Re: Max and FPI
On 24 March 2014 17:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz? Er, no, lots of people got the wrong end of the stick and argued about it at length. I was one of the ones who said he probably meant ... whatever it turned out he meant. (Maybe I just don't have enough maths background to get the wrong end of the stick on this sort of thing.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 24 March 2014 17:41, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/23/2014 8:57 PM, LizR wrote: *Is* DNA a universal programming language? I'm not sure what a universal programming language means. Just 1s and 0s are enough language. I think you probably mean to ask is whether a cell is a universal computer with DNA as the program. I don't know if there's been a formal proof but it almost certainly is. Making a universal computer is pretty easy. Wolfram's rule 110 produces a universal computer in one dimension with only two colors and nearest neighbor rules. I'm quoting the paper at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~*chaitin*/*darwin* .pdf (See section 9) Presumably DNA is a universal programming language, but how sophisticated can mutations be in actual biological organisms? In this connection, note that evo-devo views DNA as software for constructing the embryo, and that the change from single-celled to multicellular organisms is roughly like taking a main program and making it into a subroutine, which is a fairly high-level mutation. Could this be the reason that it took so long|on the order of 109 years|for this to happen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 3/23/2014 11:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 March 2014 17:41, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/23/2014 8:57 PM, LizR wrote: /Is/ DNA a universal programming language? I'm not sure what a universal programming language means. Just 1s and 0s are enough language. I think you probably mean to ask is whether a cell is a universal computer with DNA as the program. I don't know if there's been a formal proof but it almost certainly is. Making a universal computer is pretty easy. Wolfram's rule 110 produces a universal computer in one dimension with only two colors and nearest neighbor rules. I'm quoting the paper at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~ http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/%7E*chaitin*/*darwin*.pdf (See section 9) Presumably DNA is a universal programming language, but how sophisticated can mutations be in actual biological organisms? That seems like a strange question. Mutations are errors by definition and are random. So what does it mean to ask how sophisticated they can be? Obviously they can accumulate as errors in DNA copying without doing anything and then be activated by one more error. In this connection, note that evo-devo views DNA as software for constructing the embryo, and that the change from single-celled to multicellular organisms is roughly like taking a main program and making it into a subroutine, which is a fairly high-level mutation. Could this be the reason that it took so long|on the order of 109 years|for this to happen Sure, although 1e9yr seems pretty quick to me. The eukaryote cell is already tremendously complicated, just becoming multicellular doesn't seem like such a big step to me. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Max and FPI
On 3/23/2014 11:27 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 March 2014 17:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com mailto:chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz? Er, no, lots of people got the wrong end of the stick and argued about it at length. I was one of the ones who said he probably meant ... whatever it turned out he meant. (Maybe I just don't have enough maths background to get the wrong end of the stick on this sort of thing.) I wonder if people on the list are aware of Adrian Kent's proposed test of MWI. Before you look at his paper on the link below, answer this question: By courtesy of genetic engineering and an oppressive Orwellian government, you must choose a reproductive strategy for yourself and all your descendants. You will become a member of either humans-a or humans-b. Each generation, say 70yrs, all humans-a die and leave one progeny, so the human-a population stays constant. But each generation the human-b population will, in accordance with a 0.5 probability quantum event, either go extinct, none have progeny, or they triple, each one dies leaving three progeny. Then the question is, which new subspecies do you want to join, human-a or human-b? Kent's paper is arXiv:0905.0624v2. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Modal summary and new exercises + motivation
Liz, Brent, others,
Just a revision, before you forget the definitions :)
A multiverse (W, R), or frame, is a set W, with a binary relation R.
The elements of the set are called world , and denoted often by
greek letter (alpha, beta, gamma, ...). The binary relation is called
accessibility relation, and constitutes the main ingredient in Kripke
semantic.
Now we are doing logic. So we suppose the usual classical
propositional language, with atomic sentence letters p, q, r, ..., and
the symbol - and f.
(The other logical symbols can be defined from - and f, for
example ~p can be defined as an abbreviation of (p - f), as it clear
when we give the usual classical semantic).
From them, we can build the usual formula like p, q, (p - q), ((p -
f) - (q - r)), etc.
A will denote such arbitrary formula. (It is a metavariable, and it
does not belong to the formal symbols).
A valuation or illumination is a function from {p, q, r, ...} to {1, 0}.
An multiverse becomes illuminated when each world get a valuation. So
in each world, the sentence letters can be said true, or false,
according to the valuation. Let us call V that valuation which
attributes a 1 or a 0 to each propositional letter, in each world of
the multiverse.
So we can denote an illuminated multiverse by (W, R, V).
We suppose that each world obeys classical logic. basically this
means, that:
- The propositional letter are true or false, according to the
valuation in the illuminated multiverse.
- f is false in alpha (any alpha)
- A - B is true in the world alpha iff A is false in alpha or B is
true in alpha.
Ah, but we do modal logic. So we have one unary connector symbol more:
[]p, and Kripke semantics for modal logic is that:
[]A is true in alpha iff A is true in all beta such that alpha
R beta. That is, such that beta is accessible from alpha.
p is defined as an abbreviation of ~[] ~, and you might enjoy
verifying that
A is true in alpha iff there exist a world beta, with A true
in beta, and beta accessible from
Last but not least definitions. Now that we know what it means for a
formula to be true in a world, we say that :
An illuminated multiverse (W, R, V) satisfies a formula if that
formula is true in all worlds of the multiverse.
A multiverse (W, R) respect a formula if that formula is true in all
worlds for any of its illumination (W, R, V).
