Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

  On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
 for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
 distributed voting capital or something similar? So people can spend
 their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?


  The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In
 the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally
 distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial
 capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author
 proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an
 equal distribution of political power.

  Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea
 fail miserably, but it's fun to think about.

Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the
 current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending
 is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy
 the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment.

  Where does the money go once it's bought votes?


 It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
 next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
 back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
 spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
 attack ads with their billion.


Which is a better situation than we have now, where they can just buy the
laws for much cheaper.

Telmo.



 Brent

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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 04 May 2015, at 10:23, Telmo Menezes wrote:



 On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 10:08 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:


 Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
 mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
 current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.

 That would just mean the terminology isn't very good. It would be more
 accurate to say you do (or don't) believe in ghosts.


 That's a good point.
 Of course the non-materialist deals with ontological problems. Do entities
 perceived under the influence of psychoactive drugs exist in some sense?



 At Iridia, there has been a talk and demo of Virtual Reality. I have been
 very often disappointed, but this time I have been quite impressed. They
 have solved the main problems, and the immersion feeling was quite realist,
 in all direction where you looked, without any screen border, and perfect
 real time synchronization for any type of the move of your head or eyes.


William Gibson felt the same :)
https://twitter.com/perrychen/status/579058927511334912

They did it!, said the guy who has been writing and dreaming about this
stuff for decades.


 In one demo there was a creature, was it real? Those things are relatively
 real. Like in personal nocturnal dream, or when reading a novel, and with
 comp, like with physicalism, there is a physical reality, which is a priori
 different from a machine (as it is a sum of the work of all machine)
 acting below our substitution level. In arithmetic, one virtual reality
 is less virtual than all the others, as it has the correct comp bottom.
 That define a notion of physically real, and most entities perceived in
 inebriated state are very often not physically real. But they might still
 be images of important routine operating in the brain of a large class of
 possible subject, and be entities living on alternate reality planes, but
 still there by Turing-Universal + FPI.

 Virtual reality might help people for the thought experiences, and many
 (new) things.

 But in the long run, we have to be careful, as the poor might one day not
 afford visiting a non virtual reality. If we don't think a bit, we might
 end up all in brains in vats.


Some economists are already working on this, namely Robin Hanson. He used
to be at the center of a very lively discussion about these topics. Maybe
you'd like to take a look at his blog when you have time:
http://www.overcomingbias.com/

He's an interesting guy, in any case.

Telmo.



 Bruno






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 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 5:59 PM, PGC multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, May 4, 2015 at 4:03:50 PM UTC+2, telmo_menezes wrote:



 On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Alberto G. Corona agoc...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
 mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
 current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.


 So what?


 No problem, my only dogma is that reality is intelligible -- i.e. it is
 possible to discover laws that approximate how things work. Beyond the
 empirical successes of science, I choose this belief because I see no point
 in believing otherwise (if it's wrong, there is really no point in
 believing anything).

 Choosing things to disbelief a priori is unscientific, but of course we
 are mortal so we guide ourselves by some heuristic. I go in the direction
 of the things I find more likely to be true and I'm sure you do the same.


 Not necessarily. I find discovery of universal machine to be more
 unbelievable than strangeness that is cited in the esoteric-unexplained
 category, which is close in terms of content to children's fantasies and
 Star Wars. And yet the latter remains unsupported conjecture while the
 former is a number relation which exists provably as consequence of
 arithmetic. I'm not convinced by arguments like I see pattern in this
 strangeness and can categorize them; and we can see these patterns in
 science or in the work of so-and-so


I think most people, who are untrained in thinking about these topics, have
a simple heuristic guided by strangeness. You are more trained, so your
heuristic is more sophisticated. You say you find the universal machine
more unbelievable than
the Star Wars universe, and yet you give it more credence. I would say this
just means that you trained yourself to ignore biologically encoded
emotional responses when seeking truth.

The quacks, instead of encouraging people to improve their reasoning
skills, appeal to the fundamental strangeness of reality to peddle whatever
snake oil they are interested in selling at a given moment.



 I need evidence and clear algorithm. If say a Shulgin lays out how
 precisely to modify some molecule to ingest something that will result in
 mystical experience with paranormal content, than this is reasonable: If
 subject x ingest function of some molecule = fuzzy experience with
 features a,b,c, mystical union or whatever etc.


But then you respect empiricism somehow. You must, otherwise how could you
have learned to play music?



 But citing strangeness of unknown without being able to repeat the result
 or make it repeatable to skeptics is probably advertising again, which
 tries to sell itself as truth regardless whether in respected journal,
 obscure blog, TV... Advertising without being genuine about it and masking
 it as science, without properly situating it in tenable hypothesis = I can
 find interesting patterns in dog shit and the mud. Don't feel the need to
 post about it because I feel that too often basic rationality is left at
 the door for hidden reasons of self-glory of authors.


Ok.



 And I like reasoning about the craziest shit. But I'm too often
 disappointed by barrages of cheap psychological tricks playing to the
 unknown, instead of clear reasoning where somebody states a clean,
 discrete ontology clearly.


Yes, I stole this remark above, as you can see.


 That's why I think a lot of this stuff can be ignored. We're not in realm
 of explanation and basic rationality is left at the door... which is
 profitable and self-fulfilling (there will be more weird patterns in the
 mud to substantiate what I'm saying). With Shulgin type approach as
 contrast (he also carries extraordinary claim and is attacked as crackpot),
 we can verify mystical propositions for ourselves because the algorithms of
 how to get there and build such molecule are accessible and precise enough.
 PGC


But then we are back at an heuristic, and that is unavoidable. The search
for knowledge cannot operate blindly, there is just too much stuff to
explore.





 Telmo.



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 Alberto.

