Re: [foar] Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback

[LizR]

Thank you Russell, I have ordered my copy.


On 26 March 2014 17:39, Russell Standish  wrote:

> From your Amazon store near you.
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Amoebas-Secret-Bruno-Marchal/dp/1495992799/
>
> Cheers
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[LizR]

On 26 March 2014 16:55, chris peck  wrote:

> >> But that's assuming you *don't* live forever, so you aren't answering
> the other poster's comment.
>
> Sure it does and I'm  not assuming that. It makes no difference whether I
> live forever or not.
>
That's quite an unusual attitude. Most people consider that it matters to
them.

>
> Personally, lets say whilst my widow, mistresses and admirers are all deep
> in mourning here, my history continues somewhere else beyond the reach of
> light. What tangible effect can be measured by the scientists at my wake?
> What effect does this continuation have here? All you end up with are two
> identifiably distinct worlds that are unable to causally influence one
> another. From an operational stand point they simply do not exist relative
> to one another.
>
> The point was that (for most people at least) it matters to the person who
either does or doesn't experience immortality.

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy
> were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of
> decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next,
> since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our
> bodies.
>
>
>
> My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough
> approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to
> approximate topsoil.  The question is, why should conscious continuity
> preserve "us" while physical continuity doesn't count?  Is it just our ego
> that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes?
>

Physical continuity is important only insofar as it leads to psychological
continuity. Psychological continuity is important because we are programmed
to think it is; it has no intrinsic importance.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[LizR]

On 26 March 2014 22:38, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy
>> were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of
>> decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next,
>> since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our
>> bodies.
>>
>>
>> My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough
>> approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to
>> approximate topsoil.  The question is, why should conscious continuity
>> preserve "us" while physical continuity doesn't count?  Is it just our ego
>> that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes?
>>
>
> Physical continuity is important only insofar as it leads to psychological
> continuity. Psychological continuity is important because we are programmed
> to think it is; it has no intrinsic importance.
>
>
What would you say does have intrinsic importance? I thought importance was
*always* "only psychological" !

(Or have scientists developed an importance-detecting device that I should
know about? :)

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-03-26 2:45 GMT+01:00 meekerdb :

>  On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
>>> consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a
>>> consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no
>>> physical communication between its distant parts.
>>>
>>
>>  That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around
>> like a soul.
>>
>
>  There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple
> physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you,
> then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness.
>
>
>> I think the idea is that the "stream of consciousness" is unified so long
>> as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not
>> "multiple" per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles.  When there is some
>> quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of
>> consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams.
>>
>
>  An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your
> consciousness will continue in the other.
>
>
> But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased "you", just as I am
> quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago.  And there is no quarantee
> that some stream will continue.
>

Type 1 multiverse normally garantee not only similarity but exact match
somewhere

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-03-26 7:13 GMT+01:00 meekerdb :

>  On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>   On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR  wrote:
>
>>   On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>>
>>>   On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
   On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


  On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
>> consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a
>> consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no
>> physical communication between its distant parts.
>>
>
>  That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves
> around like a soul.
>

  There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are
 multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness
 to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your
 consciousness.


> I think the idea is that the "stream of consciousness" is unified so
> long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are 
> not
> "multiple" per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles.  When there is some
> quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of
> consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams.
>

  An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your
 consciousness will continue in the other.


  But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased "you", just as I am
 quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago.  And there is no quarantee
 that some stream will continue.

>>>
>>>  Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will
>>> continue if everything that can happen does happen.
>>>
>>>Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum
>> states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a
>> follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive...
>>
>>  Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on
>> from other ones. But our brains already seem to "know" what that means, in
>> that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel
>> continuity of "similar enough" quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the
>> nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the "follow on" state
>> is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away)
>> from the preceeding state.
>>
>
>  I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion
> would still follow in a classical infinite universe.
>
>
> Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is
> quantum mechanics for that matter).  Of course you could still fall back on
> "similar enough". But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a
> state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is "similar enough" to a fetus (of
> some animal) or maybe a cabbage.
>
>
> You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy
> were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of
> decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next,
> since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our
> bodies.
>
>
>
> My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment
>

Maybe you don't, but I surely do... saying consciousness or your identity
is an illusion is just playing with words.

Quentin


> except in rough approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may
> come to approximate topsoil.  The question is, why should conscious
> continuity preserve "us" while physical continuity doesn't count?  Is it
> just our ego that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how
> much it changes?
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Chaitin's Metabiology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Mar 2014, at 19:33, bs...@cornell.edu wrote:



If DNA +/- something else is a universal programing language
and we manage to figure out how to operate that...

it might indeed indicate that a new trillion$ technology is looming.





It exists. It is part of biotechnology. I have worked on this at  
"Plant Genetic System".


I do think thatit will not be however becuase we figure out
how to program an individual cell.  I would suggest that the hard
disk- program analogy if materialized through an applied metabiology
requires the intra vs intercellular places space thus by some such
(semantics and syntax).

I imagine that entropy will playt a role and that DNA computers might
be part of the "hard disk" while the functionality becomes integrated
with in situ biophysics.


OK.





The fact that it will require a "body" I think is an advantage in that
we might be able to coopt innate functionality for computational  
purposes
and thus though QM computers would be faster etc they might not\be  
able to \

integrate well with our human bodies.

Imagine for instance if we could "program" or communicate with a plant
and tell it to produce more sugar?


Well we did it. I think Plant Genetic System was even the first  
society to bioengineer a Tobacco plant to produce its own insecticide.
Now, many plants at treated in that way (crops), and  many  
environmentalist fight against it.
Like for the climate it is a complex subject where I can see both  
sides and I have mixed feelings about it.


Of course, we don't have exploit specifically the "universal" nature  
of the cells, but what is called DNA computing might lead to that kind  
of technology.







Then... perhaps there might be enough food for more people who
with other toys build QM devices.

But is it???

I had attempted to contact Rene Thom while he was alive.  There is a  
long\
distance between shape forming morphogenesis and population genetic  
phenotypic change understanding.



Note that I have mentionned René Thomas (a biologist), who is a  
different person than René Thom (a mathematician).


René Thomas succeeded in programming a sort of "10 goto 10"  
instruction in a bacteria E. Coli, so that a plasmid enter and go out  
of the genome repetitively.







I have generally confounded thinking of a Turing machine in multiple  
states
and a simplistic thought on the busy beaver problem when bridging  
this difference.


I have yet to integrate the entropy of DNA computation to the levels  
of organization under
different levels of selection.  That would be required to decide if  
the cell or other cells\

are important for telenomic activity based in teleomatic physical law.

Organisms never get to to use strong forces, quarks etc in this view  
of reproductive computationnalism

No organism has been found to mover neutrons around atoms.


We do now, and we are part of nature ...

Universality will be (if not actually is) implemented in all possible  
ways.


Bruno






On Monday, March 24, 2014 3:33:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Mar 2014, at 05:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/23/2014 8:57 PM, LizR wrote:

Is DNA a universal programming language?


I'm not sure what a "universal programming language" means.  Just  
1s and 0s are enough language.


Universal language can have a very tiny alphabet {0, 1}.

But the alphabet is not the language. You need some grammar, and  
semantics (operational at least). The test is in showing how to  
write a program.





I think you probably mean to ask is whether a cell is a universal  
computer with DNA as the program.


Ah! I agree. This is meaningful, and I would say yes, even for  
bacteria.




I don't know if there's been a formal proof but it almost certainly  
is.


