Re: quadratic voting
On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally distributed voting capital or something similar? So people can spend their voting power on whatever they're concerned about? The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal distribution of political power. Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea fail miserably, but it's fun to think about. Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment. Where does the money go once it's bought votes? It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion. Which is a better situation than we have now, where they can just buy the laws for much cheaper. Telmo. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 May 2015, at 10:23, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 10:08 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong. That would just mean the terminology isn't very good. It would be more accurate to say you do (or don't) believe in ghosts. That's a good point. Of course the non-materialist deals with ontological problems. Do entities perceived under the influence of psychoactive drugs exist in some sense? At Iridia, there has been a talk and demo of Virtual Reality. I have been very often disappointed, but this time I have been quite impressed. They have solved the main problems, and the immersion feeling was quite realist, in all direction where you looked, without any screen border, and perfect real time synchronization for any type of the move of your head or eyes. William Gibson felt the same :) https://twitter.com/perrychen/status/579058927511334912 They did it!, said the guy who has been writing and dreaming about this stuff for decades. In one demo there was a creature, was it real? Those things are relatively real. Like in personal nocturnal dream, or when reading a novel, and with comp, like with physicalism, there is a physical reality, which is a priori different from a machine (as it is a sum of the work of all machine) acting below our substitution level. In arithmetic, one virtual reality is less virtual than all the others, as it has the correct comp bottom. That define a notion of physically real, and most entities perceived in inebriated state are very often not physically real. But they might still be images of important routine operating in the brain of a large class of possible subject, and be entities living on alternate reality planes, but still there by Turing-Universal + FPI. Virtual reality might help people for the thought experiences, and many (new) things. But in the long run, we have to be careful, as the poor might one day not afford visiting a non virtual reality. If we don't think a bit, we might end up all in brains in vats. Some economists are already working on this, namely Robin Hanson. He used to be at the center of a very lively discussion about these topics. Maybe you'd like to take a look at his blog when you have time: http://www.overcomingbias.com/ He's an interesting guy, in any case. Telmo. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 5:59 PM, PGC multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, May 4, 2015 at 4:03:50 PM UTC+2, telmo_menezes wrote: On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Alberto G. Corona agoc...@gmail.com wrote: Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong. So what? No problem, my only dogma is that reality is intelligible -- i.e. it is possible to discover laws that approximate how things work. Beyond the empirical successes of science, I choose this belief because I see no point in believing otherwise (if it's wrong, there is really no point in believing anything). Choosing things to disbelief a priori is unscientific, but of course we are mortal so we guide ourselves by some heuristic. I go in the direction of the things I find more likely to be true and I'm sure you do the same. Not necessarily. I find discovery of universal machine to be more unbelievable than strangeness that is cited in the esoteric-unexplained category, which is close in terms of content to children's fantasies and Star Wars. And yet the latter remains unsupported conjecture while the former is a number relation which exists provably as consequence of arithmetic. I'm not convinced by arguments like I see pattern in this strangeness and can categorize them; and we can see these patterns in science or in the work of so-and-so I think most people, who are untrained in thinking about these topics, have a simple heuristic guided by strangeness. You are more trained, so your heuristic is more sophisticated. You say you find the universal machine more unbelievable than the Star Wars universe, and yet you give it more credence. I would say this just means that you trained yourself to ignore biologically encoded emotional responses when seeking truth. The quacks, instead of encouraging people to improve their reasoning skills, appeal to the fundamental strangeness of reality to peddle whatever snake oil they are interested in selling at a given moment. I need evidence and clear algorithm. If say a Shulgin lays out how precisely to modify some molecule to ingest something that will result in mystical experience with paranormal content, than this is reasonable: If subject x ingest function of some molecule = fuzzy experience with features a,b,c, mystical union or whatever etc. But then you respect empiricism somehow. You must, otherwise how could you have learned to play music? But citing strangeness of unknown without being able to repeat the result or make it repeatable to skeptics is probably advertising again, which tries to sell itself as truth regardless whether in respected journal, obscure blog, TV... Advertising without being genuine about it and masking it as science, without properly situating it in tenable hypothesis = I can find interesting patterns in dog shit and the mud. Don't feel the need to post about it because I feel that too often basic rationality is left at the door for hidden reasons of self-glory of authors. Ok. And I like reasoning about the craziest shit. But I'm too often disappointed by barrages of cheap psychological tricks playing to the unknown, instead of clear reasoning where somebody states a clean, discrete ontology clearly. Yes, I stole this remark above, as you can see. That's why I think a lot of this stuff can be ignored. We're not in realm of explanation and basic rationality is left at the door... which is profitable and self-fulfilling (there will be more weird patterns in the mud to substantiate what I'm saying). With Shulgin type approach as contrast (he also carries extraordinary claim and is attacked as crackpot), we can verify mystical propositions for ourselves because the algorithms of how to get there and build such molecule are accessible and precise enough. PGC But then we are back at an heuristic, and that is unavoidable. The search for knowledge cannot operate blindly, there is just too much stuff to explore. Telmo. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
