date:20150505

2015-05-06 8:50 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux :

>
>
> 2015-05-06 8:47 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> 2015-05-06 1:24 GMT+02:00 meekerdb >> It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a
>>> digital computer
>>> In the end it is just a program and the external world is only memory
>>> location the program can access... What you call "captors", "camera"... are
>>> only device which produce digital information which mapped on the memory
>>> the program has access to... If your consciousness is uploaded in a digital
>>> machine and *computation alone* (no magic involved) makes you conscious...
>>> the "external" world, is just memory location the program that support your
>>> consciousness can access.
>>>
>>
>> No, it is an address via which you can access an I/O device to the
>> external world.
>
>
> No it's an address of memory you can read or write to... you have no
> access to the external world...
>

The fact that the I/O device also read and write to that same memory
locations, allows the program to have digital information that the device
write to that locations... but you can remove the I/O device and simulate
its input/output, the program *can't* know that it is not "talking" to the
I/O device, from it's point of view, it's the same thing... it's
reading/writing a memory locaction. The program *has absolutely* no real
access to anything external.

Quentin


>
>
>>
>>
>>  (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change)
>>>
>>> Well how do you assume your current judgment can be trusted by yourself
>>> ? That's consciousness, I've said it would be indication for external
>>> agent, but for yourself its a proof... if you can't trust yourself, then
>>> nothing can help you.
>>>
>>
>> This is a serious dilemma for many people.
>>
>>
>>  But the digital computer is still a physical device (which
>>> presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum);
>>> That change nothing, except if you involve something more than just
>>> running a conscious program on it... See upper.
>>>
>>
>> No, it means that this consciousness supervenes on the physical world.
>>
>>  so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of
>>> physics from the UD's infinite threads of computation.
>>>
>>> You have to recover physics because as I said, if you're truly digital
>>> and just a program running on a computer... you *never* (has in never ever
>>> ever) access *real* physics... you access memory locations and that's all
>>> there is to it.
>>>
>>
>> But you do have access to the phenomena of the external physical world.
>> This is a lot more than internally generated memories of an external world.
>> It is different if you are a brain in a vat and the illusion of an external
>> world is being fed to you. But that is always a possibility, and we can
>> never rule out solipsism -- we just act as though this is not the case.
>> These remote possibilities are not (dis)solved by assuming comp.
>>
>>
>> Bruce
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>



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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-06 8:47 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> 2015-05-06 1:24 GMT+02:00 meekerdb > It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a
>> digital computer
>> In the end it is just a program and the external world is only memory
>> location the program can access... What you call "captors", "camera"... are
>> only device which produce digital information which mapped on the memory
>> the program has access to... If your consciousness is uploaded in a digital
>> machine and *computation alone* (no magic involved) makes you conscious...
>> the "external" world, is just memory location the program that support your
>> consciousness can access.
>>
>
> No, it is an address via which you can access an I/O device to the
> external world.


No it's an address of memory you can read or write to... you have no access
to the external world...


>
>
>  (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change)
>>
>> Well how do you assume your current judgment can be trusted by yourself ?
>> That's consciousness, I've said it would be indication for external agent,
>> but for yourself its a proof... if you can't trust yourself, then nothing
>> can help you.
>>
>
> This is a serious dilemma for many people.
>
>
>  But the digital computer is still a physical device (which
>> presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum);
>> That change nothing, except if you involve something more than just
>> running a conscious program on it... See upper.
>>
>
> No, it means that this consciousness supervenes on the physical world.
>
>  so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of
>> physics from the UD's infinite threads of computation.
>>
>> You have to recover physics because as I said, if you're truly digital
>> and just a program running on a computer... you *never* (has in never ever
>> ever) access *real* physics... you access memory locations and that's all
>> there is to it.
>>
>
> But you do have access to the phenomena of the external physical world.
> This is a lot more than internally generated memories of an external world.
> It is different if you are a brain in a vat and the illusion of an external
> world is being fed to you. But that is always a possibility, and we can
> never rule out solipsism -- we just act as though this is not the case.
> These remote possibilities are not (dis)solved by assuming comp.
>
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-06 1:24 GMT+02:00 meekerdb 

It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a
digital computer 

In the end it is just a program and the external world is only memory 
location the program can access... What you call "captors", "camera"... 
are only device which produce digital information which mapped on the 
memory the program has access to... If your consciousness is uploaded in 
a digital machine and *computation alone* (no magic involved) makes you 
conscious... the "external" world, is just memory location the program 
that support your consciousness can access.


