Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:45, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 2:03 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, though not to download it as a PDF (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film-graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. I have similar doubts. I also doubt that numbers exist You need only to believe in the following axioms (which are used in all textbook of physics and math): 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x You can even believe only in: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) That's all. and that the axiom of infinity is anything but a convenient approximation. No problem. We need it in the derivation of the physical laws, but that appears only at the epistemological level. But I still think there's a lot interesting about Bruno's ideas and I'm glad to see them reach a larger audience. Thanks, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 09 Dec 2013, at 18:45, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 3:52 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I mean what everybody mean by computationalism in the cognitive science Bullshit. Comp differs from computationalism in that comp includes all the silly (and contradictory) conclusions from your error riddled proof. Comp is computationalism, and I pretend (at the least) to derive the consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a scientist, just accept the definition given, and show a flaw in the derivation. The very fact that you don't act like that suggests that you are not interested in finding the flaw, if it exists. We assume comp! Every logical man should assume computationalism, This is simply ridiculous. It is logically conceivable that comp might be wrong. You are really saying that my axioms are true, which is philosophy (I don't do that). You confuse science and philosophy. no logical man should assume comp, the ideas behind it are as nonstandard as the word itself. comp is derived from comp. So, comp is never assumed. Only comp. It is up to you to show a flaw if you disbelieve that comp follows from comp. we can put our shoes in them. That's not the problem. In your duplicating machine thought experiment there are lots and lots of shoes around and one pair is no better than another, Good. that's part of why the unique person I will be (with P = 1), is undetermined. so its completely ambiguous It is undetermined, but not ambiguous. You know precise things here: 1) you know that you will feel to be one precise person, in W or in M. 2) you know that any precise prediction will be refuted by a copy, and that we have to take into account all copies, as all have the right to be considered as having survived, so you know that you cannot know which of W and M will be your next experience. Now, if you want to call that the 1-ambiguity, be my guest, and the step 4 question will be: do that ambiguity remain unchanged if we introduce delays in the reconstitution in Moscow? Changing the vocabulary will change nothing in the reasoning and its conclusions. to say that after duplication you will see this but you will not see that. The guy in W will say, gosh, I am the one in W, why? Because he's the W guy. He did not turn into the W guy and then see W, That changes nothing. he saw W and then turned into the W guy. And both the W guy and the M guy will say I was the H guy. Exactly, and that makes the point, once you understand that we were asking a prediction on the possible 1-experience. the first person does not feel has having duplicated. There is no the first person there is only a first person. and see no reason shoes can't be duplicated just like everything else. Not a first person experience FROM the view of the first person experience. FROM which first person experience is Bruno Marchal referring to? Anyone of them. We have to interview all of them, or a good sample of them. Do you agree with this? That the probability in Helsinki that (you will feel to be in one city) is equal to one? ^ ^^ WHO THE HELL IS YOU? Distracting question which is out topic, as it has been explained ad nauseam. You are ust avoiding answering the question. Bruno Marchal simply can not speak about personal identity unless there are lots of personal pronouns to hide behind. You need only to take the content of the diaries into account. John, you have not answered the question I asked you. Do you agree that in Helsinki we have: Probability(I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city) = 1 (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ? Don't say who the hell is you?, because we don't need to answer that. If both copies get a cup of coffee in the cities, and that you are told this in Helsinki, comp implies that in Helsinki P(I will drink coffee) = 1, or you should no more say that P = 1 with the simple teleportation (without duplication) and eventually you have to say no to the doctor and abandon comp. The identity question is *quite* interesting, but 100% irrelevant here. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:02, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Dec 2013, at 22:53, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 6:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo Menezes you must also reject the MWI, because you live Who is you? Telmo's post was only 63 words long but the pronoun you was used 8 times, that's almost 13%. When it is necessary to hide behind personal pronouns when a philosophical idea regarding duplicating machines and personal identity is discussed it's clear that something is wrong. in the first person, Which first person? The first person of John Clark of one hour ago? The first person of John Clark standing left of the duplicating machine? The first person of John Clark standing right of the duplicating machine? You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI? I would like to know that too. Quentin has already asked this many times to John, and we got unclear answer. John invoked the fact that with comp the duplication are done only in one branch of the universe, but did not explain why would that change anything (without adding some non Turing emulable magic in some place). I think Quentin is right, and John C. just develop irrational rhetoric do avoid moving on in the argument, ... then he talk like if I was defining comp by its consequences, but this is another rhetorical trick, often used by those who want to mock the enterprise. It is interesting. I try to figure out what is really stucking him so much. i do the same with my students in math. Why some people avoid reason in some circumstance. Given that Quentin seems to qualify himself as atheist, it can't be simply Clark's atheism, isn't it? But then what? I think the sticking point, one which I also feel with some force, is the implicit assumption in the question, Where will you find yourself. that there is a unique you. Do you agree that in Helsinki we have: Probability(I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city) = 1 (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ? Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there is no you, there are only computations that think you. The question is on that thinking. If you answer yes to the question above, and so Probability(I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city) = 1, you know in advance that you will feel/think to be unique in all possible future situations brought by the duplication. Given that both copies are produced, you know that both feels unique in one city. So both will get one bit of information, when looking where they feel to be, and that is another way to describe the first person indeterrminacy. Your point according to which that it is like there was a soul confirms my identification of the soul with the first person, and that fits nicely with theTheatetus' definition of the knower and Plotinus' definition of the soul (according to me, and Bréhier). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 01:33, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 05:52, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Could you name a materialistic theory that explains consciousness Consciousness is the feeling information has when it is being processed; if conscious is fundamental, that is to say it comes at the end of a long line of what is that? questions, then after saying that there is just nothing more that can be said about it. And hey, it's just as good as a billion other consciousness theories. Ah yes, Max Tegmark's theory.These aren't theories, is the problem. One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words. To be precise, we don't need a definition of what consciousness is. WE need only to agree on some assertion on consciousness. It is the same with line and points. The same with natural numbers. We don't need to define them (in fact we can't). We need only to agree on axioms about them, and methods or rules of logical inference/ deduction. And we learn what are natural numbers in the same way, ostensively by one's mother holding up fingers and saying one, two,... And so we generalize and make a theory about fingers and other countable things. And we know that in all cases we run into we can add one more and so we casually assume an axiom of infinity because it is convenient and seems to cause no problems. But if it leads to paradoxes and absurdities... All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta- level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws. This is a point where I might be quick sometimes/ UDA start from comp, and at step 8, we should understand that the TOE is RA (or equivalent), and comp is replaced by the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences for the epistemology. So going from UDA to AUDA, comp passes from the base level to the metalevel. In AUDA we assume RA, and interview richer believer (like PA) as generated by RA (or equivalently the universal dovetailer). After UDA, we know that we dont need and cannot need anything more than 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The comp philosophy is then translated entirely in term of definitions, and theorems in that theory. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:28, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 12:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:44 AM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 20:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/8/2013 4:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 07:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Determinism is far from well established. It's a basic assumption in almost every scientific theory. In the most important theory in physics, Quantum Mechanics, no such assumption is made, and despite a century of trying no experiment has ever been performed that even hinted such a deterministic assumption should be added in. I believe the two-slit experiment hints that QM is deterministic by implying the existence of a multiverse. Wasn't it you, Liz, that pointed out this was circular. Everett assumes a multiverse in order to make QM determinsitic. I did say something like that, didn't I? [insert embarrassed emoticon here]. I think I was saying that it was too strong to say that QM follows the principle of determinism (or something like that) because it appears to be indeterminate and only becomes deterministic thanks to Everett. However, the two-slit experiment does suggest the multiverse as a valid explanation, in that any other explanation requires other principles to be violated (causality, locality...) I think I was attempting to position myself between John and Jason - to say that determinism is reasonably well established, but only as a result of a long and winding process of experiment, conjecture and so on. But it isn't. As Roland Omnes says, quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory so it predicts probabilities - what did you expect? Among apostles of Everett there's a lot of trashing of Copenhagen. But Bohr's idea was that the classical world, where things happened and results were recorded, was *logically* prior to the quantum mechanics. QM was a way of making predictions about what could done and observed. Today what might be termed neo- Copenhagen is advocated by Chris Fuchs and maybe Scott Aronson. I highly recommend Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus. It's kind of heavy going in the middle, but if you're just interested in the philosophical implications you can skip to the last chapters. Violation of Bell's inequality can be used to guarantee the randomness of numbers, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.3427v3.pdf , assuming only locality. Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a parallel universe is. What is non local here? 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. I agree with Jason. Bruno Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:03, Jesse Mazer wrote: I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, That was what Elsevier (Santa) promised. though not to download it as a PDF Pfftt Santa looks like being a bit shabby those days ... (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film- graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. Thanks. We can come back on step 8 anytime. It shows that any supplementary assumptions we could add to (Robinson, no induction axioms) Arithmetic will not change anything about the belief we can have on matter, making primitive matter into ether or phlogiston. Step 8 just reduces the amount of occam razor that we should need in step 7, in case we want to stop the argument at that step. Step 8 is not so useful in this list, because most people here are 'everythingers', and so find quite doubtful the idea that we would live in a unique little physical universe, which is the move you can still do at step 7 to save the idea of real ontological primitive matter (but who needs that?). Step 8 makes primitive matter into a god- of-the-gap explaining nothing, not even the appearance of matter (unless you make it non Turing emulable and playing a role in the brain, but then comp get wrong). UDA 1-7 is purely deductive, but step 8 is supposed to make the link with 'reality', and so we need some use of occam razor. Bruno Jesse On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 3:32 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Excellent, Bruno! I'm very glad for you - and for the wider audience that will now read your ideas. However I notice Santa only delivers if you have institutional access. I do. But others on the list may not. Brent On 12/9/2013 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, Santa Klaus exists, and by its magical power seems to have made my last paper (The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem) in Progress in biophysics and molecular biology, *freely* available; here: http://elsarticle.com/18AF6PI This offer seems to last up to the 31 january (Santa Klaus seems to have only a *finite* amount of magic). So please download, comment, ask questions, etc. it contains (again!) the two main parts (UDA, AUDA), but also answers to many reviewers' questions in an appendix. I send this also on FOAR, for Gary :) (apology for the doubletons) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Mandela cult and mass media mythopoesis
Mandela forgive me, but this is the consequence of an unordered mythopoesis: the mythopoesis of the unrestricted will, that Voegelin http://voegelinview.com/from-The-Collected-Works/equivalents-of-experience-and-symbolization-pt-3/Reality-as-Intelligibly-Ordered-The-Unsurpassable-Mythopoetic-Play.html studied. That happens when men worship men and construct a new cult: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/the-mandela-myth/ the Mythopoesis is the individual and collective process of spontaneous creation of myths, truths and values that are the ground for social cooperation (or cooperation for social destruction). It seems that the need of the media to praise the listener vices and hopes unrestricted by reality limits promotes this kind of destructive mythopoesis -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
The myth of computer consciousnesss and intelligence
The myth of computer consciousnesss and intelligence People have been trying to create perpetual motion machines for centuries, but nobody has succeeded, I believe because of energy losses. The problem with making computers truly intelligent I believe is also impossible, because the final stage of perception must be subjective (free of symbols), not objective (described in symbols). In particular, Computers can only deal with descriptive knowledge (symbols), which is third person singular, hence, not personal and private, not conscious. The results and the process itself are publicly avalable (as code) and communicable. Only living creatures-- even a gnat--can think without symbols (not coded), since thinking is a conscious experience, hence first person singular (not coded). Since it is personal, it can to some extent be communicated, but there is always a loss converting experience to symbols, expressing in words my expeience, what I thought and concluded, which need not be in symbols. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Bruno against Plato
It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals that we can remember by anamnesis. But for you reality is a partial dream, but coherent or robust product of the aleatory Dovetailer Machine, and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and hallucinations. So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. So at the end while Plato pressuposes order the UDA pressuposes that there are tree elements that produce everithing that exist, and those that does not exist. Al the end there are two theories of everithing: In the beginning there was order and mind or at the beginning there was some kind of primitive matter and chaos. Plato theory is in the first case. Yours appears to be in the second. What is your route from chaos to Plato? -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The myth of computer consciousnesss and intelligence
On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:33, Roger Clough wrote: The myth of computer consciousnesss and intelligence People have been trying to create perpetual motion machines for centuries, but nobody has succeeded, I believe because of energy losses. The problem with making computers truly intelligent I believe is also impossible, because the final stage of perception must be subjective (free of symbols), not objective (described in symbols). In particular, Computers can only deal with descriptive knowledge (symbols), which is third person singular, hence, not personal and private, not conscious. The results and the process itself are publicly avalable (as code) and communicable. Only living creatures-- even a gnat--can think without symbols (not coded), since thinking is a conscious experience, hence first person singular (not coded). Since it is personal, it can to some extent be communicated, but there is always a loss converting experience to symbols, expressing in words my expeience, what I thought and concluded, which need not be in symbols. The conscious experience of a machine is not related only to the symbolic manipulation that the machine does, but in the relation between the truth about the machine, and that manipulations, and this, even for machine, can be shown, in computer science and mathematical logic, not amenable to only symbols. So your argument does not go through, and btw, would apply also to a third person description of a brain or bod, like other told you already. You are right that consciousness is not purely symbolic, but wrong in thinking this makes machines non conscious, as machine are confronted with non symbolic things too, like truth (arithmetical or not). Bruno Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 8:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2013 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Dec 2013, at 22:53, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 6:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo Menezes you must also reject the MWI, because you live Who is you? Telmo's post was only 63 words long but the pronoun you was used 8 times, that's almost 13%. When it is necessary to hide behind personal pronouns when a philosophical idea regarding duplicating machines and personal identity is discussed it's clear that something is wrong. in the first person, Which first person? The first person of John Clark of one hour ago? The first person of John Clark standing left of the duplicating machine? The first person of John Clark standing right of the duplicating machine? You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI? I would like to know that too. Quentin has already asked this many times to John, and we got unclear answer. John invoked the fact that with comp the duplication are done only in one branch of the universe, but did not explain why would that change anything (without adding some non Turing emulable magic in some place). I think Quentin is right, and John C. just develop irrational rhetoric do avoid moving on in the argument, ... then he talk like if I was defining comp by its consequences, but this is another rhetorical trick, often used by those who want to mock the enterprise. It is interesting. I try to figure out what is really stucking him so much. i do the same with my students in math. Why some people avoid reason in some circumstance. Given that Quentin seems to qualify himself as atheist, it can't be simply Clark's atheism, isn't it? But then what? I think the sticking point, one which I also feel with some force, is the implicit assumption in the question, Where will you find yourself. that there is a unique you. Brent, Although naive, I find the following analogy useful: consider how computer operating systems create new processes. A common method, in UNIX operating systems is forking the current execution path. I will cut and paste the relevant parts from the man page on my computer: NAME fork -- create a new process DESCRIPTION Fork() causes creation of a new process. The new process (child process) is an exact copy of the calling process (parent process) except for the following: o The child process has a unique process ID. o The child process has a different parent process ID (i.e., the process ID of the parent process). [...] RETURN VALUES Upon successful completion, fork() returns a value of 0 to the child process and returns the process ID of the child process to the parent process. [...] So let's say the original process A is forked at some point in time t, and process B is created. The only different things about A and B is a value called the process identifier (pid). This could be a very simple analogy for a person being in Moscow or Brussels. So let's say the process records its pid before the fork. After the fork, both processes are programmed to check their pid again and compare it with what was stored. For one you will get equal, for another you will get different. If you ask the program, before the fork, to predict if it will find itself in the state equal or unequal after the fork, the most correct program will assign p=.5 to each one of these outcomes. Any program that assigns a different p will be shown to be less correct by repeating this experiment a number of times. The program can tell you the state with p=1 after the fork. Otherwise, both programs will feel unique, in the sense that their algorithms remain unchanged. It is now possible for them to interact, in the same way that the victims of the duplication experiment can shake hands or play chess. If you ask any of the programs about a record of their states before the fork, they will give you equal answers (if they are correct programs). What do you think? Telmo. Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there is no you, there are only computations that think you. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
Re: Bruno against Plato
