Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 1:32 AM, Alex Smith ais...@bham.ac.uk wrote: On Fri, 2013-06-21 at 15:24 +1000, Michael Norrish wrote: Very cool. I'm glad that's being used. I don't know how long it took me, but I certainly shifted well away from being a Platonist as the game progressed. Clearly I was young and naïve initially. The current system is pretty friendly to both Platonists and Pragmatists; if an incorrect report is published, it's just incorrect, and if it isn't challenged for a week, then it causes a gamestate change to make itself correct. (If we subsequently realise that this is happened, the nature of the change is typically documented in change histories. For instance, see amendment 15 to rule 2154, which happened due to ratification rather than due to a proposal.) I think this dualism quite possibly stands out as the most important/unique feature of modern Agora, perhaps along with deputisation. Not that there are many contemporary competing games to judge against, but compared to past games...
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On 15/06/13 02:46, Kerim Aydin wrote: the *other* fundamental CFJ waiting to be assigned, the one about whether the gamestate stores a mutable record of history or not. This is another thing I keep thinking of the history of; what's the history of seeing the gamestate as some sort of state-automaton with a true platonic state that we're groping to discover (as opposed to just adjusting things on the fly as they come, as you would in a board game). I blame B. This attitude was certainly one I held when we began the game. I later proposed a “document-centric” view of things, whereby the state was defined to be whatever the contents of the document said it was, but with some (unspecified) means of redress if it was believed that the documents had the “wrong” contents. I thought this was more pragmatic/realistic, and, as I recall, Kelly agreed with me. The idea didn’t stick. Michael signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 12:34 AM, Michael Norrish michael.norr...@nicta.com.au wrote: This attitude was certainly one I held when we began the game. I later proposed a “document-centric” view of things, whereby the state was defined to be whatever the contents of the document said it was, but with some (unspecified) means of redress if it was believed that the documents had the “wrong” contents. I thought this was more pragmatic/realistic, and, as I recall, Kelly agreed with me. The idea didn’t stick. Michael It did. A number of our reports now use a mechanism to cause them to be considered true if they go unchallenged for a week. This caused an amusing situation recently when two self-ratifying reports effectively disagreed as to whether or not I was a player. -scshunt
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On 21/06/13 14:38, Sean Hunt wrote: On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 12:34 AM, Michael Norrish michael.norr...@nicta.com.au wrote: This attitude was certainly one I held when we began the game. I later proposed a “document-centric” view of things, whereby the state was defined to be whatever the contents of the document said it was, but with some (unspecified) means of redress if it was believed that the documents had the “wrong” contents. I thought this was more pragmatic/realistic, and, as I recall, Kelly agreed with me. The idea didn’t stick. Michael It did. A number of our reports now use a mechanism to cause them to be considered true if they go unchallenged for a week. This caused an amusing situation recently when two self-ratifying reports effectively disagreed as to whether or not I was a player. Very cool. I'm glad that's being used. I don't know how long it took me, but I certainly shifted well away from being a Platonist as the game progressed. Clearly I was young and naïve initially. Michael signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Fri, 2013-06-21 at 15:24 +1000, Michael Norrish wrote: Very cool. I'm glad that's being used. I don't know how long it took me, but I certainly shifted well away from being a Platonist as the game progressed. Clearly I was young and naïve initially. The current system is pretty friendly to both Platonists and Pragmatists; if an incorrect report is published, it's just incorrect, and if it isn't challenged for a week, then it causes a gamestate change to make itself correct. (If we subsequently realise that this is happened, the nature of the change is typically documented in change histories. For instance, see amendment 15 to rule 2154, which happened due to ratification rather than due to a proposal.) -- ais523
