subject:"\[EM\] Voting reform statement"


On 8/24/2011 2:15 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:

...
Well, one of the most frequently used arguments
against Condorcet methods is that there are too
many Condorcet methods and that there is no
agreement on the best one.

Markus Schulze


Perhaps we can add a statement that says something like:

"In most cases the different Condorcet methods identify the same winner. 
 Occasionally they identify different winners, but those situations 
involve complications that make it difficult to objectively determine 
which candidate is really the most popular. Each of these Condorcet 
methods has slight advantages and disadvantages compared to one another, 
and some are easier to explain than others. Yet in all cases they 
provide dramatically fairer results compared to plurality voting, and 
significantly fairer results compared to instant-runoff voting, so any 
of them is suitable for use in governmental elections."


Richard Fobes


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version

2011-08-24 Thread Dave Ketchum

Why not agree to a shared Condorcet method definition to compete here  
with Range, etc.

Condorct ballot has rank level (unranked is bottom, don't care if  
voter skips levels (only care when comparing two whether ),  
properly attend to CW.

Have to attend to cycles, but differences here not counted as method  
differences.

Dave Ketchum

On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

2011/8/24 Markus Schulze 
Hallo,

I wrote (24 Aug 2011):

> In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement"
> endorses too many alternative election methods.
> Opponents will argue that this long list
> demonstrates that even we don't have a clue
> which election method should be adopted.

Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011):

> Is that worse than what happens if we can't
> agree?

Well, one of the most frequently used arguments
against Condorcet methods is that there are too
many Condorcet methods and that there is no
agreement on the best one.

Yes. And will not agreeing on a consensus statement help that  
situation?

What I'm saying is: yes, it would be ideal if we could reduce the  
list and all unite behind one system. But  we as voting theorists  
should be able to find a way to keep this apparently-unattainable  
ideal from getting in the way of whatever agreement is actually  
possible.

JQ

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version

2011/8/24 Markus Schulze 

> Hallo,
>
> I wrote (24 Aug 2011):
>
>
> > In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement"
> > endorses too many alternative election methods.
> > Opponents will argue that this long list
> > demonstrates that even we don't have a clue
> > which election method should be adopted.
>
> Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011):
>
>
> > Is that worse than what happens if we can't
> > agree?
>
> Well, one of the most frequently used arguments
> against Condorcet methods is that there are too
> many Condorcet methods and that there is no
> agreement on the best one.
>

Yes. And will not agreeing on a consensus statement help that situation?

What I'm saying is: yes, it would be ideal if we could reduce the list and
all unite behind one system. But  we as voting theorists should be able to
find a way to keep this apparently-unattainable ideal from getting in the
way of whatever agreement is actually possible.

JQ

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version

2011-08-24 Thread Markus Schulze


Hallo,

I wrote (24 Aug 2011):

> In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement"
> endorses too many alternative election methods.
> Opponents will argue that this long list
> demonstrates that even we don't have a clue
> which election method should be adopted.

Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011):

> Is that worse than what happens if we can't
> agree?

Well, one of the most frequently used arguments
against Condorcet methods is that there are too
many Condorcet methods and that there is no
agreement on the best one.

Markus Schulze


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

I was attempting to use your post-feedback statement as an indication of 
what methods to include in what I wrote, yet I am not familiar with the 
variations on Bucklin voting beyond what I read in Wikipedia, so I am 
certainly open to your suggested edits.


Just as you created a version that you expected to change as a result of 
feedback, I too expect that what I wrote will be changed.  As I 
suggested in another response, I think it would be appropriate to post a 
Google Docs version for you and others to edit. (In another response I 
suggested some additional paragraphs, and those can be inserted into the 
Google Docs version.)


I too welcome collaboration in this effort to create a declaration. 
After all, the whole point of voting methods is to use a well-defined 
process for arriving at a collaborative decision; in this case we do not 
have a well-defined process, but basically we are voting for a 
declaration most of us like.  As in voting, everyone deserves an 
informed vote in the process.


Speaking of which, I suggested using our signature lines as a way of 
indicating which declaration-named election method we most prefer, and 
that's a way of voting.  It will be interesting to see which supporters 
of which methods sign the document.


Admittedly that will place IRV proponents in the awkward position of 
being tempted to sign it so they can indicate their support for IRV.


0   0
\___/

(I wouldn't be opposed to IRV if there was widespread recognition that 
it uses the right kind of ballot but the wrong kind of counting.  One 
average-person reaction to this concept was "I didn't know there was 
more than one way to count a ballot".)


Richard Fobes

On 8/24/2011 5:27 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

I like this version, and would sign on to it, as I would with all the
other versions which have been discussed.

2011/8/23 Richard Fobes mailto:electionmeth...@votefair.org>>

I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to
write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the
election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just
providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take
advantage of this opportunity to ...

* ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and
frustrated voters to take action, and ...


Yes. I believe that it is worth pointing out specific advantages for
different groups, including centrist and extremist voters and major
party and insurgent politicians. It may sound contradictory, but reform,
by helping cause a healthier dialogue, can benefit all of these groups;
the customary zero-sum model does not apply.


* ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as
ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.

To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new
wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as
a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex
technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing
marketing materials.

This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already
discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.

Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.
Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other
version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's
what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra
words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most
people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed
purposes.

Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies
our real areas of agreement.


I like your explicit repetition and variations on "we agree". It works.


My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version
with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign
with much more enthusiasm.

- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -

We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in
which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we
offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will
reliably produce much fairer results.

We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks
associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In
fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results
will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the
benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced
government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from
self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on
electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that
waste

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

Your suggestions make sense.  I suggest that someone post a Google Docs 
version of this declaration that you and others can edit.  I've already 
expressed my opinions about what should be said.


As a clarification, the Condorcet-Kemeny method does not "use the same 
way to find the CW" as other Condorcet methods.  The Condorcet-Kemeny 
method uses an approach that automatically reveals the overall ranking 
of all the choices (by considering all possible rankings and finding 
which ranking has the highest sequence score), and if there is a 
Condorcet winner, it is always the one at the top.


Richard Fobes

On 8/23/2011 9:10 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:


I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write,
sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method
principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a
checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this
opportunity to ...

* ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and
frustrated voters to take action, and ...

* ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as
ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.

To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new
wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a
technical writer specializing in translating especially complex
technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing
marketing materials.

This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already
discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.

Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.
Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other
version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what
made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to
clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not
already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes.

Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies
our real areas of agreement.

My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with
other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much
more enthusiasm.

- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -


**



Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting
is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its
deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information
from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular
candidate when there are more than two candidates.


The mention of "two choices" confuses. The kind of ballot to be used
must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how
many candidates will be chosen from. If nothing else, write-in
candidates can mean the possibility of more choices.


Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that
collect enough preference information to always, or almost always,
correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and
descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:

* Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter
approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates
who are not acceptable

* Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a
first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally
indicates additional choices at lower preference levels

* Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate,
with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something
with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any
range of numbers can be used

The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an
academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can be
used to refer to this primitive ballot type.

Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known?
Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the
actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more
reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference
information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear
proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results.


The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow
indicating preference among them. When this same ballot was used in
plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one.

Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than
one AND which are more or less desired.




**


In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also
support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of the
Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is
pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there
is no Condorcet winner, we support u

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version


To Ralph Suter, thank you for your extremely useful feedback!

You are the kind of person who is in a position to use our declaration 
as (for lack of a better metaphor) ammunition in the battles against 
plurality voting. The fact that you like it reveals that we are on the 
right track.


The fact that you do not find the declaration to be too long is very 
helpful!


I like your idea of emphasizing that these election methods first should 
to be used in non-governmental organizations as a way of educating 
voters about what works, and what doesn't.  This approach could have 
prevented the situations in which instant-runoff voting was adopted and 
then rejected.


For this purpose we can add paragraphs such as:

-- begin --

"The same election methods we recommend here for governmental elections 
also can be used for electing officers (such as president, treasurer, 
and secretary) in an organization.  In fact, all(?) of the methods 
recommended here have been used for officer elections, and the fairer 
results have been widely appreciated (except by incumbents who were not 
reelected)."


"We unanimously agree that plurality voting should not be used to elect 
corporate board members.  As a replacement we support using the same 
election methods that we recommend for governmental elections.  If legal 
restrictions only allow plurality voting, we unanimously support legal 
reforms that allow any one (or more) of the election methods supported 
here."


"The above-recommended election methods also can be used in any 
organization to make single-choice decisions, such as choosing a new 
logo, choosing a time or date for an event, and choosing a restaurant 
for a gathering.  However, if one of the choices is to not make a change 
(such as not changing the organization's logo), then two rounds of 
voting are needed, with the first round choosing the most popular 
change, and the second round choosing between that change and not making 
any change."


"Although instant-runoff voting is not being recommended for 
governmental elections, instant-runoff voting is useful when a small 
group of people is physically gathered together and does not have access 
to voting software.  In this case paper-based ranked ballots can be 
collected and then physically sorted into stacks based on the ballot's 
top-ranked remaining choice.  Until one of the ballot stacks contains 
more than half the ballots, the smallest remaining stack of ballots can 
be re-sorted based on the voter's next-ranked choice.  This approach is 
much fairer than plurality voting."


-- end --

Regarding your comment about 1-2-3 ballots, verbally I have used that 
name numerous times and it seldom produces the glazed and baffled look I 
get when I use words like ranked ballot and order-of-preference ballot. 
 In other words, I have been testing it with success.  Yet I agree that 
there might be a better name.


I agree that the term "pairwise" would benefit from further explanation. 
 Yet I suspect that if I had done so in the first draft, there would be 
criticisms from supporters of non-Condorcet methods claiming that the 
declaration is biased in favor of Condorcet methods.


Your feedback reveals that this declaration accomplishes what I had 
hoped it would accomplish, namely that it would be useful to the many 
people who want election-method reform, but either don't know what would 
work (and what wouldn't work), or do know what would work but need 
evidence (they can give to others) to support their beliefs.


Again, thank you!

Richard Fobes

On 8/23/2011 9:38 PM, Ralph Suter wrote:

Several thoughts (not a thorough critique) after one straight-through
reading:

1. Length: I agree that for the reasons Richard described, the length of
his proposed declaration (less than 2300 words) is appropriate and that
trying to shorten it very much would be a mistake. It's long compared to
previously proposed versions, but it's still very short compared to,
say, a small pamphlet or even a fairly short magazine article, and it's
only two to three times the length of a typical US newspaper op-ed
article. At the same time, I think it is long enough (or nearly so --
see #5 below) to convey clearly, to a broad non-expert audience, at
least the minimum necessary information and explanation.

2. Readability: When opening the email Richard's post was in (I got it
along 4 other posts in an issue of Election-Methods Digest), I didn't
expect to want to take the time to read it carefully all the way
through, but after I started reading, I found it well-written and
compelling enough to want to do so -- almost like a "page turner" novel.

3. Language: I'm guessing most readers will find the language clear with
just a few exceptions. One exception, for example, may be "pairwise".
This is a word most non-expert readers will be unfamiliar with and many
may find puzzling and jargon-like. To find other exceptions, a variety
of non-expert readers should be aske

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

2011-08-24 Thread Dave Ketchum

What those considering, or later doing, Condorcet voting should  
consider.  Fred's last principle, about participation, caught my eye.


