling me, Zefram. I could have sworn this all came up when you first proposed the lying rule, and we had a discussion in which you took the position that an imperative (e.g. an assertation that "I do X") was neither true nor false. At that time, I bookmarked the following article: http://www.jstor.org/pss/184947 but we decided that we *weren't* classifying these sorts of statements as true/false in Agora, though the honest/dishonest distinction is interesting. Am I misremembering, or have you changed your position? -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Kerim Aydin wrote: >we had a discussion in which >you took the position that an imperative (e.g. an assertation that "I do X") >was neither true nor false. We had a discussion about whether imperatives have truth values, which as I recall was inconclusive, but "I do X" is not an imperative. "Goethe, do X" is an imperative. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Sat, 12 Jul 2008, Zefram wrote: > Kerim Aydin wrote: >>we had a discussion in which >> you took the position that an imperative (e.g. an assertation that "I do X") >> was neither true nor false. > > We had a discussion about whether imperatives have truth values, which as > I recall was inconclusive, but "I do X" is not an imperative. "Goethe, > do X" is an imperative. It was questions of type "I do X" we were concerned with though, weren't we? We had issues treating these as statements of fact. For example, if you treat it as a statement of fact, it is untrue as you type it but becomes true when you hit the send key. For some things, it's even hazier: "I hereby notify you of X" isn't arguably true until X has been sent via the forum to you. In other words, we need to reconsider/set precedents on the truth or falsity of (failed or successful) Speech Acts. -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Kerim Aydin wrote: >It was questions of type "I do X" we were concerned with though, weren't we? Er, it's those that we are generally most concerned with in Agora. I don't recall what the context was for discussing imperatives. > it is untrue as you type it but becomes >true when you hit the send key. It is true at the time the statement is made for Agoran purposes. I find it becomes clearer if you insert the elided "hereby". Read "hereby" as "by the process of sending this message". > For some things, it's even hazier: "I >hereby notify you of X" isn't arguably true until X has been sent via the >forum to you. Looks fine to me. The statement is made, for Agoran purposes, by the process of sending the message containing it via the PF, and that is the same process that notifies the target. >In other words, we need to reconsider/set precedents on the truth or falsity >of (failed or successful) Speech Acts. I think we are lacking in precedents here, but it's pretty clear what position the courts should take. An attempt to act by announcement is, first and foremost, the making of a statement. The fact that rules do, or might, cause an announcement to have side effects on the game state does not deprive it of statementhood or of having a truth value. A successful action by announcement is the making of a true statement. We don't need to evaluate a statement at more than one point in time, because the rules only ascribe significance to the statement at one point in time. Actually, although we speak of it as an instant, we have some precedent that sending a message through the PF is a non-instantaneous process, so the statement takes effect in the course of that process and its meaning must be evaluated from the point of view of that process. A disclaimer along the lines of "Any statement apparently made in this message might be false." disclaims all information content of the message. It renders the message as a whole informationally null. Such a message, taken as whole, therefore does not make any statements, and cannot constitute announcing anything. It would therefore fail to qualify for acting by announcement. The disclaimer "These attempted actions may fail." is more interesting. It does indicate that the statements that attempt actions might be false, but it does so in a qualified way. They can't be false for arbitrary reasons. The disclaimer indicates specifically that they may be false purely due to the described action being impossible. It does not disclaim any other way in which they could be false. So I think this disclaimer does allow attempted actions to take effect, where the actions are possible, and avoids the message constituting a lie where they are not. An attempted action of "I hereby spend my two C notes to cause Murphy to gain a C note." would still be a lie, under that disclaimer, if I didn't have exactly two C notes, so that the phrase "my two C notes" has no valid referent. Btw, I think the formulation "If possible, I do X." is preferable over "I do X. Disclaimer: this might fail.". -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, Jul 15, 2008 at 5:27 PM, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ian Kelly wrote: >>I CFJ on this statement. > > Patently TRUE. By stating it you do in fact initiate the described CFJ, > via the rules on acting by announcement. This makes the statement true. > And it's obviously relevant. That's what I thought too. I was actually surprised not to find an existing case like this in the CotC database, especially considering all the CFJs with statements along the lines of "This is a CFJ." -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Jul 15, 2008, at 4:19 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: On Tue, 15 Jul 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: The statement is obviously not FALSE. Here's where it breaks down. If this is considered to be a poorly- labeled and communicated statement, it's not obvious. -Goethe I need to find a good place to drop into the rules the provision: The CotC CAN and SHOULD dismiss CFJs that are clearly dialatory. - Benjamin Schultz KE3OM OscarMeyr