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Sun, 16 Jun 2013, Sean Hunt wrote: It is entirely unreasonable for a real-life court to say Well, I can't give a judgment because of a paradox in the Constitution. The court must try to find the most consistent interpretation, whereas Agora does not see itself as needing to be bound in that manner. Perhaps that's simply an option we should consider: rule by fiat that a contradiction or paradox cannot interfere with the game. tl;dr we need more precedents about precedence Great analysis overall. As to this last paragraph, I think the third body of rules that should be considered as a model (alongside strict algorithms and real life law) is that of a traditional board game. In which, if you're partway into a game (especially a long one!) you don't try to throw up your hands when something funny comes to light and say eh, game frozen, no winner. You make some reasonable house rule that allows you to keep playing. And since those reasonable house rules usually deal with physical things like cards, you don't tend to regress to infinity. Either you're holding the card, or you're not. If you're holding it when you're not supposed to, you discard it, apologize, and maybe make some vague attempt to re-adjust counters - but certainly don't go back 10 moves to figure out what would have happened. Those reasonable house rules are a good way to think of precedent - not as binding as in the common law, and certainly not algorithmic - but out of fairness to all players, you generally refer to past decisions if the same sort of problem comes up again. -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Jun 16, 2013 12:04 PM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: Those reasonable house rules are a good way to think of precedent - not as binding as in the common law, and certainly not algorithmic - but out of fairness to all players, you generally refer to past decisions if the same sort of problem comes up again. -G. Indeed, this is the civil law model, more or less. -scshunt
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
Everyone's seen Primer right? -- You've got to wiggle before you can crawl
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 12:46 PM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: I remember, when Kelly was around, at one point someone asked her about why a particular pair of clauses in the U.S. Constitution (I forget which) weren't treated as a paradox. She just laughed and said in essence they just aren't. Not satisfying! (see e.g. the famous story on Godel's U.S. Citizenship). This is, I think, due to a rather nomic-al invention of treating the rules much more strictly than the law does. While it's true that loopholes do exist in real law, the (common law, anyway, which is probably the driver of discussion here) courts are generally much much less likely to interpret laws with a prescriptivist approach, because of the contexts surrounding their creation and their enforcement. Historically, common law courts have been charged with developing law in addition to enforcing it, statute is used as a tool to deal with the failings of common law (to change the law directly, to establish certainty in a new frontier of law, or to prescribe niggling details). But the statute is far from perfect, and this is supplemented to a great degree by the binding decisions made by the Court. This is a vital thing to understand, because for the most part the law relating to precedence of laws is common law, not statute law. Certain laws (the Act of Settlement in the UK, for instance), despite there being no provisions in them or any other statute granting them paramountcy, are nonetheless regarded as taking precedence over other laws. Indeed, there are situations where common law, never truly codified, take precedence over a statute unless the statute says otherwise---the privileges of Parliament have long been held to be restrained by a statute only if it a very deliberate attempt on Parliament's part to surrender them. However, this is not a particularly apt analogy to Agora, which operates by a doctrine of law much closer to civil law. The only law that is absolute are the rules, and precedents are never binding. This is particularly evident in the law on precedence itself, wherein we generally try not to read additional precedence into rules (see my legitimate paradox win). We do not have the same need to come to an answer, however. In law, the fundamental difference I think is that a court must come to an answer somehow. It is entirely unreasonable for a real-life court to say Well, I can't give a judgment because of a paradox in the Constitution. The court must try to find the most consistent interpretation, whereas Agora does not see itself as needing to be bound in that manner. Perhaps that's simply an option we should consider: rule by fiat that a contradiction or paradox cannot interfere with the game. tl;dr we need more precedents about precedence -scshunt [N.B. I'm not a lawyer, but I do study constitutional and parliamentary law as a hobby]
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Fri, 14 Jun 2013, Fool wrote: (time-travelly paradoxy sci-fi smeg --Red Dwarf) And now my head hurts, serves me right. TIMEY-WIMEY: Appropriate if the Judge hand-waves on the nature of spacetime and the gamestate to arbitrarily make a decision that may or may not be consistent with the logic that any past or future precedents willan on-take.