Those writing of Condorcet voting often promote formally ranking all  
candidates (the least liked retains its position even if the only one  
not formally ranked).  I read that as excessive since it goes against  
the principle by demanding more effort than useful in properly  
choosing as winner. To clarify:


Assuming a voter has found ranking A to be satisfying "the full extent  
of the individual's desire and ability", then ranking only A is a  
proper vote and would have the  same effect as a similar vote in  
FPTP.  Note that in FPTP voters often are tortured by wanting to vote  
for more than one, but being unable to.


Assuming a voter has found A & others to be equally satisfying "the  
full extent of the individual's desire and ability", then ranking them  
alike is a proper vote and would have the  same effect as a similar  
vote in Approval.


Assuming a voter has found A & B, with A preferred, to be satisfying  
"the full extent of the individual's desire and ability", but showing  
preference by ranking both with A higher than B is doable here, though  
not in FPTP or Approval.


Combinations of the above ranking are permitted, leaving as many as  
the voter may choose at the bottom (unranked) level.


Dave Ketchum

On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:57 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:

If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election- 
method principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to  
start by finding out which principles command agreement?


Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define  
the principles before attempting a formal statement.  One  
possibility might start something like this:


Electoral Method Principles:

* Principles express a consensus.

* No principle has primacy over another principle.

* Any principle can be challenged by rational argument.


Principles of human interaction:

* The interactions between humans is known as politics.

* The scope of politics is immense.

* The immensity of politics requires organization.

* The first step of forming an organization is to define its
 principles.


Principles of government:

* The people have the right to define their government.

* The Electoral Method must implement government by the people.

* Government by the people means that every individual in the
 society can participate in the political process to the full
 extent of the individual's desire and ability.

It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as  
an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline.  
Participants in the discussion must define the principles important  
to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement  
alleged to be supported by all members.


Fred Gohlke






Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version


On 8/24/2011 6:39 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:

... in my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement"
endorses too many alternative election methods.
Opponents will argue that this long list
demonstrates that even we don't have a clue
which election method should be adopted.

Markus Schulze


I agree it would be advantageous to shorten the list of supported 
election methods.  However, the methods you and I would remove are 
supported by other potential signers, and they would want to remove what 
you and I support.


As someone (Jameson Quinn?) earlier said, we are "splitting the vote" in 
our opposition to plurality voting.


Ironically, as election-method experts, we know we can't even vote on 
what to include in our recommendation list, because we wouldn't be able 
to agree on which voting method to use, and which choices to rank or score.


My software negotiation tool at www.NegotiationTool.com attempts to 
provide a way to resolve such disagreements, but so far I haven't 
received any feedback about that tool from election-method experts.


Richard Fobes


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

Your implication (at the bottom of your message) that our goal should be 
to create something that is "supported by all members" is impractical. 
(As we know, a consensus requirement easily leads to a dictatorship by 
someone "holding out" for their favorite "cause".)


I agree with Jameson Quinn that we should try to "write a statement, 
then see who objects to what."  Already that approach is revealing new 
information. The key word is "try".  If we don't succeed and very few 
people want to sign it, then we have still learned a lot.


I am interested in your specific feedback about what you like and 
dislike about the declaration.  If you dislike most of the declaration, 
then I encourage you to do what I did in response to the previous 
declaration, which is to write an alternate version.


Richard Fobes


On 8/24/2011 9:57 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote:

If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election-method
principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by
finding out which principles command agreement?

Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the
principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might
start something like this:

Electoral Method Principles:

* Principles express a consensus.

* No principle has primacy over another principle.

* Any principle can be challenged by rational argument.


Principles of human interaction:

* The interactions between humans is known as politics.

* The scope of politics is immense.

* The immensity of politics requires organization.

* The first step of forming an organization is to define its
principles.


Principles of government:

* The people have the right to define their government.

* The Electoral Method must implement government by the people.

* Government by the people means that every individual in the
society can participate in the political process to the full
extent of the individual's desire and ability.

It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an
example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in
the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should
do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by
all members.

Fred Gohlke


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info







Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

I think that, in discussing the statement specifics, we are discussing our
shared principles. And I think that people are more likely to participate
when it relates to a specific draft statement. As a python programmer, one
of my community's maxims is "It's better to ask forgiveness than
permission". In programming practice, what that means is that often the best
way to find out how something is broken is to try to use it in a real-world
task and see what happens. Not smart when fixing airplanes, but in the realm
of ideas or software, where you can fix most anything once you understand
the error, it works out. And the application to the current case is: assume
we agree and write a statement, then see who objects to what.

JQ

2011/8/24 Fred Gohlke 

> If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election-method
> principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by finding
> out which principles command agreement?
>
> Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the
> principles before attempting a formal statement.  One possibility might
> start something like this:
>
> Electoral Method Principles:
>
> * Principles express a consensus.
>
> * No principle has primacy over another principle.
>
> * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument.
>
>
> Principles of human interaction:
>
> * The interactions between humans is known as politics.
>
> * The scope of politics is immense.
>
> * The immensity of politics requires organization.
>
> * The first step of forming an organization is to define its
>  principles.
>
>
> Principles of government:
>
> * The people have the right to define their government.
>
> * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people.
>
> * Government by the people means that every individual in the
>  society can participate in the political process to the full
>  extent of the individual's desire and ability.
>
> It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an
> example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the
> discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so
> before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members.
>
> Fred Gohlke
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

2011-08-24 Thread Fred Gohlke

If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election-method 
principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by 
finding out which principles command agreement?


Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the 
principles before attempting a formal statement.  One possibility might 
start something like this:


Electoral Method Principles:

* Principles express a consensus.

* No principle has primacy over another principle.

* Any principle can be challenged by rational argument.


Principles of human interaction:

* The interactions between humans is known as politics.

* The scope of politics is immense.

* The immensity of politics requires organization.

* The first step of forming an organization is to define its
  principles.


Principles of government:

* The people have the right to define their government.

* The Electoral Method must implement government by the people.

* Government by the people means that every individual in the
  society can participate in the political process to the full
  extent of the individual's desire and ability.

It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an 
example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in 
the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should 
do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by 
all members.


Fred Gohlke


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version

2011/8/24 Markus Schulze 
>
>
> in my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement"
> endorses too many alternative election methods.
> Opponents will argue that this long list
> demonstrates that even we don't have a clue
> which election method should be adopted.
>
>
Is that worse than what happens if we can't agree?

Jameson Quinn

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

>
>
> Again I choke on IRV getting near Condorcet, even though they use the same
> ballot.
>
>
I've seen several results arguing for Condorcet/IRV hybrids as having good
strategy resistance compared to other Condorcet methods. For instance,
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/FORTHCOMING/I29P1f.pdf . Tideman, for
instance, is on record as supporting such a hybrid as the best realistic
method.

At a more basic level, I think that if we're going to reach consensus, it's
important to not be to facile about shooting down methods others favor. I
hear several Condorcet advocates reacting to the statement by repeating
pro-Condorcet arguments, essentially saying that they are reluctant to sign
something which advocates methods they consider inferior to Condorcet. If we
have to decide whether Condorcet is better or Approval is better [1] before
we have a statement, we're never going to get anywhere.

JQ

[1] See http://www.cs.brown.edu/~ws/personal/approval.pdf for an example of
an argument that Approval is better than Condorcet. I'm not trying to fan
the flames here, I'm just trying to illustrate that there are two sides to
this issue.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version

2011-08-23 Thread Ralph Suter

Several thoughts (not a thorough critique) after one straight-through 
reading:


1. Length: I agree that for the reasons Richard described, the length of 
his proposed declaration (less than 2300 words) is appropriate and that 
trying to shorten it very much would be a mistake. It's long compared to 
previously proposed versions, but it's still very short compared to, 
say, a small pamphlet or even a fairly short magazine article, and it's 
only two to three times the length of a typical US newspaper op-ed 
article. At the same time, I think it is long enough (or nearly so -- 
see #5 below) to convey clearly, to a broad non-expert audience, at 
least the minimum necessary information and explanation.


2. Readability: When opening the email Richard's post was in (I got it 
along 4 other posts in an issue of Election-Methods Digest), I didn't 
expect to want to take the time to read it carefully all the way 
through, but after I started reading, I found it well-written and 
compelling enough to want to do so -- almost like a "page turner" novel.


3. Language: I'm guessing most readers will find the language clear with 
just a few exceptions. One exception, for example, may be "pairwise". 
This is a word most non-expert readers will be unfamiliar with and many 
may find puzzling and jargon-like. To find other exceptions, a variety 
of non-expert readers should be asked to read the statement (or later 
drafts of it) and note any words, phrases, or explanations they find 
unclear.


4. When describing Condorcet methods: I suggest briefly describing 
Condorcet himself and his role in developing such methods. I would also 
explain that the main point of Condorcet methods is to use the 
preference information voters provide to determine how each candidate 
would fare against every other candidate in a series of one-to-one 
contests, just as in a round-robin athletic tournament in which each 
contestant competes one-to-one against every other contestant. In 
addition, I suggest mentioning that for this reason, an alternative name 
sometimes used to describe Condorcet methods is Instant Round Robin 
methods, which can be abbreviated as IRR methods to distinguish them 
from Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), a more widely known and promoted 
method that makes use of the same kinds of ballots IRR methods do. (By 
the way, "1-2-3 ballots" may not be much better than "preferential 
ballots"; there may better names than either, such as rank voting 
ballots, rank order ballots, or just ranking or ranked ballots. This may 
be worth asking non-expert readers about.)


5. Finally, I think the statement could be greatly improved and made 
more interesting, relevant, and compelling to a wider range of readers 
by explaining that alternative voting and representation methods can 
also be beneficially used for a large variety of purposes other than 
general political elections and that different methods are often more 
suitable for some kinds of purposes than for other purposes. Some 
example of other purposes are: US-style primary elections; party 
convention votes; decisions in legislative bodies and committees; 
decisions by informal groups; decisions in meetings of different kinds 
and sizes; uncritical or relatively minor decisions vs. major, 
critically important decisions; opinion polling; TV/radio audience 
voting; provisional ("straw") voting; and choosing organizational board 
members and conference attendees. Furthermore, because alternative 
voting and representation methods have the potential to greatly improve 
collective decisionmaking in a large variety of situations other than 
general political elections and because abstract analyses of different 
methods need to be supplemented with well-designed experimentation and 
social scientific research, there is a great need and justification for 
support for such experimentation and research, possibly in the form of a 
new well-funded non-partisan research institute.


Explaining these things would require lengthening the statement, though 
I think not by a lot. An objection may be that this would make the 
statement less focused and therefore less compelling and influential. My 
reply would be that while election laws are generally very difficult to 
change, it is often much easier (as I know from some personal 
experience) to change how decisions are made for purposes other than 
public elections. If such changes became increasingly frequent and 
widespread, people would increasingly become more familiar with 
alternative voting and representation methods and with the idea that 
alternative methods are often far superior to ones currently used, and 
it should also become increasingly easy to persuade people to support 
major changes in public election laws.


-RS

PS: I'm actually not an election-methods expert and haven't read 
messages on this list at all regularly for several years. At most, I'm a 
fairly well-informed amateur, and even that may be overstating it. M

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

2011-08-23 Thread Dave Ketchum


On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:

I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to  
write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the  
election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just  
providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take  
advantage of this opportunity to ...


* ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and  
frustrated voters to take action, and ...


* ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as  
ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.


To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new  
wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as  
a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex  
technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing  
marketing materials.


This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already  
discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.


Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.  
Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other  
version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's  
what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra  
words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most  
people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed  
purposes.


Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies  
our real areas of agreement.


My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version  
with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign  
with much more enthusiasm.


- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -


**



Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality  
voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its  
deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information  
from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most  
popular candidate when there are more than two candidates.


The mention of "two choices" confuses.  The kind of ballot to be used  
must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how  
many candidates will be chosen from.  If nothing else, write-in  
candidates can mean the possibility of more choices.


Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that  
collect enough preference information to always, or almost always,  
correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and  
descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:


* Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the  
voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the  
candidates who are not acceptable


* Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a  
first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and  
optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels


* Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each  
candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to  
rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from  
1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used


The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an  
academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can  
be used to refer to this primitive ballot type.


Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single- 
mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual  
preferences of voters in elections that have three or more  
reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference  
information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear  
proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results.


The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow  
indicating preference among them.  When this same ballot was used in  
plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one.


Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than  
one AND which are more or less desired.




**


In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also  
support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of  
the Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is  
pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there  
is no Condorcet winner, we support using either instant-runoff  
voting (IRV) or approval voting to resolve the ambiguity and  
identify a single winner.


Most, if not all, Condorcet methods use the same way to find the CW  
and, if found, declare that to be the winner.  If not found, different  
methods have their own way to find a winner.


I question involving IRV here.  Seems like, unless defending against  
such, that it would have its home problem of wrong choices.


Note that each member of the cycle would be the CW if all other cycle  
members were excluded.

[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

2011-08-23 Thread Richard Fobes

I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, 
sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method 
principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist 
of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ...


* ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and 
frustrated voters to take action, and ...


* ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as 
ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.


To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. 
Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical 
writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into 
clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials.


This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already 
discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.


Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. 
Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other 
version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what 
made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to 
clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not 
already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes.


Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our 
real areas of agreement.


My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with 
other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much 
more enthusiasm.


- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -

We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, 
unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which 
there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer 
ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably 
produce much fairer results.


We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks 
associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, 
we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce 
many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect 
include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise 
from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), 
wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who 
solve underlying problems that waste money), dramatically increased 
voter turnout because of having meaningful choices, increased compliance 
with laws including taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread 
economic prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world).


We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used 
counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the 
ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the 
candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner. In some 
nations this method is called "First Past The Post" (and abbreviated 
FPTP). Although this election method produces fair results when there 
are only two candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when 
this approach is used in elections with three or more candidates.


In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is predominantly 
used in most elections in most democratic nations around the world, with 
Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions. It is also the 
preferred election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet 
lack the freedoms and economic benefits of democracy.


Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is 
not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is 
that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters 
in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when 
there are more than two candidates.


Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect 
enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly 
identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these 
ballot types are, in alphabetical order:


* Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter 
approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who 
are not acceptable


* Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first 
choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally 
indicates additional choices at lower preference levels


* Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, 
with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something 
with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any 
range of numbers can be used


The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an 
academically recognized name,

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-22 Thread robert bristow-johnson

r evaluate the candidate they like better as to how much 
better.  what is the answer you'll give voters you are educating about 
Approval or Range who ask such questions?



it can unite more reformers and is simpler (especially once you get
into arguments between Condorcet systems).


*which* Condocet system is a good debate to have after having the 
*whether* Condocet debate (in the public sphere).  otherwise "which" is 
sorta moot.  in the meantime, let the eggheads debate the "which" and 
provide the public with a digested answer or choice.


i would love it if the legislature was considering Condocet (any 
Condorcet) to the point they started to thrash out whether to adopt 
Schulze or Tideman or Simpson.


bestest,

r b-j


JQ

2011/8/22 robert bristow-johnson mailto:r...@audioimagination.com>>



Well, to repeat a little of what i mailed you earlier, Jameson:

while i may agree with Laslier of the possible truth in fact:  "if
49% of the population strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly
prefer B to A, I think that A is collectively preferable" (it *is*
ostensibly utilitarian), if one could consistently (for comparison
between individuals) and reliably measure individual strength of
preference.  sure, we can ask them, but every franchised voter is
a person of equal worth and everyone's vote is private, everyone
can bring their own motivations (including unjust motivations like
racial prejudice or debatably justified motivations like religious
belief) into the voting booth and express those motives on a
secret ballot. no voter can be compelled to reduce their political
worth for which they have equal franchise to.  so i would fully
disagree with the translation of what i think that Laslier is
pointing to: "if 49% of the electorate strongly prefer A to B and
51% slightly prefer B to A, then A should be elected"

no voter should be made to, and i don't even thing *asked* to,
voluntarily reduce the weight their electoral franchise.  every
person's vote must be of equal value. no voter should be able to
"multiply" the effect of their vote (say, by voting twice) which
is the fundamental principle behind "one-person-one-vote".  it's
gonna be pretty hard to get people to part with that principle.

presently people are using the two fundamental principles of
"Simple Majority" (whatever the hell *that* means, but they all
agree what it means for a 2-candidate election) and
"one-person-one-vote" to prop up their nearly religious belief
that nothing other than a traditional single-vote ballot decided
either by FPTP or top-two runoff.  i see no hope of accomplishing
voter reform that will be challenged or associated with abandoning
either of those two principles.

only Condorcet (assuming a Condorcet winner) can be laid against
the template of "Simple majority" and "one-person-one-vote" and
decide the election *consistently* with every hypothetical race
between two candidates.  what IRV sorta claimed; that it's
equivalent to the old way, but applies the old rules automatically
(IRV and Condorcet or any ranked-choice agree that the only
meaning to racking A above B is that this voter would vote for A
in traditional two-person race between A and B). this justifies
some people's support for IRV where it is opaque to every choice a
voter has below the first choice, until their first choice is
eliminated and some other choice is promoted.

but it's really Condorcet that accomplishes doing it the old way,
but using the "technology" of requiring of every voter to make up
their minds (as if that is such a hardship - to make up your mind
about the election by Election Day) about contingency votes (which
is what the ranked ballot does, but the Range and Approval ballots
do something else).

--

r b-j r...@audioimagination.com <mailto:r...@audioimagination.com>

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

    -Original Message-
From: "Jameson Quinn" [jameson.qu...@gmail.com
<mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com>]
Date: 08/22/2011 10:14
To: r...@audioimagination.com <mailto:r...@audioimagination.com>
CC: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
<mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give
opinions

I appreciate RBJs analysis of a possible failure mode of approval.
Its true, if Approval were implemented and then repealed, that
would be a blow to voting reform.

However, for me, there are two problems with that.


1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance,
in the AV question in the UK. We d

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-22 Thread Jameson Quinn

That's an argument of why Condorcet is a good system. What I was asking for
was an argument of why Condorcet is more likely to be implemented, and/or
less likely to be repealed, than Approval.

Earlier you said why Approval being implemented and repealed would be bad.
But that does not support Condorcet over Approval unless Condorcet is less
likely to be repealed. I don't see that. And I certainly see Approval as
more likely to be implemented; it can unite more reformers and is simpler
(especially once you get into arguments between Condorcet systems).

JQ

2011/8/22 robert bristow-johnson 

>
>
> Well, to repeat a little of what i mailed you earlier, Jameson:
>
> while i may agree with Laslier of the possible truth in fact:  "if 49% of
> the population strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly prefer B to A, I
> think that A is collectively preferable" (it *is* ostensibly utilitarian),
> if one could consistently (for comparison between individuals) and reliably
> measure individual strength of preference.  sure, we can ask them, but every
> franchised voter is a person of equal worth and everyone's vote is private,
> everyone can bring their own motivations (including unjust motivations like
> racial prejudice or debatably justified motivations like religious belief)
> into the voting booth and express those motives on a secret ballot. no voter
> can be compelled to reduce their political worth for which they have equal
> franchise to.  so i would fully disagree with the translation of what i
> think that Laslier is pointing to: "if 49% of the electorate strongly prefer
> A to B and 51% slightly prefer B to A, the A should be elected"
>
> no voter should be made to, and i don't even thing *asked* to, voluntarily
> reduce the weight their electoral franchise.  every person's vote must be of
> equal value. no voter should be able to "multiply" the effect of their vote
> (say, by voting twice) which is the fundamental principle behind
> "one-person-one-vote".  it's gonna be pretty hard to get people to part with
> that principle.
>
> presently people are using the two fundamental principles of "Simple
> Majority" (whatever the hell *that* means, but they all agree what it means
> for a 2-candidate election) and "one-person-one-vote" to prop up their
> nearly religious belief that nothing other than a traditional single-vote
> ballot decided either by FPTP or to-two- runoff.  i see no hope of
> accomplishing voter reform that will be challenged or associated with
> abandoning either of those two principles.
>
> only Condorcet (assuming a Condorcet winner) can be laid against the
> template of "Simple majority" and "one-person-one-vote" and decide the
> election *consistently* with every hypothetical race between two candidates.
>  what IRV sorta claimed; that it's equivalent to the old way, but applies
> the old rules automatically (IRV and Condorcet or any ranked-choice agree
> that the only meaning to racking A above B is that this voter would vote for
> A in traditional two-person race between A and B). this justifies some
> people's support for IRV where it is opaque to every choice a voter has
> below the first choice, until their first choice is eliminated and some
> other choice is promoted.
>
> but it's really Condorcet that accomplishes doing it the old way, but using
> the "technology" of requiring of every voter to make up their minds (as if
> that is such a hardship - to make up your mind about the election by
> Election Day) about contingency votes (which is what the ranked ballot does,
> but the Range and Approval ballots do something else).
>
> --
>
> r b-j          r...@audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> -Original Message-
> From: "Jameson Quinn" [jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
> Date: 08/22/2011 10:14
> To: r...@audioimagination.com
> CC: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions
>
> I appreciate RBJs analysis of a possible failure mode of approval. Its
> true, if Approval were implemented and then repealed, that would be a blow
> to voting reform.
>
> However, for me, there are two problems with that.
>
>
> 1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance, in the AV
> question in the UK. We do not have evidence of which other system (Approval,
> Condorcet, or other) is least likely to be rejected. RBJ believes that
> Condorcet is better, and therefore safer against repeal, than Approval.
> Others might dispute either or both of these contentions, and I dont see
> that we have

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-22 Thread robert bristow-johnson



Well, to repeat a little of what i mailed you earlier, Jameson:

while i may agree with Laslier of the possible truth in fact:  "if 49% of the 
population strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly prefer B to A, I think that 
A is collectively preferable" (it *is* ostensibly utilitarian), if one could 
consistently (for comparison between individuals) and reliably measure 
individual strength of preference.  sure, we can ask them, but every franchised 
voter is a person of equal worth and everyone's vote is private, everyone can 
bring their own motivations (including unjust motivations like racial prejudice 
or debatably justified motivations like religious belief) into the voting booth 
and express those motives on a secret ballot. no voter can be compelled to 
reduce their political worth for which they have equal franchise to.  so i 
would fully disagree with the translation of what i think that Laslier is 
pointing to: "if 49% of the electorate strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly 
prefer B to A, the A should be elected"

no voter should be made to, and i don't even thing *asked* to, voluntarily 
reduce the weight their electoral franchise.  every person's vote must be of 
equal value. no voter should be able to "multiply" the effect of their vote 
(say, by voting twice) which is the fundamental principle behind 
"one-person-one-vote".  it's gonna be pretty hard to get people to part with 
that principle.

presently people are using the two fundamental principles of "Simple Majority" 
(whatever the hell *that* means, but they all agree what it means for a 
2-candidate election) and "one-person-one-vote" to prop up their nearly 
religious belief that nothing other than a traditional single-vote ballot 
decided either by FPTP or to-two- runoff.  i see no hope of accomplishing voter 
reform that will be challenged or associated with abandoning either of those 
two principles.

only Condorcet (assuming a Condorcet winner) can be laid against the template 
of "Simple majority" and "one-person-one-vote" and decide the election 
*consistently* with every hypothetical race between two candidates.  what IRV 
sorta claimed; that it's equivalent to the old way, but applies the old rules 
automatically (IRV and Condorcet or any ranked-choice agree that the only 
meaning to racking A above B is that this voter would vote for A in traditional 
two-person race between A and B). this justifies some people's support for IRV 
where it is opaque to every choice a voter has below the first choice, until 
their first choice is eliminated and some other choice is promoted.

but it's really Condorcet that accomplishes doing it the old way, but using the 
"technology" of requiring of every voter to make up their minds (as if that is 
such a hardship - to make up your mind about the election by Election Day) 
about contingency votes (which is what the ranked ballot does, but the Range 
and Approval ballots do something else).