That's all you have to know. Print this or recopy this by hand in the
diary, as this will remains with us, for sometime.
Then you have shown (Brent and Liz, at least):
(W, R) respects []A - A
iff
R is reflexive (that is for all alpha in W, alpha R alpha)
and
(W, R) respects []A - A
iff
R is ideal on W, that means that from any world you can access to some
world (another one or itself). It means that there is no cul-de-sac
worlds.
OK?
I will send one post with all the proofs.
Brent, in some post you tell me you were working on the proof of
(W, R) respects []A - [][]A
iff
R is transtive (aRb and bRc implies aRc) (writing quickly a b c for
alpha beta gamma, it is also clearer:
R is reflexive iff for all a aRa,
R is symmetrical iff for all a and B, aRb implies bRa.
I will prove the transtitive case soon, unless you ask some delay.
New exercise:
show
(W,R) respects A - []A
iff
R is symmetrical.
This one plays some role in the specific derivation of physics from
arithmetic. This is due to the fact that the logic B, with axioms:
[](A - B) -( []A - []B)
[]A - A
A - []A,
translates a minimal Quantum logic in modal terms. []A quantized
the truth of A in some sense. Quantum logic are usually handled by
the algebraical structure of the observable, and quantum proposition
are structured in terms of orthospace, that is a space with a
orthogonality notion (a scalar product). The complementary relation
(not-orthogonal) defines a proximity relation.
In arithmetic we will get a weakening/strengthening, of this as we
will get A-[]A, only for the atomic sentences (the arithmetical
interpretation of the letters p in the modal logic), and we will loss
the necessitation rules, losing some quantum tautologies, perhaps, but
not necessarily. It is a strengthening by the axioms corresponding to
the Löb formula, and the arithmetical reality (intensional and
extensional).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 24 March 2014 19:41, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/23/2014 11:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 March 2014 17:41, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/23/2014 8:57 PM, LizR wrote: *Is* DNA a universal programming language? I'm not sure what a universal programming language means. Just 1s and 0s are enough language. I think you probably mean to ask is whether a cell is a universal computer with DNA as the program. I don't know if there's been a formal proof but it almost certainly is. Making a universal computer is pretty easy. Wolfram's rule 110 produces a universal computer in one dimension with only two colors and nearest neighbor rules. I'm quoting the paper at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~*chaitin*/ *darwin*.pdf (See section 9) Presumably DNA is a universal programming language, but how sophisticated can mutations be in actual biological organisms? That seems like a strange question. Mutations are errors by definition and are random. So what does it mean to ask how sophisticated they can be? Obviously they can accumulate as errors in DNA copying without doing anything and then be activated by one more error. They are random, but I assume they are (very occasionally) improvements, and maybe that's what they're thinking of. In this connection, note that evo-devo views DNA as software for constructing the embryo, and that the change from single-celled to multicellular organisms is roughly like taking a main program and making it into a subroutine, which is a fairly high-level mutation. Could this be the reason that it took so long|on the order of 109 years|for this to happen Sure, although 1e9yr seems pretty quick to me. The eukaryote cell is already tremendously complicated, just becoming multicellular doesn't seem like such a big step to me. I agree (insofar as my opinion on this is of any value) - it always seemed to me, or at least since I read Bill Bryson's description of a cell in his big book on science, that single cells are very, very complex machines, while multicellular organisms are almost riding on top of this complexity - getting a sort of free lunch as it were. I believe the figures are something like 4Gyr to evolve the sort of cells in our bodies and maybe 500Myrs to go from single cells to our multicellular current state. So I'd say cells are roughly 8 x as complex as organisms if you ignore the complexity of their cells. (Well, very roughly, but you probably see what I mean...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Max and FPI
On 24 March 2014 17:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. I always find presentations disappointing in terms of information content, at least when compared to papers and articles, but I was more than happy to see Max in the flesh (and Richard Feynman for an added bonus). He was alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing field in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one + a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky wave function collapse, depends very much on what definition of parsimonious you find most fitting. What flaws were those? He seemed to be saying that you didn't need Everett to get a multiverse - if you have eternal inflation, you get one anyway. I didn't see anything particularly apologetic about that. His definition of parsimony is like Russell's (Standish, not Bertrand) - which can be summed up as everything possible = zero information. We got the classic intuition buster argument. You know, screw intuition because it evolved in the sub Saharan savannah to help us lob spears. God forbid that it evolved in sub Saharan society to help spot hogwash. Apart from the fact that he confuses Tau for intuition, even before QM and Relativity came along, intuition has never been the arbiter of right and wrong. There have always been counter intuitive facts, there is nothing new about the current situation. Theres no more reason to distrust intuition now that there has been before. Its only ever been a guide and as such should be trusted as much now as it ever was. And that was never entirely. I can't offhand see what's wrong with this argument, however. Indeed you seem to be saying it's valid, so what shouldn't Max use it? Worst of all though was that I wanted to hear about his level 4 multiverse but he didn't address it except to comment that it was a little nutty. But really, in the world of QM interpretation barking mad is where things start. I would have liked to have heard more about that, too (but I'm not sure if he has anything new to say about it that wasn't in the Scientific American article...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