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Thu, 13 Jun 2013, omd wrote: You can get around the deemed to have not happened by saying that one can't deem the impossible. That deemed language was always a tricky one in any case (similar to the sort of tricky things that happen with ratification). ...But then again, perhaps it shouldn't be surprising that the simplest possible treatment of retroactive actions - just deeming them directly and being vague about the mechanism with which time travel is simulated - does not adequately explain what happens in certain situations. It's not that different from any other too-vague rule, it's just that time travel thingies tend to feel like fundamental universal paradoxes; I agree with you. I think calling that card-situation a true paradox was compelling and remains compelling due to the appearance of actual (i.e. explicitly rules-described) time travel. Which is probably why (at the time) there was little or no argument that it was in fact a true paradox. I myself am arguing for the lawyer's standpoint here without being trained in that way of thinking myself. To me, the 'lawyer's argument' basically says in reality, any deeming is a fiction (since time travel isn't truly happening), so if the fiction creates a paradox, we choose some way to get out of it, which may be wholly arbitrary (but hopefully fair to all parties and the spirit of the law's intent[*]) the first time, then later follows precedent. This also, not wholly incidentally, is the way people typically deal with conflicts in normal board games. This is not *supposed* to satisfy a logician, which is the point of Suber's essays. I remember, when Kelly was around, at one point someone asked her about why a particular pair of clauses in the U.S. Constitution (I forget which) weren't treated as a paradox. She just laughed and said in essence they just aren't. Not satisfying! (see e.g. the famous story on Godel's U.S. Citizenship). the *other* fundamental CFJ waiting to be assigned, the one about whether the gamestate stores a mutable record of history or not. This is another thing I keep thinking of the history of; what's the history of seeing the gamestate as some sort of state-automaton with a true platonic state that we're groping to discover (as opposed to just adjusting things on the fly as they come, as you would in a board game). I blame B. -G. [*] Example of 'intent' for the cards: the intent of the retroactive card is to cancel the effect of the targeted card. The overall effect would be everything in the discard pile, so the end result is everything in the discard pile and let's not worry about how they got there.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
Kerim Aydin, Wed, 12 Jun 2013 07:37:53 -0700 : Some history: From 2002 (when I started) to 2005 no one thought about paradoxes at all in this sense. Paradoxical CFJ statements were simply DISMISSED as meaningless. I think the aforementioned lawyer had a hand in creating this system (before my time). R2358 didn't exist. In 2005, we were playing cards. As a defense card, one card had retroactive application (it could cancel any recent play). It was used to cancel out the play that led to it being obtained to play. It was done because it could be, and hadn't been done, and because the original Nomic rules said that creating a paradox ended the game. We didn't know what to do: until a proposal papered over the problem, I (the recordkeepor for cards) tracked to separates states of the game (where the card had been played and where it hadn't). Someone suggested we just had to start Agora II. Players thought it was cool enough (in that particular instance, where it was a really clear retroactive application) to add it as a win condition. That led to lots lots more purely verbal attempts to win this way (e.g. CFJing on this statement is false etc.) and the rule was constantly tweaked. [...] The current case isn't really the same sort of win attempt, IMO. I think it's just re-discovering (or re-interpreting according to current Agoran rules and play) the original legal conundrum that led Suber to invent Nomic. Probably worth doing that once in an Agoran generation or so! That's pretty neat to get a historical perspective like that, thanks, G., for posting this. If R2358 were repealed it would probably cut back on such things drastically Well, yeah, based on what you're saying, it seems it took years for a paradox to come up that actually bothered anyone. For that matter, is the card paradox still compelling? I had a look at the current ruleset and I'd guess that nowadays the card paradox would be resolved by R1030 (In a conflict between rules...) or R2240 (In a conflict between clauses of the same rule...) but not eliminate the possibility of logical paradoxes cropping up (impossible to do that in a self-referential algorithmic system). Impossible to do that? I dunno. Of course, the entire ruleset can be replaced. If no rule is permanent, then you can't eliminate any possibility. And if any rule did become permanent, then you could say it's not Nomic anymore. But aside from that, I'd bet that you could eliminate paradoxes. -Dan
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 6:16 PM, Fool fool1...@gmail.com wrote: For that matter, is the card paradox still compelling? I had a look at the current ruleset and I'd guess that nowadays the card paradox would be resolved by R1030 (In a conflict between rules...) or R2240 (In a conflict between clauses of the same rule...) Precedence between rules (though not clauses) was largely the same in 2005 as it is now; the wording of the card paradox is that card shall be deemed to have not been played, which is not really a rule conflict, though it could arguably be interpreted as one. The reason that a paradox like that is supposed to be unlikely to happen again is that we strictly avoid actual retroactive effects in favor of simulated ones, though some have fallen through the cracks - I think one of those came up in one of BobTHJ's eras, and another just recently with the promises thing, which still hasn't been ruled on.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