No, it is an address via which you can access an I/O device to the 
external world.



(assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change)

Well how do you assume your current judgment can be trusted by yourself 
? That's consciousness, I've said it would be indication for external 
agent, but for yourself its a proof... if you can't trust yourself, then 
nothing can help you.


This is a serious dilemma for many people.



But the digital computer is still a physical device (which
presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum); 

That change nothing, except if you involve something more than just 
running a conscious program on it... See upper.


No, it means that this consciousness supervenes on the physical world.


so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of
physics from the UD's infinite threads of computation.

You have to recover physics because as I said, if you're truly digital 
and just a program running on a computer... you *never* (has in never 
ever ever) access *real* physics... you access memory locations and 
that's all there is to it.


But you do have access to the phenomena of the external physical world. 
This is a lot more than internally generated memories of an external 
world. It is different if you are a brain in a vat and the illusion of 
an external world is being fed to you. But that is always a possibility, 
and we can never rule out solipsism -- we just act as though this is not 
the case. These remote possibilities are not (dis)solved by assuming comp.


Bruce

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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-06 3:51 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 5/5/2015 5:34 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> Where does the money go once it's bought votes?
>>
>>
>>  It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in
>> the next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will
>> get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
>> spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
>> attack ads with their billion.
>>
>
>  Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on
> spreading their views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV
> would be that any form of political advertising or support for parties or
> editorialising "outside" the system would be illegal, and heavily penailsed
> if it occurred - otherwise the current system is far more efficient from
> the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using their
> newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates.
>
>
> I think you're right that such a restriction would be needed; but I don't
> know whether it's actually proposed that way.  I've never studied voting
> systems much beyond Arrow's theorem, but I know a mathematician who's
> writing a book about various systems.  He's not impressed by quadratic
> voting:
>
> http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html
>
> Brent
>

But what would prevent the rich to invest a one time big thing that would
outlaw quadratic voting, ensure their wealth and still gives them power
through a dictator ship ?

It's like you have 3 wishes... The first, I want to have an infinity of
wishes... They would took over the system as soon as it is in place (if
they're evil... but that's what is implied here imo).

Quentin


>
>
>
>  Or am I missing the point?
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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-06 1:24 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> 2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>> 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb >>  
>>>
>>> It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we
>>> have to have everything sort out
>>> before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
>>> thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
>>> and therefore false.
>>>  But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
>>> show that
>>> our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
>>>
>>> That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
>>> a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
>>> we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
>>> consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
>>> measure problem cannot be solvable...
>>> Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
>>> extracted
>>> and must exist.
>>>
>>> But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".
>>>
>>> Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
>>> theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
>>> computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
>>> intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
>>> practice...
>>>
>>>
>>> But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
>>> suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that "If my theory
>>> is true then such a measure must exist." If you show no progress,
>>> then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
>>> should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
>>> on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
>>> made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
>>> point.
>>>
>>> Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would
>>> be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by
>>> engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having
>>> confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if
>>> technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo
>>> uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that
>>> it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that
>>> proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have
>>> and hope)... without a measure theory.
>>>
>>
>> Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
>> computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that
>> just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It
>> would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.
>
>
>  Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a
> computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a
> definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not shareable.
>
>
> It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital
> computer
>

In the end it is just a program and the external world is only memory
location the program can access... What you call "captors", "camera"... are
only device which produce digital information which mapped on the memory
the program has access to... If your consciousness is uploaded in a digital
machine and *computation alone* (no magic involved) makes you conscious...
the "external" world, is just memory location the program that support your
consciousness can access.


> (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change)
>

Well how do you assume your current judgment can be trusted by yourself ?
That's consciousness, I've said it would be indication for external agent,
but for yourself its a proof... if you can't trust yourself, then nothing
can help you.


> .  But the digital computer is still a physical device (which presumably
> obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum);
>

That change nothing, except if you involve something more than just running
a conscious program on it... See upper.


> so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from
> the UD's infinite threads of computation.
>

You have to recover physics because as I said, if you're truly digital and
just a program running on a computer... you *never* (has in never ever
ever) access *real* physics... you access memory locations and that's all
there is to it.