OK. From René Thomas work, it is easy to build a formal proof. Or  
even from Jacob and Monod. I discovered computer science in that  
paper :)



Making a universal computer is pretty easy.  Wolfram's rule 110  
produces a universal computer in one dimension with only two colors  
and nearest neighbor rules.


That was not easy to find. And it is not always easy to prove that  
something is Turing complete. It took 70 years to prove that  
diophantine polynomials are Turing universal. Even just the degree  
4. Open problem for the degree 3.


But you are right, universality is cheap, just that it is more and  
more complex to prove once the systems are more and more simple.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Mar 2014, at 21:31, LizR wrote:


On 26 March 2014 06:52, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote:

"But Tegmark goes further.  He doesn't say that the universe is  
"isomorphic" to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that  
structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the  
same thing."


I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be  
isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long,  
long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if  
the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing  
else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at  
least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's  
razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the  
existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic.


However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature  
of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never  
actually reach it with 100% certainty.


But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA,  
if you don't mind my frankness.


No of course I don't mind. I was wearing a "physicalist hat" what I  
wrote that.because I was replying to Brent who seems to assume  
physicalism, so I wasn't using a comp perspective. So I started from  
what I think is called an ultrafinitist view (?) and said that IF  
the universe proves isomorphic, etc, I would find myself forced to  
adjust that view. (But I am quite happy to admit I haven't perhaps  
grasped the UDA fully, too!)


OK, just step 8, which shows that the ultrafinitist move will force an  
ad hoc magic violating a weak version of Occam (making science non  
sensical) or comp (using some non turing emulable in the primitive  
matter). OK.







Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that  
consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even  
relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to  
be redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first  
person prediction) as a "probability calculus" on self-consistent  
and computably accessible states.


So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the  
mathematical, or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside  
phenomenon, which generalizes Everett's embedding of the subject in  
the object from the wave to arithmetic. Normally we should find back  
the wave, so we can test the hypothesis.


No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's  
consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is  
still a bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer  
science, and mathematics.


Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times,  
but ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and  
its intensional variants.


With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical  
coherence of a variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams.  
There isn a relation physical reality, but the notion of universe is  
getting a bit obscure.


Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux  
which is more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not  
physical indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more  
theological or computer science theoretical, or arithmetical "in the  
eye of God". Spivack probably just confuses mechanism and  
materialism, like many.


Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that  
is really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again.
Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and  
Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo).


Yes. On days with a "T" in them I allow myself to be more  
physicalist, but today is Wednesday and I am veering towards Plato  
again.


All right. I will note this in my diary. Never send a post to Liz when  
in a day with "T".


:)

Bruno






Bruno






On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb  wrote:



 Original Message 


Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's Our Mathematical Universe:

http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753

The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott  
Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with:

http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790


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Re: [foar] COMP => no cloning?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Mar 2014, at 21:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:





On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor".
Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory-
just to indicate that this is an important question.


No problem: I love all questions :)

The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum  
state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically,  
but you have to detsroy "the original".


But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state.  
It needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be  
at a quite higher level than the quantum state.


You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland",  
but it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content,  
which is way above the quantum level defining the "material" book.


Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that  
if it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not  
be transmitted



Quentin did clarify this. Are you OK with what he said? By definition,  
*a* substitution level is a level of description of your brain/body/ 
environment such that a copy at that level will preserve exactly your  
consciousness/personality.


By definition, if we copy you at a lower level, you will surivive.
If we copy your body/brain at a higher level, you might still survive  
and stay conscious, but, by definition,  you will notice a difference,  
or someone else will notice a difference. Anyway, there will be a  
difference, in God's eye. You might feel a headache, or be stoned, or  
something. You might also not survive at all, if the level is too much  
above, or if inadequate. To treat this we need the thought experience  
with amnesia or altered state of consciousness, which are more  
difficult (and usually avoided and not needed in the derivation of  
physics).






All the same with this present post. Once send it will be  
multiplied, without any information loss, to all participant to this  
forum.


Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious.


Me too. But with comp, a mental state can temporarily be put on an  
hard disk.






Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even  
if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total  
quantum state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7,  
which does not use any duplication of any states, but only their  
multi-preparation, which is done automatically by the arithmetical  
reality, or the Universal Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6  
are no more available except ... as pedagogical steps. But a  
majority of people believe that the brain, although plausibly a  
quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I don't insist so  
much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result directly by comp.


OK?

Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated
if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level.


OK.



Seems we have several levels:
the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the  
substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature.

The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics.


They are the same. The consciousness level is defined, when assuming  
comp, by the substitution level. See Quentin posts.


Note that the substitution level is unknowable, even by the person  
doing the teleportation experience, despite "surviving" will *seem* to  
him/her to be a string argument in favor of comp, and it might be in  
his 1p view, but he cannot use it as a public 3p proofs. The existence  
of Anosognosia can be used to illustrate this. Imagine the person who  
after having a digital brain transplant says "I have survived"  
repetitively without ever stopping, like if the hyppocamus was not  
functionning, he might believe having perfectly survived for a time,  
but is wrong. The survival is 3-1p, and is not denibale  
constructively. This has made me anxious that physics could not been  
constructively derived from arithmetic, but this does not follow  
either, as AUDA eventually illustrates.





They both may be the same: nature and math, that is.


That is a consequence indeed.


Bruno



Richard

Bruno









Richard


On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote:

Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the  
first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem.  
Could you explain how?


In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in  
staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide  
to copy a piece of matter.


Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is  
already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy  
should be defined by something like a non dist

Re: Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback

[Kim Jones]

Thank you Russell I have ordered my copy two.

Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL

Email:   kimjo...@ozemail.com.au
 kmjco...@icloud.com
Mobile: 0450 963 719
Phone:  02 93894239
Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com


"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain

 

> On 26 Mar 2014, at 3:39 pm, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> From your Amazon store near you.
> 
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> 
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Re: [foar] COMP => no cloning?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Mar 2014, at 21:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:


I presume that FPI includes consciousness.


In the sense that the FPI domain is the 1p experience.


So ti seems that the consciousness level is below the substitution  
level


It is at the substitution level, by definition. It is also below  
(redundant information will not "kill you").




and so I suspect that it cannot be transmitted by computer
using only classical particle information.


It can because, even if the brain is a quantum computer, it can be  
emulated by a classical machine in the UD*, or in arithmetic, and  
that's all what counts in the derivation of the necessity of the  
reversal.


Bruno




Richard


On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 25 Mar 2014, at 07:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-03-24 23:27 GMT+01:00 LizR :
On 25 March 2014 11:03, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
2014-03-24 22:00 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist :

Well then the question is How is cloning different from Asking the  
doctor to gather info from the substitution level to reproduce you  
at two different locations? To me at least that seems to be  
essentially cloning you.


By computationalism "you" are duplicable at your substitution level  
which by hypothesis is finite... but *matter* is not, because  
matter is what is below your substitution level and is composed of  
an infinity of computation.


I thought matter wasn't necessarily below your subst level. I'm  
fairly sure Bruno said the subst level could be at the level of  
fundamental particles,


That's not "matter" in comp... matter is what is stable and below  
your substitution level, so any piece of matter is "made of" an  
infinity of computations, and that's why you can't "clone" it.  
Bruno will correct me if I'm wrong.


Just to be sure, that's correct. With comp matter is "redefined" by  
the FPI, on what the UD, or arithmetic "do" below our substitution  
level. That's why "matter" inherit verifiable properties from  
computer science or (intensional) arithmetic only.


Bruno





Quentin

or whatever is going on at the Planck length, or below...