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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread Telmo Menezes
Hi Mitch,

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 4:00 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote:

 Totally agree, Telmo, regarding communication. On the Bostrom concept of
 Sims and, by extension, our reality being a sim, I like the concept, but in
 a way, it seems too simple, Rather than life being an illusion, let us
 conceive that its the result of a great program running and producing us as
 a result. Moreover, our program can be either revised, copied, or both,
 etc. This is one reason professor, Eric Steinhart's work seems compelling
 to me. The following summary is available from his book, Your Digital
 Afterlives, but here is a taste, from Steinhart's website-

  http://ericsteinhart.com/FLESH/flesh-chabs.html


I will have to read this more carefully, but I think I get the gist of it.
Most of the ideas are not new to me, and correspond to things that I enjoy
thinking about myself.

I have gone through several revisions of my belief system about these
topics, so it's likely that I can be convinced by good, new ideas.

Just in case you don't know, I really enjoyed this book at some point:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Never-Ending-Days-Being-Dead/dp/0571220568

It's mostly a sampler of theories on these topics, and some have already
been falsified (like the omega point, I believe).



 The best of these theories is Promotion, but Steinhart views his own idea
 as flawed, because he wants it to be progressive rather then regressive. I
 don't see the logical regression he seemed concerned about, He did come up
 with Revision theory, as workable, however, these are merely, *better-off
 clones* of ourselves, and miss the continuity, that infers identity.
 Promotion is better, because it does exactly this, via pipelines,
 processes, data transfers, as well as uploading and teleportation.


Ok, I have no problem with any of this stuff. I will try to summarize how
my current view of things intersects with these topics.

I think immortality is a given. I suspect we are all versions of the same
thing (as conscious entities) and that all moments are eternal. I think the
perception of a time line arises inside each eternal observer moment.

What does not appear possible, at the moment, is to have very long story
lines. I cannot be Telmo for a time span of many centuries (disregarding
Quantum Immortality issues). It would be nice if we could do that. I think
there is potentially great value in having human being that extend their
personal development way beyond our biological limitations.

So the issue becomes: how to preserve a set of memories and transfer them
to another medium, so that we can extend story lines? This could take the
form of Promotion, trans-humanism, mind uploading, who know what else...

I would just say that the story lines problem is somewhat tangencial to the
simulated reality problem.

Sorry if I'm rambling, I don't have a lot of time at the moment...


 This is one reason I want to see if Ben Goetzel has an
 afterlife-resurrection theory, because they both appeared to have come to
 the same conclusions, independently,  on several other concepts.

 Steinhart, like Goetzel, is a computationalist (digitalist) - (5 minute
 video)

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfDB35y-5Z0


I am mostly ok with this video. My only objection is that time must not
exist in the maximally simple universe, so thinking about causality between
universes seems problematic. This is part of what attracts me to Platonia
and this list: the idea that everything already exists, and what is called
causality is just structure.




 Please let me know if you uncover anything concerning Ben Goetzel's views.
 Thanks.


The AGI conference is going to be in my city in the end of July. I am not
sure I will be able to attend, but if I can I will try to ask Ben in person.

Telmo.



 Mitch


  -Original Message-
 From: Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 9:08 am
 Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!



  On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote:

 I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last,
 number 26th, the last one.


  Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting
 there, it's a small world.

  My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an
 infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us.


  This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist
 stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems
 unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with
 information.


  I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and
 non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is
 personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you
 a nobel 

Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei
Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :)

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 ana and kata if I remember correctly.

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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/5/2015 5:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:



On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say 
you pay
for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of 
equally
distributed voting capital or something similar? So people can 
spend
their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?


The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In 
the end,
all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by 
the
voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to 
influence
policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a 
mathematical
proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal distribution of 
political
power.

Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea 
fail
miserably, but it's fun to think about.

Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current 
system, at
least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is allowed. A lot 
of the
time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy the result they want, as 
per Mark
Twain's comment.

Where does the money go once it's bought votes?


It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the 
next
election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back 
$6.88
(plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). 
Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion.



Which is a better situation than we have now, where they can just buy the laws for much 
cheaper.


I'm not sure that's much cheaper.  One way they buy votes is by funding attack ads against 
opponents of legislators they want a vote from.  But if you're interested in quadratic 
voting you should read this


 http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html

by a Warren D. Smith.

Brent

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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Where does the money go once it's bought votes?


 It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
 next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
 back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
 spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
 attack ads with their billion.


Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on
spreading their views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV
would be that any form of political advertising or support for parties or
editorialising outside the system would be illegal, and heavily penailsed
if it occurred - otherwise the current system is far more efficient from
the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using their
newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates.

Or am I missing the point?

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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/5/2015 5:34 PM, LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


Where does the money go once it's bought votes?


It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the 
next
election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back 
$6.88
(plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). 
Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion.



Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on spreading their 
views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV would be that any form of 
political advertising or support for parties or editorialising outside the system 
would be illegal, and heavily penailsed if it occurred - otherwise the current system is 
far more efficient from the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using 
their newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates.


I think you're right that such a restriction would be needed; but I don't know whether 
it's actually proposed that way.  I've never studied voting systems much beyond Arrow's 
theorem, but I know a mathematician who's writing a book about various systems.  He's not 
impressed by quadratic voting:


http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html

Brent



Or am I missing the point?
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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 6 May 2015 at 14:34, spudboy100 via Everything List 
everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote:

 Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased,
 and subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and
 spiritual leanings, Nobel is best left to academic scientists who tow the
 socialist line, and are nicely rewarded. Are all career academics like
 that? No, but not making waves while obtaining government grants, goes a
 long way to get along, and go along career wise.

 So you're saying Templeton is less biased and subjective?

I'm not disagreeing, I just want to know what you think. I don't know much
about either of them.

(And what was that about 100F summers?)

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/4/2015 11:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 09:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment
ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly
equal degrees of similarity.

Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.


What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying
consciousness with memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the
similarities of successive experiences.  In the above example you is
ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body.  But on
Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body
were based on some quantum event, I would end up in two different places.

Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original
transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you
say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather
than the park?

Ask John Clark. :-)

Seriously, one can only talk about what you expect given a definition of
you.  If you means your closest continuation then waking up at home is
closer than waking up in the park.  We tend to think of this as uncertainty
because all the similarities of body and memory mean that the difference
between the park and home is almost neglegible compared to the similarities.
But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except into the body of an
eighty year old black woman with one leg.  Would you still find yourself
waking up in the park?