Quentin


>
> It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used for
> idea that parts of ones brain

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

To be fair, in the last 10 years the everything list has at least
influenced one genuine proper scientist, namely Max Tegmark. (There may be
others of whom I am ignorant, but Mr T acknowledges the influece of the EL
in his book "Our Mathematical Universe". I would add Bruno as a second
example, but there are some who would, no doubt, disagree). And although
Russell's TON is almost 10 years old, it isn't quite, so I can count that
as well. So even the Bear of Little Brain knows of two scientists who have
produced work influenced by discussions on the EL.

(And if I think harder, like the characters in the Monty Python "Spanish
Inquisition" sketch, I can probably come up with some others. "Our three
chief scientists are surprise, fear, and a fanatical dedication to the
Pope...")

I would quite like to discuss what you've said above, but I fear that this
would merely be buying into the ongoing confusion of which you speak so
eloquently.

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Fwd: quadratic voting -- done by bees? No.


Here's another blog from Warren on quadratic voting

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

This web page

http://rangevoting.org/BogusBeeQV.html

refutes massively false THE SPECTATOR piece on this by irresponsible
quadratic voting hype artist (Univ. of Chicago Economist, last I saw)
E. Glen Weyl.


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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Colin Hales

On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 11:21 AM, LizR  wrote:

> It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for
>> the same reason computed flight physics is not flight.
>>
>
> I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does
> seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a
> computer programme could be conscious. Simulated flight isn't real flight,
> but (according to comp) consciousness can't be simulated, because it's
> *already* the result of computations.
>
> *or comp1 if you prefer
>

With respect I will refuse to buy into the jargon of this milieu. I don't
care what comp-x or any other variant of it is. I care even less what a
dovetailer is. Yet you have touched right on the very essence of the
map/territory confusion.

But it is even worse than you think. First consider

A) The universe is a massive collection of interacting elemental primitives
of kind X whose interactions could be characterised as a computation. Call
it a noumenon. Underlying fabric of whatever it is we are inside.
and
B) A computer K  inside A made by entities (us), also inside the set A,
that is running and exploring a _model_  of a set of abstracted (by us) X.

We in B you can look at the computer K and say: "*The universe A, made of
X, is computing a computer K running a program that is an abstraction of A*".
The computing of the computer by the universe A and the computing by K of
the abstractions inside the program in the computer K are two *utterly
different things *that are endlessly confused here.

The entire 10 years discourse can be characterised as a group of people
variously mixing A and B and never realising they were talking about
different things while not even knowing which of A or B they are in AND

it gets worse. *in neither case were they speaking about
traditional 'laws of nature'. **This is a second cockup. These cockups are
factorially confusing. *

In essence the study of the kind B is a different kind of science. It's not
what traditional science, out here in the real world of Dr Colin science,
does. B is a different kind of novel scientific enquiry/ epistemology that
this list continually fails to recognise.

What we do as *scientists *out here in the non-Everything-list world is *not
*B.

Instead we do something different(C). We create abstractions that
predict how (A) appears (in a scientist's consciousness ... as a scientific
observer) when you are inside it (A) (made of X). These regularities in
appearances are NOT the regularities depicted as B. We call C the
traditional 'laws of nature'. A completely *different *kind of epistemology.

Then, just to make everything *even more confusing ...*

* *we scientists (C) then compute the abstract 'laws of nature' C,
variously confusing them with the laws in B (= think C and B are the same
epistemology), or completely miss B or shun B as metaphysical mumbo-jumbo.

B and C are separate epistemologies. Their difference scientifically
accounts for consciousness in the form of the scientific observer.

So...

One underlying unknowable (from the inside) universe A made of something.
What that 'something' might be is what B explores.
and
*Two *sets of potential abstractions of A: B and C. B depicts/characterises
what A is made of whereas C is what it *appears *like to an observer inside
A (you know...atoms and space and stuff). Epistemology C makes the observer
predictive of appearances and simultaneously completely fails to contact X
or B and thereby does what has been happening for >2000 years... fail to
account for (explain) the scientific observer.

Here in this email form COMP argument, A and B *and* C are being endlessly
confused with each other and mis-correlated in respect of consciousness.
Neither a computed B epistemology or a computed C epistemology can be
claimed conscious and this is testable. Careful: by 'computed'  I mean
computed by a computer made of X by us, also made of X.