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Re: Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback

[Kim Jones]

Thank you Russell I have ordered my copy two

Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL

Email:   kimjo...@ozemail.com.au
 kmjco...@icloud.com
Mobile: 0450 963 719
Phone:  02 93894239
Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com


"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain

 

> On 26 Mar 2014, at 3:39 pm, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> From your Amazon store near you.
> 
> http://www.amazon.com/Amoebas-Secret-Bruno-Marchal/dp/1495992799/
> 
> Cheers
> -- 
> 
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:





On 25 March 2014 16:58, chris peck  wrote:
>>I think you're missing Scott's point.  The universe is obviously  
isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many  
different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges  
Library of Babel.  Almost all of them are just lists of what  
happens.  Scott's point is that this is not very interesting,  
important, or impressive.  It's only some small elegant compression  
of those lists that's interesting - if it exists.   Scott seems to  
think that it does.  I think it does *only* because we're willing to  
call a lot of stuff "geography" as Bruno puts it, aka boundary  
conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness...


Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in  
the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis  
being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a  
little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to  
uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what  
would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a  
mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of  
the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes  
Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows  
Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which  
regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as  
evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to  
which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle  
and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that  
existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported  
life.


I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not  
risky enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time.



I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point  
concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon.


I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that  
a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like  
Andromeda but just a bit further away.


On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far  
enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't  
satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be  
causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference  
between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it  
couldn't ever effect us.


An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness  
flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence  
we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical  
communication between its distant parts.


Yes. Eventually "physical distance", and time emerge from the  
consciousness flux (in arithmetic, which defined all possible  
computations, with the important redundancies).


Bruno





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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2


Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without  
knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then  
his argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on  
consciousness, ... and on matter.


He's just another example of the growing number of people who are  
familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that  
consciousness does not arise through computation.


He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 1p- 
machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at  
least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that.


Bruno





Craig


Bruno





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Re: Chaitin's Metabiology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:31, LizR wrote:


On 26 March 2014 04:35, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:32, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Is there anything in particle physics that emulates the processing  
capabilities of computers, analog or digital? My question goes  
below Chaitin's metabiology. Something that is a characteristic of  
physics.


Theoretically, you can emulate a universal computer with billiard  
balls, on an infinite table. I think that classical physics needs  
three bodies to emulate a universal machine. QM needs 0 bodies, as  
the quantum vacuum is already Turing Universal, and even emulates  
"naturally" a universal quantum dovetailer (making it into a  
possible comp measure winner).


Just three? Wow!


I think. Not yet seen a proof, but I think 3 bodies are enough.



(I assume it also needs no friction, perfectly elastic collisions  
and what-have-you?)


Yes, sure.

Bruno





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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:





On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR  wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou   
wrote:


An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness  
flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence  
we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical  
communication between its distant parts.


Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank  
Tipler's "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that  
identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one  
another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite  
BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!)


You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness  
is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that  
a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the  
universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar  
consciousness.


Assuming comp!
If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my  
liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is  
conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another  
person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp.




This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about  
type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit  
about because you can't be sure which copy you are.


Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is required,  
then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree  
this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can*  
conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically "other  
person".


Bruno





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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>> On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou 
>> 
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness
>>> flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are
>>> immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication
>>> between its distant parts.
>>>
>>> Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's
>> "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that identical quantum
>> states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all
>> the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation
>> occurs. (Cosmic, man!)
>>
>
> You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is
> secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a
> simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe
> similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness.
>
>
> Assuming comp!
> If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver,
> the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that
> although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no
> sense, if you use some form of comp.
>
>
>
> This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of
> theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because
> you can't be sure which copy you are.
>
>
> Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is required, then
> by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems
> absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the
> other might be an impostor an authentically "other person".
>

If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain
you will make a similar consciousness. The actual theory of consciousness
doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the
same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as,  the claim that I'm not the
same person after a night's sleep.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2
>>
>>
>> Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without 
>> knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his 
>> argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on 
>> consciousness, ... and on matter. 
>>
>
> He's just another example of the growing number of people who are familiar 
> with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that consciousness does 
> not arise through computation.
>
>
> He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 
> 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at 
> least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that.
>

You don't know what he knows.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 02:23, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:



Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some
draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version,
making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under
influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I
am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like
"pretending that I "believe" in "parallel world", that's enough).



Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the
FPI result?


That was unclear.



If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who
conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving
subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory.


OK. But although we can argue some implicit use of comp by Everett, he  
uses only quantum superposition, and failed to realize that classical  
mechanics entails it already. This explains also why he missed that we  
might need to consider the indeterminacy on all computations (quantum  
or not), and eventually that the FPI bears on arithmetic. Everett was  
a bit loose on this aspect. As far as I remember the allusion to  
mechanism is slightly more explicit in Wheeler assessment of Everett.






That was the
implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it
either way, historically.

That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the
computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly
computationalist.


Of course, I would say he is, at least implicitly, but the key point  
is that he remains physicalist and assumes the "FPI" is defined only  
on the universal wave, that he assumes, not seeing that once you make  
the comp move, the measure problem (roughly solved by Gleason theorem  
in the quantum context), is no more solved and has to be handled  
again, in a way capable of justifying the quantum wave.




But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space
is fundamental, so only needs Everett.


And some non-comp fuzzy axiom, because with comp, even if the quantum  
wave was "really existing", it would not explain why we can avoid the  
many-computations context. The Hilbert structure *cannot* be assumed,  
once we use comp.


Bruno


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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 02:48, Joseph Knight wrote:




On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 8:23:10 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some
> draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version,
> making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under
> influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I
> am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like
> "pretending that I "believe" in "parallel world", that's enough).
>

Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the
FPI result?  If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who
conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving
subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory. That was the
implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it
either way, historically.

That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the
computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly
computationalist.

Everett is explicitly computationalist.


That is not so clear. I don't remember having found some explicit  
axioms, but he does assumes classical memories.
As I said to Russell, we can find a more explicit allusion to comp in  
Wheeler assessment. I might look at this again, as I might have miss a  
paragraph, but that is not so important.




He identifies the observer with an "automaton" whose memory can be  
identified with some finite amount of information.


He just didn't carry the logic nearly as far as Bruno. (He was  
martyred anyway.)


OK.

Bruno





But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space
is fundamental, so only needs Everett.

Cheers
--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Entropy and curved spacetime

[John Clark]

Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> For 2 things to be in the same macrostate small changes to the microstate
> must make no difference the way the things behave at the largest scale
>

First you say "Macrostates are defined only in terms of a set of *present*
microstates" and then you give a quote (which as usual you have absolutely
no understanding of but could nevertheless still find by searching with
Google with a few simple keywords) that said " Standard references define
macrostates either as sets of microstates, i.e. subsets of phase space,
with given values of a small number of macroscopic observables".

Well, all game of life patterns that contain 36 live cells is a subset, and
36 is a small number, and one element in that set will grow to infinity and
the others will not, and the process of growing to infinity is certainly
macroscopic and observable. So I repeat my question, do you really want to
say that only the number of live cells is important not their position, so
all 36 cell Game of Life patterns have the same macrostate?


> > the definition of a macrostate says nothing whatsoever about *future*
> behavior.
>

If so then the entire concept of macrostate would be a pretty damn useless
idea.