--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

-Original Message-
From: "Jameson Quinn" [jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
Date: 08/22/2011 10:14
To: r...@audioimagination.com
CC: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

I appreciate RBJs analysis of a possible failure mode of approval. Its true, if 
Approval were implemented and then repealed, that would be a blow to voting 
reform.

However, for me, there are two problems with that.


1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance, in the AV 
question in the UK. We do not have evidence of which other system (Approval, 
Condorcet, or other) is least likely to be rejected. RBJ believes that 
Condorcet is better, and therefore safer against repeal, than Approval. Others 
might dispute either or both of these contentions, and I dont see that we have 
the empirical data to decide.


2. Reform has at least two failure modes. It can be implemented and then 
rejected, as RBJ worries; or it can never be implemented in the first place. 
Our inability as activists to agree on anything, which would be highlighted if 
we cant agree on a consensus statement, accentuates the possibility of the 
latter failure.


2a. Id argue that while we cant know whether approval or Condorcet is better 
proof against repeal, we can be pretty sure that Approval is the most likely to 
get consensus from theorists. For that, we have not just strong logical 
arguments (Approval is the simplest system, and represents a step towards any 
better system); we have empirical evidence.


Robert: I would be interested to hear your response to these points


JQ




Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-22 Thread Jameson Quinn

I appreciate RBJ's analysis of a possible failure mode of approval. It's
true, if Approval were implemented and then repealed, that would be a blow
to voting reform.

However, for me, there are two problems with that.

1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance, in the AV
question in the UK. We do not have evidence of which other system (Approval,
Condorcet, or other) is least likely to be rejected. RBJ believes that
Condorcet is better, and therefore safer against repeal, than Approval.
Others might dispute either or both of these contentions, and I don't see
that we have the empirical data to decide.

2. Reform has at least two failure modes. It can be implemented and then
rejected, as RBJ worries; or it can never be implemented in the first place.
Our inability as activists to agree on anything, which would be highlighted
if we can't agree on a consensus statement, accentuates the possibility of
the latter failure.

2a. I'd argue that while we can't know whether approval or Condorcet is
better proof against repeal, we can be pretty sure that Approval is the most
likely to get consensus from theorists. For that, we have not just strong
logical arguments (Approval is the simplest system, and represents a step
towards any better system); we have empirical
evidence
.

Robert: I would be interested to hear your response to these points

JQ

2011/8/22 robert bristow-johnson 

> On 8/19/11 12:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>>
>>These are better than Plurality:
>>
>> Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most:
>>
>>* Approval
>>* Bucklin
>>
>> / (Majority Judgment)
>>
>>* Condorcet
>>* Range
>>* SODA
>>  Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.
>>
>>
>>
> alright.  may i offer some perspective here?  this is a little more of what
> i've been thinking in the past couple of days:  what have we learned from
> (or should be learning from) the ongoing IRV experiment and Fairvote and
> such?  i remember hearing or reading a little concession from some
> knowledgeable IRV advocates (will not mention names) that Condorcet was
> better than IRV and Burlington 2009 sorta epitomized how and why it's
> better.  but they said the same thing, that IRV was a good "first step".
>  something like "let's get Ranked Choice Voting in first and optimize
> later."
>
> now here's the problem: if a voting reform has some anomalous result or
> doesn't exactly deliver on its promise, the reactionary opponents of that
> reform will be happy to point that out and this makes the rest of the
> electorate suspicious or skeptical of the next reform effort when it comes
> up.  in Burlington 2005, we adopted IRV with 65% mandate and it was narrowly
> repealed in 2010 with less than 52%.
>
> the problem is that if Approval is adopted and later disliked (it might not
> be an anomalous result, but might be that voters tire of having to decide
> whether or not to approve of their 2nd-choice candidate) they will be
> disinterested in any second step.  there is a finite number of times that
> voters are willing to try something new.  (see
> http://vtdigger.org/2010/03/**05/vermonters-should-consign-**
> irv-to-the-ash-heap-of-**electoral-history/)
>   i'm afraid that we'll have to wait for another generation (and i hope
> that we continue to have 3 or more competitive parties in Vermont) to
> revisit the issue of a better method than FPTP or TTR.  the anti-IRV crowd
> likes to think that the traditional vote-for-one ballot is handed down by
> God and the other people that voted against IRV (and had voted *for* IRV in
> 2005) just didn't like how it turned out and will be more skeptical of the
> next reform than they were in 2005.
>
> so besides Aspen CO, Cary NC, Pierce Co WA, maybe Ann Arbor MI (can't
> remember who else, Burlington VT, of course), other towns, perhaps Cambridge
> or Mpls/St.P. or SF will also have a problem and revisit the IRV issue, and
> with that, other ranked-choice systems like Condorcet. other methods of
> voting reform get stained (from the POV of traditionalists, and this seems
> to be close to religion for them) by a failure of one method.
>
> so, i think we should learn from FairVote's error(s).  and i think we
> really should be careful and aim for the *final* step, rather than the first
> step.
>
>
>  Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional
>> representation would solve it. There are many good options, including
>> some with geographical aspects, but closed party list is not good.
>>
>
> i'm definitely in favor of mapping algorithms that, given a few parameters
> from humans, sorta "blindly" draw legislative districts according to
> mandated rules (like equal population districts, statewide proportionality
> regarding groups and class of voter, community c

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-21 Thread robert bristow-johnson

On 8/19/11 12:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

These are better than Plurality:

Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most:

* Approval
* Bucklin

/ (Majority Judgment)

* Condorcet
* Range
* SODA
Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.

alright. may i offer some perspective here? this is a little more of
what i've been thinking in the past couple of days: what have we
learned from (or should be learning from) the ongoing IRV experiment and
Fairvote and such? i remember hearing or reading a little concession
from some knowledgeable IRV advocates (will not mention names) that
Condorcet was better than IRV and Burlington 2009 sorta epitomized how
and why it's better. but they said the same thing, that IRV was a good
"first step". something like "let's get Ranked Choice Voting in first
and optimize later."

now here's the problem: if a voting reform has some anomalous result or
doesn't exactly deliver on its promise, the reactionary opponents of
that reform will be happy to point that out and this makes the rest of
the electorate suspicious or skeptical of the next reform effort when it
comes up. in Burlington 2005, we adopted IRV with 65% mandate and it
was narrowly repealed in 2010 with less than 52%.

the problem is that if Approval is adopted and later disliked (it might
not be an anomalous result, but might be that voters tire of having to
decide whether or not to approve of their 2nd-choice candidate) they
will be disinterested in any second step. there is a finite number of
times that voters are willing to try something new. (see
http://vtdigger.org/2010/03/05/vermonters-should-consign-irv-to-the-ash-heap-of-electoral-history/
) i'm afraid that we'll have to wait for another generation (and i hope
that we continue to have 3 or more competitive parties in Vermont) to
revisit the issue of a better method than FPTP or TTR. the anti-IRV
crowd likes to think that the traditional vote-for-one ballot is handed
down by God and the other people that voted against IRV (and had voted
*for* IRV in 2005) just didn't like how it turned out and will be more
skeptical of the next reform than they were in 2005.

so besides Aspen CO, Cary NC, Pierce Co WA, maybe Ann Arbor MI (can't
remember who else, Burlington VT, of course), other towns, perhaps
Cambridge or Mpls/St.P. or SF will also have a problem and revisit the
IRV issue, and with that, other ranked-choice systems like Condorcet.
other methods of voting reform get stained (from the POV of
traditionalists, and this seems to be close to religion for them) by a
failure of one method.

so, i think we should learn from FairVote's error(s). and i think we
really should be careful and aim for the *final* step, rather than the
first step.

Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional
representation would solve it. There are many good options, including
some with geographical aspects, but closed party list is not good.

i'm definitely in favor of mapping algorithms that, given a few
parameters from humans, sorta "blindly" draw legislative districts
according to mandated rules (like equal population districts, statewide
proportionality regarding groups and class of voter, community centered,
and competitiveness - not to ensure someone's safe seat).

r b-j r...@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-19 Thread Jameson Quinn

2011/8/19 Jonathan Lundell 

> On Aug 19, 2011, at 9:22 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> Re: 10 words per signatory.
>
> I don't think I should be the one to judge. What do other people think? If
> people like things short, I've suggested an extra 15 or 20 words below.
>
> JQ
>
> 2011/8/19 Michael Allan 
>
>> One possible obstacle to participation (and to agreement) is the sheer
>> size of the text.  I once formulated a "laconic rule of thumb" to
>> address this kind of problem.  It states: [1]
>>
>>   Limit the consensus draft to 10 words per voter [or signatory].
>>
>> In our case, and depending on how we tallied the level of agreement,
>> that would mean 20 or 30 words maximum.  I recommend: [2]
>>
>>   These are better than Plurality:
>
> Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most:
>
>> * Approval
>> * Bucklin
>>
> / (Majority Judgment)
>
>> * Condorcet
>> * Range
>> * SODA
>>   Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.
>
>
> Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional
> representation would solve it. There are many good options, including some
> with geographical aspects, but closed party list is not good.
>
>
> I'm not a fan of closed lists, but I wonder if their condemnation qualifies
> as an electoral-method topic. What drives closed lists is the desire for
> strong parties and party discipline. One might disagree philosophically, but
> that doesn't make it a bad electoral method if that's the goal. Seems to me
> the question then becomes how the list gets generated. Suppose, for example,
> that a party held a ranked-vote primary that used the Condorcet preference
> ranking of the candidates to create a list.
>

I live in Guatemala, where closed lists are completely decided by party
higher-ups. What that means is that literally the majority of congress don't
give a flying flip what the voters think. That is what I meant by closed
lists. To me, a primary-based system would be more like "two-round open
lists" than closed lists. And the problems I see with this go far beyond a
matter of taste, and easily equal the worst problems of gerrymandering or
two-party domination.