Not to belabor a point Edgar, but wood gathering for 1.7 billion does incur forest chopping. Yes it is renewable, but if one is focus not only on flora, but fauna, giving this 1.7 billion a good substitute seems to be the way to go. My own personal favorite is wind, sun, and molten salt, but I am neither an engineer nor, an economist, to see how well my proposal might work. As for us, I would lead by example. However, please note, I have no influence, no pull, no money. Therefore, the world will continue onward despite what I state. My status is that of a particle on a particle. My political influence is confined to the planck width. Cheers, Mitch -Original Message- From: Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Mar 21, 2014 7:16 am Subject: Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating Spud, If only dead wood is cut for firewood and cooking you are just recycling a sustainable resource. Unlike coal and oil, firewood quickly and sustainably regenerates. And basically burning dead wood is just speeding up the natural process of the decay of dead trees. So burning dead wood for heat is NOT the problem. It's a completely sustainable process. The problem is way too many people so they are forced to cut LIVE wood and denude forests. So again it's a human overpopulation problem, not a firewood problem... Edgar On Thursday, March 20, 2014 7:43:35 PM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote: You have a point, Edgar, and you yourself do not have a bad effect on the environment. However, a billion and one half fellow firewood gatherers, might have a more profound impact, and they may do a bit more than chopping then you do. Following Maslow's hierarchy of needs, when peoples standard of living improves, they start demanding a cleaner environment, and worry more about wildlife. You are doing the good because you choose to. Others are forced to gather firewood and chop trees. I hope nobody advocates permanent poverty as a method to protect the environment. Mitch Spud, Using firewood properly done does NOT disrupt the forest. I've used firewood for heating most of my life including currently. I use only dead trees from my own property (16 acres), not taking any with nesting holes. Only very rarely do I cut a live tree when it's clearly on its last le ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
1. Germany, when they shut down their nukes in 2011, restarted the old coal burners using US coal, and dirtied their skies. 2. The German government has just began firing up their uranium burners. 3. 25% renewables sound like a great start, but this focuses attention on the remaining 75% Here's a new article just out from New Scientist speaking to AGW. New Scientist is a solid supporter of AGW finding and research. Read it carefully, because its interesting and informs our arguments on the forum. No wonder we are fighting. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25272-less-gloopy-oceans-will-slow-climate-change.html#.UzBIaaPD-dI -Original Message- From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Mar 22, 2014 9:44 pm Subject: Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 10:07 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 21, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-03-21 17:59 GMT+01:00 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: On Fri, Mar 21, 2014 at 5:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-03-21 17:19 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 10:50 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: The thing I most want to know about RCP4.5 is what RCP stands for, Google seems to think it's Rich Client Platform but that doesn't sound quite right. It must be pretty obscure, Wikipedia has never heard of RCP either. For your information, that means Regional Climate Prediction I'm pretty sure it's not Russian Communist Party but are you sure it's not Representative Concentration Pathways? I'm pretty sure you must be dumb as dumb if you really think this... As I see we are in a thread talking about climate... This thread seems to be mostly about politics. To be fair, John seems to be in the minority here in wanting to discuss this from a scientific and technological perspective. He raises a number of points that I have raised myself in previous discussions. Instead of focusing on such issues, pop culture distractions (Fox News etc.) and political tribalism seem to get all of the attention. The thing is that I don't know much in climate and I prefer to let persons in the field handle that, by default I would believe them in these matters, they have more knowledge than me on these. I agree, and it would take years of study for a non-expert to be able to have an informed opinion. But scientists are humans, and unfortunately we have seen over and over again that they can fall prey to group think, confirmation bias and other -- very human -- tendencies. One contemporary exemple is nutrition science -- more and more, we are seeing that the consensus here was pseudo-scientific and influenced by lobbies. The food pyramid probably killed more than cigarettes. In the case of climate science, there are a number of red flags. For me, the major ones are: - claims of 100% consensus: never a sign of serious, rigorous science; True for media. But non-100% consensus on trends and models, even given disagreements about particularities, scopes, use of models etc. point to simple commonsense notion of not polluting the sphere you live on. - claims of certainty over the behaviour of a highly complex system - I don't have to be a climatologist to raise my eyebrows at this; Behavior and market dominantly presuppose however: absolute certainty that it doesn't matter. That this sparks hyperbolic reaction in non rigorous contexts is natural. - scientists using emotional, loaded terms like deniers; - so many models that any correct predictions don't appear to have statistical significance; - retroactive cherry picking of models; - there doesn't seem to be any amount of falsification that will lead the mainstream of the field to reconsider their hypothesis; Again, I admit I may be completely wrong. But there are red flags. You can only run with best accessible models and levels, so anybody can be wrong. Given the vast overlap of so many systems and models interacting, producing shocks and spikes, I'll bet you can only do worse by accelerating all kinds of imbalance, pollutions, pacific garbage islands and all the side effects of multiplying, accelerating cherry picked natural/chemical processes for the whims of the free individual and his market. Ok, I'm not a climate scientist, but I still bet the above is stupid. :-) I do not believe in conspiracy either... I don't understand this position. In human history, conspiracies seems to be a very frequent event. Recently we learned of a vast conspiracy by western governments to implement total surveillance. Here I see another red flag -- the ridicule surrounding any suggestion of conspiracy seems to benefit precisely the
Re: Modality Independence
On Friday, March 21, 2014 7:04:58 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 2:11:17 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 12:42:13 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the assumptions from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical models of consciousness arise. OK. Would you mind defining which assumptions you're thinking of? The assumptions that forms and functions can exist independently of perception and participation. What forms, functions, and participation? There's only one word that has a fairly clear referent. :( It would be more helpful if, instead of talking in general about the kind of assumptions involved, you could just go ahead and list the key assumptions. They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM. That is not a prediction of CTM. Here's a relevant quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Turing himself seems to have been of the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same thing in all relevant respects. Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans and modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that consciousness is driven by logic and computation. Right, modality (in)dependent communication neither supports nor opposes the idea that consciousness is computation. No, the fact that modality independent communication does not appear until human experience does oppose the idea that consciousness is computation, since computation is by definition modality independent. Er, no, that's not true in the senses of the terms with which I'm familiar, for the reasons I gave previously. In CTM, brains doing modality-dependent computations would have minds experiencing sense-data qualia, and brains doing modality-independent computations would have minds experiencing abstract qualia. Argh, CTM has nothing to do with brains. That would be a BTM. OK, but then CTM_Weinberg has major differences from CTM_Others. You've stated that you're not interested in defining CTM_Weinberg and how it differs from CTM_Others, which means at this point all we know is that you're attacking some unspecified assumptions of an unspecified theory. That's not enough for meaningful communication. Would you care to fill in the missing details of precisely which assumptions you wanted to explode? -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Entropy and curved spacetime
