Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC I can't agree more. I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow). Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun! But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can help everybody. I think JC must have realised at some point that his initial objections were not valid but, by that point, he was too invested in proving you wrong. His more recent objections are more suspicious, because it's hard to believe that a smart guy who understands and explains complex ideas cannot see the problem with arguing in a way that goes against the usual meaning of probabilities. He's also insisting that you said things that we all can see that you have not (like the infamous back-paddling on definitions accusation). On the bright side, Bruno, people have been discussing your ideas for years and keep doing so. This is a huge victory, as any scientist knows. Trolling comes with exposure. There's no reason for you to be sad, really. Many of us are very happy that you and your ideas exist in this world, and it's even better that we get to discuss them with you. Best, Telmo. About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive, but I would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also, we get his posts in double exemplars! Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested, possibly a bot. Bruno On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious, period phase, he might go to the next step, John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno Marchal simply can not allow Bruno Marchal's previous statement you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki to stand as is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as you will see only one city. Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee and circular caveats to his statement ( such as you is what is seen from the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is you) and the transition from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle. John K Clark On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly. Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and deterministic process. I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages away from finishing reading the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: For John Clark
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 5:13 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious, period phase, he might go to the next step, John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno Marchal simply can not allow Bruno Marchal's previous statement you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki to stand as is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as you will see only one city. Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee and circular caveats to his statement ( such as you is what is seen from the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is you) and the transition from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle. John, you are the guy who explained Bell's inequality in a very compelling way. You're obviously smart, so why are you only engaging in personal attacks? I could understand that if personal attack were the only thing left in the discussion, but this is not the case at all. Why don't you instead address the issues that have been pointed about your position, namely: - that it renders the probability of a coin toss to either 0 or 1 - that if you refuse to accept the 1p/3p distinction, then you also have to refuse the MWI ? Telmo. John K Clark On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly. Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and deterministic process. I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages away from
Re: For John Clark
Hi, I comment on Quentin, and then on John, to help anyone interested. On 01 Nov 2013, at 22:22, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ... ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV, And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them does not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than the other. but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV. You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two... Exact. each will have a different diary, and by repeating the experience they will notice the frequency goes to 0.5, like when you do a coin toss... oh but wait... JC does not want to look at that, oh wait... JC said that probability is 0 or 1 yes JC knows all. Exact. The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views, and by comp we know that the 1-view is felt as unique, from the 1-view point. It looks like John Clark's Strategy consists in describing only the 3- views. He is aware of the existence of the 1-view, and agreed that they are unique---from their own 1-view, but keeps giving the 3-view on the 1-views. And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will survive Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. John, In most (all?) natural languages we use the same pronouns for the 1- view, and the 3-view, and this for the probable reason that by reproducing by sex, and by dying, we hide that we are all the same amoeba, at least in the sense of the you in Washington is the same person than the you in Moscow. We don't really recognize our children, somehow. here the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in the teleportation box. Assuming you believe in comp, and assuming comp, you know that 1-you will live (write in the diary) a unique experience, and you are asked to evaluate the chance of which one. You know intellectually that the 1-you will live all experience, but you know that they all will live only one from their point of view, and so will have the right to ask to themselves question like why am I the one with the experience (described in the diary): MMWWMWWMMM Why this one? And how to evaluate if the next one is W or M? Oh! but that's PI in binary, so it looks like my story is PI in binary (*), so I can predict that the next experience will be W! Is that rational with respect to comp? The fact is that the prediction will be refuted by one of the continuation, and we have already agree that they are both consistent extension with the right to identify themselves with the person before duplication, and so we have to listen to BOTH of them. In the worlds of the iterated self-duplication, prediction like PI, always W, are confirmed by a set of experience which get measure 0 among all (infinite) experiences. Fortunately, if in the arithmetical reality there is some amount of randomness, there is much more structure than that, and with comp, the points of view (always self-referential with respect to some universal number(s)), get structured by the logics of self-reference (the infinity of them). (*) pi, in binary, is 11.001001110110101010001000110110100011... and experience being in only one place. No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and gentleman let the backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough soon we will leave the kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the land of gibberish. and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you] have with where [you] have found to be, ^ ^^ ^^^ There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get Bruno Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it means, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, therefore the fellow named you has found himself to be in BOTH Washington and Moscow. and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki. And it was written by you and you now resides
Re: For John Clark
On 02 Nov 2013, at 11:13, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC I can't agree more. I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow). Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun! But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can help everybody. I think JC must have realised at some point that his initial objections were not valid but, by that point, he was too invested in proving you wrong. OK. That's the pride theory, and making it explicit will not help John. I guess. But there are other theories. May be he believes that from step 3 everything follows correctly, and he finds the conclusion too much startling. Or something like that. His more recent objections are more suspicious, because it's hard to believe that a smart guy who understands and explains complex ideas cannot see the problem with arguing in a way that goes against the usual meaning of probabilities. He's also insisting that you said things that we all can see that you have not (like the infamous back-paddling on definitions accusation). Glad you saw that. Why does John Clark do this publicly? Why not in private circles like my usual opponents. There is an amount of rare braveness in John Clark that I appreciate. Enough brave to go to step 4? That's the question. On the bright side, Bruno, people have been discussing your ideas for years and keep doing so. This is a huge victory, as any scientist knows. Trolling comes with exposure. There's no reason for you to be sad, really. Many of us are very happy that you and your ideas exist in this world, and it's even better that we get to discuss them with you. Thanks for the warm remarks, Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model of randomness. If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries: , WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions. Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
