date:20140217



On 16 Feb 2014, at 20:09, David Nyman wrote:


On 16 February 2014 19:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Why not being agnostic, especially that you have admitted not having  
studied computer science.


Why being negative on something that you ignore?

Because he understands that comp cannot possibly be true.


It looks like pseudo-mysticism to me. Not sure we can answer this  
through reason alone.


Bruno



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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On 16 Feb 2014, at 21:56, David Nyman wrote:


On 16 February 2014 16:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 16 Feb 2014, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote:


On 16 February 2014 09:39, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:




snip

From thought cannot act on matter we arrive at thought cannot  
refer to matter, and well, this is almost the consequence of step  
8, as it says that the notion of matter has nothing to do with a  
material reality. Then we can still refer to the moon, but we know  
it is a sort of collective lawful hallucination, or more exactly a  
mean on a set of 3p well defined computation.


Yes, at least it seems that thought cannot refer to the sort of  
matter of which it would be an epiphenomenon!


snip

It illustrates, perhaps better than step 8, the difficulty of  
wanting a primitive matter having a primitive ontological reality  
capable of singularizing a conscious person capable to refer to it.


I have to think more about this.

In effect, might step 8 be regarded as a reductio of the premise  
that the laws of matter to which we can refer and those of any  
putative ur-matter can be in any way coterminous? Under CTM, it is  
consistent to suppose that the observable laws of matter must derive  
from some principled notion of computation. At the outset we grant  
the assumption that such a notion of computation must ultimately be  
grounded in primitive physical activity. Accordingly, we propose a  
system of such physical activity that is initially acceptable as  
grounding some set of computational relations corresponding to a  
conscious subject and hence to the physical laws observable by such  
a subject. Then we show that we can systematically change the  
physical contingencies such that every last vestige of these  
relations is evacuated even while all relevant physical events  
continue to go through. This in effect provides a reductio of the  
original premise, under CTM: That the observable physical laws can  
be supposed to derive directly from a more primitive physical  
activity and simultaneously from any principled notion of  
computation consistently extractable from such activity. Since both  
cannot be the case, we must opt for one or the other.


OK.






However, one distinction between arithmetic / computation as an  
ontology, and some kind of putative ur-physics, is that it is more  
difficult to discern any principled motivation whatsoever to derive  
reference in a primitive physics. A typical response to this  
reference problem is to justify CTM by smuggling an ad hoc notion  
of computation into physics.


Yes. That is why at first sight I took the discovery of the quantum  
universal machine as a blow for comp. I thought that the quantum  
formalism provided a notion of physical computability, but it  
brought only a notion of physical computation, which is not excluded  
with computationalism (it is a sort of direct exploitation of the  
statistical nature of the computations below our substitution level).


Could you elaborate a little on the distinction you see between  
physical computability and physical computation?


May be I should not have, as we can use the intensional Church's  
thesis, for the UD. But we can formally make a difference, and some  
can exploit it.
In fact the difference between computation and computability is more  
general than between physical computation and physical computability.  
Computability a priori concerns only the class of functions that we  
can compute.
It has been proved that such class is the same for all know universal  
system, from Babbage machine to the quantum computer. But each system  
computes in a priori very different ways. Combinators are computed by  
following two simple reduction laws (like Kxy = x, Sxyz = xz(yz)),  
arithmetic computes by adding and subtracting one, register machine  
compute by erasing or adding one in some register, quantum  
computations processes on waves, etc.
But all systems can imitate all systems. Combinators and their  
reduction can implement a program computing like a quantum processor  
(althou with a superexponential slow down, which does not matter in  
the UD*, though).


Now for some reason, I didn't get that immediately, and for a time I  
believed that QC could violate the intensional Church thesis, notably  
due to strict parallelization, use of arbitrary complex coefficients,  
and entanglement. I was just wrong.


In fact, even if some quantum computation was necessary for the mind  
to exist, comp should still able to justify this, by a necessary back  
and forth above and below the substitution level, which indeed must  
already play some role in the stabilization of the histories (the  
measure). In fact comp predicts already the existence, formally, of  
comp-quantum computations. But it is an open problem if it is  
isomorphic to quantum computation. Today, it is even an open problem  
if such comp-quantum-computation violates Church

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On 16 Feb 2014, at 22:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:18:54 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 February 2014 17:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

Ah, but then you would be faced with the questions posed by the UDA/ 
MWI arguments, because there would then be two conscious originals  
who claimed equal possession of the same history to that point. That  
is all you need for the duplication arguments to go through.


They would each be their own originals, not the same original. In  
identical twin is as identical as identical can be.


You are blatantly ignoring the challenge this presents to your  
contention that a conscious person cannot be duplicated in  
principle, by quibbling over the meaning of copy and original. If  
Craig were the person duplicated (whilst asleep, say) and there were  
then two originals (A and B) each of whom laid claim to being Craig  
with the same history, how would you know whether you were A or B?


A single cell can be divided into many, but full grown organism  
can't be cut down the middle longitudinally and grow into two  
separate bodies. Even as a single cell, mitosis can't be induced by  
slicing a zygote in half - the motive for reproduction has to come  
from the inside out. I don't think it will ever be possible to  
duplicate an organism without growing it from scratch. A cloned  
brain would have to grow in a vat and would come out as a new born  
unique individual (who would have comparable similarity to their  
clone parent as an identical twin separated at birth does). The  
problem is the assumption that duplication is a possibility in the  
first place, and that the barrier to duplication depends on  
complexity alone. What I'm saying is that consciousness is an event,  
not a structure. You cannot duplicate an event because it is  
connected to all other events.




But again, that is true for the 1p associated to a machine. From its  
1p view, it is never duplicated. the doppelganger appears as an  
autonomous agent, an other.


Right phenomenology, but invalid inference.

Bruno



Craig


David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On 17 Feb 2014, at 00:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:23:11 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Feb 2014, at 18:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, February 16, 2014 9:58:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Feb 2014, at 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, February 16, 2014 5:29:09 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Feb 2014, at 00:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Saturday, February 15, 2014 3:43:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just  
because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically  
perpendicular to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy  
awareness result in a doll.


Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission,  
the resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them?


That's not a copy of an amoeba, reproducing its body is part of what  
an amoeba does.


But the evidences we have is that amoeba use the Dx = xx method  
for the self-copy (indeed I discovered it by looking at amoeba and  
reading book on molecular biology, before finding the logicians got  
it).


That makes sense to me because the amoeba's body will look like a  
copy to our body's senses. A 3p view of 3p is truncated and filled  
in generically. The 1p amoeba is the localized subset of the entire  
history of amoeba-like experience, not just the isolated maintainer  
of the 3p amoeba body. When we look for 3p evidence, we will not  
necessarily see 1p authenticity as certain evidence. The  
authenticity has to be felt through the feeling as semi-describable  
aesthetic qualities...which is where we get a lot of unscientific  
sounding terms like life force, kundalini, prana, xi, etc. These  
kind of numinous qualities apply not just to living beings, but to  
works of art, sacred places, etc, if you are subjectively receptive  
to their authenticity. They do not give us infallible proof of  
originality, but they are reminders that there is an important  
difference between 'something' and *the real thing*.


You are just saying that you are not subjectively receptive to the  
machines 1p.


No, I'm saying that I am receptive to the absence of machine 1p (and  
I'm not by any means alone in that sensitivity).


A nonsense, followed by an authoritative argument.

The idea that is is nonsense or an authoritative argument is itself  
an authoritative argument.



I don't think so.



I'm reporting on what I consider to be a common sense, apprehension  
which could likely be classified as a human universal.


 perhaps machine universal.
We should avoid reference to common sense, in a highly counter- 
intuitive context.




Even a monkey prefers a wire mother which is soft to one which is  
only wire. The idea that somehow the difference between machines and  
conscious people is simply a matter of degree of complexity is,  
believe it or not, a hypothesis which is supported only by certain  
interpretations of mathematics, not an uncontested truth. My  
argument is that these interpretations are actually an inversion of  
Godel's understanding, and falsely attribute tangible aesthetic  
qualities where none are specified. It's not enough to say that comp  
cannot be proved wrong,


Do you read the post? I am explaining that comp cannot been proved  
true. It can only, like any scientific theory, been proved wrong.


You talk like if I wad defending comp, but I show only that comp  
forces us to come back to Plato's theology and physics, and to a many  
dream interpretations of arithmetic brought by the numbers themselves,  
and that we can test that theory, once we can agree on some definition  
(like the axiom that knowing(p) implies  p, for example.





it is my understanding that our progress as a species depends on our  
realization that the fact that comp cannot be proved wrong is  
actually proof that it is wrong.


I would agree with this, but the premise is wrong. Comp can be proved  
wrong. it is all what I explain.






I expect that to sound like nonsense, but it is all consistent with  
the nature of proof being subordinate to more primitive layers of  
sense from which the expectation of proof or falsification, logic or  
illogic arise.








The uncanny valley is not merely the failure to detect the presence  
of subjectivity it is the positive detection of the failed attempt  
of an object disguised as a subject.



What you say is that you, and some others, have a magical talent,  
capable of detecting absence of consciousness.



No, I am saying that everyone has this ordinary sense, but a few  
people deny it.



Do you think that the humans having not that talents are also  
deprived of subjectivity, or are they just stupid, or what?


Not at all, those who deny that sensitivity or who have developed  
their other talents to the point that they lose touch with it are

Re: 3-1 views



On 17 Feb 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/16/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Feb 2014, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/16/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of  
personal identity none of this matters, it doesn't matter if the  
predictions were correct or not.


We are not trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity at  
all. I can be amnesic on who I am for example. the question is  
about the expectation of some unique 1p experience I will live  
soon. By comp I know that it must be W, or M, but not both, nor  
none.


But that's the ambiguity I see.  When you ask the H-man, Where do  
you think you will be?



The H-man has a diary. He must predict what will happen from his  
first person experience, when he pushes on the button, and then  
open a door. He must write the result, which can only be W, or  
M, but not both, in his diary, and compare that result with the  
prediction.


See my last reply to John Clark.

There is no ambiguity, you need only distinguish carefully the 3p  
description, from the 1p experiences.






he has to provide some interpretation to the word you.  My  
immediate, intuitive thought was, I expect to be in both places.


That is the 3-1 view. You go out of your body, and you look at you  
reconstituted in both place. That is the correct 3-1 view indeed.
yet, to answer the question asked, you need to reintegrate the  
body, and as it has been duplicated, you need to dovetail a little  
bit on the two 1-views itself. And in this case, both can see that  
both city was wrong, as both can see they are in only one city.





  Which depends on what is meant by I.


You might reread the thread, or just the paper. The 1-I, or 1-view,  
or 1p view, is the content of the personal diary taken by the  
experiencer, and the 3-view are view by outsider, which means here  
that they are not entering in the duplication boxes.




  If I is just conscious experience then there are two Is and  
neither is the H-man because they're not experiencing Helsinki.   
So I must be experiences and memory.


For UDA, even just the memory is enough, and the honesty in the  
confirmation and refutation game, also.


No, just memory can't be enough because then there is no difference.