On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 6:41 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: So, you admit you were wrong to object to my statement even with reversible laws there is more than one way to get into a given MACROstate? No, sometimes that would be true but because of chaos it wouldn't always be. For 2 things to be in the same macrostate small changes to the microstate must make no difference the way the things behave at the largest scale, but some systems are inherently chaotic and any change at all in them can cause a huge macro change in behavior. Some things like a box full of gas have almost no chaos and that's why the equations of thermodynamics work. Some systems like planetary motion have only a modest amount of chaos, and some systems like global weather patterns have lots and lots of chaos. A microstate can be used to refer to the exact physical state of any system, so even if the most exact possible description of a black hole told you nothing but its mass, charge and angular momentum, you could still call that a microstate. Or you could call it a macrostate. If physics is not unitary (and it almost certainly is unitary) and a Black Hole really can be completely described by just 3 numbers (2 really because the charge is almost always zero) then the entire macrostate\microstate distinction starts to break down. It is true that if physics is non-unitary then black hole entropy could not be defined in terms of its microstates, but that's what I already said, that in this case there would be two different types of entropy, one for black holes and one for everything else. But it would remain true that if X is proportional to the logarithm of the number of microstates in a system then according to the laws of logarithms X MUST also be proportional to the logarithm of the number of ways the system could have been produced. The physical laws in the Game of Life are not unitary, so a large block of dead cells would be equivalent to a Black Hole in our universe if the laws of physics were not unitary. In both cases it would be gibberish to talk about the microstates of a block of dead cells or of a Black Hole because they would have none, they would only have a macrostate. Why would it be gibberish? The microstate would have the same meaning for a block of dead cells as it would for a block with a mix of live and dead cells, Now that I think about it in a block that has a mixture of live and dead cells in the Game of Life I know what a microstate would mean but I'm not quite sure what a macrostate would mean. It's supposed to mean behaving the same at the largest scale even though small changes have been made, but very small changes can dramatically effect a pattern's macro behavior, some patterns die completely and will fade away to nothing, some will start to oscillate and never die, and some finite patterns will generate a infinite (not just very large but infinite) number of additional live cells. if macrostates are defined in terms of the ratio of live to dead cells [...] I think that would be such a crude measure as to be useless. The smallest known Game of Life pattern that is capable of infinite growth has only 36 live cells, but kill just one of those 36 cells or move just one of the cells one space to the right (or left or up or down) and the pattern no longer has that capability to produce infinity. The difference between finite and infinite is about as macro as you can get, so do you really want to say any 36 cell pattern has the same macrostate? Of course I agree the physics in our universe is almost certainly unitary, but this whole debate about entropy got started when you suggested the second law of thermodynamics was possible to deduce from logic alone, Yes, even if we knew none of the fundamental laws of physics from logic alone we could deduce that there are more disordered states than ordered ones, if in addition we assume that in the distant past the universe was in a much more ordered state (please note this doesn't necessarily mean more complex) than it is now you could then deduce that something very much like the second law of thermodynamics must exist. This is unlike the first law of thermodynamics, we believe in that not because the contrary to it is illogical but simply because we've never observed it being violated and using induction we infer that we never will. you've got it backwards. If the fundamental laws of physics were non-reversible then it would be easy to see how time could have a preferred direction and easy to understand why the second law of thermodynamics is true. It would be easy to see why time would have a preferred direction but this wouldn't necessarily be the direction of increasing entropy, Huh? I don't know what you can say about time's dimension except that entropy increases and the universe expands when you move along it in one direction and entropy decreases and the universe contracts when
Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
On Fri, Mar 21, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Climate models predict that there should be plenty of statistical fluctuation on the level of individual decades, Well now, it would be pretty difficult for that prediction to be proven wrong. It reminds me of the famous and vacuous quote from J P Morgan regarding stocks: I Believe the Market Is going to fluctuate. Given that environmentalists are claiming that it might even be too late to advert disaster, why aren't we seriously considering geoengineering approaches, as the one proposed by Nathan Myhrvold, which can be easily and cheaply tested and turned off at any moment? I don't think there's any widespread agreement among scientists that this would halt all the problems associated with high CO2 levels or on what the side effects would be So because there is uncertainty about what the effects of Myhrvold's plan would be we shouldn't even consider it (even though it's effects could be reversed just by turning a valve on a hose) but we should consider putting the world on a energy starvation diet because we are certain that the computer models predictions about what things will be like a century from now are correct and are certain that the changes would be so bad for humanity we should take DRASTIC action right now. Also, if you commit to this plan then you're less likely to make any attempt to reduce CO2 That's it! The real problem with Myhrvold's plan is it involves no suffering, even the wicked over-consumer is not punished for his extravagant ways. It reminds me of preachers who opposed giving painkillers to women in childbirth because it was against God's plan. From Genesis 3:15 To the woman he said, I will surely multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children. Getting more into sci-fi territory, my hope is that within a few decades robotics may have advanced to the point where industrial robots can manufacture and assemble almost any mass-produced good without any