This sort of thing actually happens on a daily basis: people are
injured in serious accidents and wake up with parts of their body
missing and major changes in memories, cognitive abilities and
personality.


Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of their physical 
being - even if they are not conscious.


Brent

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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 6 May 2015 at 08:38, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

 Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting:

 1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a
 good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and
 one latent  national for the leading names in the party.
 EVERY VOTE COUNTS: if somebody gets within the District the fixed number
 of votes for being elected, so be it and the excess goes to the national
 list. If somebody does NOT get elected, all the votes (s)he got go onto the
 national list, from where the names are considered one after the other as
 the (pre)fixed number of votes accumulated for an election-need.
 As I hear the system is still on.

 This is much superior than the Gerrymandered unjustice of the USA.

 2. I do not approve a 'voting' of just YES-men. There should be a way to
 express a   N O  to the candidate, or proposal.

 What I completely disapprove is the Big Money influence on the voting. Any
 candidate should get identical expense-money once fulfilled the conditions
 of running lawfully and NO MORE from NO SOURCE. Give the voter a chance to
 freely compare the proposals and make up their mind in the privacy of their
 home.
 Nobody should be inundated with ads etc.

 I agree with everything you say here.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:


Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we 
have to
have everything sort out
before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
and therefore false.
 But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
show that
our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
measure problem cannot be solvable...
Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
extracted
and must exist.

But that must means otherwise my theory fails.

Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
practice...


But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory
is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress,
then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
point.

Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would 
be a
strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by 
engeenering,
succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence 
it's the
same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically 
we can
in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find 
yourself
surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like 
quantum
suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but nonetheless, it 
would
still be the best proof you will ever have and hope)... without a 
measure theory.


Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for 
computationalism. It
would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that 
consciousness
can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards
establishing the comp hypothesis.


Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a computational 
entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a definitive a proof from 
your own perspective, but it is not shareable.


It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital computer 
(assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change).  But the digital 
computer is still a physical device (which presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime 
continuum); so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from the 
UD's infinite threads of computation.


It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea that parts 
of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones 
consciousness.  That's a fairly widely held opinion.  But then comp is also used to mean 
although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, 
just a reductio.  The two comp's are not the same.


Brent



Having only AGI, is an indication computationalism is true, but as we wouldn't have 
proof they are conscious as we are, it would be just that an indication... but if you 
undergo yourself and it works, for you it's a proof, for us you arguing you're still 
yourself, is still just an indication that computationalism is true (and not a proof) 
but a stronger one than AGI IMO.


Quentin



Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruce Kellett

meekerdb wrote:

On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 


Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI,
but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a
physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing
the comp hypothesis.

Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as 
a computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. 
It's a definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not 
shareable.


It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital 
computer (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a 
change).  But the digital computer is still a physical device (which 
presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum); so it doesn't 
prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from the UD's 
infinite threads of computation.


It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for 
idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent 
digital device and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a fairly widely 
held opinion.  But then comp is also used to mean although 
consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical 
inferences, just a reductio.  The two comp's are not the same.


Yes, I find the same problem. The assumption -- stemming from Bruno 
himself I think -- seems to be that if you accept that some brain 
functions could be simulated on a computer at some substitution level 
(strong AI), then all the rest of Bruno's 'comp' thesis follows 
logically. I do not think that this is the case. That is why I think 
that the wider 'comp' thesis can be criticized on the basis that it has 
not led to substantive results -- there is no indication that any useful 
physics can be obtained by 'questioning the machine'.


Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruce Kellett

LizR wrote:
On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 


It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used
for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an
equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a
fairly widely held opinion.  But then comp is also used to mean
although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not
logical inferences, just a reductio.  The two comp's are not the same.

That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational 
hypothesis - the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and 
that human consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer 
programme. (This includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum 
computer, since a QC can be emulated by a classical computer.)


Maybe we should distinguish comp1 and comp2 or comp and Comp (or 
comp and Bruno's comp...!)


Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts 
comp1 and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw 
in the argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. 
(This is what Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be 
nice to know which one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy 
with comp1 but still don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't 
spot a flaw in the logic.


The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have pointed 
out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming that it 
still computes in exactly the same way as a physical computer; and the 
MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity, not a logical argument.


Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruce Kellett

Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
that it still computes in exactly the same way as a physical
computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity,
not a logical argument.


Rejecting the move to Platonia is the non-robust, or small universe
move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place on
this list, but I didn't really notice at the time).


You make some interesting points. I am concerned about the move to 
Platonia, not because the physical universe is too small, but because it 
seems that the notion of a computation is taken over from physical 
computers without modification. If a computation is nothing more than an 
order set of steps, then a computation is no different from a 
description of that computation (the map/territory confusion). For 
there to be a difference, the steps have to be performed in real time, 
and that notion of real time is not available in Platonia.



This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper
MGA Revisited).


The MGA purports to show that the physical substrate is not needed for 
consciousness. The argument fails for several reasons, some of which you 
outline below.



This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism, ie the
notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that
are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless,
ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being
particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman
Wildberger.

The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually
correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis
for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the
images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a
consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I
ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense,
unless I accidentally ask just the right question.


Counterfactual correctness has not been shown to be necessary -- it is 
just an ad hoc move to save the argument. You can't question the actors 
in a James Bond movie and expect to get anything sensible, of course. 
But then, no one is suggesting that a movie of someone's face records 
the basis of their consciousness. The movie in question is a recording 
of the basic brain processes (at the necessary substitution level). 
This, when replayed, recreates the conscious moment -- not a new 
conscious moment, as you point out, but a conscious moment nonetheless. 
If it did not, then the original comp argument fails -- we could not 
replace all or part of our brain with a device performing the same 
operations.


If we replace part of our brain with a functionally equivalent computer, 
we will then have counterfactual correctness because the replacement is 
functionally equivalent: it will respond to different inputs just as the 
original brain tissue would. But that is not the essence of the 
conscious moment. The whole MGA hangs on a fundamental confusion.