Yet, that which is conscious (certain organisations of X in A) can be
understood as a form of computation! That does not mean that a computed
version of that understanding is conscious. Nor does it mean that X is some
kind of platonic realm computer running a program. You can nest this back,
"The Matrix" style, forever and it's just a load of empty sophistry.
Instead why don't we *solve the problem*. Sorry 10 years can make you
grumpy.

So really this is a *massive systemic *screw up. 3 layers A/B/C (a
'dual-aspect' epistemology) confused with each other AND with computed
versions of 2 of them (B/C) AND that confused mess is then used to speak
about consciousness at the level of each of the 3 confused layers.

This discourse fails to realise that it is right at the juncture of the
emergence of a new kind of science..The recognition and adding of B as
a new distinct epistemology. That is what you are really doing here.

This has been very hard to unpack. And unpacking it is the main resul

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On 6 May 2015 at 14:34, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased,
> and subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and
> spiritual leanings, Nobel is best left to academic scientists who tow the
> socialist line, and are nicely rewarded. Are all career academics like
> that? No, but not making waves while obtaining government grants, goes a
> long way to get along, and go along career wise.
>
> So you're saying Templeton is less biased and subjective?

I'm not disagreeing, I just want to know what you think. I don't know much
about either of them.

(And what was that about 100F summers?)

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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Much of the nobel committees even for physics and chemistry seem biased, and 
subjective. Templeton, is for scientists with intellectual and spiritual 
leanings, Nobel is best left to academic scientists who tow the socialist line, 
and are nicely rewarded. Are all career academics like that? No, but not making 
waves while obtaining government grants, goes a long way to get along, and go 
along career wise. 

Sent from AOL Mobile Mail


-Original Message-
From: LizR 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Tue, May 5, 2015 10:23 PM
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!





 
  
   
On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List 
everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 wrote:



 Respectability? You must mean 
what a majority or a self appointed peer group like in Oslo decide what is 
acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree Fahrenheit summers you have been 
having for the last 17 years? All the rock in scientists have proclaimed the 
happy hockey stick-for example. 




 




I'm having some trouble parsing your reply. I was wondering in what sense the 
Templeton award was worth more than the Nobel, as Brett said it was, but I 
can't see that you've answered.



 




I'm not sure what you mean about the 100 degree summers, either (for one thing 
I can't remember how to convert from Frankenstein to CelsiusI've got a 
feeling 100 is quite hot, isn't it? But then the boiling point of water is 312 
or something weird, so maybe it isn't.)



 




And as for the jolly hockey sticks...

   
  
  
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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On 6 May 2015 at 13:49, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer
> group like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100
> degree Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All
> the rock in scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example.
>

I'm having some trouble parsing your reply. I was wondering in what sense
the Templeton award was worth more than the Nobel, as Brett said it was,
but I can't see that you've answered.

I'm not sure what you mean about the 100 degree summers, either (for one
thing I can't remember how to convert from Frankenstein to CelsiusI've
got a feeling 100 is quite hot, isn't it? But then the boiling point of
water is 312 or something weird, so maybe it isn't.)

And as for the jolly hockey sticks...

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
that it still "computes" in exactly the same way as a physical
computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity,
not a logical argument.


Rejecting the "move to Platonia" is the non-robust, or small universe
move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place on
this list, but I didn't really notice at the time).


You make some interesting points. I am concerned about the move to 
Platonia, not because the physical universe is too small, but because it 
seems that the notion of a "computation" is taken over from physical 
computers without modification. If a computation is nothing more than an 
order set of steps, then a computation is no different from a 
description of that computation (the "map/territory" confusion). For 
there to be a difference, the steps have to be performed in real time, 
and that notion of "real time" is not available in Platonia.



This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper
"MGA Revisited").


The MGA purports to show that the physical substrate is not needed for 
consciousness. The argument fails for several reasons, some of which you 
outline below.



This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism, ie the
notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that
are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless,
ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being
particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman
Wildberger.

The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually
correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis
for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the
images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a
consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I
ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense,
unless I accidentally ask just the right question.