On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:40, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals that we can remember by anamnesis. OK. But for you reality is a partial dream, Not at all. Only physical reality. And it is not one dream, it is what result from an infinity of dreams, by the FPI on arithmetic. (FPI = first person indeterminacy, *on* the complete UD emulation in arithmetic). but coherent or robust product of the aleatory Dovetailer Machine, + The FPI. and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and hallucinations. By comp, and the FPI on all computations going through our comp state (which exists theoretically, as we work in the comp theory). So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. Only computations. Computer science shows this to be a complex mathematical structure, structured differently from the different points of view of a machines, which themselves obeys the non trivial laws of self-reference. It is full of structure. So at the end while Plato pressuposes order the UDA pressuposes that there are tree elements that produce everithing that exist, and those that does not exist. I assume comp, and then reason. Like Plato we presuppose order (indeed, brought by arithmetic: we know that the order in arithmetic is *very* rich, and not completely accessible by *any* effective theory). Comp let us just assume no more order than there is in arithmetic, at he basic ontological (assumed) level.. Al the end there are two theories of everithing: In the beginning there was order and mind That is exactly what you get by assuming comp. In the 'beginning' you have order (the additive/multiplicative structure of the numbers) and the emerging mind from it (the universal consciousness that you associate to all universal numbers in arithmetic, by comp, and which is differentiating through the indexical (self-referential) FPI). or at the beginning there was some kind of primitive matter and chaos. Plato theory is in the first case. Yes. No primitive matter, and the full rich order of the numbers (or of any Turing universal system). Yours appears to be in the second. Not at all. There is no assumed matter, and we assume the order needed to make sense of computations and Church thesis. You are right that there is some chaos, but that is part of the (new) world of ideas. What is your route from chaos to Plato? The One of the Parmenides (used by Plotinus) = arithmetical truth (that is full order far beyond what any machine can grasped). Chaos can be there, like in the prime numbers, but there is also a lot of music. That chaos is there is what is new in Platonia, but Plato could not be aware of Gödel. The Noùs (Plato's universe of ideas) is given by the arithmetical truth, made partially intelligible by the universal numbers. The Soul (Plato's soul, Plotinus' universal soul) is given by the conjunction/intersection of the One, and the Noùs. Intelligible Matter is given by the conjunction of the Noùs and the existence of a reality (self-consistency, Dt). Sensible Matter is given by the conjunction of intelligible matter and the One. More on this in the Plotinus' paper. Comp rehabilitates not just Plato, but Pythagorus (thanks to Church thesis). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Bruno against Plato
2013/12/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:40, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals that we can remember by anamnesis. OK. But for you reality is a partial dream, Not at all. Only physical reality. And it is not one dream, it is what result from an infinity of dreams, by the FPI on arithmetic. (FPI = first person indeterminacy, *on* the complete UD emulation in arithmetic). but coherent or robust product of the aleatory Dovetailer Machine, + The FPI. and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and hallucinations. By comp, and the FPI on all computations going through our comp state (which exists theoretically, as we work in the comp theory). So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. Only computations. Computer science shows this to be a complex mathematical structure, structured differently from the different points of view of a machines, which themselves obeys the non trivial laws of self-reference. It is full of structure. Where that structure come from? I see all computatons possible coming from the UDA, some of them with structure, some of them do not. It is isomorphic to some subset of the mathematical multiverse or the boltzmann aleatory structures.Or can be emulated by UDA. The only additional merit is the use of few initial assumptions. But to emulate everithing possible with few assumptions is not a merit IMHO. I´m not trying to be harsh. I just want to put my impressions in words. The platoninc world of ideas is then ONE of the many possible infinite whoknows that the UDA can produce. The self reference, the diofantic equations etc are tentative ways to stablish a limit to that exuberance, but either you postulate UDA in its completeness and everithing produced from UDA exist and therefore I´m right and the order is only apparent and local, like in the multiverse hypothesis(that i find equaly unsatisfactory) or you add additional axioms. So at the end while Plato pressuposes order the UDA pressuposes that there are tree elements that produce everithing that exist, and those that does not exist. I assume comp, and then reason. Like Plato we presuppose order (indeed, brought by arithmetic: we know that the order in arithmetic is *very* rich, and not completely accessible by *any* effective theory). Comp let us just assume no more order than there is in arithmetic, at he basic ontological (assumed) level.. Al the end there are two theories of everithing: In the beginning there was order and mind That is exactly what you get by assuming comp. In the 'beginning' you have order (the additive/multiplicative structure of the numbers) and the emerging mind from it (the universal consciousness that you associate to all universal numbers in arithmetic, by comp, and which is differentiating through the indexical (self-referential) FPI). or at the beginning there was some kind of primitive matter and chaos. Plato theory is in the first case. Yes. No primitive matter, and the full rich order of the numbers (or of any Turing universal system). Yours appears to be in the second. Not at all. There is no assumed matter, and we assume the order needed to make sense of computations and Church thesis. You are right that there is some chaos, but that is part of the (new) world of ideas. What is your route from chaos to Plato? The One of the Parmenides (used by Plotinus) = arithmetical truth (that is full order far beyond what any machine can grasped). Chaos can be there, like in the prime numbers, but there is also a lot of music. That chaos is there is what is new in Platonia, but Plato could not be aware of Gödel. The Noùs (Plato's universe of ideas) is given by the arithmetical truth, made partially intelligible by the universal numbers. The Soul (Plato's soul, Plotinus' universal soul) is given by the conjunction/intersection of the One, and the Noùs. Intelligible Matter is given by the conjunction of the Noùs and the existence of a reality (self-consistency, Dt). Sensible Matter is given by the conjunction of intelligible matter and the One. More on this in the Plotinus' paper. Comp rehabilitates not just Plato, but Pythagorus (thanks to Church thesis). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
Re: A definition of human consciousness
Bruno: All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws. Richard: Could explain why the physical laws are not ontological.? On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 01:33, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 05:52, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Could you name a materialistic theory that explains consciousness Consciousness is the feeling information has when it is being processed; if conscious is fundamental, that is to say it comes at the end of a long line of what is that? questions, then after saying that there is just nothing more that can be said about it. And hey, it's just as good as a billion other consciousness theories. Ah yes, Max Tegmark's theory.These aren't theories, is the problem. One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words. To be precise, we don't need a definition of what consciousness is. WE need only to agree on some assertion on consciousness. It is the same with line and points. The same with natural numbers. We don't need to define them (in fact we can't). We need only to agree on axioms about them, and methods or rules of logical inference/deduction. And we learn what are natural numbers in the same way, ostensively by one's mother holding up fingers and saying one, two,... And so we generalize and make a theory about fingers and other countable things. And we know that in all cases we run into we can add one more and so we casually assume an axiom of infinity because it is convenient and seems to cause no problems. But if it leads to paradoxes and absurdities... All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws. This is a point where I might be quick sometimes/ UDA start from comp, and at step 8, we should understand that the TOE is RA (or equivalent), and comp is replaced by the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences for the epistemology. So going from UDA to AUDA, comp passes from the base level to the metalevel. In AUDA we assume RA, and interview richer believer (like PA) as generated by RA (or equivalently the universal dovetailer). After UDA, we know that we dont need and cannot need anything more than 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The comp philosophy is then translated entirely in term of definitions, and theorems in that theory. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Leibniz vs Jerry Fodor - Is there a language of thought ?
Leibniz and Piccinini versus Jerry Fodor - Is there a language of thought ? 1. Jerry Fodor argues that thoughts have representations, namely that there is a language of thought: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_of_thought In which, as I understand it, computations are made by the brain presumably semantically using this language in some analogy to a Turing machine. 2. There is an alternate theory of thinking by Gualteiro Piccinini: http://philpapers.org/rec/PICCWR as well as Leibniz, which seems to me to be essentially pragmatic or or perhaps mechanical, not semantic, so not disimilar to Leibniz's theory of perceptions and the following of the pre-established order. Leibniz's theory as well as this theory can seemingly'be used by any biological entity, and in Leibniz's case at least, by non-biological (in the conventional sense) entities. Both of these seem to follow these steps: a) the brain perceives a sensory and b) by some mechanism knows what it perceives (forming a representation, a word that Piccinini rejects) c) which causes it pragmatically to act in an instinctual. learned or otherwise prescribed fashion. Here semantics are replaced by functional (pragmatic) mechanisms. In Leibniz these steps are carried out by the One which in a) converts a sensory into signal into a perception and in b) and c) carries out a prescribed action which biologists might call an instinct and which Leibniz calls a pre-established harmony. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
[no subject]
Leibniz and Piccinini versus Jerry Fodor - Is there a language of thought ? 1. Jerry Fodor argues that thoughts have representations, namely that there is a language of thought: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_of_thought In which, as I understand it, computations are made by the brain presumably semantically using this language in some analogy to a Turing machine. 2. There is an alternate theory of thinking by Gualteiro Piccinini: http://philpapers.org/rec/PICCWR as well as Leibniz, which seems to me to be essentially pragmatic or or perhaps mechanical, not semantic, so not disimilar to Leibniz's theory of perceptions and the following of the pre-established order. Leibniz's theory as well as this theory can seemingly'be used by any biological entity, and in Leibniz's case at least, by non-biological (in the conventional sense) entities. Both of these seem to follow these steps: a) the brain perceives a sensory and b) by some mechanism knows what it perceives (forming a representation, a word that Piccinini rejects) c) which causes it pragmatically to act in an instinctual. learned or otherwise prescribed fashion. Here semantics are replaced by functional (pragmatic) mechanisms. In Leibniz these steps are carried out by the One which in a) converts a sensory into signal into a perception and in b) and c) carries out a prescribed action which biologists might call an instinct and which Leibniz calls a pre-established harmony. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Leibniz and Piccinini versus Jerry Fodor - Is there a language of thought ?