Hi Mitch, On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 4:00 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Totally agree, Telmo, regarding communication. On the Bostrom concept of Sims and, by extension, our reality being a sim, I like the concept, but in a way, it seems too simple, Rather than life being an illusion, let us conceive that its the result of a great program running and producing us as a result. Moreover, our program can be either revised, copied, or both, etc. This is one reason professor, Eric Steinhart's work seems compelling to me. The following summary is available from his book, Your Digital Afterlives, but here is a taste, from Steinhart's website- http://ericsteinhart.com/FLESH/flesh-chabs.html I will have to read this more carefully, but I think I get the gist of it. Most of the ideas are not new to me, and correspond to things that I enjoy thinking about myself. I have gone through several revisions of my belief system about these topics, so it's likely that I can be convinced by good, new ideas. Just in case you don't know, I really enjoyed this book at some point: http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Never-Ending-Days-Being-Dead/dp/0571220568 It's mostly a sampler of theories on these topics, and some have already been falsified (like the omega point, I believe). The best of these theories is Promotion, but Steinhart views his own idea as flawed, because he wants it to be progressive rather then regressive. I don't see the logical regression he seemed concerned about, He did come up with Revision theory, as workable, however, these are merely, *better-off clones* of ourselves, and miss the continuity, that infers identity. Promotion is better, because it does exactly this, via pipelines, processes, data transfers, as well as uploading and teleportation. Ok, I have no problem with any of this stuff. I will try to summarize how my current view of things intersects with these topics. I think immortality is a given. I suspect we are all versions of the same thing (as conscious entities) and that all moments are eternal. I think the perception of a time line arises inside each eternal observer moment. What does not appear possible, at the moment, is to have very long story lines. I cannot be Telmo for a time span of many centuries (disregarding Quantum Immortality issues). It would be nice if we could do that. I think there is potentially great value in having human being that extend their personal development way beyond our biological limitations. So the issue becomes: how to preserve a set of memories and transfer them to another medium, so that we can extend story lines? This could take the form of Promotion, trans-humanism, mind uploading, who know what else... I would just say that the story lines problem is somewhat tangencial to the simulated reality problem. Sorry if I'm rambling, I don't have a lot of time at the moment... This is one reason I want to see if Ben Goetzel has an afterlife-resurrection theory, because they both appeared to have come to the same conclusions, independently, on several other concepts. Steinhart, like Goetzel, is a computationalist (digitalist) - (5 minute video) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfDB35y-5Z0 I am mostly ok with this video. My only objection is that time must not exist in the maximally simple universe, so thinking about causality between universes seems problematic. This is part of what attracts me to Platonia and this list: the idea that everything already exists, and what is called causality is just structure. Please let me know if you uncover anything concerning Ben Goetzel's views. Thanks. The AGI conference is going to be in my city in the end of July. I am not sure I will be able to attend, but if I can I will try to ask Ben in person. Telmo. Mitch -Original Message- From: Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 9:08 am Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism! On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last, number 26th, the last one. Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting there, it's a small world. My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us. This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with information. I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you a nobel
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :) On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: ana and kata if I remember correctly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/YPM76ym2l0w/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com'); . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: quadratic voting
On 5/5/2015 5:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally distributed voting capital or something similar? So people can spend their voting power on whatever they're concerned about? The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal distribution of political power. Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea fail miserably, but it's fun to think about. Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment. Where does the money go once it's bought votes? It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion. Which is a better situation than we have now, where they can just buy the laws for much cheaper. I'm not sure that's much cheaper. One way they buy votes is by funding attack ads against opponents of legislators they want a vote from. But if you're interested in quadratic voting you should read this http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html by a Warren D. Smith. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: quadratic voting
On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Where does the money go once it's bought votes? It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion. Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on spreading their views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV would be that any form of political advertising or support for parties or editorialising outside the system would be illegal, and heavily penailsed if it occurred - otherwise the current system is far more efficient from the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using their newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates. Or am I missing the point? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: quadratic voting
On 5/5/2015 5:34 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Where does the money go once it's bought votes? It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion. Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on spreading their views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV would be that any form of political advertising or support for parties or editorialising outside the system would be illegal, and heavily penailsed if it occurred - otherwise the current system is far more efficient from the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using their newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates. I think you're right that such a restriction would be needed; but I don't know whether it's actually proposed that way. I've never studied voting systems much beyond Arrow's theorem, but I know a mathematician who's writing a book about various systems. He's not impressed by quadratic voting: http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html Brent Or am I missing the point? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