Counterfactual correctness has not been shown to be necessary -- it is 
just an ad hoc move to save the argument. You can't question the actors 
in a James Bond movie and expect to get anything sensible, of course. 
But then, no one is suggesting that a movie of someone's face records 
the basis of their consciousness. The movie in question is a recording 
of the basic brain processes (at the necessary substitution level). 
This, when replayed, recreates the conscious moment -- not a new 
conscious moment, as you point out, but a conscious moment nonetheless. 
If it did not, then the original comp argument fails -- we could not 
replace all or part of our brain with a device performing the same 
operations.


If we replace part of our brain with a functionally equivalent computer, 
we will then have counterfactual correctness because the replacement is 
functionally equivalent: it will respond to different inputs just as the 
original brain tissue would. But that is not the essence of the 
conscious moment. The whole MGA hangs on a fundamental confusion.


Bruce


Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed
recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious
entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence
of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of
accuracy).

Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly,
it is not in the here and now, via the above argument, but what about
in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there and
then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have
supervenience on the physical recording. 


To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the
physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer
moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly
improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on
steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really
existed in the first place.


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Re: quadratic voting


On 5/5/2015 5:34 PM, LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


Where does the money go once it's bought votes?


It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the 
next
election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back 
$6.88
(plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). 
Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion.



Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on spreading their 
views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV would be that any form of 
political advertising or support for parties or editorialising "outside" the system 
would be illegal, and heavily penailsed if it occurred - otherwise the current system is 
far more efficient from the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using 
their newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates.


I think you're right that such a restriction would be needed; but I don't know whether 
it's actually proposed that way.  I've never studied voting systems much beyond Arrow's 
theorem, but I know a mathematician who's writing a book about various systems.  He's not 
impressed by quadratic voting:


http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html

Brent



Or am I missing the point?
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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-05 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Respectability? You must mean what a majority or a self appointed peer group 
like in Oslo decide what is acceptable. By the way, how's those 100 degree 
Fahrenheit summers you have been having for the last 17 years? All the rock in 
scientists have proclaimed the happy hockey stick-for example. 

-Original Message-
From: LizR 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 10:08 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On 5 May 2015 at 12:01, meekerdb  wrote:

On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote: 

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List  
 wrote: 

  I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my 
last, number 26th, the last one. 

Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting there, 
it's a small world. 

My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an infinity 
of times), but this is completely transparent to us. 

   This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the 
materialist stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems 
unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with 
information.  

I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and 
non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is 
personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you a 
nobel prize or even any sort of recognition. 

This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning 
Theology).  

But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does indeed 
quasi-succeed, perhaps, in communication a bit of the uncommunicable. Then you 
can communicate a part conditionally, like if I am consistent then I can't 
justify that I am consistent, and the inetnsional variants. 

Bruno 

   You can get a Templeton, which is for merging science and religion and 
is worth more than a Nobel.

Do you mean it's worth more in monetary terms, or in terms of kudos, 
respectability, etc?

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

>
> It also appears to me that the computing entity would not be conscious for
> the same reason computed flight physics is not flight.
>

I don't have the benefit of thinking about this for ten years, but it does
seem that there is a map/territory confusion here. Comp* is the idea that a
computer programme could be conscious. Simulated flight isn't real flight,
but (according to comp) consciousness can't be simulated, because it's
*already* the result of computations.

*or comp1 if you prefer

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
> pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
> that it still "computes" in exactly the same way as a physical
> computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity,
> not a logical argument.
> 
> Bruce
> 

Rejecting the "move to Platonia" is the non-robust, or small universe
move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place on
this list, but I didn't really notice at the time).

This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper
"MGA Revisited").

This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism, ie the
notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that
are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless,
ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being
particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman
Wildberger.

The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually
correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis
for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the
images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a
consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I
ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense,
unless I accidentally ask just the right question.

Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed
recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious
entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence
of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of
accuracy).

Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly,
it is not in the here and now, via the above argument, but what about
in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there and
then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have
supervenience on the physical recording. 

To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the
physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer
moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly
improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on
steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really
existed in the first place.

-- 

Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension


On 5/5/2015 1:26 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward 
??/?? ?


earlier/later

Brent

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RE: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread colin hales

Hi,
I've been watching this "if COMP is true then " discussion for over 10 
years. In that time my thinking has evolved to the point where I can express 
what COMP now looks like to me, from my perspective.