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
OscarMeyr wrote: > I need to find a good place to drop into the rules the provision: > > The CotC CAN and SHOULD dismiss CFJs that are clearly dialatory. Rule 2175 seems as good a place as any.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Jul 15, 2008, at 9:29 PM, Ed Murphy wrote: OscarMeyr wrote: I need to find a good place to drop into the rules the provision: The CotC CAN and SHOULD dismiss CFJs that are clearly dilatory. Rule 2175 seems as good a place as any. Draft, AI=1: Append to R2175 the following paragraph: c) If a case is clearly dilatory, the CotC CAN and SHOULD refuse it by announcement, thus causing it to cease to be a judicial case. (This needs some protection against a CotC refusing meaningful cases, especially cases over what counts as "clearly dilatory," and some protection against people challenging a CotC for refusing a dilatory case.) - Benjamin Schultz KE3OM OscarMeyr
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, Jul 15, 2008 at 7:13 PM, Benjamin Schultz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Jul 15, 2008, at 4:19 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 15 Jul 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: >>> >>> The statement is obviously not FALSE. >> >> Here's where it breaks down. If this is considered to be a poorly-labeled >> and communicated statement, it's not obvious. -Goethe > > I need to find a good place to drop into the rules the provision: > > The CotC CAN and SHOULD dismiss CFJs that are clearly dialatory. I take offense. Mine is a serious case, intended to demonstrate that actions do indeed carry truth values. -root
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Jul 15, 2008, at 11:53 PM, Ian Kelly wrote: On Tue, Jul 15, 2008 at 7:13 PM, Benjamin Schultz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Jul 15, 2008, at 4:19 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: On Tue, 15 Jul 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: The statement is obviously not FALSE. Here's where it breaks down. If this is considered to be a poorly-labeled and communicated statement, it's not obvious. -Goethe I need to find a good place to drop into the rules the provision: The CotC CAN and SHOULD dismiss CFJs that are clearly dialatory. I take offense. Mine is a serious case, intended to demonstrate that actions do indeed carry truth values. I make appropriate apologies. There are enough specious CFJs running around right now. Plus, "clearly dilatory" is pretty weak. I'm more concerned at this moment with dilatory proposals. - Benjamin Schultz KE3OM OscarMeyr
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
2008/8/13 Geoffrey Spear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I believe it's 754(1) that grants them meaning, since those words have > no ordinary-language meaning. I'd say they represent either a > difference in spelling or dialect, depending on your view of whether a > language variation with a tiny number of adherents that isn't > geographically constrained really constitutes a "dialect" or not. And, > I suppose, your view of whether "e" could really be considered a > "different spelling" of something like "he, she, or it". > he or she, surely. We don't call objects "e" do we?
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 12:25 PM, Elliott Hird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > he or she, surely. We don't call objects "e" do we? We have players that aren't humans and thus have no gender, and the rules do use "e" when referring to players, so yes.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 2008-09-23 at 21:21 +0100, Elliott Hird wrote: > 2008/9/23 ais523 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > CoE: You are not necessarily a person. > > A biological entity able of communicating in English via email? > > Yeah, e's a person. How do you know biological? For all you know invalid invalid is set up like PerlNomic, its emails are composed by a committee, and its emails are actually sent by Googlebot. -- ais523
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 23 Sep 2008, Geoffrey Spear wrote: > CotC Murphy certainly knows whether e sent the message purporting to > initiate the CFJ emself, so it definitely wasn't impossible that e > could assign it to a player e knew didn't send it. Of course, in this > case if e didn't send the message than e didn't assign it to someone e > could be absolutely sure didn't send it... Therefore, Murphy is the Werewolf??