significant human labor needed, given the necessary raw materials and energy--this would include additional industrial robots, so in this case you'd have self-replicating machines so you could start with a small number and soon have as large a number as you had land zoned to put them on. If this is achieved I expect it would drastically reduce the cost of almost all manufactured goods (probably down to not much more than the cost of the raw materials and energy they were made from), to the the point where rapid construction of vast number of solar panels or carbon capture devices could be far less costly than it would be today. Yes, and the robots would likely be very very small and very very numerous. And unlike some sci-fi ideas like faster than light spaceships or time travel there is nothing in advanced nanotechnology and molecular scale self reproducing robots that would violate the known laws of physics. New science is not needed to accomplish it, just better technology. there's no way of knowing how long it would take to reach such a point, I certainly don't know when it will happen, all I can say is I'd be astonished if it happened in the next 10 years and equally astonished if it didn't happen in the next 100. I don't think this hope should be an excuse for taking no action today Why not? I think it's a damn good excuse. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 23 Mar 2014, at 19:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. It depends on the theory we assume. You don't see the double standard there? You, again, talk like if our point was symmetrical. It is not. I do not say that non-comp is wrong. You *do* say that comp is wrong. You can assume non-comp, and make your theory and prediction. You might even use your theory to find a valid argument against comp, but it has not to rely on the non-comp assumption, or you beg the question. Note that the Löb formula (the main axiom of G, in which all points of view are defined in arithmetic, or in arithmetical terms) is a form of begging the question, and might be seen as a form of placebo, which makes my sympathy for your consciousness has to beg the question. But of course, that rings like a confirmation of comp. Note that this has to be taken with some grain of salt, but it is clear that the Löb theorem shows that machines can prove by a curious technic of begging the question. Indeed if PA proves []p - p, for some proposition p, then PA will always prove p. PA obeys to the Löb rule: ([]p - p) p ([]p - p) p PA knows that, as PA can prove []([]p - p) - []p. (Löb's formula, the main axiom of G and G*). I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter- intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already derivable from comp. The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. But we have never disagree on that. The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not match, You never mention one without either begging the question, or confusing some points of view. and indeed are counter-factual. What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. No, that self-consciousness. That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'. Yes. That is why there is awareness/consciousness and self-awareness/ self-consciousness. In the first both the 1-I and 3-I are implicit, and in the second, it is explicit, the machine sees it. Currently, I think consciousness appears at the Sigma_1 complete, or Turing universal, level. Self-consciousness appears at the Löbian level. I would say. It is the difference between RA and PA. The main difference is that although each time RA proves p, RA will soon or later proves []p, yet RA will fail to notice or justify that fact,, RA will not prove []p
Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 23 Mar 2014, at 21:40, bs...@cornell.edu wrote: One might note that at the end of Chapter Three (Proving Darwin) Greg has the caveat Metabiology in its present form cannot address thinking and consciousness, fascinating those these be. (page 21). I do not see any reason why plants should not be included. I think so to. If one has the inspiration to imagine that the act of reproduction *is like* a computation (math and philosophy different) and abstract simply that we humans reproduce and if one thought that all of algorithmic complexity in metabiology (as a subect) was derived from a difference in that biotic potential in different lineages then... metabiology applied might not be a part of the/an algorithmic theory of everything yet different computations that emerge in different lineages would be differentiable. A machine cannot know what computations support it but propagtion of species differences is a different kind of monkey at the qwerty...I would think and be conscious of...There are really no physical laws that support pure metabiology (only generalized matheatical function through arbitrary points) and the step to physical lawys engineer-able in applied metabiology is actually a bit more than would be for non preserved force propagations. These kinds of contained algorithmic sets are only thus a part of what a theory of everything etc would contain but it might be more somatically correct even if not currently inclusive of any kind of plant or animal. What is contained and what can exist for longer times are different things. OK. That is the problem, but it helps to put it in mind/body or first- person/third person terms, and assuming, like Chaitin, digitality put a lot of interesting constraints, especially if you take into account tractability and resources. My questioning is more fundamental, and eventually consists in a translation of the mind body problem into a stable belief in body problem arising in arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (but meta-arithmetic is in some part in arithmetic: this is exploited maximally). Bruno On Friday, March 21, 2014 5:26:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:18, bs...@cornell.edu wrote: Are you still interested in talking about metabiology? http://www.axiompanbiog.com/Pages/Metabiology.aspx On Wednesday, November 24, 2010 2:10:42 PM UTC-5, thermo wrote: Chaitin is currently drafting some attemps on metabiology and biological evolution of creativity. I read the latest: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~chaitin/darwin.pdf I found it very interesting in it's simplicity. Strong features: - Abstract and theorems can be proved. - Includes algorithmic mutations. - Fitness is general enough to enable infinite evolution. Weak features: - Some oracles are used. - Biological features such as replication, environment were removed favoring more abstract concepts. - Evolution is only associated with mathematical creativity, IA? Can someone can explain how this theory is related to Algorithmic Theories of Everything? It *is* an algorithmic theory of everything, but like digital physics, it still assumes a brain-mind identity thesis, which does not work when you assume computationalism in the cognitive science. It avoids the comp mind body problem, which forces us to derive the core of the physical laws from a statistics on all computations. It cannot work because it implies comp, and comp implies that reality is a view from inside the space of all computations, and this is not entirely reductible to an algorithm. Like Wolfram, they still don't take into account that a machine cannot know which computation support it, and can know she is distributed in many computation. They miss the Everett aspect of arithmetic or computer science. I would say in a nutshell. Bruno Cheers, José. -- A los hombres fuertes les pasa lo que a los barriletes; se elevan cuando es mayor el viento que se opone a su ascenso. José Ingenieros (1877.1925) *thermo* http://www.mechpoet.net -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the first- person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you explain how? In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy a piece of matter. Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of instruments. Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and *you* diffuse on all the possible subcomputations, where, by the FPI, all universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see there is only an average of the many possible computations below our (first person plural) substitution level. OK? Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Fabric of Alternate Reality group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to foar+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to f...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. Richard On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you explain how? In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy a piece of matter. Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of instruments. Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and *you* diffuse on all the possible subcomputations, where, by the FPI, all universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see there is only an average of the many possible computations below our (first person plural) substitution level. OK? Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Fabric of Alternate Reality group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to foar+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to f...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 24 Mar 2014, at 04:57, LizR wrote: Is DNA a universal programming language? I would say, not by itself. But some sufficiently long DNA strand, can define a universal programming language/amchine, with respect to the cytoplasm and the neighborhood. A cell is a universal computer, but the DNA itself is more like an hard disk. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
Is there anything in particle physics that emulates the processing capabilities of computers, analog or digital? My question goes below Chaitin's metabiology. Something that is a characteristic of physics. -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Mar 24, 2014 2:08 pm Subject: Re: Chaitin's Metabiology On 23 Mar 2014, at 21:40, bs...@cornell.edu wrote: One might note that at the end of Chapter Three (Proving Darwin) Greg has the caveat Metabiology in its present form cannot address thinking and consciousness, fascinating those these be. (page 21). I do not see any reason why plants should not be included. I think so to. If one has the inspiration to imagine that the act of reproduction *is like* a computation (math and philosophy different) and abstract simply that we humans reproduce and if one thought that all of algorithmic complexity in metabiology (as a subect) was derived from a difference in that biotic potential in different lineages then... metabiology applied might not be a part of the/an algorithmic theory of everything yet different computations that emerge in different lineages would be differentiable. A machine cannot know what computations support it but propagtion of species differences is a different kind of monkey at the qwerty...I would think and be conscious of...There are really no physical laws that support pure metabiology (only generalized matheatical function through arbitrary points) and the step to physical lawys engineer-able in applied metabiology is actually a bit more than would be for non preserved force propagations. These kinds of contained algorithmic sets are only thus a part of what a theory of everything etc would contain but it might be more somatically correct even if not currently inclusive of any kind of plant or animal. What is contained and what can exist for longer times are different things. OK. That is the problem, but it helps to put it in mind/body or first-person/third person terms, and assuming, like Chaitin, digitality put a lot of interesting constraints, especially if you take into account tractability and resources. My questioning is more fundamental, and eventually consists in a translation of the mind body problem into a stable belief in body problem arising in arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (but meta-arithmetic is in some part in arithmetic: this is exploited maximally). Bruno On Friday, March 21, 2014 5:26:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:18, bs...@cornell.edu wrote: Are you still interested in talking about metabiology? http://www.axiompanbiog.com/Pages/Metabiology.aspx On Wednesday, November 24, 2010 2:10:42 PM UTC-5, thermo wrote: Chaitin is currently drafting some attemps on metabiology and biological evolution of creativity. I read the latest: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~chaitin/darwin.pdf I found it very interesting in it's simplicity. Strong features: - Abstract and theorems can be proved. - Includes algorithmic mutations. - Fitness is general enough to enable infinite evolution. Weak features: - Some oracles are used. - Biological features such as replication, environment were removed favoring more abstract concepts. - Evolution is only associated with mathematical creativity, IA? Can someone can explain how this theory is related to Algorithmic Theories of Everything? It *is* an algorithmic theory of everything, but like digital physics, it still assumes a brain-mind identity thesis, which does not work when you assume computationalism in the cognitive science. It avoids the comp mind body problem, which forces us to derive the core of the physical laws from a statistics on all computations. It cannot work because it implies comp, and comp implies that reality is a view from inside the space of all computations, and this is not entirely reductible to an algorithm. Like Wolfram, they still don't take into account that a machine cannot know which computation support it, and can know she is distributed in many computation. They miss the Everett aspect of arithmetic or computer science. I would say in a nutshell. Bruno Cheers, José. -- A los hombres fuertes les pasa lo que a los barriletes; se elevan cuando es mayor el viento que se opone a su ascenso. José Ingenieros (1877.1925) *thermo* http://www.mechpoet.net -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this
Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 24 Mar 2014, at 05:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/23/2014 8:57 PM, LizR wrote:
Is DNA a universal programming language?
I'm not sure what a universal programming language means. Just 1s
and 0s are enough language.
Universal language can have a very tiny alphabet {0, 1}.
But the alphabet is not the language. You need some grammar, and
semantics (operational at least). The test is in showing how to write
a program.
I think you probably mean to ask is whether a cell is a universal
computer with DNA as the program.
Ah! I agree. This is meaningful, and I would say yes, even for bacteria.
I don't know if there's been a formal proof but it almost certainly
is.
OK. From René Thomas work, it is easy to build a formal proof. Or even
from Jacob and Monod. I discovered computer science in that paper :)
Making a universal computer is pretty easy. Wolfram's rule 110
produces a universal computer in one dimension with only two colors
and nearest neighbor rules.
That was not easy to find. And it is not always easy to prove that
something is Turing complete. It took 70 years to prove that
diophantine polynomials are Turing universal. Even just the degree 4.