Bruce


Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed
recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious
entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence
of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of
accuracy).

Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly,
it is not in the here and now, via the above argument, but what about
in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there and
then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have
supervenience on the physical recording. 


To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the
physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer
moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly
improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on
steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really
existed in the first place.


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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
To be fair, in the last 10 years the everything list has at least
influenced one genuine proper scientist, namely Max Tegmark. (There may be
others of whom I am ignorant, but Mr T acknowledges the influece of the EL
in his book Our Mathematical Universe. I would add Bruno as a second
example, but there are some who would, no doubt, disagree). And although
Russell's TON is almost 10 years old, it isn't quite, so I can count that
as well. So even the Bear of Little Brain knows of two scientists who have
produced work influenced by discussions on the EL.

(And if I think harder, like the characters in the Monty Python Spanish
Inquisition sketch, I can probably come up with some others. Our three
chief scientists are surprise, fear, and a fanatical dedication to the
Pope...)

I would quite like to discuss what you've said above, but I fear that this
would merely be buying into the ongoing confusion of which you speak so
eloquently.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/5/2015 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 May 2015, at 09:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It's not my theory.  It's 
not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You 
can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it 
is incomplete, and therefore false.

But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that
   our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we 
should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the 
discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure 
problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has 
to be extracted

   and must exist.
   But that must means otherwise my theory fails.
Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails... 
that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this 
become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice...


But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It 
is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then such a measure must exist.


But it is not my theory. It is the digital version the antic mechanist theory, suggested 
in the King Milinda, equivocated with rationalism by Diderot, used explicitly or 
implicitly by those people who brush away mystic experience as hallucination, it is used 
by neurophysiologist, and most biologist (when they pretend not using mecanism they are 
usually confusing automata with machine is the Turing sense).
And there is no clue that a process in nature is not computable, 


If it takes infinitely many threads of the UD to compute a moment of consciousness then 
isn't that moment not computable?



a good things because it is also the hypothesis used in darwinian type of 
explanation.

Now, some people come ans say, no there is a real physical universe, and it is needed to 
make some computations more real than others.


What do you mean by real?



UDA+MGA shows that such an explanation does not work, and add implicitly magic to both 
mind and matter, for which there is no evidence today.


Then Quentin forget to mention that after UDA there is AUDA, where I explain that if e 
are machine and can solve that machine, then machine can solve that problem, and so why 
not interviewing the machine.
It happens that we are living a wonderful period, and that Gödel, Löb, and others have 
already begin the interview, and Solovay even axiomatised it entirely at the 
propositional level.


UDA shows that a physical events are associated to sigma_1 propositions which are 
simultaneously

- provable (in a p way, at the right subst;level, by construction),
- consistent (they are realized by some truth, I use the completeness theorem)
- true (this can be explained to be necessary to get the first person, and is 
traditional since Theaetetus).


Is this your definition of physical event?

Brent

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/5/2015 1:26 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward 
??/?? ?


earlier/later

Brent

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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List
Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer group 
like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree 
Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All the rock in 
scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example. 



-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 10:08 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


 
  
   
On 5 May 2015 at 12:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  
  
On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 
On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
  
  
   

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List  
everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: 
  
  I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my 
last, number 26th, the last one. 
  
  
  
  
Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting there, 
it's a small world. 
  
  
  
  
My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an infinity 
of times), but this is completely transparent to us. 
  
  
  
   This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the 
materialist stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems 
unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with 
information.  
  
  
  
  
I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and 
non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is 
personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you a 
nobel prize or even any sort of recognition. 
 

   
  
  
This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning 
Theology).  
 
  
  
  
  
But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does indeed 
quasi-succeed, perhaps, in communication a bit of the uncommunicable. Then you 
can communicate a part conditionally, like if I am consistent then I can't 
justify that I am consistent, and the inetnsional variants. 
  
  
  
  
Bruno 
 

   You can get a Templeton, which is for merging science and religion and 
is worth more than a Nobel.
 


 


Do you mean it's worth more in monetary terms, or in terms of kudos, 
respectability, etc?

 

   
  
 
  
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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List 
everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote:

 Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer
 group like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100
 degree Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All
 the rock in scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example.


I'm having some trouble parsing your reply. I was wondering in what sense
the Templeton award was worth more than the Nobel, as Brett said it was,
but I can't see that you've answered.

I'm not sure what you mean about the 100 degree summers, either (for one
thing I can't remember how to convert from Frankenstein to CelsiusI've
got a feeling 100 is quite hot, isn't it? But then the boiling point of
water is 312 or something weird, so maybe it isn't.)

And as for the jolly hockey sticks...

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 6 May 2015 at 11:10, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of
 their physical being - even if they are not conscious.


Specifically because physical continuity ensures continuity of memory
(normally). Should it become possible to copy memories from one brain to
another, or to upload people into computers, we would of course have to
revise this intuition.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 
 The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
 pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
 that it still computes in exactly the same way as a physical
 computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity,
 not a logical argument.
 
 Bruce
 

Rejecting the move to Platonia is the non-robust, or small universe
move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place on
this list, but I didn't really notice at the time).

This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper
MGA Revisited).

This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism, ie the
notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that
are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless,
ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being
particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman
Wildberger.

The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually
correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis
for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the
images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a
consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I
ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense,
unless I accidentally ask just the right question.

Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed
recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious
entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence
of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of
accuracy).

Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly,
it is not in the here and now, via the above argument, but what about
in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there and
then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have
supervenience on the physical recording. 

To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the
physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer
moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly
improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on
steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really
existed in the first place.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List
Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased, and 
subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and spiritual 
leanings, Nobel is best left to academic scientists who tow the socialist line, 
and are nicely rewarded. Are all career academics like that? No, but not making 
waves while obtaining government grants, goes a long way to get along, and go 
along career wise. 