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
2008/9/23 ais523 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > How do you know biological? > > For all you know invalid invalid is set up like PerlNomic, its emails > are composed by a committee, and its emails are actually sent by > Googlebot. Still, your CoE doesn't prove anything and has no basis either... (probably "it"'ll just send off an email denying it)
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Charles Reiss wrote: > On Tue, Sep 23, 2008 at 12:17, Jeff Weston (Sir Toby) > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I CFJ on the following statement: The message sent by "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" >> on "Tue, 16 Sep 2008 20:16:23 +" (see evidence 1) was successful in >> initiating a CFJ. >> >> I argue for a FALSE judgement in this case. The statement in the message >> is clearly an inquiry case. Rule 591 (see evidence 2) governs inquiry >> cases. In Rule 591, we see that, "the initiator is unqualified to be >> assigned as judge of the case." >> >> The message in question clearly does not indicate who sent the message. >> Without knowing who sent the message, there is no way to ensure that the >> initiator is unqualified to be assigned as judge of the case. For all we >> know, Sir Toby was the sender of the message. Since he was assigned as >> judge of the resulting CFJ, it is possible that he was illegally >> assigned as judge to that CFJ. > > While I agree that it may have been IMPOSSIBLE to assign Sir Toby as > the judge of that case (not ILLEGAL, I suggest CoE'ing on the relevant > docket and such), I don't think it has much relevance in the success > of the initiation... > > -woggle The example I gave of the possible legality problems with assigning me as the judge of the CFJ in question when it is possible that I initiated the CFJ was more an indication of the problem of submitting a CFJ anonymously, rather than an indication that assigning a judge to the CFJ was impossible. That should probably be a question for another CFJ. -- Jeff Weston (Sir Toby) PGP public key available from http://pgp.mit.edu/ PGP Key ID: 0x14B456ED
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Geoffrey Spear wrote: > On Tue, Sep 23, 2008 at 3:17 PM, Jeff Weston (Sir Toby) > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I CFJ on the following statement: The message sent by "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" >> on "Tue, 16 Sep 2008 20:16:23 +" (see evidence 1) was successful in >> initiating a CFJ. >> >> I argue for a FALSE judgement in this case. The statement in the message >> is clearly an inquiry case. Rule 591 (see evidence 2) governs inquiry >> cases. In Rule 591, we see that, "the initiator is unqualified to be >> assigned as judge of the case." >> >> The message in question clearly does not indicate who sent the message. >> Without knowing who sent the message, there is no way to ensure that the >> initiator is unqualified to be assigned as judge of the case. For all we >> know, Sir Toby was the sender of the message. Since he was assigned as >> judge of the resulting CFJ, it is possible that he was illegally >> assigned as judge to that CFJ. > > I don't think it follows that since the assignment of the CFJ might > have been illegal that the CFJ could not have been initiated at all; > CotC Murphy certainly knows whether e sent the message purporting to > initiate the CFJ emself, so it definitely wasn't impossible that e > could assign it to a player e knew didn't send it. Of course, in this > case if e didn't send the message than e didn't assign it to someone e > could be absolutely sure didn't send it, but the CotC's actions after > a CFJ has been initiated shouldn't be retroactively relevant to > whether it was initiated in the first place. > > And, of course, when Murphy attempted to assign the case to you, you > knew for sure whether that assignment was possible; the fact that you > claimed to assign a judgment to the case should be taken as evidence > that you believed to be assigned to judge it. Of course, since we > don't have a truthiness rule anymore it's not actually against the > rules for you to claim to assign judgment to a case you don't believe > you're the judge of. I have issued one CFJ regarding whether or not the CFJ in question was even initiated and I intend to issue another CFJ regarding the legality of assigning someone to judge the CFJ. I issued a judgement to the CFJ in question because I am obligated to do so under the rules, and I wanted to make sure I fulfilled my duty in the event that it is ruled that the CFJ was indeed initiated and I was legally assigned to judge it. I will neither confirm nor deny that I sent any of the messages from "[EMAIL PROTECTED]". -- Jeff Weston (Sir Toby) PGP public key available from http://pgp.mit.edu/ PGP Key ID: 0x14B456ED