JQ

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-19 Thread Michael Allan

Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> And re the word count: I think it's important to list the criteria
> by which plurality has "big problems" and approval et al "solve"
> most of them, instead of making the naked claim.

If you were to formally sign on, then we'd have an additional 10 words
to qualify the claims.  The fear otherwise is that adding to the text
would only raise obstacles to participation and agreement; wheras
omissions are more neutral in effect, or even attractive.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Aug 19, 2011, at 9:22 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 
> > Re: 10 words per signatory.
> > 
> > I don't think I should be the one to judge. What do other people think? If 
> > people like things short, I've suggested an extra 15 or 20 words below.
> > 
> > JQ
> > 
> > 2011/8/19 Michael Allan 
> > One possible obstacle to participation (and to agreement) is the sheer
> > size of the text.  I once formulated a "laconic rule of thumb" to
> > address this kind of problem.  It states: [1]
> > 
> >   Limit the consensus draft to 10 words per voter [or signatory].
> > 
> > In our case, and depending on how we tallied the level of agreement,
> > that would mean 20 or 30 words maximum.  I recommend: [2]
> > 
> >   These are better than Plurality:
> > Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most: 
> > * Approval
> > * Bucklin
> > / (Majority Judgment) 
> > * Condorcet
> > * Range
> > * SODA
> >   Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.
> > 
> > Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional 
> > representation would solve it. There are many good options, including some 
> > with geographical aspects, but closed party list is not good. 
> 
> I'm not a fan of closed lists, but I wonder if their condemnation qualifies 
> as an electoral-method topic. What drives closed lists is the desire for 
> strong parties and party discipline. One might disagree philosophically, but 
> that doesn't make it a bad electoral method if that's the goal. Seems to me 
> the question then becomes how the list gets generated. Suppose, for example, 
> that a party held a ranked-vote primary that used the Condorcet preference 
> ranking of the candidates to create a list. 
> 
> And re the word count: I think it's important to list the criteria by which 
> plurality has "big problems" and approval et al "solve" most of them, instead 
> of making the naked claim.

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-19 Thread Jonathan Lundell

On Aug 19, 2011, at 9:22 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Re: 10 words per signatory.
> 
> I don't think I should be the one to judge. What do other people think? If 
> people like things short, I've suggested an extra 15 or 20 words below.
> 
> JQ
> 
> 2011/8/19 Michael Allan 
> One possible obstacle to participation (and to agreement) is the sheer
> size of the text.  I once formulated a "laconic rule of thumb" to
> address this kind of problem.  It states: [1]
> 
>   Limit the consensus draft to 10 words per voter [or signatory].
> 
> In our case, and depending on how we tallied the level of agreement,
> that would mean 20 or 30 words maximum.  I recommend: [2]
> 
>   These are better than Plurality:
> Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most: 
> * Approval
> * Bucklin
> / (Majority Judgment) 
> * Condorcet
> * Range
> * SODA
>   Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.
> 
> Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional representation 
> would solve it. There are many good options, including some with geographical 
> aspects, but closed party list is not good. 

I'm not a fan of closed lists, but I wonder if their condemnation qualifies as 
an electoral-method topic. What drives closed lists is the desire for strong 
parties and party discipline. One might disagree philosophically, but that 
doesn't make it a bad electoral method if that's the goal. Seems to me the 
question then becomes how the list gets generated. Suppose, for example, that a 
party held a ranked-vote primary that used the Condorcet preference ranking of 
the candidates to create a list. 

And re the word count: I think it's important to list the criteria by which 
plurality has "big problems" and approval et al "solve" most of them, instead 
of making the naked claim.

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-19 Thread Jameson Quinn

Re: 10 words per signatory.

I don't think I should be the one to judge. What do other people think? If
people like things short, I've suggested an extra 15 or 20 words below.

JQ

2011/8/19 Michael Allan 

> One possible obstacle to participation (and to agreement) is the sheer
> size of the text.  I once formulated a "laconic rule of thumb" to
> address this kind of problem.  It states: [1]
>
>   Limit the consensus draft to 10 words per voter [or signatory].
>
> In our case, and depending on how we tallied the level of agreement,
> that would mean 20 or 30 words maximum.  I recommend: [2]
>
>   These are better than Plurality:

Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most:

> * Approval
> * Bucklin
>
/ (Majority Judgment)

> * Condorcet
> * Range
> * SODA
>   Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.


Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional representation
would solve it. There are many good options, including some with
geographical aspects, but closed party list is not good.


>
> That's 20 words.  It leaves no room for elaboration or qualification.
> But if someone else wants to sign on, then he can bring up to 10
> additional words along with his signature.
>
> What do you think?  Is this a reasonable approach?
>
>

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-19 Thread Michael Allan

One possible obstacle to participation (and to agreement) is the sheer
size of the text.  I once formulated a "laconic rule of thumb" to
address this kind of problem.  It states: [1]

   Limit the consensus draft to 10 words per voter [or signatory].

In our case, and depending on how we tallied the level of agreement,
that would mean 20 or 30 words maximum.  I recommend: [2]

   These are better than Plurality:
 * Approval
 * Bucklin
 * Condorcet
 * Range
 * SODA
   Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.

That's 20 words.  It leaves no room for elaboration or qualification.
But if someone else wants to sign on, then he can bring up to 10
additional words along with his signature.

What do you think?  Is this a reasonable approach?


 [1] http://mail.zelea.com/list/votorola/2011-May/001068.html

 [2] I couldn't resist putting it in the wiki and generating the
 difference: http://zelea.com:8080/v/w/D?a=4639&b=4638

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


Jameson Quinn wrote:
> At the suggestion of someone who wrote me privately, I have one thing to add
> to my message:
> 
> 2011/8/17 Jameson Quinn 
> 
> > I have done a significant rewrite to the voting reform statement on Google
> > Docs.
> > The new draft is pasted below. Please, go to the 
> > doc,
> > make any comments or 
> > suggestions,
> > and write your tentative "signature" (just name, spamproofed contact, and
> > credentials for now) at the bottom. Even if you can't sign on to the
> > statementin
> >  its current form, you can say
> > what changes you'd 
> > wantbefore
> >  signing. (Yes, all those links go to the same place. Subtle, no?)
> >
> > The significant changes to this draft are:
> >
> > * Does not talk about the EM list. I hope to get signatures from off-list
> > academics, *and you can help*.
> > * Does not discuss single-winner criteria, except to say that plurality
> > generally does poorly on all of them.
> > * Does not state that we agree that IRV is worse than the systems listed,
> > simply that some find it better than plurality and some do not.
> > * Includes a section on PR.
> >
> > The new draft is below *in my previous message*.  Again, your direct edits
> > and suggestions are 
> > welcome
> > .
> 
> 
> The first three changes were not my ideas, but rather suggestions from
> someone else. My point is: you can participate in this effort. I will
> happily continue to push for a joint statement, even if it morphs into
> something very different from what I originally wrote.
> 
> JQ

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-18 Thread Jameson Quinn

At the suggestion of someone who wrote me privately, I have one thing to add
to my message:

2011/8/17 Jameson Quinn 

> I have done a significant rewrite to the voting reform statement on Google
> Docs.
> The new draft is pasted below. Please, go to the 
> doc,
> make any comments or 
> suggestions,
> and write your tentative "signature" (just name, spamproofed contact, and
> credentials for now) at the bottom. Even if you can't sign on to the
> statementin
>  its current form, you can say
> what changes you'd 
> wantbefore
>  signing. (Yes, all those links go to the same place. Subtle, no?)
>
> The significant changes to this draft are:
>
> * Does not talk about the EM list. I hope to get signatures from off-list
> academics, *and you can help*.
> * Does not discuss single-winner criteria, except to say that plurality
> generally does poorly on all of them.
> * Does not state that we agree that IRV is worse than the systems listed,
> simply that some find it better than plurality and some do not.
> * Includes a section on PR.
>
> The new draft is below *in my previous message*.  Again, your direct edits
> and suggestions are 
> welcome
> .


The first three changes were not my ideas, but rather suggestions from
someone else. My point is: you can participate in this effort. I will
happily continue to push for a joint statement, even if it morphs into
something very different from what I originally wrote.

JQ

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[EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

2011-08-17 Thread Jameson Quinn

I have done a significant rewrite to the voting reform statement on Google
Docs.
The new draft is pasted below. Please, go to the
doc,
make any comments or
suggestions,
and write your tentative "signature" (just name, spamproofed contact, and
credentials for now) at the bottom. Even if you can't sign on to the
statementin
its current form, you can say
what changes you'd
wantbefore
signing. (Yes, all those links go to the same place. Subtle, no?)

The significant changes to this draft are:

* Does not talk about the EM list. I hope to get signatures from off-list
academics, *and you can help*.
* Does not discuss single-winner criteria, except to say that plurality
generally does poorly on all of them.
* Does not state that we agree that IRV is worse than the systems listed,
simply that some find it better than plurality and some do not.
* Includes a section on PR.

The new draft is below. Again, your direct edits and suggestions are
welcome
.
JQ

-
The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last
decade. Yet understanding of that progress by members of society, and even
by policy-makers, has lagged. Partly, that is because there has been no full
consensus by theorists on a single best voting system. However, there is
consensus on one thing: the two most common voting arrangements in the
English-speaking world, single-round plurality voting (also termed First
Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings, or
electorates), are two of the worst voting systems known.

We believe that reforming these systems would provide huge societal
benefits, with insignificant downside. We may disagree about which specific
reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results, but we can
nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would represent
worthwhile improvements.

Single-winner reform

There are various ways that different people evaluate single-winner election
systems. Systems can be evaluated by the results they give with honest
voters; by their resistance or lack of incentive for strategic manipulation;
by the kind of behavior they encourage from parties and candidates; or by
the simplicity or fraud-resistance of the counting process.

By almost any of these measures, plurality is among the worst single-winner
systems. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates, "spoiling"
the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters respond by
strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the two major candidates,
which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt,
widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from
entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although plurality
has good simplicity and fraud-resistance, other systems are competitive in
those regards, without sharing Plurality’s many flaws..

A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist.
Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these systems is
best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-shoulders above
plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and accepted as good
by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order):

   - Approval Voting
   - Various Bucklin or median-based systems such as Majority Judgment
   - Various Condorcet systems, including Condorcet//Approval, various
   Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze.
   - Range Voting (aka Score Voting)
   - SODA voting



Some of the signatories to this statement consider Instant Runoff
Voting(IRV, aka Alternative Vote or "Ranked Choice Voting") an
improvement over
Plurality which would merit inclusion in the list above. IRV even has some
advocates who feel that its property of "Later-no-harm", a
strategy-resistance criterion, make it the only good reform proposal.
However, IRV still suffers from other strategic concerns; in some cases, it
can lead to similar “spoiled” elections and incentive to choose the “lesser
evil” as plurality voting. This problem is not merely theoretical; it has
occurred in real-world elections. This and similar objections, along with
concerns about IRV’s complex and centralized counting process, means that
some of us feel that IRV is actually worse than Plurality. Out of respect to
this group, IRV is not included in the list.