Comp appears to be trivially true.

 That is, the resultant computing entity would be computing the entire universe 
and hence is simply pointless. It also appears to me that the computing entity 
would not be conscious for the same reason computed flight physics is not 
flight.

There is an endless confusion operating here: The confusing of "the universe as 
computation" with "computing, with this universe, models of how the universe 
appears to us inside it". A deep map/territory confusion. I wrote a book on 
this.

I am not going to spend any further on this because I know COMP is religion 
here and talking to the religious doesn't  work. Witness 10 years and the same 
conversation is still going on. There is a fantastically detailed 
self-promulgating mental cage here in the comp argument. I for one am over it. 
I am building artificial brain and there is no computer involved at all. Comp 
is irrelevant in the real practice of the mission to make real AGI.

When you _don't_ know anything about the universe, yet you are inside it and 
need to survive you need to survive based on fighting  your own ignorance. 

So If you already know everything you can compute your way out of 
ignorance... But then you already know everything... So why bother?

You can prove this argument experimentally. I intend, finally, to do this or at 
least organize this before I drop dead.

Comp. Imo trivially true and wasting the time of a lot of prodigious brains.

That's where i am at, anyway. Thanks for listening. In another 10 years I'll 
see what it looks like again!

 Carry on. 😉.

Cheers 
Colin


-Original Message-
From: "LizR" 
Sent: ‎6/‎05/‎2015 10:28 AM
To: "everything-list@googlegroups.com" 
Subject: Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb  wrote:



It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used for idea 
that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device 
and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a fairly widely held opinion.  But 
then "comp" is also used to mean although consequences Bruno says follow, 
consequences which are not logical inferences, just a reductio.  The two 
"comp's" are not the same.



That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis - 
the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human 
consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This includes 
the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC can be 
emulated by a classical computer.)


Maybe we should distinguish "comp1" and "comp2" or "comp" and "Comp" (or "comp" 
and "Bruno's comp"...!)


Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1 and 
the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the argument 
linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what Bruno has 
been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which one someone 
has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still don't find comp2 
convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the logic.


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Re: The dovetailer disassembled


LizR wrote:
On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb 

It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used
for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an
equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a
fairly widely held opinion.  But then "comp" is also used to mean
although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not
logical inferences, just a reductio.  The two "comp's" are not the same.

That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational 
hypothesis - the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and 
that human consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer 
programme. (This includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum 
computer, since a QC can be emulated by a classical computer.)


Maybe we should distinguish "comp1" and "comp2" or "comp" and "Comp" (or 
"comp" and "Bruno's comp"...!)


Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts 
comp1 and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw 
in the argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. 
(This is what Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be 
nice to know which one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy 
with comp1 but still don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't 
spot a flaw in the logic.


The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have pointed 
out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming that it 
still "computes" in exactly the same way as a physical computer; and the 
MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity, not a logical argument.


Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/5/2015 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 May 2015, at 09:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before discussing ? You
can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it
is incomplete, and therefore false.

But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that
our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure. So yes, we
should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is not a problem for the
discussion of the consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure
problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has
to be extracted

and must exist.
But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".
Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory fails...
that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be false... If in fact, this
become intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in practice...

But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable measure. It
is not enough just to claim that "If my theory is true then such a measure must exist."

But it is not my theory. It is the digital version the antic mechanist theory, suggested
in the King Milinda, equivocated with rationalism by Diderot, used explicitly or
implicitly by those people who brush away mystic experience as hallucination, it is used
by neurophysiologist, and most biologist (when they pretend not using mecanism they are
usually confusing automata with machine is the Turing sense).
And there is no clue that a process in nature is not computable,

If it takes infinitely many threads of the UD to compute a moment of consciousness then
isn't that moment not computable?

a good things because it is also the hypothesis used in darwinian type of
explanation.

Now, some people come ans say, no there is a real physical universe, and it is needed to
make some computations more real than others.

What do you mean by "real"?

UDA+MGA shows that such an explanation does not work, and add implicitly magic to both
mind and matter, for which there is no evidence today.

Then Quentin forget to mention that after UDA there is AUDA, where I explain that if e
are machine and can solve that machine, then machine can solve that problem, and so why
not interviewing the machine.
It happens that we are living a wonderful period, and that Gödel, Löb, and others have
already begin the interview, and Solovay even axiomatised it entirely at the
propositional level.