? There is a difference which appears after the duplication and the  
opening of the door.










Then the M-man and the W-man are both I the H-man, in which case  
the H-man should answer Both.


Again, that is the correct 3-1 view. But the question is asked on  
the 1-1 views, which are the 1-views.


But it is your insistence that the H-man write either M or W but not  
both as his expectation.


I explain why. If he wrote both, it only means that he is thinking on  
the 3-1 view, and not on the possible 1-1-views, like what was asked  
to him. No problem, we can do the experience again.





So then one must ask Why not both?.  The answer is obviously,  
They are physically different and will start to form different  
memories due to their interaction with their environment - otherwise  
there would continue to be only one person (at least that's our best  
theory).


That's a plea for the indeterminacy. That's my point.

Bruno





Brent



The reason why I insist in that 1p/3p distinction is to avoid any  
ambiguity. In the 3p you are all of them, in the 1-p you remain  
always only one of them.  (them = the relative copies).


Again see my last post to John Clark.

Bruno



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Re: 3-1 views



On 17 Feb 2014, at 03:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/16/2014 6:17 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 17 February 2014 01:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well then, facing duplication, would your expectation change to  
that of personally experiencing a simultaneous two-valued outcome?  
And if the answer is yes, does that imply that you would reject  
MWI as a possibility because (I presume) you have never in fact  
experienced such an outcome?
I wouldn't say reject since it is possible, but MWI is very  
different it is just projection onto different orthogonal subspaces  
of the Hilbert space.  Bruno's teleportation is necessarily  
classical and it depends on consciousness being *classically*  
duplicated.


So what about the first part of the question?


I don't know what I would personally experience because I is  
ambiguous after duplication.  That's where I think John Clark has a  
point about pronouns.


The ambiguity comes from not taking the 1p/3p distinctions only. I do  
it, but people complaining about ambiguity are the one introducing  
it by systematically ignoring that distinction.




Of course Bruno objects that this expectation question is about 1-p  
experience.


That's better.



But it is asked of H-man, to whom the M-man and the W-man are like  
third persons.


Not necessarily. They are like that in the 3-1 view, but by comp, we  
know that they will not be like that from their personal view.





Perhaps it is enough for Bruno's point that the question has no  
definite answer - I think he's just trying to motivate indeterminancy.


Exactly. By making vague the pronouns, it looks like an ambiguity, but  
*assuming* comp, and using the 1-3 distinction, the ambiguity is no  
more ambiguous than in the throwing of a coin, or the measurement of a  
spin.


Bruno





Brent



David


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Re: 3-1 views

2014-02-17 Thread LizR

On 17 February 2014 13:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 But it is your insistence that the H-man write either M or W but not
 both as his expectation. So then one must ask Why not both?.  The
 answer is obviously, They are physically different and will start to form
 different memories due to their interaction with their environment -
 otherwise there would continue to be only one person (at least that's our
 best theory).

 If I asked you if you expected to see a radioactive decay you wouldn't say
yes *and* no you would say something like I expect there to be a certain
probability that I see the decay - although I admit that sometimes when
people ask me some question about the future I may say well, in fact I
will experience both those outcomes! But only with friends who know about
the MWI, so not many.

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Re: How Wolves Change Rivers

On 17 February 2014 03:19, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 9:07:06 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

 On 17 February 2014 00:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

 You don't suggest that I can't understand comp, but you suggest that I am
 impervious to reasoned argument about it...why would that be the case if I
 understood comp as you seem to think it deserves to be understood?


 You said that I understood that you could not possibly understand comp. I
 have never said that nor do I believe it. I do however expect that you will
 persist in attacking a parody of comp of your own devising as long as you
 fail to engage with the genuine argument in its own terms and this is not
 necessarily so easy.


 Then that means you are accusing me of understanding comp but pretending
 not to so that I can attack a straw man.


You misunderstood my meaning. I said that I don't believe that you cannot
*possibly* understand comp, assuming you ever give it proper consideration,
but I see no evidence that *in fact* you have ever understood it
sufficiently well to refute it. Indeed your peremptory dismissals always
seem to me to be based on one misunderstanding or another, but you never
consistently engage with the argument to the point where these
misunderstandings could be resolved.


 If you are convinced of that there's nothing that I can say, but from my
 perspective, if you think that I'm attacking a straw man, all that you have
 to do is explain the difference between what I am attacking and the full
 strength position of comp.


See below.


 I do use examples which are hyperbole to make my point obvious, but that
 doesn't mean my points are invalid just because the context becomes more
 sophisticated. The problem with the disconnection of mathematics from
 either consciousness (if we use a physical primitive) or physics (if we use
 a phenomenal primitive) remains no matter what. If computation can create
 consciousness, then consciousness has to be superfluous to consciousness,
 and if computation can create superfluous phenomena which are not
 computational then there is no basis to consider computation any different
 than any other brute-emergence religious faith.


But computation cannot create consciousness. This is a gross misconception
and we have touched on it before. What the comp argument elucidates is a
principled reciprocity between a domain of function and a domain of
appearance. The first is modelled as arithmetic (representing any
first-order combinatorial system) and the second as a class of indexical
arithmetical truths. The fact that the latter is encountered after the
former *in the argument* should not mislead you into supposing that this
recapitulates some actual sequence of creation, or that one is more
fundamental than the other. That would be to mistake the argument for the
thing argued for.

So granting that comp can indeed faithfully represent the necessary
reciprocity between function and appearance entails the acceptance (i.e. of
the force of the cumulative argument) that the latter *just is* coterminous
with arithmetical truth in some adequate sense and that this is
*necessarily* the case from the outset. It is not a bolt-on extra to
computation.



 But not only is genuine understanding not equivalent to acceptance, it is
 the only generally accepted route to refuting any argument on reasonable
 grounds. When I previously suggested this, you deflected my proposal with
 some slightly disturbing remarks about seduction and Kool-Aid (which I
 presume to be some delightful US beverage unfortunately unavailable in my
 neighbourhood). Oh, and some tendentious psycho-babble about too-clever
 people losing touch with common sense, as I recall.


 References to Kool-Aid generally have to do with its availability in
 Guyana, rather than the US.


Ah, I hadn't made the connection with Jonestown.  What a revolting
comparison.

I'm not sure what it is that you think I don't understand. I get accused of
 not understanding something very important about comp, but when pressed for
 more details, all that I have ever gotten is that it can only be understood
 by studying the very principles which I am saying supervene on more
 primitive sense for their very existence.


Then you make the whole argument into a circle. To understand comp in its
own terms you must cut the circle, start from the stated assumptions and
convince yourself that, assuming the comp theory of mind, there is a
*necessary* relation between function and sense. As I argue above, this
does not entail any discrimination between the two as to which is the more
fundamental; if anything it is the entire system of reciprocity that is
fundamental, in a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian sense.




 I don't know whether you regard me as a die-hard defender of comp, but I
 certainly don't see myself in that light. My own original predilections
 tended towards sensory-motive ideas and the

Re: 3-1 views

On 17 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I don't know what I would personally experience because I is ambiguous
 after duplication.


But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am
duplicated both the resulting continuations are equivalent immediately
posterior to duplication. Consequently I repeat my question: if *you* were
duplicated in this manner, would you reasonably expect that either of the
resulting equivalent continuations would experience a two-valued outcome?

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

On 17 February 2014 06:07, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

snip
 
  I and I would agree with Stathis - except for the merely.  I think
 Bruno
  was right when he observed that epi doesn't mean anything in this
 context.
  Stathis doesn't think that consciousness is separable from the physics;
 it's
  just talking about the same thing at a different level.  We don't call
 life
  an epiphenomena of biochemistry.  And I regard meaning in the same
 way, or
  as Dennett calls it the intentional stance.

 I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I
 should also say that life is.


Yes, I think that is required for your general position to be coherent.


 We don't say that, because while life is
 mysterious, it is not quite as mysterious as consciousness, and it
 seems to me that much of the philosophical discussion about
 consciousness occurs mainly because it seems mysterious. As a person
 somewhat familiar with biology I can see how life emerges from
 biochemistry, but I can't see how consciousness does in quite the same
 way.


I must say you're putting rather a lot of weight on quite here!


 To put it differently, I can't imagine all the biochemistry being
 there but life absent, but I can imagine all the biochemistry being
 there but consciousness absent (though further reasoning may show that
 that to be impossible). But maybe that is just a failure of
 imagination.


Maybe.

David




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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

On 17 February 2014 09:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

May be I should not have, as we can use the intensional Church's thesis,
 for the UD. But we can formally make a difference, and some can exploit it.
 In fact the difference between computation and computability is more
 general than between physical computation and physical computability.
 Computability a priori concerns only the class of functions that we can
 compute.
 It has been proved that such class is the same for all know universal
 system, from Babbage machine to the quantum computer. But each system
 computes in a priori very different ways. Combinators are computed by
 following two simple reduction laws (like Kxy = x, Sxyz = xz(yz)),
 arithmetic computes by adding and subtracting one, register machine compute
 by erasing or adding one in some register, quantum computations processes
 on waves, etc.
 But all systems can imitate all systems. Combinators and their reduction
 can implement a program computing like a quantum processor (althou with a
 superexponential slow down, which does not matter in the UD*, though).

 Now for some reason, I didn't get that immediately, and for a time I
 believed that QC could violate the intensional Church thesis, notably due
 to strict parallelization, use of arbitrary complex coefficients, and
 entanglement. I was just wrong.

 In fact, even if some quantum computation was necessary for the mind to
 exist, comp should still able to justify this, by a necessary back and
 forth above and below the substitution level, which indeed must already
 play some role in the stabilization of the histories (the measure). In fact
 comp predicts already the existence, formally, of comp-quantum
 computations. But it is an open problem if it is isomorphic to quantum
 computation. Today, it is even an open problem if such
 comp-quantum-computation violates Church thesis (which I find not quite
 plausible, to be sure).


OK, I see. Thanks.

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

On 16 February 2014 16:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The whole schema - physics included - would then have to be considered
 an epiphenomenon of some inaccessible ur-physics.

 Exactly.

 I'm not sure that it's exactly a contradiction just because of that,
 though, as in practice any putative ontological base - numbers included -
 must be inaccessible in this sense, except to theory.

 It illustrates, perhaps better than step 8, the difficulty of wanting a
 primitive matter having a primitive ontological reality capable of
 singularizing a conscious person capable to refer to it.

 I have to think more about this.


I must say that it is this form of argument that most forcefully persuades
me that the reversal of comp-physics is necessary if CTM is to be
salvageable. ISTM that MGA or Maudlin-style arguments tend to lead to
somewhat ad hoc quibbling over the role of counterfactuals or the like. But
the comp account of consciousness - or indeed any non-eliminativist
position - strongly entails that thought can refer only to epiphenomenal
matter (to continue with that way of speaking). The leap from epiphenomenal
to primitive matter then seems inadequately motivated, to say the least.
The most typical explicit motivation is by appeal to evolutionary arguments
- e.g. that we have evolved more-or-less accurate internal models to aid in
our survival in the real external world of physics. But this appeal
conceals a blatant begging of the question: yes, it must *appear* so, but
it is precisely these appearances that we should seek to explain on
independent grounds, not by assuming what is to be explained.