Still, even without IRV, the list above has too many options for the
average, une

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - method of consensus drafting

2011-08-17 Thread Michael Allan

Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I appreciate the idea, and I think it has promise. Having just
> logged in and "patched" my statement to equal yours, though, I think
> that the process is still too complicated for a not-explicitly-
> -techie audience. ...

I agree, it's not beta ready and I wouldn't recommend using it.
Unless participation in the drafting effort began to flag at some
point.  Then it might be helpful.  It has a kind of "viral visibility"
that can be difficult to ignore, if not resist.

Let me know if Google Docs ever fails for you in that way, and we can
look at staging a recovery bid.

> ... For instance, even I (a relatively savvy guy; for instance, a
> regular user of git and github) can't figure out how to vote for
> "my" own version. And besides the generally-easier interface, google
> docs has wysiwyg, and comments.

Google Docs and MediaWiki have their pros and cons.  Often it comes
down to preference.  We can support free-range drafting across all
media in principle, including Google Docs.  But currently we cover
only MediaWiki.

I should mention that the voting system behind this cannot be compared
with those at issue in the reform statement.  They have different
purposes.  Voting is optional too, unless you happen to have lots of
participants.  Then it becomes indispensible.

You would vote for yourself here:
http://zelea.com:8080/v/w/Votespace?u=Jameson.quinn-GmailCom&p=G!p!vrs
But self voting is not allowed, because the purpose of these votes is
to express agreement.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/

> So, I'm really sorry, I know that there's a lot of work there, and
> if it worked out, the idea of putting diffs into emails is a good
> one... but I'm going to have to say, I still consider the Google
> Docs version
> 
> as the official one. I've put your suggested changes in there.
> 
> We can also copy from the google docs "view history" to paste diffs here.
> For instance, the first of your suggested changes:
> 
> The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last
> decade
> , and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years ago. One
> important place where that has happened is on the election methods mailing
> list.
> 
> 
> I understand that that will not fully work for those with text-only email,
> and does not provide a url with patch buttons. So I still think that when
> you smooth out the interface, your system will be better than Google Docs in
> important ways. But...
> 
> Sorry,
> Jameson

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - method of consensus drafting

2011-08-17 Thread Jameson Quinn

I appreciate the idea, and I think it has promise. Having just logged in and
"patched" my statement to equal yours, though, I think that the process is
still too complicated for a not-explicitly-techie audience. For instance,
even I (a relatively savvy guy; for instance, a regular user of git and
github) can't figure out how to vote for "my" own version. And besides the
generally-easier interface, google docs has wysiwyg, and comments.

So, I'm really sorry, I know that there's a lot of work there, and if it
worked out, the idea of putting diffs into emails is a good one... but I'm
going to have to say, I still consider the Google Docs
versionas
the official one. I've put your suggested changes in there.

We can also copy from the google docs "view history" to paste diffs here.
For instance, the first of your suggested changes:

The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last
decade
, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years ago. One
important place where that has happened is on the election methods mailing
list.


I understand that that will not fully work for those with text-only email,
and does not provide a url with patch buttons. So I still think that when
you smooth out the interface, your system will be better than Google Docs in
important ways. But...

Sorry,
Jameson

2011/8/17 Michael Allan 

> Jameson Quinn wrote:
> > I've made this draft statement into a google doc ... Probably we
> > should continue to discuss here for a while longer, but feel free to
> > also make suggested changes over there...
>
> I want to suggest an alternative method of drafting, one that might
> integrate better with the discussion.  Here's a brief demo:
>
> fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> > Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order...
> >
> > > - Various *Bucklin* or median-based systems such as *Majority
> > > Judgment* - Various *Condorcet* systems, including
> > > *Condorcet//Approval, various
> > > Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, *and* Schulze*.
> > > - *Range Voting* (aka Score Voting)
> > > - *SODA voting*
>
> I agree with Forest and I made the recommended change.  What do you
> think Jameson?
>
>  http://zelea.com:8080/v/w/D?a=4637&b=4627#_3.1
>
> [demo off] Here I propose several modifications to Jameson's draft.
> These take the form of a composite "text diff" that shows the
> differences between his draft and mine, including the particular one I
> refer to (3.1).  This method is based on multiple drafts, one per
> drafter.  Some of the advantages:
>
>  * Embedding a difference URL in the mailing list helps to focus the
>discussion.  At every step the issue boils down to differences of
>text, so it can only help to make those differences concrete.
>
>  * The discussion remains rooted in the mailing list.  It need not be
>transplanted to another medium, such as Google Docs or wiki talk
>pages.
>
>  * If the discussion leads to agreement, or if the difference happens
>to be trivial, then it can be eliminated by pressing the "Patch"
>button.  This is pretty easy to do (and kind of fun).
>
>  * Or, if agreement fails, then the difference remains standing.  It
>never gets swept aside by the process or buried in the archives,
>but remains as a qualification of any consensus that emerges.
>
> The software isn't beta ready yet, so I doubt anyone will jump in and
> start using it full time.  But I do hope a few intelligent people will
> play with it and get some ideas.  Here's how to use it:
>
>  1. Visit one of the drafts, such as:
>http://zelea.com/w/User:Jameson.quinn-GmailCom/G/p/vrs
>
>  2. Click on "My position".
>
>That gives you a draft of your own.  Login under an alias if you
>prefer.  It requires no account.
>
>  3. Go to anybody's draft and click "Diff vs. mine".
>
>That gives you the full diff.  Use the Patch button to get an
>initial text.
>
>  4. Edit the text, do another diff and post the URL for discussion.
>
> I had hoped to set this up in the Electorama wiki, but its API isn't
> functioning.  I left some edits there, and will clean up later.
>
> Please let me know if you encounter any problems, or have questions.
> Overall, doesn't this approach make sense?
>
> --
> Michael Allan
>
> Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
> http://zelea.com/
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>

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[EM] Voting reform statement - method of consensus drafting

2011-08-17 Thread Michael Allan

Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I've made this draft statement into a google doc ... Probably we
> should continue to discuss here for a while longer, but feel free to
> also make suggested changes over there...

I want to suggest an alternative method of drafting, one that might
integrate better with the discussion.  Here's a brief demo:

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order...
>
> > - Various *Bucklin* or median-based systems such as *Majority
> > Judgment* - Various *Condorcet* systems, including
> > *Condorcet//Approval, various
> > Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, *and* Schulze*.
> > - *Range Voting* (aka Score Voting)
> > - *SODA voting*

I agree with Forest and I made the recommended change.  What do you
think Jameson?

  http://zelea.com:8080/v/w/D?a=4637&b=4627#_3.1

[demo off] Here I propose several modifications to Jameson's draft.
These take the form of a composite "text diff" that shows the
differences between his draft and mine, including the particular one I
refer to (3.1).  This method is based on multiple drafts, one per
drafter.  Some of the advantages:

  * Embedding a difference URL in the mailing list helps to focus the
discussion.  At every step the issue boils down to differences of
text, so it can only help to make those differences concrete.

  * The discussion remains rooted in the mailing list.  It need not be
transplanted to another medium, such as Google Docs or wiki talk
pages.

  * If the discussion leads to agreement, or if the difference happens
to be trivial, then it can be eliminated by pressing the "Patch"
button.  This is pretty easy to do (and kind of fun).

  * Or, if agreement fails, then the difference remains standing.  It
never gets swept aside by the process or buried in the archives,
but remains as a qualification of any consensus that emerges.

The software isn't beta ready yet, so I doubt anyone will jump in and
start using it full time.  But I do hope a few intelligent people will
play with it and get some ideas.  Here's how to use it:

 1. Visit one of the drafts, such as:
http://zelea.com/w/User:Jameson.quinn-GmailCom/G/p/vrs

 2. Click on "My position".

That gives you a draft of your own.  Login under an alias if you
prefer.  It requires no account.

 3. Go to anybody's draft and click "Diff vs. mine".

That gives you the full diff.  Use the Patch button to get an
initial text.

 4. Edit the text, do another diff and post the URL for discussion.

I had hoped to set this up in the Electorama wiki, but its API isn't
functioning.  I left some edits there, and will clean up later.

Please let me know if you encounter any problems, or have questions.
Overall, doesn't this approach make sense?

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-16 Thread Jameson Quinn

2011/8/16 Dave Ketchum 

> On Aug 16, 2011, at 9:16 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I
> keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's
> about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
>
> JQ
>
> 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum 
>
>> Strategy thoughts:
>>
>> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but S is
>> better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G
>> preferred.
>>
>
> While a voter can often identify one target for all their attention, or
> more which share being best liked, I see my description of G and S as
> identifying a common other major desire.
>
> SODA?  If, when a voter lists multiple candidates, they are treated as in
> approval, I see SODA as grouping with approval.
>

If a voter agrees with their preferred candidate's declared preference order
- which will almost certainly be the case for a plurality, and probably for
a majority, of each candidate's voters - then SODA allows the simple bullet
vote for G to be strategically-optimal in electing S. So yes, there will be
a minority of voters, perhaps a small minority, who will be still faced with
the dilemmas of approval. But I think that resolving the dilemma for a
majority is important enough to deserve separate mention.

>
> MJ?  J am not sure what this is - would it, like many, fit among what I
> have described?  For example there are many flavors of Condorcet of varying
> quality, though not worth mentioning in the current effort (yet I see IRV as
> different enough to deserve mention).
>

MJ is Majority Judgment. It is defined similar to Range, except that instead
of the candidate with the highest average score winning, it is the one with
the highest median score. This apparently-simple change has very important
implications in terms of strategy; so until you've at least skimmed one of
the papers at http://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/majority-judgment ,
please do not make assumptions based on your understanding of Range voting.

Bottom line:

For Approval and Range, most voters must do some amount of strategic
thinking. For SODA, MJ, and Condorcet, most voters can vote a
strategically-optimal sincere vote. I've looked at various studies of how
likely that is (
http://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/xfiles/BalinskiLarakiExperiEvid%28LastVersion%29.pdf?attredirects=0,
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/projects/VPP/VPPpdf/VPPpdf_Wshop2010/Workshop%20Papers/duBaffy2010_Laslier.pdf,
http://books.google.com/books?id=RN5q_LuByUoC ) and my informed opinion is
that, if anything, SODA and MJ are less likely to require strategic thinking
from any given voter or party than Condorcet is.

Jameson

>
>

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-16 Thread Dave Ketchum


On Aug 16, 2011, at 9:16 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA.  
But as I keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right  
answer, it's about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.


JQ

2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum 
Strategy thoughts:

Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G  
but S is better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and  
S with G preferred.


While a voter can often identify one target for all their attention,  
or more which share being best liked, I see my description of G and S  
as identifying a common other major desire.


SODA?  If, when a voter lists multiple candidates, they are treated as  
in approval, I see SODA as grouping with approval.


MJ?  J am not sure what this is - would it, like many, fit among what  
I have described?  For example there are many flavors of Condorcet of  
varying quality, though not worth mentioning in the current effort  
(yet I see IRV as different enough to deserve mention).


Dave Ketchum


Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to  
certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.


Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple  
rules and a bit better than plurality.


IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can  
fail to elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the  
way the counters look at the ballots.


Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a  
strategy headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low  
and risk S losing to lice.


Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.

On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were  
"We believe that approval is marginally superior to  
plurality" (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think  
it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). But  
that's not what you're proposing. Is it?



No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a  
number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including  
that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we  
see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as  
approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or  
what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.)  
So, either propose some specific change in the language relating  
to approval, or bring some other objection, or both.