> >> it would remain true that  if X is proportional to the logarithm of the
>> number of microstates in a system then according to the laws of logarithms
>> X MUST also be proportional to the logarithm of the number of ways the
>> system could have been produced.
>>
>
> > Not if it's non-reversible, no.
>

YES! In non-reversible physics like the Game of Life 2,3, 4 or k different
patterns could have produced the pattern you're looking at now. So however
you wish to define "microstate" if X is proportional to the logarithm of
the number of microstates in that pattern then it is also proportional to k
times the logarithm of the number of microstates in that pattern because k
is a constant. So if X is proportional to the logarithm of the number of
microstates in a system then according to the laws of logarithms X MUST
also be proportional to the logarithm of the number of ways the system
could have been produced.


> > The finite game of life example, with macrostates defined in terms of
> the ratio of dead to live cells,
>

Nobody knows if our universe is a cellular automation or not but it's
pretty clear it's not a finite cellular automation. And even if it were why
is that definition more useful that others? Why is the number of cells more
important that the position of those cells? Remember, one 36 cell pattern
produced infinity, the others do not.


> > But "macrostate" does not mean "the same at the largest scale even
> though small changes have been made", that's a definition you just made up
> that has little to do with how physicists define it.
>

BULLSHIT!


> > If you don't believe me that the basic definition of what constitutes a
> valid "macrostate" in statistical mechanics can be any choice of
> macroscopic   observable regardless of considerations like whether
> knowledge of the observable allows you to predict future behavior, see for
> example

http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0303625v1.pdf which says:
>

I'll tell you exactly what it says, it says:

"The set of macrostates forms the unique maximal partition of phasespace
which
 1) is consistent with our observations (a subjective fact about our
ability to observe the system) and
 2) obeys a Markov process"

And a system obeys a Markov process if it is non-reversible and you can
make PREDICTIONS  about the FUTURE state of the system based only on the
present state of the system.  It also says "Macrostates arrived at in this
way are provably optimal statistical predictors of the future values of our
observables." So wave goodbye to your previous ideas about macrostates.

And that my dear Jesse is the problem in giving lengthy quotes found by
Googling keywords that you have no understanding of.


> > the definition of Boltzmann entropy in terms of the log of the number of
> microstates associated with a macrostate does not say that the parameter
> that determine the macrostate must be a "useful"
>

Oh for christ sake! A scientist has an idea, he writes a paper about this
idea, but if he doesn't specifically say "I think this idea is worth a
damn" therefore we must conclude he doesn't think his idea is worth a damn.


> > you agree it's possible to have an observer that moves inertially from
> top to bottom of the accelerating elevator in deep space, with no external
> forces from the elevator or anything else acting on him as he travels?
>

Yes.


> >> we've been over this before, there is no contradiction everybody
>> agrees. You would say that a triangle formed by your lasers contained
>> exactly 180 degrees and your friend in the accelerating elevator looking at
>> your triangle would agree with you, it has 180 degrees.
>>
>>
> > But in the coordinate system of the accelerated observer moving with the
> elevator the paths of the lasers wouldn't even 

Set theory Undermines Theism

[Richard Ruquist]

"Taxpayers fund creationism in the classroom"
About that Taxpayer Funded Creationism: Why Set Theory??
Some fine Daily Kos diarists, as well as the estimable Charles P. Pierce at
Esquire, have highlighted the new article in Politico today called
"Taxpayers fund creationism in the classroom"...
In addition to the now-customary attacks on biological evolution, the
article refers to other domains of modern knowledge that are considered
suspect by the religious, including areas of modern mathematics, and in
particular, "set theory".  Now I've seen this article linked on a few other
lefty blogs I read in addition to Mr. Pierce, as well as by several friends
on Facebook, and
the usual response to the sentences about modern math are generally met
with a comment like "Creationists are so dumb they probably still think
Pi=3!".  But the fact that the article specifically singles out set
theory immediately jumped out at me, and for reasons which I would like
to explore below the fleur-de-Kos, I think signifies something rather
more important than many of us are giving it credit for.  I
would like to share directly with the DKos community something I wrote
earlier on the Esquire piece...
I would like to offer an somewhat-informed opinion on the whole math
& set theory thing, on the basis that if we are to be forced to
debate these kinds of people, we should understand what it is they're
really on about. I'm sure the creationist doesn't deny "carry the five"
type
arithmetic. Since the article specifically mentions set theory, allow me to
posit something related to that which I have noticed cropping up a
great deal in the modern Christian "apologetics" movement, particularly
propounded by such folks as William Lane Craig (and I apologize but this
comment is of necessity going to be kinda long)
Craig is the leading proponent of the so-called "Kalam Cosmological
Argument" which uses some propositions based on formal logic and a lot of
sophistry to deduce "therefore God did it." One of the supporting legs
of this argument is the essential impossibility of a real infinity, and
to explain this Craig uses a "thought experiment" known as Hilbert's Hotel
(named for English mathematician David Hilbert)
The essence of Hilbert's Hotel is really an argument drawing from set
theory, much like the following: take the "set" (or grouping) of normal
positive integers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... 10... 27 ... a billion...). It
goes on forever, there are an infinite number of positive integers. Now
consider the set of positive EVEN integers (integers evenly divisible by 2:
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, ... a billion...). Are there fewer even integers than
positive integers (even & odd)? There are an infinite number
of members of both sets, but in some sense there's only "half as many"
even integers... or alternately you could think of it as you get the set of
evens by taking away the set of odds (1, 3, 5, 7, ... also an
infinite set) away from the set of all integers. But in fact there are
EXACTLY the same number of even integers as odd integers as all
integers. How to prove it? You can map every single integer to every
single even integer simply by doubling it: 1:2, 2:4, 3:6, 4:8, etc. In
this way you can see that there must be one, and ONLY one, corresponding
even integer to every member of the integer set we started with.
Therefore the two sets must be exactly the same size.
But does this work for all real numbers? Real numbers include both
integers and fractions and irrational numbers (numbers that can't be
represented exactly as a fraction, such as Pi and the square root of 2). Is
the infinity of real numbers the same size as the infinity of
integers? As it turns out, no, it's not, it's a BIGGER infinity. Georg
Cantor proved this again using this concept of mapping from one set to the
other, and you CANNOT find a mapping which will include all possible real
numbers. (check the links for the details or read the classic "Gödel,
Escher, Bach" by Douglas Hofstader (where I was first introduced to these
ideas back
in college). Because of this difference the infinity of real numbers is
not denoted by the familiar "sideways 8" character, but by the hebrew
letter "Aleph".
Now how does this relate to Craig and creationism? Because the
knowledge that there are higher order infinities which cannot be mapped
in the simple way I described undermines the "Hilbert Hotel" argument,
which is part of the underpinning of the Kalam Cosmological model which
serves as a smart-sounding philosophical "proof" of the necessity of
God.
I first came to understand this when I came upon a "William Lane
Craig and Hilbert's Hotel" video on Youtube a while back, and tried to
explain this in the comments: whereupon I was met with responses along
the lines of "Hurr Durr Infinity is the biggest there is you are stupid and
Craig has a PhD" before I was blocked from the channel.
I am far, far more annoyed and frightened by guys like Craig than I
am by armies of Ken Hams (owner of the "Crea

Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Mar 2014, at 04:22, chris peck wrote:

>>It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you  
actually live forever.


Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the  
one thing it isn't is significant.


The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a  
history common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not  
an effect on this earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as  
things can be.



To this earth, perhaps, but it is significant on where you can be  
next. The regions do not interact, but they still 1p statistically  
interfere.
Eventually what you call this earth is a Moiré effect on infinitely  
many computations under our substitution level, normally.