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On 11 Dec 2008, at 21:02, Geoffrey Spear wrote: Gratuitous: the new contract was not the backing document for VP, as they would continue to exist if the new contract didn't exist, thus it couldn't grant the power to create VP. Gratuitous: The same could be said about the Vote Market at that time.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Thu, Dec 11, 2008 at 4:08 PM, Elliott Hird wrote: > On 11 Dec 2008, at 21:02, Geoffrey Spear wrote: > >> Gratuitous: the new contract was not the backing document for VP, as >> they would continue to exist if the new contract didn't exist, thus it >> couldn't grant the power to create VP. > > Gratuitous: The same could be said about the Vote Market at that time. Yes, arguably VP ceased to have a backing document and BobTHJ couldn't create VP at the time either.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Thu, Dec 11, 2008 at 4:17 PM, Geoffrey Spear wrote: >>> Gratuitous: the new contract was not the backing document for VP, as >>> they would continue to exist if the new contract didn't exist, thus it >>> couldn't grant the power to create VP. >> Gratuitous: The same could be said about the Vote Market at that time. > Yes, arguably VP ceased to have a backing document and BobTHJ couldn't > create VP at the time either. If an entity is _defined_ by a contract-- or any other bit of text-- that contract doesn't need anyone's permission to manipulate the entity, not even Rule 2166's; on the contrary, Rule 2166 in most cases does not purport to limit the ways that contracts can manipulate assets: it merely provides reasonable defaults. If a contract contradicted one of the non-'generally' clauses in Rule 2166, such as if a contract specified that players CANNOT transfer stuff from the LFD without objection, we're left in the messy business of Rule vs. contract conflicts over a contract-defined entity. I believe this is usually resolved with the argument that since contracts are by definition governed by the Rules [Rule 1742], they have the power to supersede contracts. But that is not the case here. No contract is contradicting Rule 2166: in fact, Rule 2166 does not apply. Rather, we have two different contracts Rule-legislated to be referring to the same entity. By nature, it's impossible for an entity to be defined by two different things: we can define e as lim[n->inf](1 + 1/n)^n, or as 1 + 1/1! + 1/2! + 1/3! + ..., but not as both unless we prove that they're equivalent.* Yet a Rule: If multiple rules or contracts (hereafter documents) attempt to define an entity with the same name, then they refer to the same entity. says that it's possible. The only way to resolve this is to have the currency in question defined by a combination of the two documents: the Vote Market and ehird's pledge. If they contradicted each other, then the state of Vote Points would be undefined. But the VM does not explicitly say that ehird can't create VP by announcement; it is consistent with both contracts to assume that e can. So ehird successfully created a boatload of VP, and anyone can create a contract to utterly screw up most assets. Hey, the alternative is that anyone can create a contract to make assets unusable... *Not that that stopped my math teacher last year from doing so.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Thu, Feb 12, 2009 at 10:02 PM, Warrigal wrote: > Gratuitous arguments: rule 2136 authorizes this to happen whether or > not 1728 does. It allows the contestmaster to be changed when the mechanism (of a dependent action) succeeds; however, R1728 does not allow it to succeed.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
2009/5/2 Taral : > On Sat, May 2, 2009 at 10:52 AM, comex wrote: >> I CFJ on the statement: >> * It is ILLEGAL to grant certain powers (in the ordinary-language >> sense) and privileges to Agora's ambassador if one is not a nomic. > > Clever. MAY vs may? > I'd say it's not ILLEGAL since it's not MAY, so saying that one MAY NOT if one isn't a nomic is only how it SHOULD be. -- -Tiger
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Sat, May 2, 2009 at 4:42 PM, Taral wrote: > On Sat, May 2, 2009 at 10:52 AM, comex wrote: >> I CFJ on the statement: >> * It is ILLEGAL to grant certain powers (in the ordinary-language >> sense) and privileges to Agora's ambassador if one is not a nomic. > > Clever. MAY vs may? Well, if may means CAN, then it's IMPOSSIBLE for a non-nomic to grant powers and privileges, which might have some effect on contracts. It could mean something entirely separate, but if so, what?
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 9:20 PM, Ed Murphy wrote: > c-walker wrote: > >> CFJ, II 3: When a Rule is repealed, its Power is set to 0. > > Gratuitous: No, the rule simply ceases to exist. I doesn't matter, I retracted the CFJ. They may be some upcoming scams related to this, though. -- C-walker A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? A: Top-posting. Q: What is the most annoying thing on usenet and in e-mail?