Leibniz and Piccinini versus Jerry Fodor - Is there a language of thought ? 1. Jerry Fodor argues that thoughts have representations, namely that there is a language of thought: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_of_thought In which, as I understand it, computations aremade by the brain presumably semantically using this language in some analogy to a Turing machine. 2. There is an alternate theory of thinking by Gualteiro Piccinini: http://philpapers.org/rec/PICCWR as well as Leibniz, which seems to me to be essentially pragmatic or or perhaps mechanical, not semantic, so not disimilar to Leibniz's theory of perceptions and the following of the pre-established order. Leibniz's theory http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ as well as this theory can seemingly'be used by any biological entity, and in Leibniz's case at least, bynon-biological (in the conventional sense) entities. Both of these seem to follow these steps: a) the brain perceives a sensory signal and b) by some mechanism knowswhat it perceives (forming a representation, a word that Piccinini rejects) c) which causes it pragmatically to act in an instinctual, learned orotherwiseprescribed fashion. Here semantics are replaced by functional (pragmatic) mechanisms. In Leibniz these stepsare carried out by the One which in a) converts a sensory into signal into a perception and in b) and c) carries out a prescribed action which biologists might call an instinct and which Leibniz calls a pre-established harmony. Dr.Roger B CloughNIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI? If I am reluctant to answer your question it is because I've already done so many times in the past, but if you insist I will do so again. The Many World's Interpretation is about what can be expected to be seen, and although it may seem strange to us Everett's ideas are 100% logically self consistent. Bruno's proof is not about what will be seen but about a feeling of identity, about who you can expect to be; but you do not think you're the same person you were yesterday because yesterday you made a prediction about today that turned out to be correct, you think you're the same person you were yesterday for one reason and one reason only, you remember being Telmo Menezes yesterday. It's a good thing that's the way it works because I make incorrect predictions all the time and when I do I don't feel that I've entered oblivion, instead I feel like I am the same person I was before because I can still remember being the guy who made that prediction that turned out to be wrong. I don't feel like I'm dead, I just feel like the guy who made a crappy prediction. Bruno thinks you can trace personal identity from the present to the future, but that is like pushing on a string. You can only pull a string and you can only trace identity from the past to the present. A feeling of self has nothing to do with predictions, successful ones or otherwise, and in fact you might not even have a future, but you certainly have a past. If tomorrow somebody remembers being Telmo Menezes today then Telmo Menezes has a future, if not then Telmo Menezes has no future, and Quantum Mechanics or a understanding of Everett's Many Worlds is not needed for any of it. Period. However in a completely different unrelated matter, if you want to assign a probability that tomorrow a observer that can be interviewed by a third party will observe a electron move left or right then Quantum Mechanics will be needed. And some (including me) feel that Everett's interpretation is a convenient way to think about it, although there are other ways. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Bruno against Plato
On 10 Dec 2013, at 12:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2013/12/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:40, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals that we can remember by anamnesis. OK. But for you reality is a partial dream, Not at all. Only physical reality. And it is not one dream, it is what result from an infinity of dreams, by the FPI on arithmetic. (FPI = first person indeterminacy, *on* the complete UD emulation in arithmetic). but coherent or robust product of the aleatory Dovetailer Machine, + The FPI. and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and hallucinations. By comp, and the FPI on all computations going through our comp state (which exists theoretically, as we work in the comp theory). So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. Only computations. Computer science shows this to be a complex mathematical structure, structured differently from the different points of view of a machines, which themselves obeys the non trivial laws of self-reference. It is full of structure. Where that structure come from? They follow from the laws of addition and multiplication and logic, basically from: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The TOE has no other axioms. (Only definitions). Note that most scientific theories admit those axioms. I see all computatons possible coming from the UDA, You mean the UD (the universal dovetailer). UDA is for the UD Argument (UDA is only the name of a deductive argument based on the notion of Universal Dovetailing). some of them with structure, some of them do not. That is ambiguous. They all have some structure. But I am OK, as some have internal and external (to them, relatively) random data, also. It is isomorphic to some subset of the mathematical multiverse Too much fuzzy. It depends of your starting assumption. multiverse is usually used in the context of QM. But neither QM, nor ~QM is assumed in the UD Argument. The UD argument is deductive (not entirely in step 8 as it is intended to apply on 'reality' and use Occam razor). It shows that if you survive with a digital brain, then you survive in the infinitely many arithmetical brain, and physics, to remain a stable appearance has no choice to exploit an infinite self-multiplication. UDA reduces partially the mind-body problem (my job) to a body problem in arithmetic. It is a problem. Not a solution of a problem (except that in the arithmetical translation of the UDA (AUDA), we can already interview the universal machine (Löbian one) on that problem, and they tell us that Plato seems less foolish than Aristotle. or the boltzmann aleatory structures. Same remark. Keep in mind that if we accept the existence of a physical reality, we meta-reason to find the deepest laws of reality, and be open that physics might not be the fundamental theory. Or can be emulated by UDA. Yes. Note that the UD emulation is entirely deterministic (in the 3p), and hopefully partially deterministic in the 1p (plural) view. The only additional merit is the use of few initial assumptions. I think you miss the point. I am just saying that if comp is correct, then adding anything to those initial assumption is a redundant form of conceptual treachery. But to emulate everithing possible with few assumptions is not a merit IMHO. You do miss the point. With all my respect. The emulation is only a manner of formulating the problem precisely, that is, mathematically. I´m not trying to be harsh. No problem. I could look like a philosopher, defending some theory. But that's not what I do, and did. I am a logician, and computer scientist, explaining that if you say yes to the comp doctor, then (assuming you have enough logical cognitive ability) to reduce the comp mind body problem into body problem in arithmetic. Then I show that we can interview universal machine having such cognitive ability, translating indeed the problem into a sequence of problems in arithmetic. At first sight Plotinus and the mystics are closer to the Löbian numbers than Aristotle. I mean in term of coherent whole. I just want to put my impressions in words. The platoninc world of ideas is then ONE of the many possible infinite whoknows that the UDA can produce. Well, it is just the sigma_1 complete part of a vastly bigger arithmetical reality (pi_1, sigma_24, pi_1000, etc.)) It is important to keep in mind the difference between the computable part of the arithmetical reality, with the non computable part, and the non provable part, by any machines,
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 10 Dec 2013, at 13:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Comp is computationalism, and I pretend (at the least) to derive the consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a scientist, just accept the definition given, and show a flaw in the derivation. The very fact that you don't act like that suggests that you are not interested in finding the flaw, if it exists. Richard: I suggest that comp and esp MWI may be flawed on the empirical basis of photosynthesis where quantum coherence allows the incoming electron (as they say) to sample every possible superposition or MWI pathway and then chooses the optimal path. I do not know that to be true, but that appears to be the scientific consensus. Yes. Plants and some bacteria do quantum computations, or some quantum exploitation, yes. It is amazing. But this does not prove that the brain do similar in a way relevant to our substitution level, and even if it does, it is still a question of level as the UD emulates all quantum computers too. Even if 'super- exponentially' slowly (but the first person don't mind). The point is that if comp is true we have to justify the winner from inside. Bruno PS will take a look on the paper below, but keep in mind that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and the UD emulates them all, and so are also realized by arithmetical true relations. Bruno If MWI were true, every possible pathway, as they say, would be chosen and not just the optimal one. I posted this once before but got no response. http://www.neuroquantology.com/index.php/journal/announcement/view/68 Superposition in Photosynthesis On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 18:45, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 3:52 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I mean what everybody mean by computationalism in the cognitive science Bullshit. Comp differs from computationalism in that comp includes all the silly (and contradictory) conclusions from your error riddled proof. Comp is computationalism, and I pretend (at the least) to derive the consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a scientist, just accept the definition given, and show a flaw in the derivation. The very fact that you don't act like that suggests that you are not interested in finding the flaw, if it exists. We assume comp! Every logical man should assume computationalism, This is simply ridiculous. It is logically conceivable that comp might be wrong. You are really saying that my axioms are true, which is philosophy (I don't do that). You confuse science and philosophy. no logical man should assume comp, the ideas behind it are as nonstandard as the word itself. comp is derived from comp. So, comp is never assumed. Only comp. It is up to you to show a flaw if you disbelieve that comp follows from comp. we can put our shoes in them. That's not the problem. In your duplicating machine thought experiment there are lots and lots of shoes around and one pair is no better than another, Good. that's part of why the unique person I will be (with P = 1), is undetermined. so its completely ambiguous It is undetermined, but not ambiguous. You know precise things here: 1) you know that you will feel to be one precise person, in W or in M. 2) you know that any precise prediction will be refuted by a copy, and that we have to take into account all copies, as all have the right to be considered as having survived, so you know that you cannot know which of W and M will be your next experience. Now, if you want to call that the 1-ambiguity, be my guest, and the step 4 question will be: do that ambiguity remain unchanged if we introduce delays in the reconstitution in Moscow? Changing the vocabulary will change nothing in the reasoning and its conclusions. to say that after duplication you will see this but you will not see that. The guy in W will say, gosh, I am the one in W, why? Because he's the W guy. He did not turn into the W guy and then see W, That changes nothing. he saw W and then turned into the W guy. And both the W guy and the M guy will say I was the H guy. Exactly, and that makes the point, once you understand that we were asking a prediction on the possible 1-experience. the first person does not feel has having duplicated. There is no the first person there is only a first person. and see no reason shoes can't be duplicated just like everything else. Not a first person experience FROM the view of the first person experience. FROM which first person experience is Bruno Marchal referring to? Anyone of them. We have to interview all of them, or a good sample of them. Do you agree with this? That the probability in Helsinki that (you will feel to be in one city) is equal to one?