Bruno











Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 19:56:21 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR  wrote:
On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou   
wrote:

On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb  wrote:
On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness  
flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence  
we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical  
communication between its distant parts.


That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves  
around like a soul.


There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are  
multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar  
consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently  
generating your consciousness.


I think the idea is that the "stream of consciousness" is unified so  
long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they  
are not "multiple" per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles.  When  
there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in  
the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are  
two (or more) streams.


An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your  
consciousness will continue in the other.


But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased "you", just as I  
am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago.  And there is no  
quarantee that some stream will continue.


Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will  
continue if everything that can happen does happen.


Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum  
states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state  
that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you  
continue to be alive...


Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow  
on from other ones. But our brains already seem to "know" what that  
means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning,  
and so we feel continuity of "similar enough" quantum states. Unless  
QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel  
continuity if the "follow on" state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light  
years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state.


I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The  
conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe.


Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and  
so is quantum mechanics for that matter).  Of course you could still  
fall back on "similar enough". But in that case you will, as you are  
dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is  
"similar enough" to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage.


Brent

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Re: Chaitin's Metabiology

[spudboy100]

Years back, Clifford Pickover at IBM came up the identical (indexical?) notion, 
using bicycle parts, jello cubes in all the refrigerators on Earth, and flocks 
of birds. It would be a great thing if we were somehow to capture actual 
programs being run in cloud formations. I don't even guess how?

Mitch

Theoretically, you can emulate a universal computer with billiard balls, on an 
infinite table. I think that classical physics needs three bodies to emulate a 
universal machine. QM needs 0 bodies, as the quantum vacuum is already Turing 
Universal, and even emulates "naturally" a universal quantum dovetailer (making 
it into a possible comp measure winner).


Bruno




-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Tue, Mar 25, 2014 11:35 am
Subject: Re: Chaitin's Metabiology




On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:32, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:


 
Is there anything in particle physics that emulates the processing capabilities 
of computers, analog or digital? My question goes below Chaitin's metabiology. 
Something that is a characteristic of physics.



Theoretically, you can emulate a universal computer with billiard balls, on an 
infinite table. I think that classical physics needs three bodies to emulate a 
universal machine. QM needs 0 bodies, as the quantum vacuum is already Turing 
Universal, and even emulates "naturally" a universal quantum dovetailer (making 
it into a possible comp measure winner).


Bruno








 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal 
 To: everything-list 
 Sent: Mon, Mar 24, 2014 2:08 pm
 Subject: Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
 
 
 

 
 
On 23 Mar 2014, at 21:40, bs...@cornell.edu wrote:
 

 
One might note that at the end of Chapter Three (Proving Darwin)  Greg has the 
"caveat" "Metabiology in its present form cannot address thinking and 
consciousness, fascinating those these be." (page 21).
 
 I do not see any reason why plants should not be included.
 
 
 

 
 
I think so to. 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 

 If one has the inspiration to imagine that the act of reproduction *is like* a 
computation (math and philosophy different) and abstract simply that we humans 
reproduce
 
  and if one thought that all of algorithmic complexity in metabiology (as a 
subect) was derived from a difference in that biotic potential in different 
lineages then...
 
 metabiology applied might not be a part of the/an algorithmic theory of 
everything yet different computations that "emerge" in different lineages would 
be differentiable.  A machine cannot know what computations "support it" but 
propagtion of species differences is a different kind of monkey at the 
qwerty...I would think and be conscious of...There are really no physical laws 
that support pure metabiology (only generalized matheatical function through 
arbitrary points) and the step to physical lawys engineer-able in applied 
metabiology is actually a bit more than would be for non preserved force 
propagations. These kinds of contained algorithmic sets are only thus a part of 
what a theory of everything etc would contain but it might be more somatically 
correct even if not currently inclusive of any kind of plant or animal.  What 
is contained and what can exist for longer times are different things.
 
 
 

 
 
OK. That is the problem, but it helps to put it in mind/body or 
first-person/third person terms, and assuming, like Chaitin, digitality put a 
lot of interesting constraints, especially if you take into account 
tractability and resources.
 

 
 
My questioning is more fundamental, and eventually consists in a translation of 
the mind body problem into a "stable belief in body" problem arising in 
arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (but meta-arithmetic is in some part in 
arithmetic: this is exploited maximally).
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 
 
 

 On Friday, March 21, 2014 5:26:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 
 
On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:18, bs...@cornell.edu wrote:
 
 
 

 Are you still interested in talking about metabiology?
 
 http://www.axiompanbiog.com/Pages/Metabiology.aspx
 
 On Wednesday, November 24, 2010 2:10:42 PM UTC-5, thermo wrote:
Chaitin is currently drafting some attemps on metabiology and biological 
evolution of creativity. I read the latest:
 
 http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~chaitin/darwin.pdf
 
 I found it very interesting in it's simplicity.
 
 Strong features:
 
  - Abstract and theorems can be proved.
  - Includes algorithmic mutations.
  - Fitness is general enough to enable infinite evolution.
 
 Weak features:
 
  - Some oracles are used.
  - Biological features such as replication, environment were removed favoring 
more abstract concepts.
  - Evolution is only associated with mathematical creativity, IA?
 
 Can someone can explain how this theory is related to Algorithmic Theories of 
Everything?
 
 
 

 
 

 
 
It *is* an algorithmic theory of everything, but like digital physics, it still 
assumes a brain-mind identity thesis, which does not work when you assume 
computational

Re: [foar] COMP => no cloning?

[spudboy100]

we want information..information...information... You are number 6, I am number 
2. Get him rover


-Original Message-
From: LizR 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Tue, Mar 25, 2014 2:59 am
Subject: Re: [foar] COMP => no cloning?



On 25 March 2014 19:26, Kim Jones  wrote:


> On 25 Mar 2014, at 9:23 am, LizR  wrote:
>
> "I am not a number! I am a free man!"
>
> (Sorry...)


OK - I've seen "The Elephant Man" too... ( took me all day to recognise your 
twisted quote source!)


It was from the 60s classic "The Prisoner" !


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tra3Zi5ZWa0



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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2014 2:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy 
were
needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal 
places,
then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very 
small period
there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies.



My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough 
approximation
and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to approximate topsoil.  The
question is, why should conscious continuity preserve "us" while physical 
continuity
doesn't count?  Is it just our ego that says consciouness should be 
preserved - no
matter how much it changes?


Physical continuity is important only insofar as it leads to psychological continuity. 
Psychological continuity is important because we are programmed to think it is; it has 
no intrinsic importance.


I'd say physical continuity is fairly important to most people - and it's easier to 
understand natural selection for it than for psychological continuity.


Brent
"I don't want to achieve immortality through my work. I want to achieve immortality by not 
dying."

 --- Woody Allen

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2014 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-03-26 2:45 GMT+01:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:

On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our 
consciousness flits
about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we 
are
immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical 
communication
between its distant parts.



That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around 
like a
soul.


There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple 
physical
copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you 
can't
know which copy is currently generating your consciousness.

I think the idea is that the "stream of consciousness" is unified so 
long as
all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not 
"multiple"
per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum 
event
amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness 
then the
stream divides and there are two (or more) streams.


An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your 
consciousness
will continue in the other.


But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased "you", just as I am quite
different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago.  And there is no quarantee that 
some
stream will continue.


Type 1 multiverse normally garantee not only similarity but exact match 
somewhere


I think it only guarantees an exact match (and hence only one history) up to the last 
quantum event that got amplified to the classical level before you died.  I don't have a 
very good feel for the time scale, but it seems that could be a few minutes.  And in 
anycase, dying is not sharp, well defined event.