Sent from AOL Mobile Mail


-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tue, May 5, 2015 10:23 PM
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!



div id=AOLMsgPart_2_5e8b2376-c552-4025-af5c-bcfc6a3097a8

 div dir=ltr
  div class=aolmail_gmail_extra
   div class=aolmail_gmail_quote
On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List 
span dir=ltra target=_blank 
href=mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com;everything-list@googlegroups.com/a/span
 wrote:


blockquote class=aolmail_gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex
 font color=black size=2 face=arialRespectability? You must mean 
what a majority or a self appointed peer group like in Oslo decide what is 
acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree Fahrenheit summers you have been 
having for the last 17 years? All the rock in scientists have proclaimed the 
happy hockey stick-for example. 
/font
/blockquote


 




I'm having some trouble parsing your reply. I was wondering in what sense the 
Templeton award was worth more than the Nobel, as Brett said it was, but I 
can't see that you've answered.



 




I'm not sure what you mean about the 100 degree summers, either (for one thing 
I can't remember how to convert from Frankenstein to CelsiusI've got a 
feeling 100 is quite hot, isn't it? But then the boiling point of water is 312 
or something weird, so maybe it isn't.)



 




And as for the jolly hockey sticks...

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RE: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread colin hales
Hi,
I've been watching this if COMP is true then  discussion for over 10 
years. In that time my thinking has evolved to the point where I can express 
what COMP now looks like to me, from my perspective.

Comp appears to be trivially true.

 That is, the resultant computing entity would be computing the entire universe 
and hence is simply pointless. It also appears to me that the computing entity 
would not be conscious for the same reason computed flight physics is not 
flight.

There is an endless confusion operating here: The confusing of the universe as 
computation with computing, with this universe, models of how the universe 
appears to us inside it. A deep map/territory confusion. I wrote a book on 
this.

I am not going to spend any further on this because I know COMP is religion 
here and talking to the religious doesn't  work. Witness 10 years and the same 
conversation is still going on. There is a fantastically detailed 
self-promulgating mental cage here in the comp argument. I for one am over it. 
I am building artificial brain and there is no computer involved at all. Comp 
is irrelevant in the real practice of the mission to make real AGI.

When you _don't_ know anything about the universe, yet you are inside it and 
need to survive you need to survive based on fighting  your own ignorance. 

So If you already know everything you can compute your way out of 
ignorance... But then you already know everything... So why bother?

You can prove this argument experimentally. I intend, finally, to do this or at 
least organize this before I drop dead.

Comp. Imo trivially true and wasting the time of a lot of prodigious brains.

That's where i am at, anyway. Thanks for listening. In another 10 years I'll 
see what it looks like again!

 Carry on. .

Cheers 
Colin


-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
Sent: ‎6/‎05/‎2015 10:28 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:



It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for idea 
that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device 
and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a fairly widely held opinion.  But 
then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, 
consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio.  The two 
comp's are not the same.



That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis - 
the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human 
consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This includes 
the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC can be 
emulated by a classical computer.)


Maybe we should distinguish comp1 and comp2 or comp and Comp (or comp 
and Bruno's comp...!)


Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1 and 
the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the argument 
linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what Bruno has 
been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which one someone 
has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still don't find comp2 
convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the logic.


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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Colin Hales
On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 11:21 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for
 the same reason computed flight physics is not flight.


 I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does
 seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a
 computer programme could be conscious. Simulated flight isn't real flight,
 but (according to comp) consciousness can't be simulated, because it's
 *already* the result of computations.

 *or comp1 if you prefer


With respect I will refuse to buy into the jargon of this milieu. I don't
care what comp-x or any other variant of it is. I care even less what a
dovetailer is. Yet you have touched right on the very essence of the
map/territory confusion.

But it is even worse than you think. First consider

A) The universe is a massive collection of interacting elemental primitives
of kind X whose interactions could be characterised as a computation. Call
it a noumenon. Underlying fabric of whatever it is we are inside.
and
B) A computer K  inside A made by entities (us), also inside the set A,
that is running and exploring a _model_  of a set of abstracted (by us) X.

We in B you can look at the computer K and say: *The universe A, made of
X, is computing a computer K running a program that is an abstraction of A*.
The computing of the computer by the universe A and the computing by K of
the abstractions inside the program in the computer K are two *utterly
different things *that are endlessly confused here.

The entire 10 years discourse can be characterised as a group of people
variously mixing A and B and never realising they were talking about
different things while not even knowing which of A or B they are in AND

it gets worse. *in neither case were they speaking about
traditional 'laws of nature'. **This is a second cockup. These cockups are
factorially confusing. *

In essence the study of the kind B is a different kind of science. It's not
what traditional science, out here in the real world of Dr Colin science,
does. B is a different kind of novel scientific enquiry/ epistemology that
this list continually fails to recognise.

What we do as *scientists *out here in the non-Everything-list world is *not
*B.

Instead we do something different(C). We create abstractions that
predict how (A) appears (in a scientist's consciousness ... as a scientific
observer) when you are inside it (A) (made of X). These regularities in
appearances are NOT the regularities depicted as B. We call C the
traditional 'laws of nature'. A completely *different *kind of epistemology.

Then, just to make everything *even more confusing ...*

* *we scientists (C) then compute the abstract 'laws of nature' C,
variously confusing them with the laws in B (= think C and B are the same
epistemology), or completely miss B or shun B as metaphysical mumbo-jumbo.

B and C are separate epistemologies. Their difference scientifically
accounts for consciousness in the form of the scientific observer.

So...

One underlying unknowable (from the inside) universe A made of something.
What that 'something' might be is what B explores.
and
*Two *sets of potential abstractions of A: B and C. B depicts/characterises
what A is made of whereas C is what it *appears *like to an observer inside
A (you know...atoms and space and stuff). Epistemology C makes the observer
predictive of appearances and simultaneously completely fails to contact X
or B and thereby does what has been happening for 2000 years... fail to
account for (explain) the scientific observer.

Here in this email form COMP argument, A and B *and* C are being endlessly
confused with each other and mis-correlated in respect of consciousness.
Neither a computed B epistemology or a computed C epistemology can be
claimed conscious and this is testable. Careful: by 'computed'  I mean
computed by a computer made of X by us, also made of X.