I wonder if you have had any further thoughts?

David

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

Russell,

All of science assumes an external reality independent of human 
observation. Science is what gives us by far our most accurate view of the 
universe. So what is your reasoning to reject this fundamental assumption 
of science?

Can you define your intersubjective reality? Does it include all humans? 
Does it exclude rats and other non-human life forms? Do you think this 
intersubjective reality actually somehow creates the non-human or 
non-living universe? Did it create the stars and galaxies, or are they only 
figments of our collective consciousness?

Please explain...

Edgar

On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: 
  Russell, 
  
  Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact that 
 you 
  and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless you 
 think 
  I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination! 

 It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a 
 common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one 
 theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an intersubjective 
 reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all 
 observers. 

  
  And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just fine 
 before 
  I ever met you 
  
  The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive, unless you 
  believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us. 
  

 That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger 
 evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be 
 consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic Principle 
 does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a 
 reverse syllogism fallacy. 

  So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of 
 reality 
  that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world he 
 lives 
  in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in their 
  own way. 
  

 Keep going. You still haven't provided any evidence that this real 
 external reality actually exists! Until you do so, I will state that 
 there is nothing here to confuse. Of course, if you actually succeed, 
 not only will many people be surprised, you will undoubtedly be the 
 most famous philosopher since Aristotle and Plato. 

 Cheers 

 -- 

  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  



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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

Craig,

My point is that human EXperience is just a subset of generalized 
Xperience. Human experience is, like xperience, basically just alterations 
of information forms. The difference is not in the basic phenomenon, but 
just that that alteration of forms occurs to the specialized information 
forms that humans use to model the reality in which they exist. 

All is information forms. Xperience is the fact that all information forms 
are altered in computational interaction with other information forms. When 
those information forms that are altered happen to be the one's minds use 
to encode information about their environments, that is what we call 
EXperience, which is just a subset of Xperience.

In this way we are able to understand experience as just a specialized 
subset of the fundamental computational aspect of reality.

Edgar


On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:49:22 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 1:13:29 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 Well first I'm not so optimistic as you that some here don't harbor some 
 pretty ridiculous ideas including that there was no reality before humans. 

 Second, there is a view I present in my book that resolves both 
 perspectives. If we hold the view that everything is just computationally 
 interacting information at the fundamental level, then it is reasonable to 
 define any change in that information as a generic type of experience I 
 call Xperience.

 In this model then, everything that happens is an Xperience, and every 
 information form can be considered a generic observer, whose computational 
 change amounts to an observation.


 Except that information does not seem to be an observer. Signs don't read. 
 Rules don't play games. Languages don't speak. I think it makes more sense 
 the other way around. Forms and information must first be experiences. The 
 idea of things 'happening' of 'change' requires an a priori expectation of 
 linear time, of memory, persistence, comparison, etc...all kinds of 
 sensible conditions which must underpin the possibility of any information 
 at all.

 Craig
  


 So in this sense we get observers from the very beginning and don't have 
 to wait for human observers to appear. I don't see how this wouldn't be 
 consistent with the Block and Bruno universes 1p views of observable 
 reality though I have no desire to explore that avenue

 Note that this model is also consistent with the transition from the old 
 erroneous view that human observation 'caused' wavefunction 'collapse' to 
 the modern view of decoherence, in which we can say that it is the 
 interactions of two particles themselves which supply the generic 
 'observation' of each other to produce some exact dimensional 'measurement' 
 in each other's frames.

 Edgar



 On Thursday, February 13, 2014 10:04:24 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Thursday, February 13, 2014 8:51:18 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Russell,

 But that assumes that consciousness is prior to ontological reality, to 
 actual being. That's one of the things I find most ridiculous about both 
 Bruno's comp and block universes, that they assume everything is 1p 
 perspectives of conscious human observers.

 To me, that's just solipsism in new clothes. And it implies there was 
 no reality before humans.


 I don't think anyone here (or anyone that I have ever spoken with, 
 really) thinks that there was no reality before humans. Idealism, or the 
 kind of Pansensitivity that I suggest need not have anything to do with 
 human beings at all. The issue is whether anything can simply 'exist' 
 independently of all possibility of experience. I think that if that were 
 possible, then any form of perception or experience would be redundant and 
 implausible. More importantly though, in what way would a phenomenon which 
 has no possibility of detection be different than nothingness? We can 
 create experiences that remind us of matter and energy just by imagining 
 them, and we can derive some pleasure and meaning from that independently 
 of any functional consideration, but what reason would the laws of physics 
 or arithmetic have to accidentally make sensation and participation?
  


 I think the correct view is that reality is independent of human 
 perception, that it being functioning quite fine for 13.7 billion years 
 before humans came along. But that humans each have their own internal 
 VIEWS or SIMULATIONS of reality, which they mistake for actual human 
 independent reality.

 Bruno, and a few others seem to MISTAKE those internal views of reality 
 for human independent reality itself. 

 That's a fundamental and deadly mistake in trying to make sense of 
 reality...

 Edgar




 On Thursday, February 13, 2014 6:05:34 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 10:23:14AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: 
  Craig, 
  
  I also suspect Bruno's math skills are superior to mine, but his 
  understanding of the

Re: How does acceleration curve space? Can anyone provide an answer?

Craig,

If I understand you it sounds close to my theory of Xperience which I just 
described in my other reply to you on the What are numbers... topic.

Please refer to that..

Edgar



On Sunday, February 16, 2014 4:49:57 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 1:23:32 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 But how can elemental computation arise out of even more primitive 
 sensory-motive qualities and supervene on an even more primordial 
 possibility of aesthetic appreciation and intentional participation since 
 those seem to be human dependent attributes?


 They only seem to be human dependent attributes because we are human. If 
 the cells and molecules our bodies are made of had no sensory capabilities, 
 certainly there would be no reason to develop any such capabilities. What 
 our immune system or digestive system does is far more important and 
 complex than what humans primitively do in their environment.
  


 Aren't you confusing human mental MODELS of reality (to which your 
 comments might apply) with the actual human independent reality which human 
 minds make their internal models of? That seems like a much more reasonable 
 view of reality...


 While human experience does model non-human experiences, I do not think 
 that it makes sense to say that it is, itself a model of anything. There 
 are experiences which are independent of human experience, but there are 
 not necessarily any phenomena which are independent of all experience. As 
 far as I can tell, there is no meaningful difference between a phenomenon 
 which can never be detected or inferred in any way and nothingness or 
 non-existence.

 If we are talking about local views of reality only, then sure, the 
 experiences which our body tells us are other bodies or objects are indeed 
 so alien to our own perception, on such wildly different scales, that 
 figuratively we could consider our experience a model of the phenomenon, 
 but literally there is no model, only a presentation of the relation of our 
 own experience to others.

 Craig
  


 Edgar



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 1:05:15 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 12:32:35 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 I agree with your idea in one sense, that actually space and clock time 
 are just computational relationships between events, specifically the 
 dimensional aspects of those events, rather than the actual physical 
 background to events that is usually assumed.

 In my book on Reality, I point out the reasons why it's more reasonable 
 to assume that spaceclocktime is something that arises out of elemental 
 computational events in discrete fragments, rather than existing as a 
 fixed, pre-existing background to events.


 I agree, except that I see elemental computation also as something that 
 arises out of even more primitive sensory-motive qualities disentangling 
 into localized fugues which precede even qualities of discreteness or 
 linear sequence. 


 The advantage of this approach is that it enables a conceptual 
 unification of quantum theory and GR; immediately resolves all quantum 
 paradoxes (which are paradoxical only with respect to the fixed, 
 pre-existing background space mistakenly assumed); and provides a clear 
 explanation of the source and necessity of quantum randomness. 


 Strangely no one here seems interested in how this happens, even to 
 criticize it!


 Yes, I am very familiar with the feeling ;)  I have only a superficial 
 understanding of QT and GR, so I wouldn't be the one to criticize 
 technically. My objection is only that whatever primordial form or function 
 can be conceived of as absolute must supervene on an even more primordial 
 possibility of aesthetic appreciation and intentional participation.

 Craig
  

  


 Edgar

 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 8:35:32 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Thursday, February 13, 2014 8:22:50 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Russell,

 No, the proper understanding is that gravitation and curved space are 
 EQUIVALENT. Both are produced by the presence of mass-energy (and 
 stress).


 I would say that gravity and curved space are metaphorical rather than 
 literal. The literal phenomenon is that the inertial frame of sensible 
 external relations is what is being curved. It is literally the 
 experience 
 of stress - of seriousness and realism which is seen from the outside as 
 exaggerated irreversibility and inevitability. Mass-energy is the public 
 token which represents sensory-motive. Space/density is the dual of mass, 
 time/duration is the dual of energy.

 Mass-energy doesn't produce anything except externalized reflections 
 of phenomenal experiences. Gravitation and curved space describe the back 
 end of the sensory-motor (not motive because its externalized) relations 
 which are interphenomenal, automatic, and unattended on all frames but 
 the 
 primordial one.

 Craig
  


 You say Motion

Re: What are numbers? What is math?

Russell,

And, as I mentioned, there is exhaustive evidence from cognitive science, 
and the sciences of physiology and perception, of the many specific 
different ways that humans DO model an external reality in their internal 
mental models of reality. 

Why do you just reject all this well documented science out of hand?

Edgar

On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: 
  Russell, 
  
  Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact that 
 you 
  and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless you 
 think 
  I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination! 

 It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a 
 common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one 
 theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an intersubjective 
 reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all 
 observers. 

  
  And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just fine 
 before 
  I ever met you 
  
  The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive, unless you 
  believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us. 
  

 That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger 
 evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be 
 consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic Principle 
 does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a 
 reverse syllogism fallacy. 

  So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of 
 reality 
  that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world he 
 lives 
  in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in their 
  own way. 
  

 Keep going. You still haven't provided any evidence that this real 
 external reality actually exists! Until you do so, I will state that 
 there is nothing here to confuse. Of course, if you actually succeed, 
 not only will many people be surprised, you will undoubtedly be the 
 most famous philosopher since Aristotle and Plato. 

 Cheers 

 -- 

  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  



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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

2014-02-17 Thread Richard Ruquist

Edgar,

We recently learned on this list that a Turing machine does not halt based
on real numbers and apparently can only halt for the natural numbers. I
wonder if that may correspond to your claim of the computations of nature
being different from the computations of humans. If I remember correctly
you referred to the former as R computations and the latter as H
computations.
Richard


On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Russell,

 And, as I mentioned, there is exhaustive evidence from cognitive science,
 and the sciences of physiology and perception, of the many specific
 different ways that humans DO model an external reality in their internal
 mental models of reality.

 Why do you just reject all this well documented science out of hand?

 Edgar

 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  Russell,
 
  Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact that
 you
  and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless you
 think
  I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination!

 It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a
 common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one
 theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an
 intersubjective
 reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all
 observers.