On 6 May 2015 at 14:34, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased, and subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and spiritual leanings, Nobel is best left to academic scientists who tow the socialist line, and are nicely rewarded. Are all career academics like that? No, but not making waves while obtaining government grants, goes a long way to get along, and go along career wise. So you're saying Templeton is less biased and subjective? I'm not disagreeing, I just want to know what you think. I don't know much about either of them. (And what was that about 100F summers?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 5/4/2015 11:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 09:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment ago. The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly equal degrees of similarity. Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep. What does that mean? Memories survive...so are you identifying consciousness with memories? They certainly contribute a lot to the similarities of successive experiences. In the above example you is ambiguous. In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body. But on Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body were based on some quantum event, I would end up in two different places. Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather than the park? Ask John Clark. :-) Seriously, one can only talk about what you expect given a definition of you. If you means your closest continuation then waking up at home is closer than waking up in the park. We tend to think of this as uncertainty because all the similarities of body and memory mean that the difference between the park and home is almost neglegible compared to the similarities. But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except into the body of an eighty year old black woman with one leg. Would you still find yourself waking up in the park? This sort of thing actually happens on a daily basis: people are injured in serious accidents and wake up with parts of their body missing and major changes in memories, cognitive abilities and personality. Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of their physical being - even if they are not conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: quadratic voting
On 6 May 2015 at 08:38, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting: 1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and one latent national for the leading names in the party. EVERY VOTE COUNTS: if somebody gets within the District the fixed number of votes for being elected, so be it and the excess goes to the national list. If somebody does NOT get elected, all the votes (s)he got go onto the national list, from where the names are considered one after the other as the (pre)fixed number of votes accumulated for an election-need. As I hear the system is still on. This is much superior than the Gerrymandered unjustice of the USA. 2. I do not approve a 'voting' of just YES-men. There should be a way to express a N O to the candidate, or proposal. What I completely disapprove is the Big Money influence on the voting. Any candidate should get identical expense-money once fulfilled the conditions of running lawfully and NO MORE from NO SOURCE. Give the voter a chance to freely compare the proposals and make up their mind in the privacy of their home. Nobody should be inundated with ads etc. I agree with everything you say here. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this point. Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have and hope)... without a measure theory. Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis. Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not shareable. It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital computer (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change). But the digital computer is still a physical device (which presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum); so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from the UD's infinite threads of computation. It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a fairly widely held opinion. But then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio. The two comp's are not the same. Brent Having only AGI, is an indication computationalism is true, but as we wouldn't have proof they are conscious as we are, it would be just that an indication... but if you undergo yourself and it works, for you it's a proof, for us you arguing you're still yourself, is still just an indication that computationalism is true (and not a proof) but a stronger one than AGI IMO. Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
meekerdb wrote: On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis. Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not shareable. It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital computer (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change). But the digital computer is still a physical device (which presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum); so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from the UD's infinite threads of computation. It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a fairly widely held opinion. But then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio. The two comp's are not the same. Yes, I find the same problem. The assumption -- stemming from Bruno himself I think -- seems to be that if you accept that some brain functions could be simulated on a computer at some substitution level (strong AI), then all the rest of Bruno's 'comp' thesis follows logically. I do not think that this is the case. That is why I think that the wider 'comp' thesis can be criticized on the basis that it has not led to substantive results -- there is no indication that any useful physics can be obtained by 'questioning the machine'. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
LizR wrote: On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a fairly widely held opinion. But then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio. The two comp's are not the same. That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis - the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC can be emulated by a classical computer.) Maybe we should distinguish comp1 and comp2 or comp and Comp (or comp and Bruno's comp...!) Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1 and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the logic. The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming that it still computes in exactly the same way as a physical computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity, not a logical argument. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming that it still computes in exactly the same way as a physical computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity, not a logical argument. Rejecting the move to Platonia is the non-robust, or small universe move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place on this list, but I didn't really notice at the time). You make some interesting points. I am concerned about the move to Platonia, not because the physical universe is too small, but because it seems that the notion of a computation is taken over from physical computers without modification. If a computation is nothing more than an order set of steps, then a computation is no different from a description of that computation (the map/territory confusion). For there to be a difference, the steps have to be performed in real time, and that notion of real time is not available in Platonia. This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper MGA Revisited). The MGA purports to show that the physical substrate is not needed for consciousness. The argument fails for several reasons, some of which you outline below. This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism, ie the notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless, ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman Wildberger. The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense, unless I accidentally ask just the right question. Counterfactual correctness has not been shown to be necessary -- it is just an ad hoc move to save the argument. You can't question the actors in a James Bond movie and expect to get anything sensible, of course. But then, no one is suggesting that a movie of someone's face records the basis of their consciousness. The movie in question is a recording of the basic brain processes (at the necessary substitution level). This, when replayed, recreates the conscious moment -- not a new conscious moment, as you point out, but a conscious moment nonetheless. If it did not, then the original comp argument fails -- we could not replace all or part of our brain with a device performing the same operations. If we replace part of our brain with a functionally equivalent computer, we will then have counterfactual correctness because the replacement is functionally equivalent: it will respond to different inputs just as the original brain tissue would. But that is not the essence of the conscious moment. The whole MGA hangs on a fundamental confusion. Bruce Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of accuracy). Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly, it is not in the here and now, via the above argument, but what about in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there and then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have supervenience on the physical recording. To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really existed in the first place. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
To be fair, in the last 10 years the everything list has at least influenced one genuine proper scientist, namely Max Tegmark. (There may be others of whom I am ignorant, but Mr T acknowledges the influece of the EL in his book Our Mathematical Universe. I would add Bruno as a second example, but there are some who would, no doubt, disagree). And although Russell's TON is almost 10 years old, it isn't quite, so I can count that as well. So even the Bear of Little Brain knows of two scientists who have produced work influenced by discussions on the EL. (And if I think harder, like the characters in the Monty Python Spanish Inquisition sketch, I can probably come up with some others. Our three chief scientists are surprise, fear, and a fanatical dedication to the Pope...) I would quite like to discuss what you've said above, but I fear that this would merely be buying into the ongoing confusion of which you speak so eloquently. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 5/5/2015 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2015, at 09:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. But it is not my theory. It is the digital version the antic mechanist theory, suggested in the King Milinda, equivocated with rationalism by Diderot, used explicitly or implicitly by those people who brush away mystic experience as hallucination, it is used by neurophysiologist, and most biologist (when they pretend not using mecanism they are usually confusing automata with machine is the Turing sense). And there is no clue that a process in nature is not computable, If it takes infinitely many threads of the UD to compute a moment of consciousness then isn't that moment not computable? a good things because it is also the hypothesis used in darwinian type of explanation. Now, some people come ans say, no there is a real physical universe, and it is needed to make some computations more real than others. What do you mean by real? UDA+MGA shows that such an explanation does not work, and add implicitly magic to both mind and matter, for which there is no evidence today. Then Quentin forget to mention that after UDA there is AUDA, where I explain that if e are machine and can solve that machine, then machine can solve that problem, and so why not interviewing the machine. It happens that we are living a wonderful period, and that Gödel, Löb, and others have already begin the interview, and Solovay even axiomatised it entirely at the propositional level. UDA shows that a physical events are associated to sigma_1 propositions which are simultaneously - provable (in a p way, at the right subst;level, by construction), - consistent (they are realized by some truth, I use the completeness theorem) - true (this can be explained to be necessary to get the first person, and is traditional since Theaetetus). Is this your definition of physical event? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
On 5/5/2015 1:26 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward ??/?? ? earlier/later Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer group like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All the rock in scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example. -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 10:08 pm Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism! On 5 May 2015 at 12:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last, number 26th, the last one. Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting there, it's a small world. My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us. This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with information. I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you a nobel prize or even any sort of recognition. This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning Theology). But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does indeed quasi-succeed, perhaps, in communication a bit of the uncommunicable. Then you can communicate a part conditionally, like if I am consistent then I can't justify that I am consistent, and the inetnsional variants. Bruno You can get a Templeton, which is for merging science and religion and is worth more than a Nobel. Do you mean it's worth more in monetary terms, or in terms of kudos, respectability, etc? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer group like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All the rock in scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example. I'm having some trouble parsing your reply. I was wondering in what sense the Templeton award was worth more than the Nobel, as Brett said it was, but I can't see that you've answered. I'm not sure what you mean about the 100 degree summers, either (for one thing I can't remember how to convert from Frankenstein to CelsiusI've got a feeling 100 is quite hot, isn't it? But then the boiling point of water is 312 or something weird, so maybe it isn't.) And as for the jolly hockey sticks... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 6 May 2015 at 11:10, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of their physical being - even if they are not conscious. Specifically because physical continuity ensures continuity of memory (normally). Should it become possible to copy memories from one brain to another, or to upload people into computers, we would of course have to revise this intuition. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming that it still computes in exactly the same way as a physical computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity, not a logical argument. Bruce Rejecting the move to Platonia is the non-robust, or small universe move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place on this list, but I didn't really notice at the time). This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper MGA Revisited). This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism, ie the notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless, ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman Wildberger. The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense, unless I accidentally ask just the right question. Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of accuracy). Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly, it is not in the here and now, via the above argument, but what about in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there and then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have supervenience on the physical recording. To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really existed in the first place. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased, and subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and spiritual leanings, Nobel is best left to academic scientists who tow the socialist line, and are nicely rewarded. Are all career academics like that? No, but not making waves while obtaining government grants, goes a long way to get along, and go along career wise. Sent from AOL Mobile Mail -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tue, May 5, 2015 10:23 PM Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism! div id=AOLMsgPart_2_5e8b2376-c552-4025-af5c-bcfc6a3097a8 div dir=ltr div class=aolmail_gmail_extra div class=aolmail_gmail_quote On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List span dir=ltra target=_blank href=mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com;everything-list@googlegroups.com/a/span wrote: blockquote class=aolmail_gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex font color=black size=2 face=arialRespectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer group like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All the rock in scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example. /font /blockquote I'm having some trouble parsing your reply. I was wondering in what sense the Templeton award was worth more than the Nobel, as Brett said it was, but I can't see that you've answered. I'm not sure what you mean about the 100 degree summers, either (for one thing I can't remember how to convert from Frankenstein to CelsiusI've got a feeling 100 is quite hot, isn't it? But then the boiling point of water is 312 or something weird, so maybe it isn't.) And as for the jolly hockey sticks... /div /div /div p/p -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to a target=_blank href=mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com;everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com/a. To post to this group, send email to a target=_blank href=mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com;everything-list@googlegroups.com/a. Visit this group at a target=_blank href=http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list;http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/a. For more options, visit a target=_blank href=https://groups.google.com/d/optout;https://groups.google.com/d/optout/a. /div -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: The dovetailer disassembled
Hi, I've been watching this if COMP is true then discussion for over 10 years. In that time my thinking has evolved to the point where I can express what COMP now looks like to me, from my perspective. Comp appears to be trivially true. That is, the resultant computing entity would be computing the entire universe and hence is simply pointless. It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for the same reason computed flight physics is not flight. There is an endless confusion operating here: The confusing of the universe as computation with computing, with this universe, models of how the universe appears to us inside it. A deep map/territory confusion. I wrote a book on this. I am not going to spend any further on this because I know COMP is religion here and talking to the religious doesn't work. Witness 10 years and the same conversation is still going on. There is a fantastically detailed self-promulgating mental cage here in the comp argument. I for one am over it. I am building artificial brain and there is no computer involved at all. Comp is irrelevant in the real practice of the mission to make real AGI. When you _don't_ know anything about the universe, yet you are inside it and need to survive you need to survive based on fighting your own ignorance. So If you already know everything you can compute your way out of ignorance... But then you already know everything... So why bother? You can prove this argument experimentally. I intend, finally, to do this or at least organize this before I drop dead. Comp. Imo trivially true and wasting the time of a lot of prodigious brains. That's where i am at, anyway. Thanks for listening. In another 10 years I'll see what it looks like again! Carry on. . Cheers Colin -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com Sent: 6/05/2015 10:28 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: The dovetailer disassembled On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a fairly widely held opinion. But then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio. The two comp's are not the same. That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis - the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC can be emulated by a classical computer.) Maybe we should distinguish comp1 and comp2 or comp and Comp (or comp and Bruno's comp...!) Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1 and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the logic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 11:21 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for the same reason computed flight physics is not flight. I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a computer programme could be conscious. Simulated flight isn't real flight, but (according to comp) consciousness can't be simulated, because it's *already* the result of computations. *or comp1 if you prefer With respect I will refuse to buy into the jargon of this milieu. I don't care what comp-x or any other variant of it is. I care even less what a dovetailer is. Yet you have touched right on the very essence of the map/territory confusion. But it is even worse than you think. First consider A) The universe is a massive collection of interacting elemental primitives of kind X whose interactions could be characterised as a computation. Call it a noumenon. Underlying fabric of whatever it is we are inside. and B) A computer K inside A made by entities (us), also inside the set A, that is running and exploring a _model_ of a set of abstracted (by us) X. We in B you can look at the computer K and say: *The universe A, made of X, is computing a computer K running a program that is an abstraction of A*. The computing of the computer by the universe A and the computing by K of the abstractions inside the program in the computer K are two *utterly different things *that are endlessly confused here. The entire 10 years discourse can be characterised as a group of people variously mixing A and B and never realising they were talking about different things while not even knowing which of A or B they are in AND it gets worse. *in neither case were they speaking about traditional 'laws of nature'. **This is a second cockup. These cockups are factorially confusing. * In essence the study of the kind B is a different kind of science. It's not what traditional science, out here in the real world of Dr Colin science, does. B is a different kind of novel scientific enquiry/ epistemology that this list continually fails to recognise. What we do as *scientists *out here in the non-Everything-list world is *not *B. Instead we do something different(C). We create abstractions that predict how (A) appears (in a scientist's consciousness ... as a scientific observer) when you are inside it (A) (made of X). These regularities in appearances are NOT the regularities depicted as B. We call C the traditional 'laws of nature'. A completely *different *kind of epistemology. Then, just to make everything *even more confusing ...