Yet, that which is conscious (certain organisations of X in A) can be
understood as a form of computation! That does not mean that a computed
version of that understanding is conscious. Nor does it mean that X is some
kind of platonic realm computer running a program. You can nest this back,
The Matrix style, forever and it's just a load of empty sophistry.
Instead why don't we *solve the problem*. Sorry 10 years can make you
grumpy.

So really this is a *massive systemic *screw up. 3 layers A/B/C (a
'dual-aspect' epistemology) confused with each other AND with computed
versions of 2 of them (B/C) AND that confused mess is then used to speak
about consciousness at the level of each of the 3 confused layers.

This discourse fails to realise that it is right at the juncture of the
emergence of a new kind of science..The recognition and adding of B as
a new distinct epistemology. That is what you are really doing here.

This has been very hard to unpack. And unpacking it is the main result 

Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Wednesday, May 6, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 ana and kata if I remember correctly.


Which are up and down in Greek.


-- 
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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
Thank you! :-)
(Possibly too much so in some...)

On 6 May 2015 at 11:19, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrote:

 Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :)

 On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 ana and kata if I remember correctly.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used for
 idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital
 device and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a fairly widely held
 opinion.  But then comp is also used to mean although consequences Bruno
 says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a
 reductio.  The two comp's are not the same.


That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis
- the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human
consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This
includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC
can be emulated by a classical computer.)

Maybe we should distinguish comp1 and comp2 or comp and Comp (or
comp and Bruno's comp...!)

Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1
and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the
argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what
Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which
one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still
don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the
logic.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread LizR

 It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for
 the same reason computed flight physics is not flight.


I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does
seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a
computer programme could be conscious. Simulated flight isn't real flight,
but (according to comp) consciousness can't be simulated, because it's
*already* the result of computations.

*or comp1 if you prefer

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Fwd: quadratic voting -- done by bees? No.

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

Here's another blog from Warren on quadratic voting

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

This web page

http://rangevoting.org/BogusBeeQV.html

refutes massively false THE SPECTATOR piece on this by irresponsible
quadratic voting hype artist (Univ. of Chicago Economist, last I saw)
E. Glen Weyl.


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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
ana and kata if I remember correctly.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread John Clark
On Mon, May 4, 2015  Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is
 necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.


  Nonsense, we have a ASTRONOMICAL  amount of evidence that is not
 necessary! Your quantum state changes well over a million billion times
 every nanosecond and yet you continue to feel like the same person.


  Of course personal identity is retained under internal changes.


Then why all this silliness about a copy needing to be absolutely perfect?



  But why are you so confident that the persistent quantum state of some
 molecules is not important for some memories or functions?


Because at room temperature, and even more so at 98.6F, molecules have no
persistent quantum state, they change quantum states many billions of times
a second. The only reason we don't have Quantum Computers today is that
it's so difficult to keep things in the same quantum state for more than a
fraction of a second even at liquid helium temperatures.

  John K Clark










 Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 May 2015 at 09:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
 experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
 impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
 the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment
 ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly
 equal degrees of similarity.

 Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
 example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.


 What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying
 consciousness with memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the
 similarities of successive experiences.  In the above example you is
 ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body.  But on
 Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body
 were based on some quantum event, I would end up in two different places.

 Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original
 transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you
 say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather
 than the park?

 Ask John Clark. :-)

 Seriously, one can only talk about what you expect given a definition of
 you.  If you means your closest continuation then waking up at home is
 closer than waking up in the park.  We tend to think of this as uncertainty
 because all the similarities of body and memory mean that the difference
 between the park and home is almost neglegible compared to the similarities.
 But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except into the body of an
 eighty year old black woman with one leg.  Would you still find yourself
 waking up in the park?

This sort of thing actually happens on a daily basis: people are
injured in serious accidents and wake up with parts of their body
missing and major changes in memories, cognitive abilities and
personality.


-- 
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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:

 On 5/4/2015 11:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


  And under the closest continuation theory

 Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your
 current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be
 considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the current moment,
 if not, in what sense could it be next.


 But Stathis objected that you might be transported while unconscious and
 then you wouldn't have a memory of the current moment. You'd have a gap
 in your memory.


A gap is different than no memory... obviously if you have memory of your
identity (even if just to wake up from a dream and find out you have
another identity than the one you thought), your current moment is a next
moment of the last moment you remember before being in this moment.
Assigning a measure is different, I have no theory how it could be done,
obviously such next moment should have lower measure than normal
continuation moment.


 And even if you don't have gap, your memory may be more or less veridical,
 more or less complete.  So how different can the two copies be from each
 other and from he Helsinki man and still be valid?


That's asking for a theory of measure, which I don't have, so I can't
answer that, IMO the more memories of it the more likely, but that's just a
hunch, not a theory. If computationalism is true, such measure must exists,
what it is, is another question, and I don't have the answer to it.




  If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a
 measure theory who can assign such.


 It's not what I want.


That's you who's asking for it...


 It's not my theory.


It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before
discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say
about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false.


 But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our
 world, as some class, is not too improbable.


That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure.
So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is
not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a
problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable...




  Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must
 exist.


 But that must means otherwise my theory fails.


Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory
fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be
false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be
falsifiable with that in practice...

Quentin




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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruce Kellett

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 


Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
It's not my theory. 
It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out

before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
and therefore false.
 But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
show that
our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
measure problem cannot be solvable...
Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
extracted
and must exist.

But that must means otherwise my theory fails.

Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
practice...


But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory
is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress,
then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
point.

Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would 
be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by 
engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having 
confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... 
if technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally 
undergo uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof 
for you that it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could 
not share that proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof 
you will ever have and hope)... without a measure theory.


Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for 
computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but 
that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical 
computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.


Bruce

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Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei
Computer scientist's or. If you read it that way it's a yes or no question. 
Misreading an exclusive or as an inclusive or is often used in CS/Math jokes.