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On 10 Dec 2013, at 13:38, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws. Richard: Could explain why the physical laws are not ontological.? The laws of physics should emerge from the FPI on all sigma_1 truth. The intuitive certainty (Bp Dt ( p)) gives indeed a quantization on the (true) sigma_1 sentences. We get three arithmetical quantizations(*), so strictly speaking we get three type of physical reality. The physical laws are not ontological because the theory assumes *any* universal system, and I use numbers, because people know them (but the proof of universality is not that simple). This leads to the first person measure problem, and its solution should be the physical laws (by UDA). And the propositional physics found there is up to now not refuted by the facts. Too bad, we don't refute comp! Bruno (*), on p sigma_1, Bp p, Bp Dt, Bp p Dt). In those case we get p - BDp, and can test a comparison with quantum logic(s). On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 01:33, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 05:52, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Could you name a materialistic theory that explains consciousness Consciousness is the feeling information has when it is being processed; if conscious is fundamental, that is to say it comes at the end of a long line of what is that? questions, then after saying that there is just nothing more that can be said about it. And hey, it's just as good as a billion other consciousness theories. Ah yes, Max Tegmark's theory.These aren't theories, is the problem. One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words. To be precise, we don't need a definition of what consciousness is. WE need only to agree on some assertion on consciousness. It is the same with line and points. The same with natural numbers. We don't need to define them (in fact we can't). We need only to agree on axioms about them, and methods or rules of logical inference/deduction. And we learn what are natural numbers in the same way, ostensively by one's mother holding up fingers and saying one, two,... And so we generalize and make a theory about fingers and other countable things. And we know that in all cases we run into we can add one more and so we casually assume an axiom of infinity because it is convenient and seems to cause no problems. But if it leads to paradoxes and absurdities... All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of a logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with comp at the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws. This is a point where I might be quick sometimes/ UDA start from comp, and at step 8, we should understand that the TOE is RA (or equivalent), and comp is replaced by the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences for the epistemology. So going from UDA to AUDA, comp passes from the base level to the metalevel. In AUDA we assume RA, and interview richer believer (like PA) as generated by RA (or equivalently the universal dovetailer). After UDA, we know that we dont need and cannot need anything more than 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The comp philosophy is then translated entirely in term of definitions, and theorems in that theory. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12/10/2013 12:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Do you agree that in Helsinki we have: Probability(I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city) = 1 (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ? It has the same problem. It is just moved from you to I. What does I refer to. I can say There will be a guy who finds hiself in a citybut is it I? Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there is no you, there are only computations that think you. The question is on that thinking. If you answer yes to the question above, and so Probability(I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city) = 1, you know in advance that you will feel/think to be unique in all possible future situations brought by the duplication. Given that both copies are produced, you know that both feels unique in one city. So both will get one bit of information, when looking where they feel to be, and that is another way to describe the first person indeterrminacy. Your point according to which that it is like there was a soul confirms my identification of the soul with the first person, and that fits nicely with theTheatetus' definition of the knower and Plotinus' definition of the soul (according to me, and Bréhier). Except that souls were, by definition, unique and could not be duplicated (like quantum states). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 12/10/2013 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:28, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 12:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:44 AM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 20:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/8/2013 4:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 07:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Determinism is far from well established. It's a basic assumption in almost every scientific theory. In the most important theory in physics, Quantum Mechanics, no such assumption is made, and despite a century of trying no experiment has ever been performed that even hinted such a deterministic assumption should be added in. I believe the two-slit experiment hints that QM is deterministic by implying the existence of a multiverse. Wasn't it you, Liz, that pointed out this was circular. Everett assumes a multiverse in order to make QM determinsitic. I did say something like that, didn't I? [insert embarrassed emoticon here]. I think I was saying that it was too strong to say that QM follows the principle of determinism (or something like that) because it appears to be indeterminate and only becomes deterministic thanks to Everett. However, the two-slit experiment does /suggest/ the multiverse as a valid explanation, in that any other explanation requires other principles to be violated (causality, locality...) I think I was attempting to position myself between John and Jason - to say that determinism is reasonably well established, but only as a result of a long and winding process of experiment, conjecture and so on. But it isn't. As Roland Omnes says, quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory so it predicts probabilities - what did you expect? Among apostles of Everett there's a lot of trashing of Copenhagen. But Bohr's idea was that the classical world, where things happened and results were recorded, was *logically* prior to the quantum mechanics. QM was a way of making predictions about what could done and observed. Today what might be termed neo-Copenhagen is advocated by Chris Fuchs and maybe Scott Aronson. I highly recommend Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus. It's kind of heavy going in the middle, but if you're just interested in the philosophical implications you can skip to the last chapters. Violation of Bell's inequality can be used to guarantee the randomness of numbers, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.3427v3.pdf, assuming only locality. Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a parallel universe is. What is non local here? A whole world is duplicated - including remote parts. Brent 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. I agree with Jason. Bruno Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
Hi List I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might be interested in this article from theScience Daily http://www.sciencedaily.com/ on line magazine Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm George Levy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: This is exactly what UDA shows that comp *leads* to a reduction of the mind body problem into a body problem in arithmetic. I don't know what comp is or what relevance the Universal Dance Association has to all this but never mind, what problem in arithmetic explains life the universe and everything? Is it how much is 6*7 ? We don't need to try to define consciousness, I agree, examples are far more important than definitions. but to agree that consciousness is invariant for some transformation of the brains, Yes. and this eventually reduce physics to a measure problem Yes, if a measurement of a brain is made and information on the position and velocity of atoms is obtained another brain can be made with generic atoms that will produce a identical consciousness. You didn't convince any one you refuted the reasoning, given that each time you provided a counter-example it was shown to confuse the first and third person views For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that, but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the first person and the third person. You say that the use of the pronouns is defectuous, but I am the one insisting to keep clearly the distinction between pronouns referring to the first person and the third person view (as defined with the notion of personal diary). How the hell does a diary help in making a clear distinction? There are 7 billion first person views on this planet and everybody writes about I in their diary. You are in Helsinki, and by comp you know that you will survive one and entire in a unique city, and you know you can't know which one precisely. It will be one, and if you write W, the first person experience of the one in M will refute it. That's 6 uses of the personal pronoun you in just 50 words, 12%. And the entire purpose of the sentence was to cast light on the nature of you, but I do admit that a proposition is far easier to prove if the very proposition can be used as a lemma in the proof itself. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 1:08 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:28, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 12:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:44 AM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 20:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/8/2013 4:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 07:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: Determinism is far from well established. It's a basic assumption in almost every scientific theory. In the most important theory in physics, Quantum Mechanics, no such assumption is made, and despite a century of trying no experiment has ever been performed that even hinted such a deterministic assumption should be added in. I believe the two-slit experiment hints that QM is deterministic by implying the existence of a multiverse. Wasn't it you, Liz, that pointed out this was circular. Everett assumes a multiverse in order to make QM determinsitic. I did say something like that, didn't I? [insert embarrassed emoticon here]. I think I was saying that it was too strong to say that QM follows the principle of determinism (or something like that) because it appears to be indeterminate and only becomes deterministic thanks to Everett. However, the two-slit experiment does *suggest* the multiverse as a valid explanation, in that any other explanation requires other principles to be violated (causality, locality...) I think I was attempting to position myself between John and Jason - to say that determinism is reasonably well established, but only as a result of a long and winding process of experiment, conjecture and so on. But it isn't. As Roland Omnes says, quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory so it predicts probabilities - what did you expect? Among apostles of Everett there's a lot of trashing of Copenhagen. But Bohr's idea was that the classical world, where things happened and results were recorded, was *logically* prior to the quantum mechanics. QM was a way of making predictions about what could done and observed. Today what might be termed neo-Copenhagen is advocated by Chris Fuchs and maybe Scott Aronson. I highly recommend Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus. It's kind of heavy going in the middle, but if you're just interested in the philosophical implications you can skip to the last chapters. Violation of Bell's inequality can be used to guarantee the randomness of numbers, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.3427v3.pdf, assuming only locality. Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a parallel universe is. What is non local here? A whole world is duplicated - including remote parts. Not quite, the superposition spreads, causally and locally. First when the positron and electron are sent to remote locations, and then it spreads from the positron and electron when they are themselves measured, locally causing multiplications of states to everything that interacts with everything that interacted with the particle. There is no instantaneous creation of two states for the scientists at Proxima Centarui when the electron is measured on Earth, they bifurcate into two states only when they measure their positron, or alternately, if they waited 4 years for the Earth scientist's radio transmission to reach them, then they would enter superposed states from the Earth scientists report. (This is an example of the superposition spreading at light or sub-light speeds throughout the environment.) Jason 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. I agree with Jason. Bruno Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 7:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, Examples are usually preferable to definitions. and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. But that's the beauty of consciousness theories, we can detect consciousness only in ourselves so there are no observed features that a consciousness theory must explain, and that's why it takes no brains at all to dream one up. Intelligence theories are a entirely different matter, they have to actually explain something and thus are hard as hell and a unpopular subject on the internet. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words. Yep, a jumble of words (especially personal pronouns) pretty much sums up consciousness theories. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12/10/2013 9:03 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI? If I am reluctant to answer your question it is because I've already done so many times in the past, but if you insist I will do so again. The Many World's Interpretation is about what can be expected to be seen, and although it may seem strange to us Everett's ideas are 100% logically self consistent. Bruno's proof is not about what will be seen but about a feeling of identity, about who you can expect to be; but you do not think you're the same person you were yesterday because yesterday you made a prediction about today that turned out to be correct, you think you're the same person you were yesterday for one reason and one reason only, you remember being Telmo Menezes yesterday. It's a good thing that's the way it works because I make incorrect predictions all the time and when I do I don't feel that I've entered oblivion, instead I feel like I am the same person I was before because I can still remember being the guy who made that prediction that turned out to be wrong. I don't feel like I'm dead, I just feel like the guy who made a crappy prediction. Sure, but if you were repeatedly wrong about Washington and Moscow in a way consistent with Bernoulli trials, wouldn't you begin to think Where I'm going to end up next time I do this teleportation thing is random with Prob(W)=Prob(M)=0.5.? Brent Bruno thinks you can trace personal identity from the present to the future, but that is like pushing on a string. You can only pull a string and you can only trace identity from the past to the present. A feeling of self has nothing to do with predictions, successful ones or otherwise, and in fact you might not even have a future, but you certainly have a past. If tomorrow somebody remembers being Telmo Menezes today then Telmo Menezes has a future, if not then Telmo Menezes has no future, and Quantum Mechanics or a understanding of Everett's Many Worlds is not needed for any of it. Period. However in a completely different unrelated matter, if you want to assign a probability that tomorrow a observer that can be interviewed by a third party will observe a electron move left or right then Quantum Mechanics will be needed. And some (including me) feel that Everett's interpretation is a convenient way to think about it, although there are other ways. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12/10/2013 2:07 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 8:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2013 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Dec 2013, at 22:53, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 6:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo Menezes you must also reject the MWI, because you live Who is you? Telmo's post was only 63 words long but the pronoun you was used 8 times, that's almost 13%. When it is necessary to hide behind personal pronouns when a philosophical idea regarding duplicating machines and personal identity is discussed it's clear that something is wrong. in the first person, Which first person? The first person of John Clark of one hour ago? The first person of John Clark standing left of the duplicating machine? The first person of John Clark standing right of the duplicating machine? You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI? I would like to know that too. Quentin has already asked this many times to John, and we got unclear answer. John invoked the fact that with comp the duplication are done only in one branch of the universe, but did not explain why would that change anything (without adding some non Turing emulable magic in some place). I think Quentin is right, and John C. just develop irrational rhetoric do avoid moving on in the argument, ... then he talk like if I was defining comp by its consequences, but this is another rhetorical trick, often used by those who want to mock the enterprise. It is interesting. I try to figure out what is really stucking him so much. i do the same with my students in math. Why some people avoid reason in some circumstance. Given that Quentin seems to qualify himself as atheist, it can't be simply Clark's atheism, isn't it? But then what? I think the sticking point, one which I also feel with some force, is the implicit assumption in the question, Where will you find yourself. that there is a unique you. Brent, Although naive, I find the following analogy useful: consider how computer operating systems create new processes. A common method, in UNIX operating systems is forking the current execution path. I will cut and paste the relevant parts from the man page on my computer: NAME fork -- create a new process DESCRIPTION Fork() causes creation of a new process. The new process (child process) is an exact copy of the calling process (parent process) except for the following: o The child process has a unique process ID. o The child process has a different parent process ID (i.e., the process ID of the parent process). [...] RETURN VALUES Upon successful completion, fork() returns a value of 0 to the child process and Fork() was called by the parent process; so it should return a value to the parent process, not the child process. returns the process ID of the child process to the parent process. [...] So let's say the original process A is forked at some point in time t, and process B is created. The only different things about A and B is a value called the process identifier (pid). This could be a very simple analogy for a person being in Moscow or Brussels. So let's say the process records its pid before the fork. After the fork, both processes are programmed to check their pid again and compare it with what was stored. For one you will get equal, for another you will get different. If you ask the program, before the fork, to predict if it will find itself in the state equal or unequal after the fork, the most correct program will assign p=.5 to each one of these outcomes. Any program that assigns a different p will be shown to be less correct by repeating this experiment a number of times. ?? What does the program refer to in ask the program? If you ask A to print out whether it's pid is equal to the pid recorded before the fork, A can always correctly print yes. Similarly B can always print no. So what does it mean to ask the program? You seem to have implicitly created two programs and there is no unique referent for the program. Brent The program can tell you the state with p=1 after the fork. Otherwise, both programs will feel unique, in the sense that their algorithms remain unchanged. It is now possible for them to interact, in the same way that the victims of the duplication experiment can shake hands or play chess. If you ask any of the programs about a record of their states before the fork, they will give you equal answers (if they are correct programs). What do you think? Telmo. Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there is no you, there are only computations that think you. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
2013/12/10 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 12/10/2013 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:28, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 12:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2013 12:44 AM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 20:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/8/2013 4:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 December 2013 07:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: Determinism is far from well established. It's a basic assumption in almost every scientific theory. In the most important theory in physics, Quantum Mechanics, no such assumption is made, and despite a century of trying no experiment has ever been performed that even hinted such a deterministic assumption should be added in. I believe the two-slit experiment hints that QM is deterministic by implying the existence of a multiverse. Wasn't it you, Liz, that pointed out this was circular. Everett assumes a multiverse in order to make QM determinsitic. I did say something like that, didn't I? [insert embarrassed emoticon here]. I think I was saying that it was too strong to say that QM follows the principle of determinism (or something like that) because it appears to be indeterminate and only becomes deterministic thanks to Everett. However, the two-slit experiment does *suggest* the multiverse as a valid explanation, in that any other explanation requires other principles to be violated (causality, locality...) I think I was attempting to position myself between John and Jason - to say that determinism is reasonably well established, but only as a result of a long and winding process of experiment, conjecture and so on. But it isn't. As Roland Omnes says, quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory so it predicts probabilities - what did you expect? Among apostles of Everett there's a lot of trashing of Copenhagen. But Bohr's idea was that the classical world, where things happened and results were recorded, was *logically* prior to the quantum mechanics. QM was a way of making predictions about what could done and observed. Today what might be termed neo-Copenhagen is advocated by Chris Fuchs and maybe Scott Aronson. I highly recommend Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus. It's kind of heavy going in the middle, but if you're just interested in the philosophical implications you can skip to the last chapters. Violation of Bell's inequality can be used to guarantee the randomness of numbers, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.3427v3.pdf, assuming only locality. Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a parallel universe is. What is non local here? A whole world is duplicated - including remote parts. No decoherence is spread through the environment at light speed. Quentin Brent 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. I agree with Jason. Bruno Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On 12/10/2013 11:54 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 7:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, Examples are usually preferable to definitions. and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. But that's the beauty of consciousness theories, we can detect consciousness only in ourselves so there are no observed features that a consciousness theory must explain, Actually there are some observed features. A sharp blow to the head can create a gap in ones consciousness. Imbibing various substances that can cross the blood/brain barrier have somewhat predictable effects. Localized electrical stimulation of the brain produces repeatable effects, both in consciousness and somatic. Brent and that's why it takes no brains at all to dream one up. Intelligence theories are a entirely different matter, they have to actually explain something and thus are hard as hell and a unpopular subject on the internet. Otherwise all one has is a jumble of words. Yep, a jumble of words (especially personal pronouns) pretty much sums up consciousness theories. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 12/10/2013 1:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I think I was attempting to position myself between John and Jason - to say that determinism is reasonably well established, but only as a result of a long and winding process of experiment, conjecture and so on. But it isn't. As Roland Omnes says, quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory so it predicts probabilities - what did you expect? Among apostles of Everett there's a lot of trashing of Copenhagen. But Bohr's idea was that the classical world, where things happened and results were recorded, was *logically* prior to the quantum mechanics. QM was a way of making predictions about what could done and observed. Today what might be termed neo-Copenhagen is advocated by Chris Fuchs and maybe Scott Aronson. I highly recommend Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus. It's kind of heavy going in the middle, but if you're just interested in the philosophical implications you can skip to the last chapters. Violation of Bell's inequality can be used to guarantee the randomness of numbers, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.3427v3.pdf, assuming only locality. Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a parallel universe is. What is non local here? A whole world is duplicated - including remote parts. No decoherence is spread through the environment at light speed. But if the EPR particles are measured at spacelike intervals there are two light cones of decoherence spreading through the environment - BUT they are coherent so that only two constructively interfere. There result only two worlds, instead of four. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 4:00 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 1:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I think I was attempting to position myself between John and Jason - to say that determinism is reasonably well established, but only as a result of a long and winding process of experiment, conjecture and so on. But it isn't. As Roland Omnes says, quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory so it predicts probabilities - what did you expect? Among apostles of Everett there's a lot of trashing of Copenhagen. But Bohr's idea was that the classical world, where things happened and results were recorded, was *logically* prior to the quantum mechanics. QM was a way of making predictions about what could done and observed. Today what might be termed neo-Copenhagen is advocated by Chris Fuchs and maybe Scott Aronson. I highly recommend Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus. It's kind of heavy going in the middle, but if you're just interested in the philosophical implications you can skip to the last chapters. Violation of Bell's inequality can be used to guarantee the randomness of numbers, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.3427v3.pdf, assuming only locality. Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a parallel universe is. What is non local here? A whole world is duplicated - including remote parts. No decoherence is spread through the environment at light speed. But if the EPR particles are measured at spacelike intervals there are two light cones of decoherence spreading through the environment - BUT they are coherent so that only two constructively interfere. There result only two worlds, instead of four. The positron and electron already interacted. The state of the system isn't (e↑ + e↓) + (p↓ × p↑) it is (e↑ × p↓) + (e↓ × p↑). There is a partitions of non-interacting, non-correlated states, for which there are two. Interacting with either one of the electron or the positron puts you into one a superposition of those two states. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: In case you didn't get it. Consciousness is not a scientific topic
On 10 December 2013 01:11, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: In case you didn't get it. Consciousness is not a scientific topic Did you arrive at that conclusion through the exercise of rational thought? If so, you may have Godelised your argument, or self-defeated in a similar manner to PoMo's all truth is relative and Bill's thing about no one changing their minds. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Bruno against Plato
Thanks for the clarification. But for what refer to the questions i asked, I find that my initial assumptions are broadly correct. I find the platonism of the UDA very different from the Platonism of Plato. despite the merits that the hypothesis of mechanism may have to clarify other questions. 2013/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 10 Dec 2013, at 12:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2013/12/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:40, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals that we can remember by anamnesis. OK. But for you reality is a partial dream, Not at all. Only physical reality. And it is not one dream, it is what result from an infinity of dreams, by the FPI on arithmetic. (FPI = first person indeterminacy, *on* the complete UD emulation in arithmetic). but coherent or robust product of the aleatory Dovetailer Machine, + The FPI. and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and hallucinations. By comp, and the FPI on all computations going through our comp state (which exists theoretically, as we work in the comp theory). So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. Only computations. Computer science shows this to be a complex mathematical structure, structured differently from the different points of view of a machines, which themselves obeys the non trivial laws of self-reference. It is full of structure. Where that structure come from? They follow from the laws of addition and multiplication and logic, basically from: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The TOE has no other axioms. (Only definitions). Note that most scientific theories admit those axioms. I see all computatons possible coming from the UDA, You mean the UD (the universal dovetailer). UDA is for the UD Argument (UDA is only the name of a deductive argument based on the notion of Universal Dovetailing). some of them with structure, some of them do not. That is ambiguous. They all have some structure. But I am OK, as some have internal and external (to them, relatively) random data, also. It is isomorphic to some subset of the mathematical multiverse Too much fuzzy. It depends of your starting assumption. multiverse is usually used in the context of QM. But neither QM, nor ~QM is assumed in the UD Argument. The UD argument is deductive (not entirely in step 8 as it is intended to apply on 'reality' and use Occam razor). It shows that if you survive with a digital brain, then you survive in the infinitely many arithmetical brain, and physics, to remain a stable appearance has no choice to exploit an infinite self-multiplication. UDA reduces partially the mind-body problem (my job) to a body problem in arithmetic. It is a problem. Not a solution of a problem (except that in the arithmetical translation of the UDA (AUDA), we can already interview the universal machine (Löbian one) on that problem, and they tell us that Plato seems less foolish than Aristotle. or the boltzmann aleatory structures. Same remark. Keep in mind that if we accept the existence of a physical reality, we meta-reason to find the deepest laws of reality, and be open that physics might not be the fundamental theory. Or can be emulated by UDA. Yes. Note that the UD emulation is entirely deterministic (in the 3p), and hopefully partially deterministic in the 1p (plural) view. The only additional merit is the use of few initial assumptions. I think you miss the point. I am just saying that if comp is correct, then adding anything to those initial assumption is a redundant form of conceptual treachery. But to emulate everithing possible with few assumptions is not a merit IMHO. You do miss the point. With all my respect. The emulation is only a manner of formulating the problem precisely, that is, mathematically. I´m not trying to be harsh. No problem. I could look like a philosopher, defending some theory. But that's not what I do, and did. I am a logician, and computer scientist, explaining that if you say yes to the comp doctor, then (assuming you have enough logical cognitive ability) to reduce the comp mind body problem into body problem in arithmetic. Then I show that we can interview universal machine having such cognitive ability, translating indeed the problem into a sequence of problems in arithmetic. At first sight Plotinus and the mystics are closer to the Löbian numbers than Aristotle. I mean in term of coherent whole. I just want to put my impressions in words. The platoninc world of ideas is then ONE of the many possible infinite whoknows that the UDA can
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On 11 December 2013 06:20, George gl...@quantics.net wrote: Hi List I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line magazine Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury George Levy The rat has the same behaviour, but does it have the same experience? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 10 December 2013 09:06, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. Bell realised there was a third explanation involving the relevant laws of physics operating in a time symmetric fashion. (Oddly this appears to be the hardest one for people to grasp, however.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Mandela cult and mass media mythopoesis
Is this particular one destructive? On 10 December 2013 22:12, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Mandela forgive me, but this is the consequence of an unordered mythopoesis: the mythopoesis of the unrestricted will, that Voegelin http://voegelinview.com/from-The-Collected-Works/equivalents-of-experience-and-symbolization-pt-3/Reality-as-Intelligibly-Ordered-The-Unsurpassable-Mythopoetic-Play.html studied. That happens when men worship men and construct a new cult: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/the-mandela-myth/ the Mythopoesis is the individual and collective process of spontaneous creation of myths, truths and values that are the ground for social cooperation (or cooperation for social destruction). It seems that the need of the media to praise the listener vices and hopes unrestricted by reality limits promotes this kind of destructive mythopoesis -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On 11 December 2013 10:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 11:54 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 7:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, Examples are usually preferable to definitions. and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. But that's the beauty of consciousness theories, we can detect consciousness only in ourselves so there are no observed features that a consciousness theory must explain, Actually there are some observed features. A sharp blow to the head can create a gap in ones consciousness. Imbibing various substances that can cross the blood/brain barrier have somewhat predictable effects. Localized electrical stimulation of the brain produces repeatable effects, both in consciousness and somatic. If you're assuming there is more to consciousness than the sum of our thoughts, experiences, memories, etc - then this *may* be a description of features of the contents of consciousness, rather than of the thing itself. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 12/10/2013 5:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 December 2013 09:06, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. Bell realised there was a third explanation involving the relevant laws of physics operating in a time symmetric fashion. (Oddly this appears to be the hardest one for people to grasp, however.) Yes, that idea has been popularized by Vic Stenger and by Cramer's transactional interpretation. There's also hyperdeterminism in which the experimenters only *thinks* the can make independent choices. t'Hooft tries to develop that viewpoint. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A definition of human consciousness