 
  And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just fine
 before
  I ever met you
 
  The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive, unless you
  believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us.
 

 That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger
 evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be
 consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic
 Principle
 does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a
 reverse syllogism fallacy.

  So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of
 reality
  that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world he
 lives
  in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in
 their
  own way.
 

 Keep going. You still haven't provided any evidence that this real
 external reality actually exists! Until you do so, I will state that
 there is nothing here to confuse. Of course, if you actually succeed,
 not only will many people be surprised, you will undoubtedly be the
 most famous philosopher since Aristotle and Plato.

 Cheers

 --

 

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 


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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On 17 Feb 2014, at 15:07, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Edgar,

We recently learned on this list that a Turing machine does not halt  
based on real numbers and apparently can only halt for the natural  
numbers.


It is the contrary. On real numbers, the proof of first order logical  
statement always halt. the theory is decidable (that is a theorem due  
to Tarski).


But on the natural numbers, the simple first order theory is  
undecidable, and many proofs will never halt, without us being able to  
know why  (well this assumes comp, really).


From a logical point of view, the real numbers are much more simple  
than the natural numbers. Think about the difference of complexity to  
solve x^17 + y^17 = z^17 on the real numbers and on the natural numbers.


Now, with the real number, and the sinus function, you can define the  
natural numbers, and become Turing universal, on the natural numbers.


What about the notion of computation on the real number? Well, there  
are many such notions, and they are not equivalent. On the reals,  
there is no Church thesis, and I a remain unconvinced by most attempt  
to generalize computability on the reals. This does not deprive some  
notion of computation on the reals to be useful for some application.



I wonder if that may correspond to your claim of the computations of  
nature being different from the computations of humans. If I  
remember correctly you referred to the former as R computations and  
the latter as H computations.


Unfortunately Edgar has not yet explain what he meant by computation.  
It cannot be the standard sense, as he explicitly dismiss the  
existence of computation, or of all finite pieces of computations  
(which includes the pieces of the non stopping one) in arithmetic  
(which is a relatively standard theorem).


He refers also to reality like if we knew what it is at the start.  
Logic provides tools to avoid such commitment, in any subject matter,  
even theology.


Bruno






Richard


On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net  
wrote:

Russell,

And, as I mentioned, there is exhaustive evidence from cognitive  
science, and the sciences of physiology and perception, of the many  
specific different ways that humans DO model an external reality in  
their internal mental models of reality.


Why do you just reject all this well documented science out of hand?

Edgar

On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
 Russell,

 Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact  
that you
 and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless  
you think

 I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination!

It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a
common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one
theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an  
intersubjective

reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all
observers.


 And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just  
fine before

 I ever met you

 The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive,  
unless you

 believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us.


That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger
evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be
consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic  
Principle

does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a
reverse syllogism fallacy.

 So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of  
reality
 that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world  
he lives
 in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in  
their

 own way.


Keep going. You still haven't provided any evidence that this real
external reality actually exists! Until you do so, I will state that
there is nothing here to confuse. Of course, if you actually succeed,
not only will many people be surprised, you will undoubtedly be the
most famous philosopher since Aristotle and Plato.

Cheers

--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage

2014-02-17 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 16 Feb 2014, at 17:41, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 15 Feb 2014, at 23:17, Russell Standish wrote:



  snip






  but IMHO their intelligence equals that of some mammals or birds, and
 clearly outclasses fish.


 I agree.




  I think I mentioned the anecdote which
 convinced me they exhibit a second order theory of the mind, which may
 well be sufficient for consciousness.

 You still have a link to that anecdote? I'd be interested.



 Which I call self-consciousness, and I think this is already Löbianitty.
 I do think that all animals have the first order consciousness, they
 can feel pain, and find it unpleasant, but can't reflect on it, nor assess
 I feel pain. they still can react appropriately. I m not sure, but it
 fits better with the whole picture.


 Also the survival of the little flamboyant one, that just gave up on
 swimming, mostly marching the sea floor, totally exposed to all predators,
 not bluffing poison because it actually is poisonous; when the rest of its
 kind is a delicacy for anything larger.

 Strange that the predators believe the display of colors; OK, we believe
 you little guy without having gone to the lab... and that this one
 survived, not by speed, or camouflage but by disco sign that reads:
 remember, I'm not fooling around, these colors are for real. I really am
 not like the rest of my kind, you like to eat. We get that, and we have an
 update. That's why I'm not swimming away. Simple really: you eat me, you're
 in trouble or you die. You better swim on and let me do my things here, k?
 Good. PGC



 The champion of faking is no more faking anymore, LOL.


:-) This had me on the floor, almost. If this happened in that sequence, it
reminds me of logic puzzles and chess games of GMs.


 Well, if all apparent food was edible, faking would no more made sense.
 May be there has been a competition among species of cuttlefishes the one
 being really not edible, and the other developing tools to look like them.
 Of course cuttlefishes fakes also rock, or the predators itself.

 Cuttlefish can imitate in a second, what some jumping spider took I don't
 know how many millions of year to do, like imitating perfectly a non edible
 ant. Note how it uses her front legs to imitate ant's antenna!

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pgs_-Lckno


This is always nice to see confirmed: that I'm not the only one who is slow
sometimes... Actually, it makes me feel pretty quick.

Picture a forum of cuttlefish posts, and some human mistakenly posting in
it: Do you think anybody actually changes, as a result of these posts?
and then he gets ridiculed, because cuttlefish change with every letter
they type/post.

But, as noted, just two years lifespan and they fall apart. All the more
surprising that mating ritual is so sophisticated, and the perpetual first
timers have managed to survive.

Liz, you mentioned something about gout and old age? I thought this was a
metabolic disorder involving excessive purine or something... So concerning
their short lifespan, could you clarify please?
PGC



 Bruno




 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

Hi Richard,

Yes, that is a good example. R-computations, the R-math computations that 
actual compute the current information state of the universe, never have a 
halting problem because they are a program that always simply computes the 
next state from the current state which is ALWAYS possible.

The Godel incompleteness and Halting problems only apply to H-math cases 
where a human mathematician comes up with a mathematical statement in 
advance, and then tries to get an automated system to computationally reach 
that state and thus prove it.

Reality doesn't work this way. It never 'imagines' any state to then try 
and reach it computationally. That would amount to teleology. R-math just 
always computes the next state from the present state. Just as ordinary 
software programs never have any problem at all in continually producing 
programmed output, so R-computations never do either.

R-computations ALWAYS happily compute the current state of reality no 
matter what Bruno, Godel, or Turing or anybody else postulates about H-math.

The proof of this is clearly that the universe DOES happily keep on 
existing, in spite of any H-mathematician telling us it doesn't or might 
not, or couldn't.

Best,
Edgar

On Monday, February 17, 2014 9:07:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

 Edgar,

 We recently learned on this list that a Turing machine does not halt based 
 on real numbers and apparently can only halt for the natural numbers. I 
 wonder if that may correspond to your claim of the computations of nature 
 being different from the computations of humans. If I remember correctly 
 you referred to the former as R computations and the latter as H 
 computations.
 Richard


 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Russell,

 And, as I mentioned, there is exhaustive evidence from cognitive science, 
 and the sciences of physiology and perception, of the many specific 
 different ways that humans DO model an external reality in their internal 
 mental models of reality. 

 Why do you just reject all this well documented science out of hand?

 Edgar

 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: 
  Russell, 
  
  Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact that 
 you 
  and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless you 
 think 
  I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination! 

 It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a 
 common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one 
 theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an 
 intersubjective 
 reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all 
 observers. 

  
  And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just fine 
 before 
  I ever met you 
  
  The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive, unless 
 you 
  believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us. 
  

 That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger 
 evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be 
 consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic 
 Principle 
 does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a 
 reverse syllogism fallacy. 

  So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of 
 reality 
  that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world he 
 lives 
  in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in 
 their 
  own way. 
  

 Keep going. You still haven't provided any evidence that this real 
 external reality actually exists! Until you do so, I will state that 
 there is nothing here to confuse. Of course, if you actually succeed, 
 not only will many people be surprised, you will undoubtedly be the 
 most famous philosopher since Aristotle and Plato. 

 Cheers 

 -- 

 
  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
 
  


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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room


On 2/16/2014 10:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

I can't imagine all the biochemistry being
there but life absent, but I can imagine all the biochemistry being
there but consciousness absent (though further reasoning may show that
that to be impossible). But maybe that is just a failure of
imagination.


That would be a philosophical zombie, which I think is impossible.  On the other hand I 
think consciousness could be realized in different ways, just as Bruno notes that 
computation can be realized in different ways and intelligent behavior can be realized in 
different ways. These different ways may feel different and thus have different qualia.  
A cuttlefish probably experiences qualia related to seeing its environment differently 
than a human because it has some very different ways of responding to that appearance.


Brent

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On 17 Feb 2014, at 14:13, David Nyman wrote:


On 16 February 2014 16:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The whole schema - physics included - would then have to be  
considered an epiphenomenon of some inaccessible ur-physics.

Exactly.
I'm not sure that it's exactly a contradiction just because of  
that, though, as in practice any putative ontological base -  
numbers included - must be inaccessible in this sense, except to  
theory.


It illustrates, perhaps better than step 8, the difficulty of  
wanting a primitive matter having a primitive ontological reality  
capable of singularizing a conscious person capable to refer to it.


I have to think more about this.

I must say that it is this form of argument that most forcefully  
persuades me that the reversal of comp-physics is necessary if CTM  
is to be salvageable.


Interesting.


ISTM that MGA or Maudlin-style arguments tend to lead to somewhat ad  
hoc quibbling over the role of counterfactuals or the like.


Strictly speaking MGA avoids the counterfactuals, but Maudlin does.

And as quantum logic can be seen as a sort of logic of conditionals,  
or even counterfactuals, I am not sure if that confrontation with the  
counterfactuals is not interesting per se.


There might be some sense in the quibble.

Here, we see that the very notion of epiphenomenon is related to a  
notion of causality, with his typical one way (matter -  
consciousness) causality.


But this asks for a notion of causality (which usually rise up the  
notion of counterfactuals).


With comp (with the consequences) we can derive the main notion of  
causality for the indexical type of points of view [] (when A - B  
is a law: in all worlds where A is true, B is true: that is [](A - B).






But the comp account of consciousness - or indeed any non- 
eliminativist position - strongly entails that thought can refer  
only to epiphenomenal matter (to continue with that way of speaking).


I guess that is the major attraction for idealist theories. It is  
easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being than to  
explain the illusion of consciousness (a quasi contradiction) to a  
piece of matter.





The leap from epiphenomenal to primitive matter then seems  
inadequately motivated, to say the least.


OK. It is last God-of-the-gap. But it has a strong natural appeal,  
making the correct theory necessarily counterintuitive.




The most typical explicit motivation is by appeal to evolutionary  
arguments - e.g. that we have evolved more-or-less accurate internal  
models to aid in our survival in the real external world of  
physics. But this appeal conceals a blatant begging of the question:  
yes, it must *appear* so, but it is precisely these appearances that  
we should seek to explain on independent grounds, not by assuming  
what is to be explained.