Brent

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2014 2:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-03-26 7:13 GMT+01:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:

On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:

On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another
and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does
affect us even if there is no physical communication
between its distant parts.



That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and 
moves
around like a soul.


There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are
multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar
consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is 
currently
generating your consciousness.

I think the idea is that the "stream of consciousness" is
unified so long as all the copies are being realized
identically, in fact they are not "multiple" per Leibniz's
identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event
amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of
consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or
more) streams.


An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates 
your
consciousness will continue in the other.


But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased "you", just 
as I am
quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no
quarantee that some stream will continue.


Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will
continue if everything that can happen does happen.

Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum 
states,
you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a 
follow-on
from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive...

Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on 
from
other ones. But our brains already seem to "know" what that means, in 
that we
feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel 
continuity of
"similar enough" quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of
quantum states, we will feel continuity if the "follow on" state is 
actually
10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the
preceeding state.


I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion 
would
still follow in a classical infinite universe.


Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is 
quantum
mechanics for that matter).  Of course you could still fall back on "similar
enough". But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of
consciousness (i.e. none) that is "similar enough" to a fetus (of some 
animal) or
maybe a cabbage.


You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy 
were
needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal 
places,
then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very 
small period
there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies.



My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment


Maybe you don't, but I surely do... saying consciousness or your identity is an illusion 
is just playing with words.


Yes, I agree.  "Survive" isn't well defined at the quantum level. The same kind of 
reasoning that leads people to say we're immortal, also implies we're always dying.


Brent

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than 
> the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that 
> implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental 
> states.
> 

Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the
physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time.

I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and
mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. 

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher
> than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that
> implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental
> states.
> >
>
> Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the
> physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time.
>
> I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and
> mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with.
>

Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite
number of possible brains even in an infinite universe.


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Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 08:30:41AM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >
> > > The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher
> > than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that
> > implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental
> > states.
> > >
> >
> > Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the
> > physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time.
> >
> > I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and
> > mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with.
> >
> 
> Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite
> number of possible brains even in an infinite universe.
> 

infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We
consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially
infinite tape.


- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 09:28, meekerdb  wrote:

> Yes, I agree.  "Survive" isn't well defined at the quantum level.  The
> same kind of reasoning that leads people to say we're immortal, also
> implies we're always dying.
>

As far as I can tell, quantum immortality requires that we are indeed
"always dying" (nicely put, by the way) in order for us to
*be*first-person immortal. And this is also implied by comp and
"cosmological"
immortality. Ironically, the one thing that would disprove this sort of
immortality, it seems to me, is the existence of a soul, which would tie
our identity to one location.

ISTM the price you pay for quantum or other forms of immortality is "dying
every second."

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 10:30, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

>
> Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite
> number of possible brains even in an infinite universe.
>
> With sufficiently advanced technology (e.g. uploading yourself to a
digital brain), the upper limit on your brain size is theoretically
unbounded, except perhaps by cosmological considerations. Prepare to join
the Overmind...

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 11:30, Russell Standish  wrote:

>
> infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We
> consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially
> infinite tape.
>
> I think infinite in time but not space implies a Nietzschean eternal
recurrence? Which makes said brain effectively finite (well, "merely"
limited to all possible brains, so only finite after it's lived every
possible life available to any being, anywhere - or experienced all the
pigeonholes up to whatever the Beckenstein brain bound is, probably quite a
lot).

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 04:00, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-
>>> is-not-a-computation-2
>>>
>>> Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without
>>> knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his
>>> argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on
>>> consciousness, ... and on matter.
>>>
>>
>> He's just another example of the growing number of people who are
>> familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that
>> consciousness does not arise through computation.
>>
>>
>> He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all
>> 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at
>> least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that.
>>
>
> You don't know what he knows.
>

You know what he publishes, which is a good proxy.

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Re: Chaitin's Metabiology

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 08:46,  wrote:

> Years back, Clifford Pickover at IBM came up the identical (indexical?)
> notion, using bicycle parts, jello cubes in all the refrigerators on Earth,
> and flocks of birds. It would be a great thing if we were somehow to
> capture actual programs being run in cloud formations. I don't even guess
> how?
>
> Hah! I can disprove that. My refrigerator doesn't contain any jello cubes.

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 11:31:25AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 27 March 2014 11:30, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> >
> > infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We
> > consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially
> > infinite tape.
> >
> > I think infinite in time but not space implies a Nietzschean eternal
> recurrence? Which makes said brain effectively finite (well, "merely"
> limited to all possible brains, so only finite after it's lived every
> possible life available to any being, anywhere - or experienced all the
> pigeonholes up to whatever the Beckenstein brain bound is, probably quite a
> lot).
> 

Discuss what this means for Tipler's Omega point (finite amount of
space, but an infinite amount of computation).

Cheers

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Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 11:53, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 11:31:25AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> > On 27 March 2014 11:30, Russell Standish  wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We
> > > consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially
> > > infinite tape.
> > >
> > > I think infinite in time but not space implies a Nietzschean eternal
> > recurrence? Which makes said brain effectively finite (well, "merely"
> > limited to all possible brains, so only finite after it's lived every
> > possible life available to any being, anywhere - or experienced all the
> > pigeonholes up to whatever the Beckenstein brain bound is, probably
> quite a
> > lot).
> >
> Discuss what this means for Tipler's Omega point (finite amount of
> space, but an infinite amount of computation).
>
> It means space-time is infinitely divisible and this can be used to create
hypercomputers as a naked singularity is approached, I guess. Or maybe it
means that Tipler didn't see any upper limit on the energy levels of some
physical system (gravity waves?) that could be used by a sufficiently
advanced civilisation (I would think the Planck temperature would put a
bound on that in practice???)

Sorry it's a long time since I read that book and I'm vague as to the
physical mechanism he was proposing. I was only considering brains in flat
space-time with a finite number of possible quantum states available (the
latter in particular is a standard assumption for a theory of immortality I
think, as we discussed earlier). So these would be brains limited by the
Beckenstein bound on their volume of space-time.

Actually the BB applies to black holes as well so I would guess that might
cause a problem for the Big Crunch, I'm not sure, would it apply to a naked
singularity?

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:35:18 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 27 March 2014 04:00, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-
 is-not-a-computation-2

 Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without 
 knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his 
 argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on 
 consciousness, ... and on matter. 

>>>
>>> He's just another example of the growing number of people who are 
>>> familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that 
>>> consciousness does not arise through computation.
>>>
>>>
>>> He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 
>>> 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at 
>>> least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that.
>>>
>>
>> You don't know what he knows.
>>
>
> You know what he publishes, which is a good proxy.
>

What he publishes gives me every indication that he knows his way around 
computer science.

 

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Re: Max and FPI

[LizR]

I've read Mr Kent's paper, or most of it (I'm afraid with limited time I
skipped a few bits that seemed incoherent to my fuzzy brain at least) and I
have to admit it didn't appear to say anything for or against the MWI
except that (a) he obviously doesn't like it, and (b) some people have
apparently misunderstood some of its implications (or perhaps (c)
*nobody*understands its implications, which would put it in the same
position
quantum theory was in for at least its first 50 years, though without the
experimental successes to bolster belief that it's correct).