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Sun, 2009-09-06 at 19:52 -0500, Pavitra wrote: > I'm not convinced. Rolling d...@nomic.net is a completely separate > (statistically independent) random event from the card destruction. > > If there are several platonic random events "pending", can I randomize > once for all of them? For example, if I have (numbers invented for > didactic purposes) 3 of 10 cards destroyed, can I do this: > > rseed = rand()%360 + 1; > first_card = rseed%10; > second_card = rseed%9; > third_card = rseed%8; Definitely not like that; 8 and 10 aren't coprime. -- ais523
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Mon, 2009-09-07 at 15:56 -0500, Pavitra wrote: > Either the rule is broken platonically (UNDETERMINED is appropriate), or > it's broken pragmatically (it's possible to exploit it as I described). > In no case is it working properly. I see what you mean... I'm inclined to think it's broken platonically, and if I understand your point correctly, it's that platonic random numbers are impossible to determine; this seems to be correct, but a mess. -- ais523
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 8 Sep 2009, ais523 wrote: > On Mon, 2009-09-07 at 15:56 -0500, Pavitra wrote: >> Either the rule is broken platonically (UNDETERMINED is appropriate), or >> it's broken pragmatically (it's possible to exploit it as I described). >> In no case is it working properly. > > I see what you mean... I'm inclined to think it's broken platonically, > and if I understand your point correctly, it's that platonic random > numbers are impossible to determine; this seems to be correct, but a > mess. Interesting. Making random choices is one of those things that used to be covered by the Rules, but it was repealed because a precedent was straightforward. All of R1079's (a-e) below are reasonable precedents where the rules are silent (especially as (e) defers to the courts) with the exception of (b) which is the key here. At the time of the repeal, all random choices were associated with the person who makes the choice so this wasn't an issue. A stretch that the recordkeepor could coalesce unknown randomness into known randomness by making an after-the- fact random selection; there's an indirect precedent that it's the process of making the randomness known, not rolling the dice, that resolves the action (CFJ 1435). Still even that was associated with an act (making a random choice) and here it's pretty clear that the rules say "something random happens platonically upon event X". Rule 1079/4 (Power=1) Definition of "Random" (a) When a Rule requires a random choice to be made, then the choice shall be made using whatever probability distribution among the possible outcomes the Rules provide for making that choice. If the Rules do not specify a probability distribution, then a uniform probability distribution shall be used. (b) Where the Rules do not indicate who is required to make a particular random choice, it shall be made by the Speaker. (c) When making a random choice as required by the Rules, a Player may rely on any physical or computational process whose probability distribution among the possible outcomes is reasonably close to that required by the Rules. (d) For the purposes of this Rule, tossing a platonic solid that is not specially weighted has a probability distribution among the possible outcomes that is reasonably close to uniform. (e) For other methods, the Courts are the final arbiter of whether a method's probability distribution among the possible outcomes is reasonably close to that required by the Rules.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Kerim Aydin wrote: (d) For the purposes of this Rule, tossing a platonic solid that is not specially weighted has a probability distribution among the possible outcomes that is reasonably close to uniform. Mmm... vague definition of "toss". -coppro
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Tue, 8 Sep 2009, Sean Hunt wrote: > Kerim Aydin wrote: >> (d) For the purposes of this Rule, tossing a platonic solid that >> is not specially weighted has a probability distribution >> among the possible outcomes that is reasonably close to >> uniform. > > Mmm... vague definition of "toss". And to use this in practice it has to be a nonplatonic platonic solid.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Kerim Aydin wrote: On Tue, 8 Sep 2009, Sean Hunt wrote: Kerim Aydin wrote: (d) For the purposes of this Rule, tossing a platonic solid that is not specially weighted has a probability distribution among the possible outcomes that is reasonably close to uniform. Mmm... vague definition of "toss". And to use this in practice it has to be a nonplatonic platonic solid. It's platonically platonic. -coppro