I agree.




I wonder if you have had any further thoughts?


I have to say that the notion of epiphenomenon plunges me in an abyss  
of perplexity. The notion of causalities and responsibilities are  
modal realities, notably due to the nuances between true,  
justifiable, observable, knowable, etc.


The natural picture we get assuming computationalism is conceptually  
transparent. We start from the arithmetical truth, which most people  
can understand the meaning of the sentences (before deciding its truth  
if ever). Then it is part of arithmetical truth that Turing  
(universal) machines exists and are involved in an intricate web of  
dreams, in which the self-referential constraints of relative self- 
correctness brought a non trivial invariant, sort of universal person.  
With comp it can only be a sort of baby, as any piece of life would  
particularizes it already.


I often present the three primary hypostases in the order

1) p  that is arithmetical truth
2) []p (beweisbar(p)) the intelligible
3) []p  p (the soul, the first person, the knower (Theaetetus))

But the more logical order from inside is that we start from p, and  
keep p along with the logical birth of the man ([]p).
So man is born with []p  p, and it is only civilisation/honest- 
communication that taught him to separate
[]p from []p  p.   Epiphenomenalism might be related to our  
necessarily inability to see that, or know when, they are equivalent.  
A secret well kept by G* minus G, for the consistent, and a fortiori,  
the correct machines.
I can speculate that the left brain is more specialized in []p and the  
right brain is more specialized in []p  p. The soul is lives at the  
intersection of belief and truth.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

2014-02-17 Thread Richard Ruquist

Edgar,

Well the way in which I posed my question betrayed my lack of
understanding, but the answers were illuminating.

So in this vein I will pose another. There is a fellow Peter Beamish, who
posts on the Mind/Brain and Theoretical lists (who is a biologist with a
PhD from MIT for work done at Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst), that believes
that in addition to clock time as in SR and GR, there is also a second time
he calls Rhythm Based Time RBT that is independent of clock time and that
aging of biological organisms depends only on RBT. As a result he thinks
that resolves the Twin Paradox.

I am not aware of any experiments with significant SR that validate or
falsify biological aging. So I wonder if anyone has info on either
possibility. Perhaps the answers will again be illuminating.

Here is the best link to Peter's thinking that Google came up with. Peter
calls RBT now time. Peter even wrote a book on RBT called Dancing with
the Whales.
So apparently Edgar, you are not alone.
http://www.oceancontact.com/research/ps/ps118.htm

I might add that my metaverse string cosmology also suggests the existence
of two times, actually two overlapping spacetimes within each universe. I
had supposed that the two times were synchronous, but maybe not. I think
the aging question is important.
Richard


On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 11:34 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Hi Richard,

 Yes, that is a good example. R-computations, the R-math computations that
 actual compute the current information state of the universe, never have a
 halting problem because they are a program that always simply computes the
 next state from the current state which is ALWAYS possible.

 The Godel incompleteness and Halting problems only apply to H-math cases
 where a human mathematician comes up with a mathematical statement in
 advance, and then tries to get an automated system to computationally reach
 that state and thus prove it.

 Reality doesn't work this way. It never 'imagines' any state to then try
 and reach it computationally. That would amount to teleology. R-math just
 always computes the next state from the present state. Just as ordinary
 software programs never have any problem at all in continually producing
 programmed output, so R-computations never do either.

 R-computations ALWAYS happily compute the current state of reality no
 matter what Bruno, Godel, or Turing or anybody else postulates about H-math.

 The proof of this is clearly that the universe DOES happily keep on
 existing, in spite of any H-mathematician telling us it doesn't or might
 not, or couldn't.

 Best,
 Edgar


 On Monday, February 17, 2014 9:07:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

 Edgar,

 We recently learned on this list that a Turing machine does not halt
 based on real numbers and apparently can only halt for the natural numbers.
 I wonder if that may correspond to your claim of the computations of nature
 being different from the computations of humans. If I remember correctly
 you referred to the former as R computations and the latter as H
 computations.
 Richard


 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Russell,

 And, as I mentioned, there is exhaustive evidence from cognitive
 science, and the sciences of physiology and perception, of the many
 specific different ways that humans DO model an external reality in their
 internal mental models of reality.

 Why do you just reject all this well documented science out of hand?

 Edgar

 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  Russell,
 
  Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact
 that you
  and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless you
 think
  I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination!

 It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a
 common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one
 theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an
 intersubjective
 reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all
 observers.

 
  And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just fine
 before
  I ever met you
 
  The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive, unless
 you
  believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us.
 

 That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger
 evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be
 consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic
 Principle
 does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a
 reverse syllogism fallacy.

  So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of
 reality
  that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world he
 lives
  in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in
 their
  own way.
 

 Keep going. You still haven't provided any

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

2014-02-17 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


   what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
 PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


 The question is what do you [blah blah]


 DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.

 You = the unique 1p owner of your personal memory in Helsinki


Then after the button has been pushed and the personal memory in Helsinki
is not unique anymore who is the p in the 1p ? And why 1, what is so
one-ish about it?

 In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience of
 seeing a unique city) = 1.


  Who is Mr. my? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR
 REFERENT.


  The unique 1p owner of your [blah blah]


DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.  Is Mr. p blah or blah?

 By comp we know that [blah blah]


Well good for comp.

 the question asked was about his first person experience,


  Who is Mr. his, and who exactly is the person having this first
 person experience? Be specific, give names, and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS
 WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


  The question is asked to John-Clark with diary H, before the pushing on
 the button.


 Who is Mr. you? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR
 REFERENT


 The owner of the H diary, before he pushes on the button


If the owner of the diary, a certain Mr. he, is John Clark then the correct
prediction would be that Mr. he will see both Washington AND Moscow.
However if Mr. he is the fellow who is experiencing Helsinki right now then
the correct prediction would be Mr. he will see neither Washington NOR
Moscow. But of course none of this really matters because predictions, good
bad or indifferent, have nothing to do with identity and the feeling of
self.

 Well comp implies [blah blah]


Well good for comp.


  Please go to step 4.


Why? Because the first 3 steps were so free of ambiguity? The entire point
of including strange but physically possible machines like duplicating
chambers in a thought experiment is that it forces (or at least it should
force) Bruno Marchal and John Clark to reexamine concepts that in a world
without such machines seem so self evidently true that they're not worth
thinking about. But even in these bizarre circumstances Bruno Marchal
continues to use pronouns in exactly the same way that Bruno Marchal does
in the everyday world when Bruno Marchal orders a pizza.  Duplicating
chambers are not everyday things and thus everyday language is not good
enough in a world that contains them; if the referent to personal pronouns
was always unambiguous then the thought experiment itself would be
unnecessary because the point it was trying to make would already be clear.

  John K Clark

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On Monday, February 17, 2014 12:44:43 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 4:45:13 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2014, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Saturday, February 15, 2014 10:49:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On 16 February 2014 01:32, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 

  No, the copy of the experience has no belief or experience at all. 
 The 
  reflection of the fire doesn't burn anything. 

 Are you saying that the copy will be dead?


 I'm saying that the copy was never alive to begin with.
  

 A pathologist would examine 
 it and declare that it cannot possibly be dead, everything is normal. 
 It not only looks like Craig, it also has skin, bones, internal 
 organs, blood, the histological structure of the organs is all normal, 
 biochemical analysis is normal, everything is normal.


 You are assuming that is possible, but it isn't. All you can do is 
 clone me, which is no better than a twin brother as far as being a copy. 
 No 
 other kind of reproduction will work, any more than a flame could be made 
 out of pixels.
  

 If it's all 
 normal by every objective test but it is dead, that would be a 
 miracle. 


 It won't be normal by every objective test. You keep thinking of a 
 zombie, but I am talking about a doll. There are no zombies, just as there 
 is no way to turn lead into gold by a chemical transformation.


 I'm proposing that all the atoms will be in place, put there by a 
 futuristic version of a 3D printer. 


 I understand, but I am saying that is not possible. Atoms do not 
 literally occupy 'places', it is only impressions of atoms which appear to 
 occupy relative places within a sense modality. If you try to copy a living 
 cell, you won't get an exact copy, you'll just get another living cell (if 
 you're lucky).
  

 Any analysis will then show that this is a normal human with healthy 
 organs. 


 It would, in a universe where it was possible to literally copy physical 
 presence, but it is not possible in this universe. Copying is a concept 
 that relies on our failure to detect differences from our perceptual 
 vantage point. There are no actual copies of physical events, and a human 
 lifetime is a single, irreducible physical event (within its own frame of 
 reference).


 I'm not sure what you think I mean by copy but what I actually mean is 
 that it is physically similar to the original, in the same way that a new 
 black 32GB Google Nexus 5 phone is physically similar to every other such 
 phone. They are not literally the same phone as they are physically 
 distinct, and if you did very precise measurements you would find that they 
 differ in multiple small ways, but if they came out of the factory within 
 engineering tolerance they are close enough to be shipped to customers as 
 black 32GB Google Nexus 5. 


What I am saying though is that who a person is consists entirely of the 
experience of the phone calls made with the phone, not the forms or 
functions of the phone.

 

 A pathologist doing an autopsy of a cadaver finds at least some evidence 
 of tissue damage consistent with death even if the cause of death is 
 undetermined, but in this case he will find nothing wrong. Are you claiming 
 that, nonenetheless, the 3D printed copy will be as lifeless as a cadaver?


 I doubt that a 3D printed copy of a fully developed body will ever live. 
 A 3D clone of DNA grown in vitro will live, but it will of course have a 
 separate life and be a separate person, just as all identical twins, even 
 brain-conjoined identical twins are separate people. If there were some way 
 to copy a fully developed body so that it lived, it would still not be a 
 copy of the original, but just a new original that reminds us of the copy 
 from the outside perspective.

 Craig


 If the copy were not alive then as I said a pathologist would find some 
 deficit in it,


The deficit is that it won't be alive. The parts won't integrate into a 
whole. Every examination will yield only more levels of where the copy is 
incomplete. The primary sequence of DNA is right, but the tertiary protein 
folding doesn't work. The cells seem normal but the immune system attacks 
them. Every level will fail to account for the other completely.
 

 which would indicate a technical problem with the copying process. 


Yes, the technical problem is that nothing can be copied literally except 
in our perception. If we try to make a copy of something based on our 
perception, then we get pieces of what we think we are copying rather than 
the whole. My view is that the whole can appear to be cut into pieces, but 
pieces can never be assembled into a whole in the absence of some conscious 
perception.
 

 For example, it may be that its heart does not beat because, on close 
 analysis, there is a structural problem with the myosin in the

Re: 3-1 views


On 2/17/2014 4:45 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


I don't know what I would personally experience because I is ambiguous 
after
duplication.

But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically adequate copy of me 
is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am duplicated both the resulting 
continuations are equivalent immediately posterior to duplication. Consequently I repeat 
my question: if *you* were duplicated in this manner, would you reasonably expect that 
either of the resulting equivalent continuations would experience a two-valued outcome?


No, but as I said, that's regarding them as third persons.