His proposed test doesn't strike me as terribly useful, if only because he
seems to have roughly approximated the reproductive strategies of (most)
male and female animals that care for their young - the males tend to
follow the "tripe or bust" strategy, the females the "slow and steady" one,
for reasons that I believe are obvious to any evolutionary biologist. Does
this mean that males live in a multiverse and females a universe? :-) Maybe
that explains the alleged monofocus of typical male humans vs the alleged
broader focus of females... (Or that could be explained by the requirements
of hunting vs those of looking after children.)

So I'm not sure where this leaves any proponents or opponents of the MWI.

On 24 March 2014 19:57, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 3/23/2014 11:27 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 24 March 2014 17:48, chris peck  wrote:
>
>>  The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?
>>
>
>  Er, no, lots of people got the wrong end of the stick and argued about
> it at length. I was one of the ones who said he probably meant ... whatever
> it turned out he meant. (Maybe I just don't have enough maths background to
> get the wrong end of the stick on this sort of thing.)
>
>
> I wonder if people on the list are aware of Adrian Kent's proposed test of
> MWI.  Before you look at his paper on the link below, answer this question:
>
> By courtesy of genetic engineering and an oppressive Orwellian government,
> you must choose a reproductive strategy for yourself and all your
> descendants.  You will become a member of either humans-a or humans-b.
> Each generation, say 70yrs, all humans-a die and leave one progeny, so the
> human-a population stays constant.  But each generation the human-b
> population will, in accordance with a 0.5 probability quantum event, either
> go extinct, none have progeny, or they triple, each one dies leaving three
> progeny.
> Then the question is, which new subspecies do you want to join, human-a or
> human-b?
>
> Kent's paper is arXiv:0905.0624v2.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Max and FPI

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2014 7:05 PM, LizR wrote:
I've read Mr Kent's paper, or most of it (I'm afraid with limited time I skipped a few 
bits that seemed incoherent to my fuzzy brain at least) and I have to admit it didn't 
appear to say anything for or against the MWI except that (a) he obviously doesn't like 
it, and (b) some people have apparently misunderstood some of its implications (or 
perhaps (c) /nobody/ understands its implications, which would put it in the same 
position quantum theory was in for at least its first 50 years, though without the 
experimental successes to bolster belief that it's correct).


His proposed test doesn't strike me as terribly useful, if only because he seems to have 
roughly approximated the reproductive strategies of (most) male and female animals that 
care for their young - the males tend to follow the "tripe or bust" strategy, the 
females the "slow and steady" one, for reasons that I believe are obvious to any 
evolutionary biologist.


It's not obvious to me.  Did you take a poll to support your guess?

Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 15:36, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 3/26/2014 7:05 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> I've read Mr Kent's paper, or most of it (I'm afraid with limited time I
> skipped a few bits that seemed incoherent to my fuzzy brain at least) and I
> have to admit it didn't appear to say anything for or against the MWI
> except that (a) he obviously doesn't like it, and (b) some people have
> apparently misunderstood some of its implications (or perhaps (c) 
> *nobody*understands its implications, which would put it in the same position
> quantum theory was in for at least its first 50 years, though without the
> experimental successes to bolster belief that it's correct).
>
> His proposed test doesn't strike me as terribly useful, if only because he
> seems to have roughly approximated the reproductive strategies of (most)
> male and female animals that care for their young - the males tend to
> follow the "tripe or bust" strategy, the females the "slow and steady" one,
> for reasons that I believe are obvious to any evolutionary biologist.
>
>
> It's not obvious to me.  Did you take a poll to support your guess?
>
> No, I just read a lot of books on evolutionary biology.

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Re: Max and FPI

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2014 8:14 PM, LizR wrote:

On 27 March 2014 15:36, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 3/26/2014 7:05 PM, LizR wrote:

I've read Mr Kent's paper, or most of it (I'm afraid with limited time I 
skipped a
few bits that seemed incoherent to my fuzzy brain at least) and I have to 
admit it
didn't appear to say anything for or against the MWI except that (a) he 
obviously
doesn't like it, and (b) some people have apparently misunderstood some of 
its
implications (or perhaps (c) /nobody/ understands its implications, which 
would put
it in the same position quantum theory was in for at least its first 50 
years,
though without the experimental successes to bolster belief that it's 
correct).

His proposed test doesn't strike me as terribly useful, if only because he 
seems to
have roughly approximated the reproductive strategies of (most) male and 
female
animals that care for their young - the males tend to follow the "tripe or 
bust"
strategy, the females the "slow and steady" one, for reasons that I believe 
are
obvious to any evolutionary biologist.


It's not obvious to me.  Did you take a poll to support your guess?

No, I just read a lot of books on evolutionary biology.


I don't think you can infer anything about gender preference for "triple or bust" vs 
"maintain what we've got" from evolutionary biology.  Kent's idea would be to look around 
and see whether people were overwhelmingly type A or type B.  If MWI is true they should 
be type B, if false type A.  There shouldn't be any split along gender line.


Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 16:33, meekerdb  wrote:

> I don't think you can infer anything about gender preference for "triple
> or bust" vs "maintain what we've got" from evolutionary biology.
>

Well OK, but what I've read (and indeed observed and experienced throughout
my life) indicates that people, and most animals who care for their young,
employ strategies which could (roughly) be described as male-risky,
female-play-it-safe (or at least safer). E.g. it's the male grasshoppers
who keep me awake with their racket, the male birds who wake me in the
morning with THEIR racket, peacocks with the big showy tails, male bower
birds who expend the energy to make the bowers - all males employing
(relatively) risky strategies to attract females. (Because, you see, we're
just naturally fabulous and you guys have to make the running. Sorry!)


>   Kent's idea would be to look around and see whether people were
> overwhelmingly type A or type B.  If MWI is true they should be type B, if
> false type A.
>

Yes, I realise what he was saying. I don't think it makes much sense,
because it would require people to believe in the existence of a multiverse
before they could formulate a reproductive strategy involving that
knowledge, and the idea of a multiverse has only existed for about 50
years. Otherwise, I'd expect people to act as though they are in a single
universe, regardless of whether that is so, because that's how things
appear to be. I'd expect genes to exhibit a similar strategy - they aren't
(can't be) "interested" in what happens in a parallel world which can't
communicate with the one they're in.


>   There shouldn't be any split along gender line.
>

Well there is, at least in my experience (and in various books, articles,
nature documentaries and so on that I've come across). Indeed, apart from a
few die-hard feminists I don't know of anyone who still adheres to the
notion that people are "blank slates" and that gender roles are purely
assigned by culture (humans exhibit sexual dimorphism, and brain scans
indicate that it doesn't magically stop at our necks. Plus, why would
blank-slatism only be true of us, but not the rest of the
animal/fish/insect kingdom where it - often blatantly - isn't the case?)

Anyway, that's why I don't think one can sensibly analyse an entire
species' reproductive strategy to see if it was A or B (or something else),
because reproductive strategies tend to be gender specific. It seems like a
daft idea - maybe it's a guy thing? ;-)

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Re: Max and FPI

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote:

On 27 March 2014 16:33, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

I don't think you can infer anything about gender preference for "triple or 
bust" vs
"maintain what we've got" from evolutionary biology.


Well OK, but what I've read (and indeed observed and experienced throughout my life) 
indicates that people, and most animals who care for their young, employ strategies 
which could (roughly) be described as male-risky, female-play-it-safe (or at least 
safer). E.g. it's the male grasshoppers who keep me awake with their racket, the male 
birds who wake me in the morning with THEIR racket, peacocks with the big showy tails, 
male bower birds who expend the energy to make the bowers - all males employing 
(relatively) risky strategies to attract females. (Because, you see, we're just 
naturally fabulous and you guys have to make the running. Sorry!)