He's also indicating that his model of personal identity allows branching, i.e. 
you're both. If you think you will be the Prestige beforehand, the man in the 
box will find for himself a rude awakening, if you think you'll be the man in 
the box beforehand, the Prestige is in for a pleasant surprise. It's clearly 
wrong to fix your expectation as being one of these persons, which leaves two 
remaining options. You're both xor you're neither.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread meekerdb

On 5/4/2015 11:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 And under the closest continuation theory

Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your current moment, not 
just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be considered a valid continuation, 
must have memories of the current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next.




But Stathis objected that you might be transported while unconscious and then you wouldn't 
have a memory of the current moment. You'd have a gap in your memory. And even if you 
don't have gap, your memory may be more or less veridical, more or less complete.  So how 
different can the two copies be from each other and from he Helsinki man and still be valid?


If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure theory 
who can assign such.




It's not what I want. It's not my theory.  But if it's going to be successful explanation 
it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable.



Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist.



But that must means otherwise my theory fails.

Brent

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruce Kellett

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 

It's not my theory.  

It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before 
discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say 
about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false.
 
But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that

our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a 
failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't 
have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It 
would be a problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be 
solvable... 


Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted
and must exist.

But that must means otherwise my theory fails.

Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory 
fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be 
false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be 
falsifiable with that in practice...


But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a 
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is 
true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your 
theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and should be 
abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own 
terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been made after many 
years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this point.


Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
 It's not my theory.
 It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before
 discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say
 about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false.
  But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that
 our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

 That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a
 failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have
 it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a
 problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable...
 Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted
 and must exist.

 But that must means otherwise my theory fails.

 Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory
 fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be
 false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be
 falsifiable with that in practice...


 But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable
 measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory is true then
 such a measure must exist. If you show no progress, then your theory can
 be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned.
 Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just
 has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying.
 I think we are fast reaching this point.


Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would be
a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by engeenering,
succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence it's
the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically
we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find
yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like
quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but
nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have and
hope)... without a measure theory.

Quentin




 Bruce


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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
On 5 May 2015 at 19:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
 computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that
 just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It
 would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.

 It depends on whether the consciousness is simulated or actual. If the AI
is actually conscious, that IS the comp hypothesis (plus a couple of
ancillary things like the Church-Turing thesis). If it's just passing the
Turing test by appearing to be conscious, but actually isn't, then I'm not
sure that counts as strong AI anyway?

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
 mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

 It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we
 have to have everything sort out
 before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
 thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
 and therefore false.
  But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
 show that
 our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

 That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
 a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
 we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
 consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
 measure problem cannot be solvable...
 Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
 extracted
 and must exist.

 But that must means otherwise my theory fails.

 Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
 theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
 computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
 intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
 practice...


 But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
 suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory
 is true then such a measure must exist. If you show no progress,
 then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
 should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
 on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
 made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
 point.

 Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would
 be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by
 engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having
 confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if
 technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo
 uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that
 it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that
 proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have
 and hope)... without a measure theory.


 Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
 computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that
 just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It
 would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.


Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a
computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a
definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not shareable.

Having only AGI, is an indication computationalism is true, but as we
wouldn't have proof they are conscious as we are, it would be just that an
indication... but if you undergo yourself and it works, for you it's a
proof, for us you arguing you're still yourself, is still just an
indication that computationalism is true (and not a proof) but a stronger
one than AGI IMO.

Quentin



 Bruce

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Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei
What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward 
??/?? ?

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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread John Mikes
Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting:

1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a
good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and
one latent  national for the leading names in the party.
EVERY VOTE COUNTS: if somebody gets within the District the fixed number of
votes for being elected, so be it and the excess goes to the national list.
If somebody does NOT get elected, all the votes (s)he got go onto the
national list, from where the names are considered one after the other as
the (pre)fixed number of votes accumulated for an election-need.
As I hear the system is still on.

This is much superior than the Gerrymandered unjustice of the USA.

2. I do not approve a 'voting' of just YES-men. There should be a way to
express a   N O  to the candidate, or proposal.

What I completely disapprove is the Big Money influence on the voting. Any
candidate should get identical expense-money once fulfilled the conditions
of running lawfully and NO MORE from NO SOURCE. Give the voter a chance to
freely compare the proposals and make up their mind in the privacy of their
home.
Nobody should be inundated with ads etc.



On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

  On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
 for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
 distributed voting capital or something similar? So people can spend
 their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?


  The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In
 the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally
 distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial
 capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author
 proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an
 equal distribution of political power.

  Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea
 fail miserably, but it's fun to think about.

Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the
 current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending
 is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy
 the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment.

  Where does the money go once it's bought votes?


 It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
 next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
 back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
 spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
 attack ads with their billion.

 Brent

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 May 2015, at 09:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net It's  
not my theory.  It's not mine either... do we have to have  
everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory,  
because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is  
incomplete, and therefore false.
But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show  
that

   our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a  
failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we  
don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the  
consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure  
problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has  
one, just that it has to be extracted

   and must exist.
   But that must means otherwise my theory fails.
Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the  
theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove  
computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become  
intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in  
practice...


But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a  
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that If my theory  
is true then such a measure must exist.


But it is not my theory. It is the digital version the antic mechanist  
theory, suggested in the King Milinda, equivocated with  rationalism  
by Diderot, used explicitly or implicitly by those people who brush  
away mystic experience as hallucination, it is used by  
neurophysiologist, and most biologist (when they pretend not using  
mecanism they are usually confusing automata with machine is the  
Turing sense).
And there is no clue that a process in nature is not computable, a  
good things because it is also the hypothesis used in darwinian type  
of explanation.


Now, some people come ans say, no there is a real physical universe,  
and it is needed to make some computations more real than others.


UDA+MGA shows that such an explanation does not work, and add  
implicitly magic to both mind and matter, for which there is no  
evidence today.


Then Quentin forget to mention that after UDA there is AUDA, where I  
explain that if e are machine and can solve that machine, then machine  
can solve that problem, and so why not interviewing the machine.
It happens that we are living a wonderful period, and that Gödel, Löb,  
and others have already begin the interview, and Solovay even  
axiomatised it entirely at the propositional level.