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Kerim Aydin wrote: > Interesting. Making random choices is one of those things that used to > be covered by the Rules, but it was repealed because a precedent was > straightforward. All of R1079's (a-e) below are reasonable precedents > where the rules are silent (especially as (e) defers to the courts) with > the exception of (b) which is the key here. At the time of the repeal, > all random choices were associated with the person who makes the choice > so this wasn't an issue. A stretch that the recordkeepor could coalesce > unknown randomness into known randomness by making an after-the- > fact random selection; there's an indirect precedent that it's the > process of making the randomness known, not rolling the dice, that > resolves the action (CFJ 1435). Still even that was associated with an > act (making a random choice) and here it's pretty clear that the rules > say "something random happens platonically upon event X". > > Rule 1079/4 (Power=1) > Definition of "Random" > > (a) When a Rule requires a random choice to be made, then the > choice shall be made using whatever probability distribution > among the possible outcomes the Rules provide for making > that choice. If the Rules do not specify a probability > distribution, then a uniform probability distribution shall > be used. > > (b) Where the Rules do not indicate who is required to make a > particular random choice, it shall be made by the Speaker. > > (c) When making a random choice as required by the Rules, a > Player may rely on any physical or computational process > whose probability distribution among the possible outcomes > is reasonably close to that required by the Rules. > > (d) For the purposes of this Rule, tossing a platonic solid that > is not specially weighted has a probability distribution > among the possible outcomes that is reasonably close to > uniform. > > (e) For other methods, the Courts are the final arbiter of > whether a method's probability distribution among the > possible outcomes is reasonably close to that required by > the Rules. The question then is: does the mathematical meaning (R754(3)) of "random" imply that the random choice is made platonically and invisibly, or does it leave that to "other Agoran legal documents" (R754(4)), arguably including former Rules and probably including past judicial precedents, to determine? If the former, the rule is broken. If the latter, we may be okay. Is anyone here a mathematician of randomness? signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Wed, 9 Sep 2009, Pavitra wrote:
> The question then is: does the mathematical meaning (R754(3)) of
> "random" imply that the random choice is made platonically and
> invisibly, or does it leave that to "other Agoran legal documents"
> (R754(4)), arguably including former Rules and probably including past
> judicial precedents, to determine?
>
> If the former, the rule is broken. If the latter, we may be okay.
>
> Is anyone here a mathematician of randomness?
I'm a part-statistician anyway, but the question is philosophical.
The rule in question doesn't talk about "choice" at all, but says that
"random cards are destroyed" as an external event, rather than an event
made after a random choice (e.g. "the auditor selects N cards at random,
which are destroyed").
Given this, we have two choices:
1. Infer that despite the language, our legal precedents on randomness
lead us to assume that someone does make the choice, in which case
a court would have to figure out who it was (likely the auditor or the
recordkeepor) or decide that since there's no one authorized to make
the choice, doing the destruction is IMPOSSIBLE. This favors the
spirit and some precedents but very much ignores the language. In this
case, past precedents hold that the timing of a random choice is when
the random choice is made public, even if it's after the choice event.
(This assumes that there's very little time between the person making
the choice and publishing it; if e acts on the choice before publishing
it's not random to that person, something that was debated during CFJ
1435).
2. Decide that we're dealing with a measurement issue rather than
a process issue ("an event happened, but we haven't sampled/measured
the system to see what event occurred").
If we decide this, we can look at statistical theory:
1. Before an event, we can speak of its probability.
2. After the event, the platonic probability of what actually happened
is 1 and the probability of all other events is 0.
3. But from a statistical/measurement standpoint, we have no new
information about the process, so we can still speak of the
probabilities as in (1). But can we make further inferences?
- If you believe in a frequentist viewpoint, there's no new data to
falsify a hypothesis of any particular outcome, so the result
remains UNDETERMINED.
- If you take a Bayesian standpoint (with the process probabilities
as your priors) you come to the conclusion that 1/Nth of each
possible types of N cards were destroyed. Since this is
IMPOSSIBLE (a higher-powered rule prevents destroying fractions
of cards) the destruction simply didn't function.
- If you take a legal/decision standpoint (where legally a decision
must be made based on uncertain data - see particularly natural
resource management for situations like this - a court CAN
determine a likely outcome and make it the legal reality; for
example by the court making a fair choice itself or delegating to
the recordkeepor.