omd, Thu, 13 Jun 2013 18:35:23 -0700 : Precedence between rules (though not clauses) was largely the same in 2005 as it is now; the wording of the card paradox is that card shall be deemed to have not been played, which is not really a rule conflict, though it could arguably be interpreted as one. I guess you mean that card shall be deemed to have not been played or other retroactive cancellation need not be considered a conflict with the rule enabling the action being cancelled? What I really meant was something more along the lines that if two rules or clauses jointly are inconsistent (while each without the other is consistent) then they are in conflict. One would just overrule the other. And if they are not jointly inconsistent, what's the problem exactly? I guess this is wrong? I checked the ruleset to see if conflict had a definition, it isn't there. -Dan
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Thu, 13 Jun 2013, omd wrote: On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 6:16 PM, Fool fool1...@gmail.com wrote: For that matter, is the card paradox still compelling? I had a look at the current ruleset and I'd guess that nowadays the card paradox would be resolved by R1030 (In a conflict between rules...) or R2240 (In a conflict between clauses of the same rule...) Precedence between rules (though not clauses) was largely the same in 2005 as it is now; the wording of the card paradox is that card shall be deemed to have not been played, which is not really a rule conflict, though it could arguably be interpreted as one. I was thinking about this while reading Suber's essays earlier. I think there's a couple ways to call this a non-paradox: 1. As you say, one Rule says you played a card and have it, and another rule says you cancelled the play. The rules conflict, so the play of the lower-powered is conflicting and void. 2. If we treat all plays as real events with real objects that take finite time, infinite flickering doesn't happen. You play a card. You then cancel the play. Then you play a card. Then you cancel a play. The one that holds is whichever one you stated last. You can get around the deemed to have not happened by saying that one can't deem the impossible. That deemed language was always a tricky one in any case (similar to the sort of tricky things that happen with ratification). In terms of compelling, I think that just depends on the mood of the current body of players. The current player body tends towards paradoxes and allowing platonic states of indeterminate or infinite loops, in that sense we're currently still seeing those things as compelling, though I personally wouldn't mind a swing back from that! -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Wed, 12 Jun 2013, omd wrote: On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 7:37 AM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: From 2002 (when I started) to 2005 no one thought about paradoxes at all in this sense. Paradoxical CFJ statements were simply DISMISSED as meaningless. I think the aforementioned lawyer had a hand in creating this system (before my time). R2358 didn't exist. This inspired me to go grepping a bit. There indeed really isn't a lot of reference to paradox before 2005, but here are a few hits: Thanks for doing this! A good read back before my time. In particular this bit: It should also be mentioned (for later occasions) that we Agorans have taken a Pragmatic attitude to paradoxes. made me think that it was not just Kelly's[*] influence, the game was overall more pragmatic back then. -G. [*] Minor historical note: As an example of that influence, it was Kelly who named the I say I do, therefore I do fallacy.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 9:58 PM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: 1. As you say, one Rule says you played a card and have it, and another rule says you cancelled the play. The rules conflict, so the play of the lower-powered is conflicting and void. But the odd thing is, the latter rule isn't conflicting with the former: it's conflicting with a *past version* of the former. If the rule saying you could perform the action were repealed or modified, it wouldn't have any effect on the paradox. You can get around the deemed to have not happened by saying that one can't deem the impossible. That deemed language was always a tricky one in any case (similar to the sort of tricky things that happen with ratification). ...But then again, perhaps it shouldn't be surprising that the simplest possible treatment of retroactive actions - just deeming them directly and being vague about the mechanism with which time travel is simulated - does not adequately explain what happens in certain situations. It's not that different from any other too-vague rule, it's just that time travel thingies tend to feel like fundamental universal paradoxes; and only reasonable that the solution is to be more explicit about it, as we have been. The only question is whether a scam rule can subvert higher powered rules by causing unwanted retroactive action (this has actually been tried, though I don't remember the outcome), and the answer quite possibly depends on the *other* fundamental CFJ waiting to be assigned, the one about whether the gamestate stores a mutable record of history or not.