* * *we scientists (C) then compute the abstract 'laws of nature' C, variously confusing them with the laws in B (= think C and B are the same epistemology), or completely miss B or shun B as metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. B and C are separate epistemologies. Their difference scientifically accounts for consciousness in the form of the scientific observer. So... One underlying unknowable (from the inside) universe A made of something. What that 'something' might be is what B explores. and *Two *sets of potential abstractions of A: B and C. B depicts/characterises what A is made of whereas C is what it *appears *like to an observer inside A (you know...atoms and space and stuff). Epistemology C makes the observer predictive of appearances and simultaneously completely fails to contact X or B and thereby does what has been happening for 2000 years... fail to account for (explain) the scientific observer. Here in this email form COMP argument, A and B *and* C are being endlessly confused with each other and mis-correlated in respect of consciousness. Neither a computed B epistemology or a computed C epistemology can be claimed conscious and this is testable. Careful: by 'computed' I mean computed by a computer made of X by us, also made of X. Yet, that which is conscious (certain organisations of X in A) can be understood as a form of computation! That does not mean that a computed version of that understanding is conscious. Nor does it mean that X is some kind of platonic realm computer running a program. You can nest this back, The Matrix style, forever and it's just a load of empty sophistry. Instead why don't we *solve the problem*. Sorry 10 years can make you grumpy. So really this is a *massive systemic *screw up. 3 layers A/B/C (a 'dual-aspect' epistemology) confused with each other AND with computed versions of 2 of them (B/C) AND that confused mess is then used to speak about consciousness at the level of each of the 3 confused layers. This discourse fails to realise that it is right at the juncture of the emergence of a new kind of science..The recognition and adding of B as a new distinct epistemology. That is what you are really doing here. This has been very hard to unpack. And unpacking it is the main result
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
On Wednesday, May 6, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: ana and kata if I remember correctly. Which are up and down in Greek. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
Thank you! :-) (Possibly too much so in some...) On 6 May 2015 at 11:19, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrote: Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :) On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: ana and kata if I remember correctly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/YPM76ym2l0w/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a fairly widely held opinion. But then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio. The two comp's are not the same. That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis - the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC can be emulated by a classical computer.) Maybe we should distinguish comp1 and comp2 or comp and Comp (or comp and Bruno's comp...!) Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1 and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the logic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for the same reason computed flight physics is not flight. I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a computer programme could be conscious. Simulated flight isn't real flight, but (according to comp) consciousness can't be simulated, because it's *already* the result of computations. *or comp1 if you prefer -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Fwd: quadratic voting -- done by bees? No.
Here's another blog from Warren on quadratic voting Brent Forwarded Message This web page http://rangevoting.org/BogusBeeQV.html refutes massively false THE SPECTATOR piece on this by irresponsible quadratic voting hype artist (Univ. of Chicago Economist, last I saw) E. Glen Weyl. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
ana and kata if I remember correctly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On Mon, May 4, 2015 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not. Nonsense, we have a ASTRONOMICAL amount of evidence that is not necessary! Your quantum state changes well over a million billion times every nanosecond and yet you continue to feel like the same person. Of course personal identity is retained under internal changes. Then why all this silliness about a copy needing to be absolutely perfect? But why are you so confident that the persistent quantum state of some molecules is not important for some memories or functions? Because at room temperature, and even more so at 98.6F, molecules have no persistent quantum state, they change quantum states many billions of times a second. The only reason we don't have Quantum Computers today is that it's so difficult to keep things in the same quantum state for more than a fraction of a second even at liquid helium temperatures. John K Clark Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 5 May 2015 at 09:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment ago. The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly equal degrees of similarity. Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep. What does that mean? Memories survive...so are you identifying consciousness with memories? They certainly contribute a lot to the similarities of successive experiences. In the above example you is ambiguous. In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body. But on Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body were based on some quantum event, I would end up in two different places. Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather than the park? Ask John Clark. :-) Seriously, one can only talk about what you expect given a definition of you. If you means your closest continuation then waking up at home is closer than waking up in the park. We tend to think of this as uncertainty because all the similarities of body and memory mean that the difference between the park and home is almost neglegible compared to the similarities. But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except into the body of an eighty year old black woman with one leg. Would you still find yourself waking up in the park? This sort of thing actually happens on a daily basis: people are injured in serious accidents and wake up with parts of their body missing and major changes in memories, cognitive abilities and personality. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 5/4/2015 11:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: And under the closest continuation theory Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next. But Stathis objected that you might be transported while unconscious and then you wouldn't have a memory of the current moment. You'd have a gap in your memory. A gap is different than no memory... obviously if you have memory of your identity (even if just to wake up from a dream and find out you have another identity than the one you thought), your current moment is a next moment of the last moment you remember before being in this moment. Assigning a measure is different, I have no theory how it could be done, obviously such next moment should have lower measure than normal continuation moment. And even if you don't have gap, your memory may be more or less veridical, more or less complete. So how different can the two copies be from each other and from he Helsinki man and still be valid? That's asking for a theory of measure, which I don't have, so I can't answer that, IMO the more memories of it the more likely, but that's just a hunch, not a theory. If computationalism is true, such measure must exists, what it is, is another question, and I don't have the answer to it. If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure theory who can assign such. It's not what I want. That's you who's asking for it... It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this point. Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have and hope)... without a measure theory. Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy
Computer scientist's or. If you read it that way it's a yes or no question. Misreading an exclusive or as an inclusive or is often used in CS/Math jokes. He's also indicating that his model of personal identity allows branching, i.e. you're both. If you think you will be the Prestige beforehand, the man in the box will find for himself a rude awakening, if you think you'll be the man in the box beforehand, the Prestige is in for a pleasant surprise. It's clearly wrong to fix your expectation as being one of these persons, which leaves two remaining options. You're both xor you're neither. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 5/4/2015 11:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: And under the closest continuation theory Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next. But Stathis objected that you might be transported while unconscious and then you wouldn't have a memory of the current moment. You'd have a gap in your memory. And even if you don't have gap, your memory may be more or less veridical, more or less complete. So how different can the two copies be from each other and from he Helsinki man and still be valid? If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure theory who can assign such. It's not what I want. It's not my theory. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this point. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this point. Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have and hope)... without a measure theory. Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 5 May 2015 at 19:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis. It depends on whether the consciousness is simulated or actual. If the AI is actually conscious, that IS the comp hypothesis (plus a couple of ancillary things like the Church-Turing thesis). If it's just passing the Turing test by appearing to be conscious, but actually isn't, then I'm not sure that counts as strong AI anyway? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this point. Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have and hope)... without a measure theory. Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis. Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not shareable. Having only AGI, is an indication computationalism is true, but as we wouldn't have proof they are conscious as we are, it would be just that an indication... but if you undergo yourself and it works, for you it's a proof, for us you arguing you're still yourself, is still just an indication that computationalism is true (and not a proof) but a stronger one than AGI IMO. Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward ??/?? ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: quadratic voting
Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting: 1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and one latent national for the leading names in the party. EVERY VOTE COUNTS: if somebody gets within the District the fixed number of votes for being elected, so be it and the excess goes to the national list. If somebody does NOT get elected, all the votes (s)he got go onto the national list, from where the names are considered one after the other as the (pre)fixed number of votes accumulated for an election-need. As I hear the system is still on. This is much superior than the Gerrymandered unjustice of the USA. 2. I do not approve a 'voting' of just YES-men. There should be a way to express a N O to the candidate, or proposal. What I completely disapprove is the Big Money influence on the voting. Any candidate should get identical expense-money once fulfilled the conditions of running lawfully and NO MORE from NO SOURCE. Give the voter a chance to freely compare the proposals and make up their mind in the privacy of their home. Nobody should be inundated with ads etc. On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally distributed voting capital or something similar? So people can spend their voting power on whatever they're concerned about? The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal distribution of political power. Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea fail miserably, but it's fun to think about. Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment. Where does the money go once it's bought votes? It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 05 May 2015, at 09:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false. But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable. That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. But that must means otherwise my theory fails. Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice... But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist. But it is not my theory. It is the digital version the antic mechanist theory, suggested in the King Milinda, equivocated with rationalism by Diderot, used explicitly or implicitly by those people who brush away mystic experience as hallucination, it is used by neurophysiologist, and most biologist (when they pretend not using mecanism they are usually confusing automata with machine is the Turing sense). And there is no clue that a process in nature is not computable, a good things because it is also the hypothesis used in darwinian type of explanation. Now, some people come ans say, no there is a real physical universe, and it is needed to make some computations more real than others. UDA+MGA shows that such an explanation does not work, and add implicitly magic to both mind and matter, for which there is no evidence today. Then Quentin forget to mention that after UDA there is AUDA, where I explain that if e are machine and can solve that machine, then machine can solve that problem, and so why not interviewing the machine. It happens that we are living a wonderful period, and that Gödel, Löb, and others have already begin the interview, and Solovay even axiomatised it entirely at the propositional level. UDA shows that a physical events are associated to sigma_1 propositions which are simultaneously - provable (in a p way, at the right subst;level, by construction), - consistent (they are realized by some truth, I use the completeness theorem) - true (this can be explained to be necessary to get the first person, and is traditional since Theaetetus). So I predicted a long way ago that the logic of either []p p, []p p, []p p p, provides arithmetical interpretation of intuitionist logics, and quantum logics when p is restricted to the sigma_1 sentences (which emulates the universal dovetailer in arithmetic). If you show no progress, Gödel, Löb, Kleene, Curry, ... is the progress, and AUDA is the discovery that introspective machine get quickly the propositional part. That is not nothing at all. And you are invited to refute machine physics by showing a quantum proposition separating the empirical quantum from the comp quantum. Of course, if there is a difference, it can be fatal: refuting comp (that would be revolutionary), or it could be non fatal, just that I did not express myself correctly to the machine. then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned. It is up to you to show me the actual infinities that you need to avoid the theory. usually, people invoke nit just gods, which might make some sense, they invoke fairy tales. Despite the strange consequences, that QM confirms, the theory is believed by almost all rationalist, up to some variants which leads to similar consequences. You are the one invoking your ontological commitment, to hide an unsolved problem (the mind-body problem). You are not doing theology in the greek sense. You are doing theology in the dogmatic sense of the authoritative institutions. Computationalism explains the quantum, it explains the indeterminacy, the non-locality and the non-cloning, almost trivially, as it predicts the white rabbits also, but this is what AUDA shows less trivial to prove. And, by the G/G* Gödelian splitting between what is true on a machine with what the machine can justify on itself, it explains, the communicable and non communicable part of the psychology, physics, and theology. Comp, already explains a lot, and is used by
Re: The dovetailer disassembled
On 05 May 2015, at 08:00, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 5 mai 2015 07:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 5/4/2015 10:30 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 5 mai 2015 07:26, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit : On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum level of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in another universe are not deliberate but surreptitious copies. They are irrelevant to the argument. You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see why it should. The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis. It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by definition.. you even gave it here we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you reject step 0. Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person indeterminancy. FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you could be. Why? Otherwise you are certain where you will end up. If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is irrelevant. Then that's third person indeterminancy. What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more than one future first person perspective. Are you playing with words now? Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk. What does first person indeterminancy mean except that one is uncertain about one's future. It's not something about the knowledge of it. It just means that you have more than one future *first person* perspective. Under an unique universe theory, there's obviously no FPI at all, just randomness. And under the closest continuation theory Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next. If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure theory who can assign such. Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist. IN UDA. And I certainly don't claim having a measure, but I do claim giving a method to extract it, and it enable us to have already the logic of certainty or measure one. It is the logic of the sigma_1 proposition which are intensionnaly defined by provable consistant ( true). (It happens that []p p on p sigma_1 already provide a quantization making Plotionus even closer to the machine than my own intuition!). The machine distinguishes by itself the eight arithmetical points of view: p (example 2 + 2 = 4, or fermat, or the machine i utters k on j, or the register of the machine p has been erased at time-step m, of computation (UD; 678, 56, 890), etc.) []p(example beweisbar(2+2=4) or beweisbar2+2=5), ... []p p (example beweisbar(2+2=4) 2 + 2 = 4. []p p (example beweisbar(2+2=4) ~ beweisbar ~ (2+2=4)) []p p p (example: beweisbar(2+2=4) ~ beweisbar ~ (2+2=4) 2 + 2 = 4. []p splits into G and G*, and the modality with p inherite the splits. Formidably, the logic of []p p (S4Grz) does not split. All admit a representation theorem in G, for example G* proves A can be emulated by G proving the conjunction of the reflexion frormulas []B - B with []B subformula of A. It is a toy analogical version of the mechanist yes doctor: if all my parts do what they are supposed to do ([]B - B), then I can bet I am true. Well, I might come back on this, and might explain more on [], (Gödel's beweisbar). I do not pretend that there are no other way to find the measure,
Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy
It's a question to which the answer could be yes, I would be the man in the box or the man in the prestige (believes only one is the original, and the other is a copy that doesn't preserve the original's consciousness) or yes, I will be the man in the box and the man in the prestige (believes the original is duplicated and ends up as both) or no, I won't be either of them (believes the original is destroyed and two copies are created) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
Past/Future On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrote: What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward ??/?? ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
... *Spatial* 4th dimension. Not a temporal movement On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Past/Future On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','do.infinit...@gmail.com'); wrote: What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward ??/?? ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com'); . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/YPM76ym2l0w/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com'); . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension
On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 10:26 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrot What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward ??/?? ? I don't think there's a name for that, but here's a nice game in 4D: http://miegakure.com/ They project 4D to 3D and let you switch between which 3 dimensions you see. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.