Brent

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On Monday, February 17, 2014 8:33:48 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Russell,

 All of science assumes an external reality independent of human 
 observation. 


Only for the last few centuries. Before that, natural philosophy was firmly 
grounded in the assumption of parallel-symmetric relation between interior 
experience and exterior events. Relativity and Quantum theory show that 
there is no scientific reason to insist that there could be any reality 
which is external to (some form of) observation (not necessarily human).
 

 Science is what gives us by far our most accurate view of the universe. So 
 what is your reasoning to reject this fundamental assumption of science?

 Can you define your intersubjective reality? Does it include all humans? 
 Does it exclude rats and other non-human life forms? 


http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/
 

 Do you think this intersubjective reality actually somehow creates the 
 non-human or non-living universe? Did it create the stars and galaxies, or 
 are they only figments of our collective consciousness?


Consciousness is the only reality, so they are not figments. They are 
concretely real, but they are real experiences that appear to us in a 
collapsed view as objects, rather than complete 3D objects in 4D space. 
Experience is trans-dimensional.

Craig
 


 Please explain...

 Edgar

 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 01:40:15PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: 
  Russell, 
  
  Well, there is overwhelming evidence of many sorts. The very fact that 
 you 
  and I can even communicate about this issue is one proof, unless you 
 think 
  I'm just a pesky figment of your imagination! 

 It is evidence only of an intersubjective reality. That there is a 
 common reality (to us) that we can agree on. Indeed, COMP, to take one 
 theory of consciousness, predicts the existence of such an 
 intersubjective 
 reality. But, it is not evidence of a reality independent of all 
 observers. 

  
  And of course that can't possibly be true since I was here just fine 
 before 
  I ever met you 
  
  The obvious fact that we have to eat and breathe to survive, unless you 
  believe that just imagining food and oxygen is enough to sustain us. 
  

 That is evidence of the Anthropic Principle (there is much stronger 
 evidence of that too), ie what we observe as reality must be 
 consistent with our existence within that reality. The Anthropic 
 Principle 
 does not imply an observer independent reality - that would be a 
 reverse syllogism fallacy. 

  So again I would say you are confusing the internal simulation of 
 reality 
  that all minds produce, and that everyone thinks is the real world he 
 lives 
  in, with the real external reality that all minds simulate each in 
 their 
  own way. 
  

 Keep going. You still haven't provided any evidence that this real 
 external reality actually exists! Until you do so, I will state that 
 there is nothing here to confuse. Of course, if you actually succeed, 
 not only will many people be surprised, you will undoubtedly be the 
 most famous philosopher since Aristotle and Plato. 

 Cheers 

 -- 

  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  




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Re: How Wolves Change Rivers



On Monday, February 17, 2014 7:29:48 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

 On 17 February 2014 03:19, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:


 On Sunday, February 16, 2014 9:07:06 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

 On 17 February 2014 00:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

 You don't suggest that I can't understand comp, but you suggest that I 
 am impervious to reasoned argument about it...why would that be the case 
 if 
 I understood comp as you seem to think it deserves to be understood?

  
 You said that I understood that you could not possibly understand comp. 
 I have never said that nor do I believe it. I do however expect that you 
 will persist in attacking a parody of comp of your own devising as long as 
 you fail to engage with the genuine argument in its own terms and this is 
 not necessarily so easy. 


 Then that means you are accusing me of understanding comp but pretending 
 not to so that I can attack a straw man. 


 You misunderstood my meaning. I said that I don't believe that you cannot 
 *possibly* understand comp, assuming you ever give it proper consideration, 
 but I see no evidence that *in fact* you have ever understood it 
 sufficiently well to refute it. Indeed your peremptory dismissals always 
 seem to me to be based on one misunderstanding or another, but you never 
 consistently engage with the argument to the point where these 
 misunderstandings could be resolved.


If that's true, it is only because being consistently engaged with the 
argument entails that I accept a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature 
as axiomatic.

 

 If you are convinced of that there's nothing that I can say, but from my 
 perspective, if you think that I'm attacking a straw man, all that you have 
 to do is explain the difference between what I am attacking and the full 
 strength position of comp.


 See below.
  

 I do use examples which are hyperbole to make my point obvious, but that 
 doesn't mean my points are invalid just because the context becomes more 
 sophisticated. The problem with the disconnection of mathematics from 
 either consciousness (if we use a physical primitive) or physics (if we use 
 a phenomenal primitive) remains no matter what. If computation can create 
 consciousness, then consciousness has to be superfluous to consciousness, 
 and if computation can create superfluous phenomena which are not 
 computational then there is no basis to consider computation any different 
 than any other brute-emergence religious faith.


 But computation cannot create consciousness. This is a gross misconception 
 and we have touched on it before.


What does computationalism mean other than a view that the human mind 
and/or human brain is an information processing system and that thinking is 
a form of computing. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind). If you agree 
that computation cannot create consciousness, then I don't understand what 
you think we are debating.

 

 What the comp argument elucidates is a principled reciprocity between a 
 domain of function and a domain of appearance.


But where does it get a domain of appearance from? (or domains from for 
that matter). I agree, once you have appearances, then you can derive 
principled relations between functional appearances and aesthetic 
appearances to some extent, but Bruno's comp puts all such distinctions 
within arithmetic. I see that aesthetics have nothing to do with arithmetic 
funcitonally, but that arithmetic can be derived from aesthetics.
 

 The first is modelled as arithmetic (representing any first-order 
 combinatorial system) and the second as a class of indexical arithmetical 
 truths. The fact that the latter is encountered after the former *in the 
 argument* should not mislead you into supposing that this recapitulates 
 some actual sequence of creation, or that one is more fundamental than 
 the other. That would be to mistake the argument for the thing argued for.


I'm not making that assumption, I am questioning the assumption that a 
class of indexical arithmetical truths is equivalent to an aesthetic 
quality.


 So granting that comp can indeed faithfully represent the necessary 
 reciprocity between function and appearance entails the acceptance (i.e. of 
 the force of the cumulative argument) that the latter *just is* coterminous 
 with arithmetical truth in some adequate sense and that this is 
 *necessarily* the case from the outset. It is not a bolt-on extra to 
 computation. 


There is no bolt-on extra because the definition of consciousness being 
used is already amputated from all of its non-computational significance. 
It is like taking the color wheel and saying that since values of HSV can 
me mapped to it, then knowing HSV coordinates will allow a blind person to 
see color.
 


  

 But not only is genuine understanding not equivalent to acceptance, it 
 is the only generally accepted route to refuting any argument on reasonable

Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
 Russell,
 
 All of science assumes an external reality independent of human 
 observation. 

Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.

 Science is what gives us by far our most accurate view of the 
 universe. So what is your reasoning to reject this fundamental assumption 
 of science?

Science doesn't need it, and as far as I can tell, science is not
interested in ontological questions like that.

What it does assume is that phenomena is describable in a compressed
form, and that predictions are possible using these compressed
descriptions. And that's about it - no need to ask what the phenomena
being described really is - that sort of talk is relegated to the pub,
or to internet discussion fora like this.

 
 Can you define your intersubjective reality? 
 Does it include all humans? 
 Does it exclude rats and other non-human life forms? Do you think this 
 intersubjective reality actually somehow creates the non-human or 
 non-living universe? Did it create the stars and galaxies, or are they only 
 figments of our collective consciousness?

You and I share an intersubjective reality. Liz  I share another one,
that is almost, but not quite, the same. The rat and I share another
one, but it is rather different, and more basic. A being in a
completely different universe of the multiverse shares just the
Schroedinger equation. And so on..

I don't understand your questions about creation here.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

2014-02-17 Thread LizR

On 18/02/2014, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
 Edgar,

 Well the way in which I posed my question betrayed my lack of
 understanding, but the answers were illuminating.

 So in this vein I will pose another. There is a fellow Peter Beamish, who
 posts on the Mind/Brain and Theoretical lists (who is a biologist with a
 PhD from MIT for work done at Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst), that believes
 that in addition to clock time as in SR and GR, there is also a second time
 he calls Rhythm Based Time RBT that is independent of clock time and that
 aging of biological organisms depends only on RBT. As a result he thinks
 that resolves the Twin Paradox.

 I am not aware of any experiments with significant SR that validate or
 falsify biological aging. So I wonder if anyone has info on either
 possibility. Perhaps the answers will again be illuminating.

Surely this implies that there is something special about living
creatures - otherwise aging is merely (very complex) physical
processes, and there is no reason to assume it has its own time
dimension. So what is this special feature?

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Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage

2014-02-17 Thread LizR

On 18/02/2014, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:
 Liz, you mentioned something about gout and old age? I thought this was a
 metabolic disorder involving excessive purine or something... So concerning
 their short lifespan, could you clarify please?

I read somewhere that the same excess of whatever-it-is allows us to
live longer as causes gout, but the details have faded somewhat since
I read it.

A bit of googling reveals the substance is uric acid. If you google
for uric acid and aging you will see some articles...

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?


On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Russell,

All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
observation.

Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.


I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The success of this hypothesis 
is generally taken as evidence for a reality independent of human observation.


Brent




Science is what gives us by far our most accurate view of the
universe. So what is your reasoning to reject this fundamental assumption
of science?

Science doesn't need it, and as far as I can tell, science is not
interested in ontological questions like that.

What it does assume is that phenomena is describable in a compressed
form, and that predictions are possible using these compressed
descriptions. And that's about it - no need to ask what the phenomena
being described really is - that sort of talk is relegated to the pub,
or to internet discussion fora like this.


Can you define your intersubjective reality?
Does it include all humans?
Does it exclude rats and other non-human life forms? Do you think this
intersubjective reality actually somehow creates the non-human or
non-living universe? Did it create the stars and galaxies, or are they only
figments of our collective consciousness?

You and I share an intersubjective reality. Liz  I share another one,
that is almost, but not quite, the same. The rat and I share another
one, but it is rather different, and more basic. A being in a
completely different universe of the multiverse shares just the
Schroedinger equation. And so on..

I don't understand your questions about creation here.



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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:49:11AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
 Russell,
 
 And, as I mentioned, there is exhaustive evidence from cognitive science, 
 and the sciences of physiology and perception, of the many specific 
 different ways that humans DO model an external reality in their internal 
 mental models of reality. 
 
 Why do you just reject all this well documented science out of hand?
 
 Edgar

To be fair, you haven't been particular specific about what this
exhaustive evidence is. I know of no neuroscience paper making
ontological claims about reality. The closest I can think of is a
paper written a few years ago by our very own Colin Hales, which I found
rather waffly and unconvincing. Even he, I'm pretty sure, just assumed
that there must be some sort of independent reality, though.


What I am aware of, of course, is substantial evidence linking
neurological brain states with conscious experience. This, as I
mentioned, is evidence of what philosophers call physical
supervenience, which is a manifestation of the Anthropic Principle:
the phenomena we observed must be compatible with our existence within
that phenomena. But it is not direct evidence of an independent reality.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage


On 2/17/2014 1:57 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18/02/2014, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:

Liz, you mentioned something about gout and old age? I thought this was a
metabolic disorder involving excessive purine or something... So concerning
their short lifespan, could you clarify please?