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 10:20 PM, omd c.ome...@gmail.com wrote: (this has actually been tried, though I don't remember the outcome) On further review, this was actually only in a rule I purported to prepare to scam in using a very lame mechanism on April Fool's Day a few years ago. Anyway, it probably wouldn't work without conflicting with higher powered rules.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
Is this (and a bunch of other CFJs on the topic of paradoxes) all about rule 2358? Why not just change that? Although Rule 2358 mostly depends on the traditional interpretation of paradoxes as causing fundamental logical indeterminacy, and might have to be changed if this CFJ finds otherwise, paradoxes don't depend on Rule 2358. In the spirit of absurd literalism I point out that my question asked about certain CFJs and not directly about paradoxes :) Paradoxes don't arise spontaneously, nor do they CFJ themselves. Conversely, the most recent CFJ doesn't refer to any alleged paradox in the ruleset or associated gamestate. These all involve player actions, and presumably players have reasons. -Dan
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Wed, 12 Jun 2013, Fool wrote: Is this (and a bunch of other CFJs on the topic of paradoxes) all about rule 2358? Why not just change that? Although Rule 2358 mostly depends on the traditional interpretation of paradoxes as causing fundamental logical indeterminacy, and might have to be changed if this CFJ finds otherwise, paradoxes don't depend on Rule 2358. In the spirit of absurd literalism I point out that my question asked about certain CFJs and not directly about paradoxes :) Paradoxes don't arise spontaneously, nor do they CFJ themselves. Conversely, the most recent CFJ doesn't refer to any alleged paradox in the ruleset or associated gamestate. These all involve player actions, and presumably players have reasons. Some history: From 2002 (when I started) to 2005 no one thought about paradoxes at all in this sense. Paradoxical CFJ statements were simply DISMISSED as meaningless. I think the aforementioned lawyer had a hand in creating this system (before my time). R2358 didn't exist. In 2005, we were playing cards. As a defense card, one card had retroactive application (it could cancel any recent play). It was used to cancel out the play that led to it being obtained to play. It was done because it could be, and hadn't been done, and because the original Nomic rules said that creating a paradox ended the game. We didn't know what to do: until a proposal papered over the problem, I (the recordkeepor for cards) tracked to separates states of the game (where the card had been played and where it hadn't). Someone suggested we just had to start Agora II. Players thought it was cool enough (in that particular instance, where it was a really clear retroactive application) to add it as a win condition. That led to lots lots more purely verbal attempts to win this way (e.g. CFJing on this statement is false etc.) and the rule was constantly tweaked. If R2358 were repealed it would probably cut back on such things drastically, but not eliminate the possibility of logical paradoxes cropping up (impossible to do that in a self-referential algorithmic system). The current case isn't really the same sort of win attempt, IMO. I think it's just re-discovering (or re-interpreting according to current Agoran rules and play) the original legal conundrum that led Suber to invent Nomic. Probably worth doing that once in an Agoran generation or so! -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 7:37 AM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: From 2002 (when I started) to 2005 no one thought about paradoxes at all in this sense. Paradoxical CFJ statements were simply DISMISSED as meaningless. I think the aforementioned lawyer had a hand in creating this system (before my time). R2358 didn't exist. This inspired me to go grepping a bit. There indeed really isn't a lot of reference to paradox before 2005, but here are a few hits: Date: Tue, 14 Nov 1995 22:02:58 -0600 (CST) From: c647...@showme.missouri.edu Subject: Re: BUS: Green Repeals Thoughts, Part 1 [...] Action to be rewarded: Getting more Players Improving cultural life of Agora Acquiring RL resources (computer space, programs, et. al.) Clever ideas for Contests Finding loopholes in Rules Creating paradox Gaining recognition from outside sources [...] Date: Wed, 6 Mar 96 14:08:44 PST From: j...