UDA shows that a physical events are associated to sigma_1  
propositions which are simultaneously

- provable (in a p way, at the right subst;level, by construction),
- consistent (they are realized by some truth, I use the completeness  
theorem)
- true (this can be explained to be necessary to get the first person,  
and is traditional since Theaetetus).


So I predicted a long way ago that the logic of either []p  p, []p   
p, []p  p  p, provides arithmetical interpretation of  
intuitionist logics, and quantum logics when p is restricted to the  
sigma_1 sentences (which emulates the universal dovetailer in  
arithmetic).





If you show no progress,


Gödel, Löb, Kleene, Curry, ... is the progress, and AUDA is the  
discovery that introspective machine get quickly the propositional  
part. That is not nothing at all. And you are invited to refute  
machine physics by showing a quantum proposition separating the  
empirical quantum from the comp quantum.


Of course, if there is a difference, it can be fatal: refuting comp  
(that would be revolutionary), or it could be non fatal, just that I  
did not express myself correctly to the machine.







then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and  
should be abandoned.


It is up to you to show me the actual infinities that you need to  
avoid the theory. usually, people invoke nit just gods, which might  
make some sense, they invoke fairy tales.


Despite the strange consequences, that QM confirms, the theory is  
believed by almost all rationalist, up to some variants which leads to  
similar consequences.


You are the one invoking your ontological commitment, to hide an  
unsolved problem (the mind-body problem).


You are not doing theology in the greek sense. You are doing theology  
in the dogmatic sense of the authoritative institutions.


Computationalism explains the quantum, it explains the indeterminacy,  
the non-locality and the non-cloning, almost trivially, as it predicts  
the white rabbits also, but this is what AUDA shows less trivial to  
prove.
And, by the G/G* Gödelian splitting between what is true on a machine  
with what the machine can justify on itself, it explains, the  
communicable and non communicable part of the psychology, physics, and  
theology.


Comp, already explains a lot, and is used by 

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 May 2015, at 08:00, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 5 mai 2015 07:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit :

 On 5/4/2015 10:30 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 Le 5 mai 2015 07:26, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit :
 
  On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 
 
  Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit :
  
   On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
  
  
   Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a  
écrit :

   
On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   
   
   
On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

   
On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
   
   
   
2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
:

   
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   
On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
 wrote:

   
   
The initial point that we were making was that  
copying at the quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle.  
Accidental copies in another
universe are not deliberate but surreptitious  
copies. They are irrelevant

to the argument.
   
   
You implied that if you did not know about the copy  
because it was not
prepared deliberately that would make a difference,  
but I don't see

why it should.
   
   
The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we  
know the set-up: we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate  
substitution level and duplicated -- at two different locations.  
Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the  
comp hypothesis.

   
   
It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit  
the criteria by definition.. you even gave it here we are to be  
copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated... step  
0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there  
is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you  
already have rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on  
it have already been rejected by you as you reject step 0.

   
   
Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any  
first person indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a  
duplicate that you could be.

   
   
Why?
   
   
Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
  
   If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it  
or not is irrelevant.

  
  
   Then that's third person indeterminancy.
 
  What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more  
than one future first person perspective. Are you playing with words  
now?

 
 
  Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk.  What does first person  
indeterminancy mean except that one is uncertain about one's future.


 It's not something about the knowledge of it. It just means that  
you have more than one future *first person* perspective. Under an  
unique universe theory, there's obviously no FPI at all, just  
randomness.



 And under the closest continuation theory

Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your  
current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to  
be considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the  
current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next. If you want  
a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure  
theory who can assign such. Bruno never claimed he has one, just  
that it has to be extracted and must exist.


IN UDA. And I certainly don't claim having a measure, but I do claim  
giving a method to extract it, and it enable us to have already the  
logic of certainty or measure one. It is the logic of the sigma_1  
proposition which are intensionnaly defined by provable  consistant  
( true).
(It happens that []p  p on p sigma_1 already provide a quantization  
making Plotionus even closer to the machine than my own intuition!).


The machine distinguishes by itself the eight arithmetical points of  
view:



p  (example 2 + 2 = 4, or fermat, or the machine i utters k on j, or  
the register of the machine p has been erased at time-step m, of  
computation (UD; 678, 56, 890), etc.)

[]p(example beweisbar(2+2=4) or beweisbar2+2=5), ...
[]p  p (example beweisbar(2+2=4)  2 + 2 = 4.
[]p  p (example beweisbar(2+2=4)  ~ beweisbar ~ (2+2=4))
[]p  p  p  (example: beweisbar(2+2=4)  ~ beweisbar ~ (2+2=4)  
 2 + 2 = 4.


[]p splits into G and G*, and the modality with  p inherite the  
splits. Formidably, the logic of []p  p (S4Grz) does not split.


All admit a representation theorem in G, for example G* proves A can  
be emulated by G proving the conjunction of the reflexion frormulas  
[]B - B with []B subformula of A. It is a toy analogical version of  
the mechanist yes doctor:  if all my parts do what they are supposed  
to do ([]B - B), then I can bet I am true. Well, I might come back  
on this, and might explain more on [], (Gödel's beweisbar).


I do not pretend that there are no other way to find the measure, 

Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

2015-05-05 Thread LizR
It's a question to which the answer could be

yes, I would be the man in the box or the man in the prestige (believes
only one is the original, and the other is a copy that doesn't preserve the
original's consciousness)

or

yes, I will be the man in the box and the man in the prestige (believes
the original is duplicated and ends up as both)

or

no, I won't be either of them (believes the original is destroyed and two
copies are created)

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Jason Resch
Past/Future

On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com
wrote:

 What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward
 ??/?? ?

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei
...

*Spatial* 4th dimension. Not a temporal movement

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Past/Future

 On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com
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 What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward
 ??/?? ?

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 10:26 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrot

 What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward
 ??/?? ?


I don't think there's a name for that, but here's a nice game in 4D:
http://miegakure.com/

They project 4D to 3D and let you switch between which 3 dimensions you see.



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