  Kent's idea would be to look around and see whether people were 
overwhelmingly
type A or type B.  If MWI is true they should be type B, if false type A.


Yes, I realise what he was saying. I don't think it makes much sense, because it would 
require people to believe in the existence of a multiverse before they could formulate a 
reproductive strategy involving that knowledge, and the idea of a multiverse has only 
existed for about 50 years.


Not "believe in", just believe MWI is possibly true.  But they wouldn't actually have to 
have any opinion; that's just a way to explain it.  Presumably evolution would have 
already made the choice and we'd all be overwhelmingly either A type or B type, whether we 
knew it or not.  The problem would be finding out which we are if it's just in our genes 
and not necessarily consciously available.


I'd say more of problem for the test is that the aren't really two choices which are 
passed on genetically.  There's really nothing to limit one to just replacement even if 
there's only one universe.


Otherwise, I'd expect people to act as though they are in a single universe, regardless 
of whether that is so, because that's how things appear to be. I'd expect genes to 
exhibit a similar strategy - they aren't (can't be) "interested" in what happens in a 
parallel world which can't communicate with the one they're in.


  There shouldn't be any split along gender line.


Well there is, at least in my experience (and in various books, articles, nature 
documentaries and so on that I've come across). Indeed, apart from a few die-hard 
feminists I don't know of anyone who still adheres to the notion that people are "blank 
slates" and that gender roles are purely assigned by culture (humans exhibit sexual 
dimorphism, and brain scans indicate that it doesn't magically stop at our necks. Plus, 
why would blank-slatism only be true of us, but not the rest of the animal/fish/insect 
kingdom where it - often blatantly - isn't the case?)


Anyway, that's why I don't think one can sensibly analyse an entire species' 
reproductive strategy to see if it was A or B (or something else), because reproductive 
strategies tend to be gender specific. It seems like a daft idea - maybe it's a guy 
thing? ;-)


I don't understand your reasoning.  Sure guys are less risk averse. But A vs B is pure 
win-or-lose depending on whether MWI is true or not.  If MWI is true then strategy B is 
the winner no matter whether you're male or female...and not by a little bit or just 
probabilistically, but exponentially, overwhelmingly better.  If MWI is false and there's 
just one universe then B is an absolute, zero survivors loser.


Brent

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RE: [foar] Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback

[Chris de Morsella]

Thanks Russell, just ordered a copy as well. It will dovetail in nicely with
Max Tegmark's book, about to embark on Chapter 12 into the meat of his
argument; wish I had more time to finish it a single read. Going by your sig
I suspect you will get it. am in the middle of a spot of pretty intense
programming that has been swallowing my time and filling my thoughts. Kind
of walked into inheriting a hot potato that had been promised some time ago,
and never delivered, because the service that had been developed was this
byzantine bowl of spaghetti that nobody wanted to touch with a ten foot
pole. After struggling with this artfully horrible code for a month to try
to understand it well enough to take it on I finally convinced them that it
was a lost cause by showing that it was outputting a lot of bad values. That
was two weeks ago and in two weeks I essentially rebuilt the entire thing
from scratch.

So Max has to fit within my lunch hour, in fact there are a few smudges on
some of the unlucky pages. Meaning no disrespect, I am afraid, my life being
what it is now that your translation of Bruno's book will also share that
same lunch hour risk. a little inadvertent splash off the plate of curry
perhaps, landing on the page .

Apologies for the random detour into life. looking forward to reading my
copy when it arrives.

Cheers,

Chris

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2014 1:12 AM
To: f...@googlegroups.com; everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [foar] Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback

 

Thank you Russell, I have ordered my copy.

 

On 26 March 2014 17:39, Russell Standish  wrote:

>From your Amazon store near you.

http://www.amazon.com/Amoebas-Secret-Bruno-Marchal/dp/1495992799/

Cheers
--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Max and FPI

[LizR]

On 27 March 2014 17:39, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 3/26/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 27 March 2014 16:33, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> I don't think you can infer anything about gender preference for "triple
>> or bust" vs "maintain what we've got" from evolutionary biology.
>>
>
>  Well OK, but what I've read (and indeed observed and experienced
> throughout my life) indicates that people, and most animals who care for
> their young, employ strategies which could (roughly) be described as
> male-risky, female-play-it-safe (or at least safer). E.g. it's the male
> grasshoppers who keep me awake with their racket, the male birds who wake
> me in the morning with THEIR racket, peacocks with the big showy tails,
> male bower birds who expend the energy to make the bowers - all males
> employing (relatively) risky strategies to attract females. (Because, you
> see, we're just naturally fabulous and you guys have to make the running.
> Sorry!)
>
>
>>   Kent's idea would be to look around and see whether people were
>> overwhelmingly type A or type B.  If MWI is true they should be type B, if
>> false type A.
>>
>
>  Yes, I realise what he was saying. I don't think it makes much sense,
> because it would require people to believe in the existence of a multiverse
> before they could formulate a reproductive strategy involving that
> knowledge, and the idea of a multiverse has only existed for about 50
> years.
>
>
> Not "believe in", just believe MWI is possibly true.  But they wouldn't
> actually have to have any opinion; that's just a way to explain it.
> Presumably evolution would have already made the choice and we'd all be
> overwhelmingly either A type or B type, whether we knew it or not.  The
> problem would be finding out which we are if it's just in our genes and not
> necessarily consciously available.
>
> I'd say more of problem for the test is that the aren't really two choices
> which are passed on genetically.  There's really nothing to limit one to
> just replacement even if there's only one universe.
>
>   Otherwise, I'd expect people to act as though they are in a single
> universe, regardless of whether that is so, because that's how things
> appear to be. I'd expect genes to exhibit a similar strategy - they aren't
> (can't be) "interested" in what happens in a parallel world which can't
> communicate with the one they're in.
>
>
>>   There shouldn't be any split along gender line.
>>
>
> Well there is, at least in my experience (and in various books, articles,
> nature documentaries and so on that I've come across). Indeed, apart from a
> few die-hard feminists I don't know of anyone who still adheres to the
> notion that people are "blank slates" and that gender roles are purely
> assigned by culture (humans exhibit sexual dimorphism, and brain scans
> indicate that it doesn't magically stop at our necks. Plus, why would
> blank-slatism only be true of us, but not the rest of the
> animal/fish/insect kingdom where it - often blatantly - isn't the case?)
>
> Anyway, that's why I don't think one can sensibly analyse an entire
> species' reproductive strategy to see if it was A or B (or something else),
> because reproductive strategies tend to be gender specific. It seems like a
> daft idea - maybe it's a guy thing? ;-)
>
>
> I don't understand your reasoning.  Sure guys are less risk averse.  But A
> vs B is pure win-or-lose depending on whether MWI is true or not.  If MWI
> is true then strategy B is the winner no matter whether you're male or
> female...and not by a little bit or just probabilistically, but
> exponentially, overwhelmingly better.  If MWI is false and there's just one
> universe then B is an absolute, zero survivors loser.
>
>
OK, I suppose the argument makes sense, sort of (although it seems more
likely to me that genes would act as though there is one universe whether
that's the case or not, for reasons I already mentioned). Anyway let's
assume it does, at least for the sake of argument, and see if it's
coherent, if you'll pardon a quantum pun.

So the idea is that in a multiverse we - indeed all animals (and plants,
etc) should plump for a reproductive strategy that is somehow equivalent to
the "three descendants on a quantum coin toss" one.

I guess my next question is, what could such a reproductive strategy
possibly look like in real life, given that most animals have no access to
quantum coin tossing?

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