@triple-i.com (Jeff Caruso) Subject: BUS: Guidelines for Judging, revised [...] Your final judgement must be TRUE or FALSE. In cases where the statement is logically neither true nor false (e.g. this statement is false), or is irrelevant to Agora Nomic (e.g. Pepsi is just as good as Coke), or is not allowed as a CFJ statement by the Rules (e.g. Rule 1431), you must Dismiss the CFJ. [...] Rule 404/0 (Mutable, MI=1) Legality of Proposals As long as a Proposal satisfies all requirements in place at the time of its making for the proper making of Proposals, the act of making such a Proposal is legal regardless of its content. It is legal to propose a Rule which conflicts with other Rules or with itself, which is paradoxical, or which cannot be applied. History: Created by Proposal 404, Sep. 3 1993 Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 23:28:44 +0100 (MET) From: Orjan Johansen oer...@nvg.ntnu.no Subject: DIS: Re: BUS: Paradox declaration [...] It should also be mentioned (for later occasions) that we Agorans have taken a Pragmatic attitude to paradoxes. Even if a part of the Rules should become self-contradictory, we do not consider that to affect the remainder. [...] Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 02:55:47 -0500 From m...@spinoza.cokernel.org Fri Nov 22 01:55:49 2002 Subject: Re: DIS: Proto: General Rules Cleanup Each provision of a rule that is self-contradictory shall be deemed to be deconstructed and shall have no effect. The text of such a provision shall not be removed from the rule; it shall remain as a testament to the folly of binary opposition. Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2003 00:28:50 +1100 (EST) From: Steve Gardner gard...@sng.its.monash.edu.au Subject: Re: DIS: tooting your horn in 2003 And from the Agoran side, there's a strong love of paradox and whimsicality in Agoran judgements that probably have no place in the corporate world... Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 20:24:24 + From: Ken Evans cain...@hotmail.com Subject: DIS: Replies As it appears that both Kolja's are the same person, we appear to have a paradox. Whilst the entities were named differently, problems may have arisen, but naming them both Kolja forces us into a position of asserting that Kolja is a Player and Kolja is a Watcher. As this cannot be the case, I assert that the Registrar's Report, coupled with the order to globally change Klaus to Kolja, misrepresents the game-state.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Jun 11, 2013, at 3:43 PM, omd wrote: Arguments: ...but if the statement were true, it would also be true that every judgement is appropriate and inappropriate, due to the principle of explosion. There is no alternative to paraconsistent logic. Any formal system that can be used to assign a truth value to a statement like TRUE is an appropriate judgement, but which does not trivially derive it from the contradiction elsewhere, is paraconsistent by definition. The answer to this CFJ merely depends on how you want to make your logic paraconsistent. One method, which you seem to support, is to simply blow away whatever axioms would make the system inconsistent - or possibly only instantiations of axioms with quantifiers that make the system inconsistent - which I suppose could be called preservationism. I wouldn't say I support blowing away whatever axioms would make the system inconsistent. I'd say that we just shouldn't consider a rule to be an axiom in the first place unless taking it as an axiom would result in a consistent system. I don't think this is a type of paraconsistent logic, since the principle of explosion remains a valid argument. —Machiavelli
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Tue, 11 Jun 2013, omd wrote: On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 2:01 PM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: On Tue, 11 Jun 2013, Tanner Swett wrote: 'CREAMPUFF' I disfavor everything contained in the above-cited message. Because of the word CREAMPUFF? It's an interesting and fundamental CFJ, in my opinion, despite its verbosity. Sorry about the bit of snark - see the gratuitous argument I just sent. Its due to my lack of time to do this subject justice - it is indeed fundamental to how Agora examines the question of self-amendment. I just hope the judge doesn't depend too heavily on the algorithmic as opposed to the legal angles of the question. -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Tue, 11 Jun 2013, omd wrote: On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 2:48 PM, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: by human decisions which face the need to escape absurd literalism I'm not quite sure this entirely applies to Agora. :) It would be kinda cool if it applied to legality but not possibility...
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 9:37 PM, Fool fool1...@gmail.com wrote: Is this (and a bunch of other CFJs on the topic of paradoxes) all about rule 2358? Why not just change that? Although Rule 2358 mostly depends on the traditional interpretation of paradoxes as causing fundamental logical indeterminacy, and might have to be changed if this CFJ finds otherwise, paradoxes don't depend on Rule 2358.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: May as well try to settle this, I think
On Wed, 12 Jun 2013, Fool wrote: Lawyers and logicians also have different concepts of solving a problem. Just wondering, is anyone here a lawyer? I'm pretty sure not right now (correct me someone!). In RL I work with them a lot interpreting/writing regulations but v. much not the same thing. We had one playing a while back (Kelly) and was definitely different perspective.