On 12/10/2013 7:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 11 December 2013 10:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 11:54 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 7:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start with, Examples are usually preferable to definitions. and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes testable predictions. But that's the beauty of consciousness theories, we can detect consciousness only in ourselves so there are no observed features that a consciousness theory must explain, Actually there are some observed features. A sharp blow to the head can create a gap in ones consciousness. Imbibing various substances that can cross the blood/brain barrier have somewhat predictable effects. Localized electrical stimulation of the brain produces repeatable effects, both in consciousness and somatic. If you're assuming there is more to consciousness than the sum of our thoughts, experiences, memories, etc - then this /may/ be a description of features of the contents of consciousness, rather than of the thing itself. ?? Are you speculating that there are parts of consciousness we're not conscious of? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 9:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 5:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 December 2013 09:06, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. Bell realised there was a third explanation involving the relevant laws of physics operating in a time symmetric fashion. (Oddly this appears to be the hardest one for people to grasp, however.) Yes, that idea has been popularized by Vic Stenger and by Cramer's transactional interpretation. Collapse is still fundamentally real in the transactional interpretation, it is just even less clear about when it occurs. The transactional interpretation is also non-local, non-deterministic, and postulates new things outside of standard QM. Why? Everett showed the Schrodinger equation is sufficient to explain all observations in QM. Is it just so people can sleep soundly at night believing the universe is small and that they are unique? There's also hyperdeterminism in which the experimenters only *thinks* the can make independent choices. t'Hooft tries to develop that viewpoint. Hyper-determinism sounds incompatible with normal determinism, as it seems to imply a the deterministic process of an operating mind is forced (against its will in some cases), to decide certain choices which would be determined by something operating external to that mind. I think I can use the pigeon hole principle to prove hyper-determinism is inconsistent with QM. Consider an observer whose mind is represented by a computer program running on a computer with a total memory capacity limited to N bits. Then have this observer make 2^n + 1 quantum measurements. If hyperdeterminism is true, and the results matches what the observer decided to choose, then the hyper-determistic effects must be repeating an on interval of 2^n or less. It is provable that no deterministic process limited to a fixed quantity of memory (and therefore a fixed number of states) can go through more than 2^n states without repeating, so either the randomness in QM will repeat, or the observer will get to states where their choices cannot be made to continue to agree with quantum measurements. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 12/10/2013 9:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 9:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 5:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 December 2013 09:06, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. Bell realised there was a third explanation involving the relevant laws of physics operating in a time symmetric fashion. (Oddly this appears to be the hardest one for people to grasp, however.) Yes, that idea has been popularized by Vic Stenger and by Cramer's transactional interpretation. Collapse is still fundamentally real in the transactional interpretation, it is just even less clear about when it occurs. The transactional interpretation is also non-local, non-deterministic, and postulates new things outside of standard QM. I think it's still local, no FTL except via zig-zags like Stenger's. Why? Everett showed the Schrodinger equation is sufficient to explain all observations in QM. But it's non-local too. If spacelike measurement choices in are made in repeated EPR measurements the results can still show correlations violating Bell's inequality - in the same world. The Schrodinger equation has solutions in Hilbert space, which are not local in spacetime. Is it just so people can sleep soundly at night believing the universe is small and that they are unique? There's also hyperdeterminism in which the experimenters only *thinks* the can make independent choices. t'Hooft tries to develop that viewpoint. Hyper-determinism sounds incompatible with normal determinism, as it seems to imply a the deterministic process of an operating mind is forced (against its will in some cases), to decide certain choices which would be determined by something operating external to that mind. I think I can use the pigeon hole principle to prove hyper-determinism is inconsistent with QM. Consider an observer whose mind is represented by a computer program running on a computer with a total memory capacity limited to N bits. Then have this observer make 2^n + 1 quantum measurements. If hyperdeterminism is true, and the results matches what the observer decided to choose, then the hyper-determistic effects must be repeating an on interval of 2^n or less. There's nothing in the theory to limit the capacity to local memory, if hyper-determinism is true, it's true of the universe as a whole. Brent It is provable that no deterministic process limited to a fixed quantity of memory (and therefore a fixed number of states) can go through more than 2^n states without repeating, so either the randomness in QM will repeat, or the observer will get to states where their choices cannot be made to continue to agree with quantum measurements. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 12:19 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 9:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 9:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 5:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 December 2013 09:06, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. Bell realised there was a third explanation involving the relevant laws of physics operating in a time symmetric fashion. (Oddly this appears to be the hardest one for people to grasp, however.) Yes, that idea has been popularized by Vic Stenger and by Cramer's transactional interpretation. Collapse is still fundamentally real in the transactional interpretation, it is just even less clear about when it occurs. The transactional interpretation is also non-local, non-deterministic, and postulates new things outside of standard QM. I think it's still local, no FTL except via zig-zags like Stenger's. This table should be updated in that case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics#Comparison_of_interpretations What are the zig-zags? Why? Everett showed the Schrodinger equation is sufficient to explain all observations in QM. But it's non-local too. If spacelike measurement choices in are made in repeated EPR measurements the results can still show correlations violating Bell's inequality - in the same world. Can you explain the experimental setup where this happens? The Schrodinger equation has solutions in Hilbert space, which are not local in spacetime. Are you referring to momentum vs. position basis ( http://lesswrong.com/lw/pr/which_basis_is_more_fundamental/ ) or something else? Is it just so people can sleep soundly at night believing the universe is small and that they are unique? There's also hyperdeterminism in which the experimenters only *thinks* the can make independent choices. t'Hooft tries to develop that viewpoint. Hyper-determinism sounds incompatible with normal determinism, as it seems to imply a the deterministic process of an operating mind is forced (against its will in some cases), to decide certain choices which would be determined by something operating external to that mind. I think I can use the pigeon hole principle to prove hyper-determinism is inconsistent with QM. Consider an observer whose mind is represented by a computer program running on a computer with a total memory capacity limited to N bits. Then have this observer make 2^n + 1 quantum measurements. If hyperdeterminism is true, and the results matches what the observer decided to choose, then the hyper-determistic effects must be repeating an on interval of 2^n or less. There's nothing in the theory to limit the capacity to local memory, if hyper-determinism is true, it's true of the universe as a whole. What if we have two remote locations measuring entangled particles, and whether they measure the x-spin or y-spin for the i-th particle depends on the i-th binary digit of Pi at one locations, and the i-th binary digit of Euler's constant at the other location? How can hyper-determinism force the digits of Pi or e? Jason Brent It is provable that no deterministic process limited to a fixed quantity of memory (and therefore a fixed number of states) can go through more than 2^n states without repeating, so either the randomness in QM will repeat, or the observer will get to states where their choices cannot be made to continue to agree with quantum measurements. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment
On 12/10/2013 10:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 12:19 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 9:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 9:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2013 5:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 December 2013 09:06, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the EPR paradox: 1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects 2. Measurements have more than one outcome In light of Bell's theorem, either special relativity is false or many-world's is true. Bell realised there was a third explanation involving the relevant laws of physics operating in a time symmetric fashion. (Oddly this appears to be the hardest one for people to grasp, however.) Yes, that idea has been popularized by Vic Stenger and by Cramer's transactional interpretation. Collapse is still fundamentally real in the transactional interpretation, it is just even less clear about when it occurs. The transactional interpretation is also non-local, non-deterministic, and postulates new things outside of standard QM. I think it's still local, no FTL except via zig-zags like Stenger's. This table should be updated in that case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics#Comparison_of_interpretations Hmm. I think the transactional waves are not FTL but in an EPR experiment would relay on backward-in-time signaling. Not sure why it says TIQ is explicitly non-local? What are the zig-zags? By traveling back in time and then forward a particle can be at two spacelike separate events. Why? Everett showed the Schrodinger equation is sufficient to explain all observations in QM. But it's non-local too. If spacelike measurement choices in are made in repeated EPR measurements the results can still show correlations violating Bell's inequality - in the same world. Can you explain the experimental setup where this happens? http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9810080 The Schrodinger equation has solutions in Hilbert space, which are not local in spacetime. Are you referring to momentum vs. position basis ( http://lesswrong.com/lw/pr/which_basis_is_more_fundamental/ ) or something else? No, just that a ray in Hilbert space, a state, corresponds to a solution of the SWE over configuration space (with boundary conditions) which in general is not localized in spacetime. Is it just so people can sleep soundly at night believing the universe is small and that they are unique? There's also hyperdeterminism in which the experimenters only *thinks* the can make independent choices. t'Hooft tries to develop that viewpoint. Hyper-determinism sounds incompatible with normal determinism, as it seems to imply a the deterministic process of an operating mind is forced (against its will in some cases), to decide certain choices which would be determined by something operating external to that mind. I think I can use the pigeon hole principle to prove hyper-determinism is inconsistent with QM. Consider an observer whose mind is represented by a computer program running on a computer with a total memory capacity limited to N bits. Then have this observer make 2^n + 1 quantum measurements. If hyperdeterminism is true, and the results matches what the observer decided to choose, then the hyper-determistic effects must be repeating an on interval of 2^n or less. There's nothing in the theory to limit the capacity to local memory, if hyper-determinism is true, it's true of the universe as a whole. What if we have two remote locations measuring entangled particles, and whether they measure the x-spin or y-spin for the i-th particle depends on the i-th binary digit of Pi at one locations, and the i-th binary digit of Euler's constant at the other location? How can hyper-determinism force the digits of Pi or e? ?? I think the i-th digit pi and the i-th digit of e are already determined. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