I read somewhere that the same excess of whatever-it-is allows us to
live longer as causes gout, but the details have faded somewhat since
I read it.

A bit of googling reveals the substance is uric acid. If you google
for uric acid and aging you will see some articles...



An interesting question is why humans are so long lived compared to other mammals of 
similar size.  The best theory I've heard is that having developed language and symbolic 
communication it became possible for younger generations to benefit from the memories of 
older generations, and so there was an evolutionary advantage for people to live longer. 
But that is also what puts the short lives of cephalpods in tension with their 
intelligence and ability to communicate.  They don't survive to teach their young 
anything, so their ability to learn is partially wasted.


Brent

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On Monday, February 17, 2014 4:55:29 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:



 You and I share an intersubjective reality. Liz  I share another one, 
 that is almost, but not quite, the same. The rat and I share another 
 one, but it is rather different, and more basic. A being in a 
 completely different universe of the multiverse shares just the 
 Schroedinger equation. And so on.. 


That's what I mean by multisense realism, except that I would add that the 
Shrodinger equation shares a common sense with every other equation and 
every other being. With sense itself as the absolute unity, then you don't 
need a multiverse. 

Craig

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

2014-02-17 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 4:50 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 18/02/2014, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
  Edgar,
 
  Well the way in which I posed my question betrayed my lack of
  understanding, but the answers were illuminating.
 
  So in this vein I will pose another. There is a fellow Peter Beamish, who
  posts on the Mind/Brain and Theoretical lists (who is a biologist with a
  PhD from MIT for work done at Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst), that
 believes
  that in addition to clock time as in SR and GR, there is also a second
 time
  he calls Rhythm Based Time RBT that is independent of clock time and that
  aging of biological organisms depends only on RBT. As a result he thinks
  that resolves the Twin Paradox.
 
  I am not aware of any experiments with significant SR that validate or
  falsify biological aging. So I wonder if anyone has info on either
  possibility. Perhaps the answers will again be illuminating.

 Surely this implies that there is something special about living
 creatures - otherwise aging is merely (very complex) physical
 processes, and there is no reason to assume it has its own time
 dimension. So what is this special feature?


Life



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Re: How Wolves Change Rivers

On 17 February 2014 21:45, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 snip



  You misunderstood my meaning. I said that I don't believe that you
 cannot *possibly* understand comp, assuming you ever give it proper
 consideration, but I see no evidence that *in fact* you have ever
 understood it sufficiently well to refute it. Indeed your peremptory
 dismissals always seem to me to be based on one misunderstanding or
 another, but you never consistently engage with the argument to the point
 where these misunderstandings could be resolved.


 If that's true, it is only because being consistently engaged with the
 argument entails that I accept a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature
 as axiomatic.


Sure, I get that you reject comp, and hence would say no to the doctor.
That is your right. But on the other hand can you really be certain that it
constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding if you consistently plug your
ears to any argument that might persuade you to the contrary? Ah, but in
your view the other hand conceals the Kool-Aid and now we know what happens
to those who succumb to its deadly allure.

 snip



  The first is modelled as arithmetic (representing any first-order
 combinatorial system) and the second as a class of indexical arithmetical
 truths. The fact that the latter is encountered after the former *in the
 argument* should not mislead you into supposing that this recapitulates
 some actual sequence of creation, or that one is more fundamental than
 the other. That would be to mistake the argument for the thing argued for.


 I'm not making that assumption, I am questioning the assumption that a
 class of indexical arithmetical truths is equivalent to an aesthetic
 quality.


You're not questioning it, you're asserting that it cannot possibly be
true. But how can you know a priori what sort of thing equates with
aesthetic quality? Sure, you can respond by saying that you know it by
direct acquaintance. But how do you know that indexical arithmetic truth is
not known by direct acquaintance? According to Bruno, that's precisely its
defining characteristic. A fortiori, it corresponds to what the machines
claim for themselves. It is impossible for you to know a priori that such
claims are false, but your own direct acquaintance and the similarity of
your own claims might, on the other hand, nudge you towards an empathic
suspicion that they might after all be true.

Ah, but there's that other hand again...


 So granting that comp can indeed faithfully represent the necessary
 reciprocity between function and appearance entails the acceptance (i.e. of
 the force of the cumulative argument) that the latter *just is* coterminous
 with arithmetical truth in some adequate sense and that this is
 *necessarily* the case from the outset. It is not a bolt-on extra to
 computation.


 There is no bolt-on extra because the definition of consciousness being
 used is already amputated from all of its non-computational significance.


You haven't justified this claim.


 It is like taking the color wheel and saying that since values of HSV can
 me mapped to it, then knowing HSV coordinates will allow a blind person to
 see color.


But this analogy suggests itself only because you have decided a priori to
disbelieve some body that claims to be able to see what you can and behaves
perfectly consistently with these claims.


  snip


 References to Kool-Aid generally have to do with its availability in
 Guyana, rather than the US.


 Ah, I hadn't made the connection with Jonestown.  What a revolting
 comparison.


 It's a pretty common idiom in the US. Or it was.


That doesn't make the comparison any the less revolting.


 snip


 As I argue above, this does not entail any discrimination between the two
 as to which is the more fundamental; if anything it is the entire system of
 reciprocity that is fundamental, in a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian
 sense.


 it is the entire system of reciprocity that is fundamental

 YESSS. I call that 'system' sense. Only its not a 'system', because a
 system can only function if there is a sensible context in which systemic
 qualities can be experienced.


Just so. Now if you reflect on this remark perhaps you may get an inkling
of where your general ideas and Bruno's schema might intersect.

 snip





  but sensory experience doesn't fall out of either one - not unless you
 smuggle the possibility of it in before the fact.


 But that is not necessarily so, as I argue above. I must admit that it
 used to seem obvious to me that this must be so, and indeed the force of
 arguments like Searle's depend on this native intuition, or common sense if
 you prefer. My position was that sense is sui generis and irreducible and
 that neither of these characteristics could conceivably be successfully
 captured by any objective model except as an optional extra that could just
 as easily be omitted. But I am less certain of that now, and the reasons
 for this

Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:11:17PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
 On 2/17/2014 1:57 PM, LizR wrote:
 On 18/02/2014, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:
 Liz, you mentioned something about gout and old age? I thought this was a
 metabolic disorder involving excessive purine or something... So concerning
 their short lifespan, could you clarify please?
 I read somewhere that the same excess of whatever-it-is allows us to
 live longer as causes gout, but the details have faded somewhat since
 I read it.
 
 A bit of googling reveals the substance is uric acid. If you google
 for uric acid and aging you will see some articles...
 
 
 An interesting question is why humans are so long lived compared to
 other mammals of similar size.  The best theory I've heard is that
 having developed language and symbolic communication it became
 possible for younger generations to benefit from the memories of
 older generations, and so there was an evolutionary advantage for
 people to live longer. 

The interesting thing is that the really smart ones seem to live a
long time. Most of the great apes will live to 40-50 years in
captivity, and dolphins can even reach a similar age (although 20
years is more usual for them).

 But that is also what puts the short lives of
 cephalpods in tension with their intelligence and ability to
 communicate.  They don't survive to teach their young anything, so
 their ability to learn is partially wasted.
 

Exactly.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: 3-1 views

On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
 adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am
 duplicated both the resulting continuations are equivalent immediately
 posterior to duplication. Consequently I repeat my question: if *you* were
 duplicated in this manner, would you reasonably expect that either of the
 resulting equivalent continuations would experience a two-valued outcome?

 No, but as I said, that's regarding them as third persons.


Well, the very logic of the hypothesis dictates that *both* continuations
inherit the first personal perspective of the original and this will always
be single-valued. But, as you said, there is an ineliminable ambiguity
because neither can record anything first-personal that incorporates that
third-personal doubleness. IOW it always seems as if there is only one of
me (1p) even in the case that I know there are two of me (3p). Do you agree
that this ambiguity is sufficient for step 3 to go through?

David

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Re: 3-1 views

On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy
of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am duplicated both the
resulting continuations are equivalent immediately posterior to duplication.
Consequently I repeat my question: if *you* were duplicated in this manner,
would
you reasonably expect that either of the resulting equivalent continuations
would
experience a two-valued outcome?

No, but as I said, that's regarding them as third persons.

Well, the very logic of the hypothesis dictates that *both* continuations inherit the
first personal perspective of the original and this will always be single-valued. But,
as you said, there is an ineliminable ambiguity because neither can record anything
first-personal that incorporates that third-personal doubleness. IOW it always seems as
if there is only one of me (1p) even in the case that I know there are two of me (3p).
Do you agree that this ambiguity is sufficient for step 3 to go through?

You sound as though you want to sell me something. I have no interest buying the argument
one piece at a time or swallowing it all at once. I'm interested in understanding it and
it's consequences.

Brent

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On 2/17/2014 5:21 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:03:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Russell,

All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
observation.

Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.

I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The
success of this hypothesis is generally taken as evidence for a
reality independent of human observation.

By whom?

Vic Stenger for one. Me for two.

That is a serious question. Of course, some scientists might
speculate about this down at the pub, and certainly there has been
some discussion along these lines on this list, but in everyday
science, everyone is trained as a positivist, and tends to act as
such, which is probably a worse syndrome than naive Aristotelianism.

The notion that there is a real reality there, with solid things like
tables and stones to stub your toes on has taken such a drubbing since
the beginning of the 20th century,

I'd say positivism has taken a lot more of a drubbing since Mach than realism.

The replacement of tables and chairs by atoms and then by wave functions is just changing
our best guess about ontology - it's not evidence that there is no mind independent
ontology. The fact that there is intersubjective agreement on observations is still
evidence for a mutual reality.

that most everyday scientists usually
just focus on mathematical descriptions of phenomena, and leave it at that.

But if you ask them why mathematical descriptions are so successful? Or why do we all
agree that's a chair over there? The existence of some mind independent reality is always
the working assumption.

Brent

Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 06:32:35PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
 On 2/17/2014 5:21 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:03:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
 On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
 Russell,
 
 All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
 observation.
 Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
 101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.
 I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The
 success of this hypothesis is generally taken as evidence for a
 reality independent of human observation.
 
 By whom?
 
 Vic Stenger for one.  Me for two.

and David Deutsch, for three, IIUHC. To which we can add Bruno Marchal and
myself against the obviousness of that idea.

But these are all rather unusual individuals, in a way.

 
 That is a serious question. Of course, some scientists might
 speculate about this down at the pub, and certainly there has been
 some discussion along these lines on this list, but in everyday
 science, everyone is trained as a positivist, and tends to act as
 such, which is probably a worse syndrome than naive Aristotelianism.
 
 The notion that there is a real reality there, with solid things like
 tables and stones to stub your toes on has taken such a drubbing since
 the beginning of the 20th century,
 
 I'd say positivism has taken a lot more of a drubbing since Mach than realism.
 