The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I  
disagree.


Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that  
I'm not aboard.


(What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a  
Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)


It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least  
marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV.  
I would happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than  
plurality, but I think including that here would lose too many.


Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet  
tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is  
equivalent to approval.


If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only  
giving the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead.  
But remember, any amount you weaken the "these are good systems"  
section, weakens it for all of the listed systems. Because we are  
not going to get many people to sign on to a statement that makes  
distinctions between those systems.


Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and  
we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support  
as possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone.


Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying.  
Approval does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many  
other options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you  
shouldn't generalize to "rating systems".) But this is not about  
just me.


JQ





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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-16 Thread Jameson Quinn

I've made this draft statement into a google
doc
:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US

Probably we should continue to discuss here for a while longer, but feel
free to also make suggested changes over there. (There are some "ground
rules" at the top of the doc, and I trust the people here to act
responsibly.)

JQ

2011/8/16 Jameson Quinn 

> I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I
> keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's
> about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
>
> JQ
>
>
> 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum 
>
>> Strategy thoughts:
>>
>> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but S is
>> better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G
>> preferred.
>>
>> Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to certainly
>> lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.
>>
>> Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple rules
>> and a bit better than plurality.
>>
>> IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to
>> elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters
>> look at the ballots.
>>
>> Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a strategy
>> headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S
>> losing to lice.
>>
>> Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.
>>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
>>
>>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>>
>>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We
 believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the
 extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy
 in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?


>>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of
>>> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe
>>> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly
>>> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range,
>>> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also
>>> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific
>>> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection,
>>> or both.
>>>
>>>
>>> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree.
>>>
>>> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not
>>> aboard.
>>>
>>> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a
>>> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>>>
>>> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least
>> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would
>> happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I
>> think including that here would lose too many.
>>
>> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet
>> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent
>> to approval.
>>
>> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving
>> the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any
>> amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all
>> of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign
>> on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems.
>>
>> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll
>> stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but
>> I know that I'll never get everyone.
>>
>> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does
>> force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's
>> also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating
>> systems".) But this is not about just me.
>>
>> JQ
>>
>>
>

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-16 Thread Jameson Quinn

I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I
keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's
about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.

JQ

2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum 

> Strategy thoughts:
>
> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but S is
> better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G
> preferred.
>
> Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to certainly
> lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.
>
> Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple rules
> and a bit better than plurality.
>
> IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to
> elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters
> look at the ballots.
>
> Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a strategy
> headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S
> losing to lice.
>
> Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.
>
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We
>>> believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the
>>> extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy
>>> in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
>>>
>>>
>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of
>> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe
>> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly
>> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range,
>> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also
>> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific
>> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection,
>> or both.
>>
>>
>> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree.
>>
>> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not
>> aboard.
>>
>> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a
>> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>>
>> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least
> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would
> happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I
> think including that here would lose too many.
>
> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet
> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent
> to approval.
>
> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving
> the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any
> amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all
> of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign
> on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems.
>
> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll
> stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but
> I know that I'll never get everyone.
>
> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does
> force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's
> also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating
> systems".) But this is not about just me.
>
> JQ
>
>

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-15 Thread Andy Jennings

I like it, and would sign on to these general ideas.  Thanks for writing it,
Jameson.

It's not bad as is, but I'm sure we can find ways to improve it as we work
together.  I'll try to help as much as I can, but I can't promise I'll be
fast.

~ Andy


On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> A few months ago, we had a discussion where several people supported the
> idea of writing a common statement for people on this list to sign on to. I
> said that I would write such a statement, but until now, I haven't. I
> believe that, with the Rhode Island Voter Choice Commission about to be
> seated, now is an opportune time to do so.
>
> The statement below is my attempt to write something that I think will get
> broad consensus here.* It is only a first draft and I expect it to change
> significantly before we start to sign on to it.* I am probably being
> overoptimistic about how much we can agree on. I'd welcome discussion of any
> of the points below. Remember: the main objective here is not to convince
> others to agree with you, but to find the most-useful statement on which you
> can already agree. So once people have heard each side of a debate, if we
> still don't agree on something, we just remove that from the statement or
> present both sides; we should try to avoid getting sidetracked in endless
> debates on specific points.
>
> 
>
> The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last
> decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years
> ago. One important place where that has happened is on the election methods
> mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest and most
> diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a place where
> opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the broad, though
> imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying attention to.
>
> We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the
> English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting (also termed
> First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings,
> or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems known. We
> believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal
> benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons to oppose
> such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may disagree
> about which specific reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results,
> but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would
> represent worthwhile improvements.
>
> *Single-winner reform*
>
> There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, by which
> one can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several
> classes:
>
> 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures as
> Bayesian regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority
> criterion, and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether the "correct"
> candidate, according to some definition, is elected. Although these criteria
> in some cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most
> practical cases they agree.
>
> 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, and
> inevitably there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by
> changing their votes.  It is desirable to keep such cases to a minimum. For
> one thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. But
> it's not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which gives
> too much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread
> strategy which systematically distorts the results.
>
> 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as simplicity of
> the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and feasibility of
> auditing or other fraud-prevention measures.
>
> 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage
> "clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed to voters;
> have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined
> concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system
> encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the field to 2
> major candidates could encourage negative advertising.
>
> There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is among the
> worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and for candidate
> incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates,
> "spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters
> respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the two major
> candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt,
> widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from
> entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although plurality
> has good simplicity an

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-15 Thread robert bristow-johnson


On 8/15/11 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:


Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and
we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as
possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone.


i would say that a good political document would be one that points out 
that the traditional vote-for-one ballot (either FPTP or delayed top-two 
runoff) has problems that election reform people have been pointing out 
for many decades.  in fact, every thoughtful voter who wants to vote for 
an independent or a 3rd-party candidate is aware of a problem they need 
to think through ("will I be throwing away my vote?").


the whole idea of Ranked-Choice voting is to relieve the thoughtful 
voter of having to consider strategy when considering voting for a 
potential spoiler.  then voters are discouraged from "wasting" their 
vote and that entrenches the two-party system.  in case someone asks 
"What's wrong with that?", then i recall "Dumb and Dumber" and tell 
people we shouldn't have to be forced to always choose between the two.


now, setting aside Approval voting for the moment, then *any* reform 
must call for a change in the ballot structure.  (Approval requires 
changing the structure only in the directions to voters; that they may 
vote for as many as they like.)  the simplest change or "upgrade" from 
the traditional vote-for-one ballot, is a ranked ballot.


so once this political document calls for Ranked-choice voting, i think 
it would be good to point out how IRV was sorta conceived in the first 
place and that IRV can work pretty good when any independent or a 
3rd-party candidate is far below the two major candidates.  the 
non-major candidate will not be a spoiler with IRV.


but when there are 3 or more viable candidates, where the vote really 
gets split 3 ways, *then* IRV can also fail and has done so in political 
history.  the political document should point out how this can and has 
happened.



Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval
does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other
options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't
generalize to "rating systems".)


what is "MJ"?  isn't some amount of strategic thinking necessary for 
*any* rating system (as opposed to ranked choice)?  you have to turn 
this preference:


 Mother Teresa > Mahatma Gandhi > Joseph Stalin > Satan

into numerical ratings.  that requires more thinking from the voter.

as for positively advocating a specific reform, once we get past the 
traditional ballot and once we realize that IRV will not always deliver 
on its promise (to eliminate the "spoiler problem" and the strategic 
voting that results), if we don't want to complicate the voters' lives 
with an unnecessarily complex ballot, and once we agree that the 
reformed election should turn out no different than the traditional FPTP 
for the case of two candidates, then i think it should be a Condorcet 
method that is advocated.


--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."




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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-15 Thread Dave Ketchum


Strategy thoughts:

Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but  
S is better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S  
with G preferred.


Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to  
certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.


Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple  
rules and a bit better than plurality.


IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can  
fail to elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way  
the counters look at the ballots.


Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a  
strategy headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low  
and risk S losing to lice.


Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.

On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We  
believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought  
to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to  
merit any energy in advocating it). But that's not what you're  
proposing. Is it?



No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a  
number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including  
that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we  
see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as  
approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or what  
have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So,  
either propose some specific change in the language relating to  
approval, or bring some other objection, or both.




The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I  
disagree.


Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that  
I'm not aboard.


(What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a  
Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)


It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least  
marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I  
would happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than  
plurality, but I think including that here would lose too many.


Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet  
tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is  
equivalent to approval.


If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only  
giving the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But  
remember, any amount you weaken the "these are good systems"  
section, weakens it for all of the listed systems. Because we are  
not going to get many people to sign on to a statement that makes  
distinctions between those systems.


Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and  
we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as  
possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone.


Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval  
does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other  
options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't  
generalize to "rating systems".) But this is not about just me.


JQ

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

On Aug 15, 2011, at 6:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop 
> worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I 
> know that I'll never get everyone.
> 

OK, stop worrying, and I'll watch the progress of the statement.


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting Reform Statement

2011/8/15 

>
> > The study of voting systems has made significant progress over
> > the last
> > decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was
> > 20 years
> > ago. One important place where that has happened is on the
> > election methods
> > mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest
> > and most
> > diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a
> > place where
> > opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the
> > broad, though
> > imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying
> > attention to.
> >
> > We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the
> > English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting
> > (also termed
> > First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka
> > seats, ridings,
> > or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems
> > known. We
> > believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal
> > benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons
> > to oppose
> > such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may
> > disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the
> > absolutely optimum results,
> > but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options
> > which would
> > represent worthwhile improvements.
> >
> > *Single-winner reform*
> >
> > There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal,
> > by which one
> > can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several
> > classes:
> >
> > 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures
> > as Bayesian
> > regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority
> > criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether
> > the "correct" candidate,
> > according to some definition, is elected. Although these
> > criteria in some
> > cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most
> > practicalcases they agree.
> >
> > 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process,
> > and inevitably
> > there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by
> > changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a
> > minimum. For one
> > thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior.
> > But it's
> > not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which
> > gives too
> > much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread
> > strategywhich systematically distorts the results.
> >
> > 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as
> > simplicity of
> > the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and
> > feasibility of
> > auditing or other fraud-prevention measures.
> >
> > 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage
> > "clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed
> > to voters;
> > have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined
> > concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system
> > encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the
> > field to 2
> > major candidates could encourage negative advertising.
> >
> > There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is
> > among the
> > worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and
> > for candidate
> > incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates,
> > "spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters
> > respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the
> > two major
> > candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even
> > corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system
> > discourages candidates from
> > entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although
> > pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not
> > enough to recommend
> > its use.
> >
> > A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist.
> > Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these
> > systems is
> > best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-
> > shoulders above
> > plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and
> > accepted as good
> > by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order):
> >
>
> Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order,


Is there anyone who feels that Approval is better than all the other systems
listed here? I think that's true for each of the others; the list is
supposed to be systems someone thinks are best and (almost) no-one
(reasonably) thinks are worse than plurality.