Open problem for the degree 3.
But you are right, universality is cheap, just that it is more and
more complex to prove once the systems are more and more simple.
Bruno
Brent
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Re: Max and FPI
On 3/24/2014 12:17 AM, LizR wrote: Do you mean which population do I want to join in order to have the greatest chance of leaving descendants? I think that's the underlying assumption - but I didn't want to bias answers by putting it that way. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 25 March 2014 08:18, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. Richard If you don't mind me asking, how is Bruno being contradictory? I thought his explanation made perfect sense (assuming comp, of course). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be essentially cloning you. Richard On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 4:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 25 March 2014 08:18, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. Richard If you don't mind me asking, how is Bruno being contradictory? I thought his explanation made perfect sense (assuming comp, of course). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Max and FPI
Without a specific reason for wanting to be in a population the question is meaningless in my opinion, one could have all sorts of reasons in theory, so I'll assume that the point is to maximise your descendants. So I suppose the question boils down to what is the representation of each population in the multiverse, assuming there really IS a multiverse... The human-a population is constant, barring accidents, while pop-b will bifurcate every 70 years into two branches with 3 in one and 0 in the other. This will also bifurcate pop-a into 1 offspring in each branch, so it seems like b gets 1.5 offspring per generation, on average over the multiverse. However, once pop-b stops, presumably it stops for good. So all the possible branches of the multiverse tree that fan out from the root to the no descendants side are empty of pop-b, assuming the world continues to branch at the same rate, e.g. once every 70 years in all branches, regardless of who is in each branch. Pop-b only continues down a single branch, which is equivalent to getting a continuous row of heads in a quantum coin toss. After N generations there will be 1 branch with 3^N pop-b descendants and 2^N-1 branches empty of pop-b, each with a member of pop-a. Overall, at generation N a pop-a member will have 2^N descendants spread over 2^N branches, while a pop-b member has 3^N descendants in one branch. So pop-b grows a lot faster over the entire multiverse, 1,3,9,27,81... as opposed to 1,2,4,8,16... So pop-b wins out, as long as there is definitely a multiverse involved. Otherwise (with wavefunction collapse) the chance of there being ANY pop-b members at generation N is only 1 in 2^N, so although the total expected payoff for pop-b exceeds that for pop-a one might still decide to go for a safe, but smaller, amount of happiness, because without a multiverse one is gambling on something with astronomical odds against it, everntually, like winning the lottery (since the *entire* pop-b goes extinct once the coin toss comes out tails).. If so, then the answer is ... Use the above maths to work out the expected descendants for each population, i.e. 1.5 to 1, then multiply that result by your confidence in the multiverse existing. So if you are 50% confident, the result becomes 0.75 to 1 and you should go for pop-a; if you're 90% confident you get 1.35 to 1 and should go for pop-b. Now to read that paper, when I have the time... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
On 25 March 2014 07:36, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 He could make similar arguments claiming consciousness is not chemistry. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
He gives six evidences. First, he falls for quantum pseudoscience. Second, he says that he personally failed to make AI when he tried and incorrectly implies that difficulty means impossibility. Third, he brings up the hard problem and uses it to make an argument from ignorance. Fourth, he says he doesn't know how to define what he means by consciousness, and then makes another argument from ignorance. Fifth, he repeats the mistaken Berkeley's Master argument. Sixth, he falls for NDE pseudoscience. Unconvincing. On Monday, March 24, 2014 3:36:43 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 25 Mar 2014, at 8:00 am, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be essentially cloning you. Richard How many number 2s are there? How many versions of 17 are there? You are a number, which surely makes you unique. You are unique. Just like everyone else.. Kim On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 4:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 25 March 2014 08:18, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. Richard If you don't mind me asking, how is Bruno being contradictory? I thought his explanation made perfect sense (assuming comp, of course). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
According to MWI I am not unique for there are many versions of myself having made different choices and now living different lives. Therefore I am being cloned all the time. As I understand comp, it is consistent with MWI. That in itself seems contradictory to the no-cloning theorem to me. Richard On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 25 Mar 2014, at 8:00 am, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be essentially cloning you. Richard How many number 2s are there? How many versions of 17 are there? You are a number, which surely makes you unique. You are unique. Just like everyone else.. Kim On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 4:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 25 March 2014 08:18, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. Richard If you don't mind me asking, how is Bruno being contradictory? I thought his explanation made perfect sense (assuming comp, of course). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 25 March 2014 10:33, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 25 Mar 2014, at 8:00 am, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be essentially cloning you. Richard How many number 2s are there? How many versions of 17 are there? You are a number, which surely makes you unique. I am not a number! I am a free man! (Sorry...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 25 March 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: According to MWI I am not unique for there are many versions of myself having made different choices and now living different lives. Therefore I am being cloned all the time. As I understand comp, it is consistent with MWI. That in itself seems contradictory to the no-cloning theorem to me. I always took no cloning + the MWI to mean no one can clone me EXCEPT for the multiverse itself. Assuming comp, perhaps the MWI is equivalent to setting the subst level at the same level as the branching of quantum particles. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 25 March 2014 11:03, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-03-24 22:00 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com: Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be essentially cloning you. By computationalism you are duplicable at your substitution level which by hypothesis is finite... but *matter* is not, because matter is what is below your substitution level and is composed of an infinity of computation. I thought matter wasn't *necessarily *below your subst level. I'm fairly sure Bruno said the subst level could be at the level of fundamental particles, or whatever is going on at the Planck length, or below... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