Choose your statistical worldview!
-G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Wed, 2009-09-09 at 08:44 -0700, Kerim Aydin wrote: > - If you take a legal/decision standpoint (where legally a decision > must be made based on uncertain data - see particularly natural > resource management for situations like this - a court CAN > determine a likely outcome and make it the legal reality; for > example by the court making a fair choice itself or delegating to > the recordkeepor. > > Choose your statistical worldview! Of course, the actual answer is "whatever ends up self-ratifying"; in a way, self-ratification means that as long as you can convince enough people that the choice was random, it will eventually become the correct choice, even if it wasn't. -- ais523
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Sent from my iPhone On Sep 9, 2009, at 11:44 AM, Kerim Aydin wrote: - If you take a Bayesian standpoint (with the process probabilities as your priors) you come to the conclusion that 1/Nth of each possible types of N cards were destroyed. Since this is IMPOSSIBLE (a higher-powered rule prevents destroying fractions of cards) the destruction simply didn't function. I don't follow. A Bayesian standpoint makes it clear that the outcome, though fixed, can be referred to in terms of probability because it is unknown, but it certainly doesn't require otherwise impossible events to occur.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Wed, 9 Sep 2009, comex wrote: >> - If you take a Bayesian standpoint (with the process probabilities >> as your priors) you come to the conclusion that 1/Nth of each >> possible types of N cards were destroyed. Since this is >> IMPOSSIBLE (a higher-powered rule prevents destroying fractions >> of cards) the destruction simply didn't function. > > I don't follow. A Bayesian standpoint makes it clear that the outcome, > though > fixed, can be referred to in terms of probability because it is unknown, but > it > certainly doesn't require otherwise impossible events to occur. Apologies I was leaving out a step. In blended probability assessment such as risk assessment from a Bayesian standpoint (e.g. risk assessment of a species becoming endangered) one can accept the Bayesian posteriors as "partial truths" (as a statistical construction) or if you prefer "legal truths" of prior events (probability that a species is currently or in the past has been endangered). But perhaps this is better phrased as a special case of legal method (3). You are indeed correct in the manner that Bayesian approaches modify classical statistics. -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
Kerim Aydin wrote: > This favors the > spirit and some precedents but very much ignores the language. Which of course would flagrantly violate R217s1, though as ais523 points out IMPOSSIBLE and/or ILLEGAL things do occasionally ratify for the sake of convenience. It would be nice not to rely on that for the regular functioning of the rule though. > - If you take a legal/decision standpoint (where legally a decision > must be made based on uncertain data - see particularly natural > resource management for situations like this - a court CAN > determine a likely outcome and make it the legal reality; for > example by the court making a fair choice itself or delegating to > the recordkeepor. This sounds very promising. I had assumed (after failing to find the term "random" in a few online law dictionaries) that there was no legal definition of the term. But if a non-catastrophic legal definition of random exists, then R217s2 allows us to choose it over the catastrophic mathematical definition, since R754(3) gives equal weight to each. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ
On Wed, 9 Sep 2009, Pavitra wrote: > Kerim Aydin wrote: >> - If you take a legal/decision standpoint (where legally a decision >> must be made based on uncertain data - see particularly natural >> resource management for situations like this - a court CAN >> determine a likely outcome and make it the legal reality; for >> example by the court making a fair choice itself or delegating to >> the recordkeepor. > > This sounds very promising. I had assumed (after failing to find the > term "random" in a few online law dictionaries) that there was no legal > definition of the term. But if a non-catastrophic legal definition of > random exists, then R217s2 allows us to choose it over the catastrophic > mathematical definition, since R754(3) gives equal weight to each. In legal language (and the current situation) we're talking about making a decision under "uncertainty" in what is. There are a lot of laws dealing with "decisionmaking when the true state of affairs is unknown but statistically measured". I think "randomness" in a legal sense is associated with "arbitrary and capricious" decisions which are in fact bad. For example, imaging a judge saying "both parents had an equally good case for child custody, so I'm flipping a coin." Though I suppose it may have come up if a judge were working with a contract that involved gambling or something. -G.