> and mention that each of the
> following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different
> direction.  In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the
> EM
> list turn out to be generalizations of Approval  I know that you made this
> point
> in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without
> registering menta

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 

> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We believe
>> that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the extent
>> that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in
>> advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
>>
>>
> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of
> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe
> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly
> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range,
> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also
> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific
> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection,
> or both.
>
>
> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree.
>
> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not
> aboard.
>
> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a
> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>
> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least
marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would
happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I
think including that here would lose too many.

Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet
tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent
to approval.

If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving
the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any
amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all
of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign
on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems.

Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop
worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I
know that I'll never get everyone.

Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does
force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's
also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating
systems".) But this is not about just me.

JQ

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Voting Reform Statement

2011-08-15 Thread fsimmons


> The study of voting systems has made significant progress over
> the last
> decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was
> 20 years
> ago. One important place where that has happened is on the
> election methods
> mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest
> and most
> diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a
> place where
> opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the
> broad, though
> imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying
> attention to.
>
> We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the
> English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting
> (also termed
> First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka
> seats, ridings,
> or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems
> known. We
> believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal
> benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons
> to oppose
> such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may
> disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the
> absolutely optimum results,
> but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options
> which would
> represent worthwhile improvements.
>
> *Single-winner reform*
>
> There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal,
> by which one
> can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several
> classes:
>
> 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures
> as Bayesian
> regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority
> criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether
> the "correct" candidate,
> according to some definition, is elected. Although these
> criteria in some
> cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most
> practicalcases they agree.
>
> 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process,
> and inevitably
> there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by
> changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a
> minimum. For one
> thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior.
> But it's
> not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which
> gives too
> much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread
> strategywhich systematically distorts the results.
>
> 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as
> simplicity of
> the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and
> feasibility of
> auditing or other fraud-prevention measures.
>
> 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage
> "clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed
> to voters;
> have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined
> concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system
> encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the
> field to 2
> major candidates could encourage negative advertising.
>
> There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is
> among the
> worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and
> for candidate
> incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates,
> "spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters
> respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the
> two major
> candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even
> corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system
> discourages candidates from
> entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although
> pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not
> enough to recommend
> its use.
>
> A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist.
> Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these
> systems is
> best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-
> shoulders above
> plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and
> accepted as good
> by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order):
>

Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order, and mention that each of the
following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different
direction.  In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the EM
list turn out to be generalizations of Approval  I know that you made this point
in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without
registering mentally if we are not careful.

> - Various *Bucklin* or median-based systems such as *Majority
> Judgment* - Various *Condorcet* systems, including
> *Condorcet//Approval, various
> Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, *and* Schulze*.
> - *Range Voting* (aka Score Voting)
> - *SODA voting*
>
> Notably absent from the above list is IRV (aka Alternative Vote,

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011-08-15 Thread Ralph Suter


On 8/15/2011 1:42 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:


It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were
"We  believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality"
(thought  to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough
better to merit  any energy in advocating it).


I haven't been following discussions on this list at all closely for a 
long time, but I'm astonished to read someone assert that approval is 
only marginally superior to plurality. Does anyone else agree?


Approval will pretty reliably overcome or at least greatly diminish 
plurality's worst weakness: the "spoiler problem" (as it is known and 
pretty well understood by most people who are experienced in voting in 
plurality elections). To me, that makes approval a great deal better 
(not merely marginally better) than plurality, notwithstanding the 
strategy issue, which I strongly doubt is nearly as problematic as 
Jonathan suggests it is. (Haven't Steven Brams and other well-informed 
advocates of approval persuasively addressed strategy concerns?)


As a related question (I'm asking this as one of the less expert and 
engaged readers of this list): Have variations on approval voting been 
discussed that might have advantages over it, such as disapproval voting 
or favorites plus disapproval (i.e., vote for one or more most favored 
candidates and against any number of disapproved candidates)?


One other important consideration: Approval voting is surely the single 
best method for making quick tentative or non-critical decisions during 
meetings. It is AS or NEARLY AS simple as plurality and doesn't even 
require that all the options be listed at the start of voting. For 
example, suppose a group is trying to decide where to hold its next 
meeting. Three different possible locations are selected. An approval 
vote is held, but none of the options get a lot of support. After that 
vote, additional options can be suggested and voted on and their support 
compared with support for the first three options.


The reason this is important is that approval voting could be promoted 
as a very simple and practical improvement over plurality voting for 
making tentative or uncritical decisions in meetings and decisions among 
informal groups of people wanting to quickly make one or a few 
collective choices (e.g., a group wanting to agree on a restaurant or 
movie or something else to visit or participate in together). Even those 
concerned about approval's strategy problems can probably agree that 
because of the tentativeness or relative unimportance of such decisions, 
the strategy issue is much less of a concern.


The point is that promoting approval as a simple, practical means for 
making many kinds of group decisions would, at the same time, be a good 
way of promoting the idea that there are practical alternative voting 
methods that are clearly superior to plurality voting for at least some 
purposes, possibly including formal elections. Furthermore, if a result 
of efforts to promote approval voting was that it became much more 
commonly used in meetings and by informal groups, the idea that serious 
consideration needs to be given to replacing plurality voting in formal 
elections should also become much easier to promote.


-RS

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We believe 
> that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the extent 
> that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in 
> advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
> 
> 
> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of 
> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe that 
> approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly superior to 
> plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 
> 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, 
> etc.) So, either propose some specific change in the language relating to 
> approval, or bring some other objection, or both.
> 

The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree. 

Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not 
aboard.

(What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a 
Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

>
>
>
> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We believe
> that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the extent
> that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in
> advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
>
>
No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of
other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe
that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly
superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range,
approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also
no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific
change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection,
or both.

JQ

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

On Aug 15, 2011, at 10:31 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 
>> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>> 
>>> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn 
>>> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc 
>>> out of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
>>> 
>> 
>> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of 
>> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more 
>> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic 
>> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to 
>> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of 
>> your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. 
>> 
>> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious"; 
>> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having 
>> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and 
>> strategies.)
>> 
>> Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe 
>> it, I knew it would lose people.
>> 
>> I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as 
>> plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of 
>> strategy as plurality.
>> 
>> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other 
>> rating-based system).
>> 
>> You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe 
>> that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the 
>> statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is 
>> likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists.
>> 
>> Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I 
>> wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes 
>> me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from 
>> plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing 
>> is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't 
>> flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is 
>> probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the 
>> few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political 
>> elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA?
>> 
>> Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has 
>> unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from 
>> plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step 
>> that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to 
>> go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger 
>> leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the 
>> simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of 
>> approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that.
>> 
>> So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that 
>> this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus 
>> made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system 
>> which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or 
>> do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply 
>> impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?)
>> 
> 
> I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want 
> universal assent.
> 
> Not universal, just as broad as possible. 
> 
> If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly preferable 
> to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the case for 
> rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are allergic to 
> IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against strategy-intensive rules is 
> at least as convincing (more so to me).
> 
> There are people here who have reasonable arguments that IRV is strictly 
> worse than plurality, and so will not sign any statement advocating it. You 
> are making a reasonable argument that to me says that Approval is only 
> marginally better than plurality. So I don't see how that precludes you from 
> being able to sign on to this statement.
> 
> Perhaps your argument is better than the anti-IRV argument, but that's not 
> the point here. We can certainly assume that it's impossible that everyone 
> here will agree on any statement of that form.
>  
> 
> In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy 
> problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, 
> strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy 
> category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation f

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 

> On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn
>> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out
>> of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
>>
>>
>> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of
>> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more
>> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic
>> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to
>> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of
>> your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion.
>>
>> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious";
>> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having
>> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and
>> strategies.)
>>
>
> Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe
> it, I knew it would lose people.
>
> I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as
> plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of
> strategy as plurality.
>
>>
>> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other
>> rating-based system).
>>
>
> You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe
> that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the
> statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is
> likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists.
>
> Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what
> I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which
> makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step
> up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most
> important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any
> statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd
> guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support,
> and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for
> real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse
> SODA?
>
> Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval
> has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from
> plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step
> that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to
> go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger
> leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the
> simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of
> approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that.
>
> So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that
> this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus
> made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system
> which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or
> do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply
> impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?)
>
>
> I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want
> universal assent.
>

Not universal, just as broad as possible.

>
> If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly
> preferable to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the
> case for rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are
> allergic to IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against
> strategy-intensive rules is at least as convincing (more so to me).
>

There are people here who have reasonable arguments that IRV is strictly
worse than plurality, and so will not sign any statement advocating it. You
are making a reasonable argument that to me says that Approval is only
marginally better than plurality. So I don't see how that precludes you from
being able to sign on to this statement.

Perhaps your argument is better than the anti-IRV argument, but that's not
the point here. We can certainly assume that it's impossible that everyone
here will agree on any statement of that form.


>
> In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy
> problems (and your three listed problems, honest results,
> strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy
> category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for
> advocating approval.
>

Again, broadest possible consensus. Approval is nobody's favorite (I think;
it certainly isn't mine), but it's a good next step, and something we

Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 
>> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn 
>> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out 
>> of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
>> 
> 
> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of 
> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more 
> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic 
> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to 
> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your 
> fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. 
> 
> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious"; 
> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having 
> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and 
> strategies.)
> 
> Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe 
> it, I knew it would lose people.
> 
> I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as plurality 
> strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of strategy as 
> plurality.
> 
> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other 
> rating-based system).
> 
> You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe 
> that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the statement 
> nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is likely to be 
> able to get a broader consensus from theorists.
> 
> Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I 
> wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes 
> me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from 
> plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing 
> is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't 
> flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is 
> probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the 
> few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political 
> elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA?
> 
> Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has 
> unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from 
> plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step 
> that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to go 
> from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger leap, 
> even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the simpler of 
> the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of approval does 
> exist, I can't even blame voters for that.
> 
> So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that this 
> statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus made 
> no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system which 
> could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or do you 
> thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply impossible? (Or do 
> you see some other option which I don't?)
> 

I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want universal 
assent.

If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly preferable 
to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the case for 
rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are allergic to 
IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against strategy-intensive rules is 
at least as convincing (more so to me).

In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy 
problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, strategy-resistance, 
and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy category, seems to me), then 
it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for advocating approval.
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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell 

> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn
> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out
> of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
>
>
> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of
> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more
> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic
> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to
> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of
> your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion.
>
> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious";
> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having
> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and
> strategies.)
>

Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe
it, I knew it would lose people.

I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as
plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of
strategy as plurality.

>
> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other
> rating-based system).
>

You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe
that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the
statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is
likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists.

Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I
wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes
me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from
plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing
is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't
flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is
probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the
few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political
elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA?

Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has
unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from
plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step
that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to
go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger
leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the
simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of
approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that.

So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that
this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus
made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system
which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or
do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply
impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?)

JQ

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement

On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to 
> shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of 
> it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
> 

Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of approval. 
The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more than two 
candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic voting. That is, 
if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to approve B cannot be made 
without strategizing. That flies in the face of your fine suggestion that 
strategy avoidance be an important criterion. 

(It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious"; 
that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having 
information not generally available about other voters' preferences and 
strategies.)

The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other rating-based 
system).

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[EM] Voting reform statement