On 25 March 2014 06:28, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 21, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Climate models predict that there should be plenty of statistical fluctuation on the level of individual decades, Well now, it would be pretty difficult for that prediction to be proven wrong. It reminds me of the famous and vacuous quote from J P Morgan regarding stocks: I Believe the Market Is going to fluctuate. I suppose if the climate went into (say) a runaway feedback and entered an ice age (or became far hotter so the Earth was perpetually cloud covered and racke with storms), either of those would prove it wrong, because neither of those could be called a statistical fluctuation... What is Myhrvold's plan? Oh wait I have google :) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_Myhrvold#Advocacy Hmm. Does it HAVE to be sulphur dioxide? (Maybe something that doesn't turn into acid rain would work just as well?) An evaluation of the potential negative impact of releasing large amounts of sulfur dioxide http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfur_dioxide (SO2) into the atmosphere, which, when combined with water moisture ( H2O ) can produce sulfuric acid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfuric_acid ( H2SO4 ) is needed. Significant environmental efforts aimed at scrubbing SO2 from automobile exhausts and coal-burning power plants over since the 1970s have been largely successful in eliminating acid rainhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acid_rainas an environmental pollutant. Introducing large amounts of SO2 into the atmosphere could have very detrimental effects. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 3/24/2014 2:33 PM, Kim Jones wrote: On 25 Mar 2014, at 8:00 am, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote: Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be essentially cloning you. Richard How many number 2s are there? How many versions of 17 are there? You are a number, which surely makes you unique. You are unique. Just like everyone else.. Bruno's replication thought experiment requires that you not be unique; so it is your classical approximation that can be duplicated. If youness, continuity of your consciousness, depended on your quantum state then you couldn't be duplicated (at that level) by the no-cloning theorem. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Modal summary and new exercises + motivation
Thank you for the above, for my diary! On 24 March 2014 20:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: New exercise: show (W,R) respects A - []A iff R is symmetrical. OK, symmetrical means for all a and b, a R b implies b R a. A - []A can (I hope) be read as the truth of A in one particular world (which I will call this world) implies that for all worlds accessible from this world, there exists at least one world in which A is true. Well, there is indeed one world accessible from those other worlds, in which A is true - this one! Because all worlds accessible from this one can access this world (due to symmetry) and in this world A is true. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Fwd: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's /Our Mathematical Universe/: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
The comments section looks like a mini Everything list in itself. On 25 March 2014 16:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large assumption that I've understood it correctly). The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there *is* some minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of physics or TOE or whatver), and that this exists in a manner that allows us to differentiate it from geography - as it seems to, at least for the physical constants that don't appear to vary with time or space, etc. So one has at least got what may be called local laws of physics and local geography as a starting point. If the laws of physics are (somehow - via fire breathing or whatever) able to generate all possible resulting universes, then we have an explanation for all the geography (modulo our particular position in the string landscape etc), but presumably (as per Russell's Theory of Nothing) it all cancels out, assuming that all possibilities are realised. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. We can't reach it because reaching it via infinite lists of what happens isn't worth the trip. Sure, but the MUH assumes there is a unique set of laws of physics, and the infinite lists all cancel out. (I think one should attempt to criticise a theory in terms of what it actually says rather than some other characterisation, surely?) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Max and FPI
On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote: The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz? I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing field in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one + a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky wave function collapse, depends very much on what definition of parsimonious you find most fitting. MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized to this day - assumptions built in at the start. It's like, local realism - a reasonable assumed universal. But only the bare bones. Assuming locarealism means locality as we perceive, and classically seems to be. In; these dimensions. But what happens when science transforms through a major generalization? The hallmark is that not only theories get merged, broken up, such that everything looks different. But that the revolution stretchs right out to the conceptual framework itself...the basic concepts that are upfront necessary to be shared, for basic communication to take place. It's all concepts broken apart, while others merged together. We can put some faith in local realism, but in what dimensionality it's pure, we don't about that yet..we don't know.MWI assumes that it's a safe scientific known. It isn't. In fact everything is against that. There literally dozens of others. Like assuming major properties are duplicated as is between higher and lower macrostate layers. MWI'ers need to assume local realism at quantum levels as is. Unprecedented if true. Daft in other words. When I throw this at them, the response if there is one is usually6 denial that MWI needs those massive assumptions and would not have happened without them. Arguments come the lines of MWI is derived clean from the wave function or by some other theoretical strtucture, involving simple assumptions only none of them things like local realism. They just don't get it, science, anymore. theories as internal theory structure get improved all the time as part of an ongoing progression. Building out an assumption is not a matter of improving theory structure alone. MWI is tied to assuming local realism for all time, because it was only the extreme and disturbing - incomprehensible even to the greats - character of quantum strangenessl. MWI is tied to it, because that is what it took hat an outrageous, unscientific notion like MWI could be taken seriously at all. MWI even now, has not defense for itself, without reference to quantum strangeness,, and restorations to classical determinism. It's a quantum theory, and it's wrong, because it's assumptions are that the nature of reality is hard tied forever to principles, hard tied to the complexities of this dimension, this universe right here. What a joke. The harm done by this theory is immeasurable. A theory sterile for all time, placed all around the boundaries beyond the frontiers of science, that can never be discoverex, never be passed through, never be built over, or under. It's an act of murder of the human and scientific dreamss -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported life. I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time. I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon. I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit further away. On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us. Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 16:57:05 +1300 Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large assumption that I've understood it correctly). The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there is some minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of physics or TOE or whatver), and that this exists in a manner that allows us to differentiate it from geography - as it seems to, at least for the physical constants that don't appear to vary with time or space, etc. So one has at least got what may be called local laws of physics and local geography as a starting