Hmm - I'm not so sure. It was certainly the prevailing opinion back
when I was closer to fundamental physics research. The sort of stuff I
deal with now is much less abstract, though, so things like tables and
stones (or people and dollars) are fundamental objects of
analysis. Are people doing string theory utterly realist about the
stuff they do? Seems hard to imagine it.

 The replacement of tables and chairs by atoms and then by wave
 functions is just changing our best guess about ontology - it's not
 evidence that there is no mind independent ontology.  The fact that
 there is intersubjective agreement on observations is still evidence
 for a mutual reality.

Yes a mutual reality, but not a mind independent one.

 
 that most everyday scientists usually
 just focus on mathematical descriptions of phenomena, and leave it at that.
 
 But if you ask them why mathematical descriptions are so successful?

Wouldn't they just point at Occam's razor, if they've thought about it
at all, that is? Or even go with Max Tegmark and say its all mathematics.

 Or why do we all agree that's a chair over there?  

That one is obviously convention. Someone from remote Amazonia who's
never seen a chair before wouldn't agree.

 The existence of
 some mind independent reality is always the working assumption.
 

Really? I don't think working scientists need to think about the issue
much at all. Whether they assume there is some kind of
mind-independent reality, or are outrageous solipsists would not
affect their ability to conduct experiments or do theory.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On 2/17/2014 7:09 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 06:32:35PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/17/2014 5:21 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:03:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Russell,

All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
observation.

Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.

I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The
success of this hypothesis is generally taken as evidence for a
reality independent of human observation.

By whom?

Vic Stenger for one. Me for two.

and David Deutsch, for three, IIUHC. To which we can add Bruno Marchal and
myself against the obviousness of that idea.

But these are all rather unusual individuals, in a way.

The notion that there is a real reality there, with solid things like
tables and stones to stub your toes on has taken such a drubbing since
the beginning of the 20th century,

I'd say positivism has taken a lot more of a drubbing since Mach than realism.

Hmm - I'm not so sure. It was certainly the prevailing opinion back
when I was closer to fundamental physics research. The sort of stuff I
deal with now is much less abstract, though, so things like tables and
stones (or people and dollars) are fundamental objects of
analysis. Are people doing string theory utterly realist about the
stuff they do? Seems hard to imagine it.

There's a strong form of realism which says the real is whatever is in the ontology of our
best theory. I think that is a mistake and I doubt anyone really holds that view. Of
course it is our working assumption at any given time, but that is true even when we're
pretty sure the theory is false. GR is our best theory of spacetime and so we think
gravity waves exist, but we don't think singularities exist and consider GR almost
certainly wrong. I think scientific realists are all falibilists.

But there is a weaker form. However unlikely one thinks strings or singularities or
multiple-worlds are, one may still hypothesize that there is *some* reality as the
explanation for the intersubjective agreement that is consistently observed. Just
consider the contrast with religions in which there is NOT intersubjective agreement about
visions and revelations.

The replacement of tables and chairs by atoms and then by wave
functions is just changing our best guess about ontology - it's not
evidence that there is no mind independent ontology. The fact that
there is intersubjective agreement on observations is still evidence
for a mutual reality.

Yes a mutual reality, but not a mind independent one.

Certainly independent of any single mind. And the science formulated so far is
independent of mind - which is why Liz supposed that the past existed before it was
observed (and constitutes a block universe past).

that most everyday scientists usually
just focus on mathematical descriptions of phenomena, and leave it at that.

But if you ask them why mathematical descriptions are so successful?

Wouldn't they just point at Occam's razor, if they've thought about it
at all, that is? Or even go with Max Tegmark and say its all mathematics.

Mathematics is just a different substrate, a different but still mind indpendent reality.
Notice that the main argument given for the reality of mathematics is the intersubjective
agreement on the truths of mathematics; which gives the feeling it is discovered rather
than invented.

Or why do we all agree that's a chair over there?

That one is obviously convention. Someone from remote Amazonia who's
never seen a chair before wouldn't agree.

They might not agree on the name, but they would agree there was an object there. The
possibility of having a useable convention would seem to be a miracle if there is nothing
mind-indpendent that correlates the perceptions of different persons.

The existence of
some mind independent reality is always the working assumption.

Really? I don't think working scientists need to think about the issue
much at all.

Because it's an assumption so common they only question it unusual experiments - like
tests of psychics.

Whether they assume there is some kind of
mind-independent reality, or are outrageous solipsists would not
affect their ability to conduct experiments or do theory.

One could still assume a mind-independent reality while assuming that one was the only
mind. But they could not do either experiments or theory if they assumed the

Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 07:30:23PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
 On 2/17/2014 7:09 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 06:32:35PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
 On 2/17/2014 5:21 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:03:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
 On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
 Russell,
 
 All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
 observation.
 Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
 101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.
 I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The
 success of this hypothesis is generally taken as evidence for a
 reality independent of human observation.
 
 By whom?
 Vic Stenger for one.  Me for two.
 and David Deutsch, for three, IIUHC. To which we can add Bruno Marchal and
 myself against the obviousness of that idea.
 
 But these are all rather unusual individuals, in a way.
 
 That is a serious question. Of course, some scientists might
 speculate about this down at the pub, and certainly there has been
 some discussion along these lines on this list, but in everyday
 science, everyone is trained as a positivist, and tends to act as
 such, which is probably a worse syndrome than naive Aristotelianism.
 
 The notion that there is a real reality there, with solid things like
 tables and stones to stub your toes on has taken such a drubbing since
 the beginning of the 20th century,
 I'd say positivism has taken a lot more of a drubbing since Mach than 
 realism.
 
 Hmm - I'm not so sure. It was certainly the prevailing opinion back
 when I was closer to fundamental physics research. The sort of stuff I
 deal with now is much less abstract, though, so things like tables and
 stones (or people and dollars) are fundamental objects of
 analysis. Are people doing string theory utterly realist about the
 stuff they do? Seems hard to imagine it.
 
 There's a strong form of realism which says the real is whatever is
 in the ontology of our best theory.  I think that is a mistake and I
 doubt anyone really holds that view.  Of course it is our working
 assumption at any given time, but that is true even when we're
 pretty sure the theory is false.  GR is our best theory of spacetime
 and so we think gravity waves exist, but we don't think
 singularities exist and consider GR almost certainly wrong.  I think
 scientific realists are all falibilists.
 
 But there is a weaker form.  However unlikely one thinks strings or
 singularities or multiple-worlds are, one may still hypothesize that
 there is *some* reality as the explanation for the intersubjective
 agreement that is consistently observed. 

Sure - one may hypothesise so. But does it assist in any scientific
experiment to do so? And is there any evidence to support the
hypothesis, or is it simply like pre-classical physics - good enough
to get the next meal.

  Just consider the contrast
 with religions in which there is NOT intersubjective agreement about
 visions and revelations.
 
 
 The replacement of tables and chairs by atoms and then by wave
 functions is just changing our best guess about ontology - it's not
 evidence that there is no mind independent ontology.  The fact that
 there is intersubjective agreement on observations is still evidence
 for a mutual reality.
 Yes a mutual reality, but not a mind independent one.
 
 Certainly independent of any single mind.  And the science
 formulated so far is independent of mind - which is why Liz supposed
 that the past existed before it was observed (and constitutes a
 block universe past).

Supposed, maybe, but certainly not evidence of it. Whose to say that
our past is not simply hewn out of the primordial Multiverse by our
observations, which progressively fix which world (and history) we inhabit?

 
 
 that most everyday scientists usually
 just focus on mathematical descriptions of phenomena, and leave it at that.
 But if you ask them why mathematical descriptions are so successful?
 Wouldn't they just point at Occam's razor, if they've thought about it
 at all, that is? Or even go with Max Tegmark and say its all mathematics.
 
 Mathematics is just a different substrate, a different but still
 mind indpendent reality.  Notice that the main argument given for
 the reality of mathematics is the intersubjective agreement on the
 truths of mathematics; which gives the feeling it is discovered
 rather than invented.
 

Yes - but I really don't think this is Vic's, or David's view of a
mind-independent reality. But also see my comment below re COMP.

 
 Or why do we all agree that's a chair over there?
 That one is obviously convention. Someone from remote Amazonia who's
 never seen a chair before wouldn't agree.
 
 They might not agree on the name, but they would agree there was an
 object there.  The possibility of having a useable convention would
 seem to be a miracle if there is nothing

Re: What are numbers? What is math?

On 2/17/2014 8:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 07:30:23PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/17/2014 7:09 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 06:32:35PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/17/2014 5:21 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:03:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Russell,

All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
observation.

Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.

I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The
success of this hypothesis is generally taken as evidence for a
reality independent of human observation.

By whom?

Vic Stenger for one. Me for two.

and David Deutsch, for three, IIUHC. To which we can add Bruno Marchal and
myself against the obviousness of that idea.

But these are all rather unusual individuals, in a way.

The notion that there is a real reality there, with solid things like
tables and stones to stub your toes on has taken such a drubbing since
the beginning of the 20th century,

I'd say positivism has taken a lot more of a drubbing since Mach than realism.

There's a strong form of realism which says the real is whatever is
in the ontology of our best theory. I think that is a mistake and I
doubt anyone really holds that view. Of course it is our working
assumption at any given time, but that is true even when we're
pretty sure the theory is false. GR is our best theory of spacetime
and so we think gravity waves exist, but we don't think
singularities exist and consider GR almost certainly wrong. I think
scientific realists are all falibilists.

Sure - one may hypothesise so. But does it assist in any scientific
experiment to do so? And is there any evidence to support the
hypothesis, or is it simply like pre-classical physics - good enough
to get the next meal.

The same kind of evidence as for any scientific theory. It not only assists, the
repeatability of experiments by persons with different minds tests it.

Just consider the contrast
with religions in which there is NOT intersubjective agreement about
visions and revelations.

The replacement of tables and chairs by atoms and then by wave
functions is just changing our best guess about ontology - it's not
evidence that there is no mind independent ontology. The fact that
there is intersubjective agreement on observations is still evidence
for a mutual reality.

Yes a mutual reality, but not a mind independent one.

Certainly independent of any single mind. And the science
formulated so far is independent of mind - which is why Liz supposed
that the past existed before it was observed (and constitutes a
block universe past).

Supposed, maybe, but certainly not evidence of it. Whose to say that
our past is not simply hewn out of the primordial Multiverse by our
observations, which progressively fix which world (and history) we inhabit?

Why our then; why not my and why not a brain is a vat? Why not nothing but a
momentary dream? Some hypotheses are more fruitful than others, lead to more predictions,
provide a more succinct model of the world.

that most everyday scientists usually
just focus on mathematical descriptions of phenomena, and leave it at that.

But if you ask them why mathematical descriptions are so successful?

Wouldn't they just point at Occam's razor, if they've thought about it
at all, that is? Or even go with Max Tegmark and say its all mathematics.

Mathematics is just a different substrate, a different but still
mind indpendent reality. Notice that the main argument given for
the reality of mathematics is the intersubjective agreement on the
truths of mathematics; which gives the feeling it is discovered
rather than invented.

Yes - but I really don't think this is Vic's, or David's view of a
mind-independent reality. But also see my comment below re COMP.

Re: What are numbers? What is math?