UDA shows that a "physical events" are associated to sigma_1 propositions which are
simultaneously

- provable (in a "p way, at the right subst;level, by construction),
- consistent (they are realized by some truth, I use the completeness theorem)
- true (this can be explained to be necessary to get the first person, and is
traditional since Theaetetus).

Is this your definition of "physical event"?

Brent

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Re: quadratic voting

On 6 May 2015 at 08:38, John Mikes  wrote:

> Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting:
>
> 1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a
> good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and
> one latent  national for the leading names in the party.
> EVERY VOTE COUNTS: if somebody gets within the District the fixed number
> of votes for being elected, so be it and the excess goes to the national
> list. If somebody does NOT get elected, all the votes (s)he got go onto the
> national list, from where the names are considered one after the other as
> the (pre)fixed number of votes accumulated for an election-need.
> As I hear the system is still on.
>
> This is much superior than the Gerrymandered unjustice of the USA.
>
> 2. I do not approve a 'voting' of just "YES-men". There should be a way to
> express a  " N O " to the candidate, or proposal.
>
> What I completely disapprove is the Big Money influence on the voting. Any
> candidate should get identical expense-money once fulfilled the conditions
> of running lawfully and NO MORE from NO SOURCE. Give the voter a chance to
> freely compare the proposals and make up their mind in the privacy of their
> home.
> Nobody should be inundated with ads etc.
>
> I agree with everything you say here.

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Re: quadratic voting

On 5 May 2015 at 11:12, meekerdb  wrote:

>  Where does the money go once it's bought votes?
>
>
> It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
> next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
> back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
> spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
> attack ads with their billion.
>

Ah, I see. Since the various interest groups already spend millions on
spreading their views via various media, presumably one caveat with QV
would be that any form of political advertising or support for parties or
editorialising "outside" the system would be illegal, and heavily penailsed
if it occurred - otherwise the current system is far more efficient from
the viewpoint of the 1%, and they will just stick with using their
newspapers and TV channels to support their chosen candidates.

Or am I missing the point?

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used for
> idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital
> device and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a fairly widely held
> opinion.  But then "comp" is also used to mean although consequences Bruno
> says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences, just a
> reductio.  The two "comp's" are not the same.
>

That's exactly right. Comp is simply short for the computational hypothesis
- the idea that a computer programme could be conscious, and that human
consciousness is at some level emulable by a computer programme. (This
includes the possibility that the brain is a quantum computer, since a QC
can be emulated by a classical computer.)

Maybe we should distinguish "comp1" and "comp2" or "comp" and "Comp" (or
"comp" and "Bruno's comp"...!)

Bruno's claim is that comp2 follows from comp1, hence if one accepts comp1
and the ancillary assumptions, and one can't find a logical flaw in the
argument linking them, one can feel free to conflate the two. (This is what
Bruno has been known to do...) However it would still be nice to know which
one someone has in mind. Lots of people are happy with comp1 but still
don't find comp2 convincing, even though they can't spot a flaw in the
logic.

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 6 May 2015 at 11:10, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of
> their physical being - even if they are not conscious.
>

Specifically because physical continuity ensures continuity of memory
(normally). Should it become possible to copy memories from one brain to
another, or to upload people into computers, we would of course have to
revise this intuition.

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

Thank you! :-)
(Possibly too much so in some...)

On 6 May 2015 at 11:19, Dennis Ochei  wrote:

> Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :)
>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR  wrote:
>
>> ana and kata if I remember correctly.
>>
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Re: quadratic voting

On 5/5/2015 5:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com>> wrote:

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say
you pay
for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of
equally
distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can
spend
their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?

The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In
the end,
all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by
the
voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to
influence
policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a
mathematical
proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal distribution of
political
power.

Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea
fail
miserably, but it's fun to think about.

Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current
system, at
least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is allowed. A lot
of the
time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy the result they want, as
per Mark
Twain's comment.

Where does the money go once it's bought votes?

It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
next
election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back
$6.88
(plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in).
Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying attack ads with their billion.

Which is a better situation than we have now, where they can just buy the laws for much
cheaper.

I'm not sure that's much cheaper. One way they buy votes is by funding attack ads against
opponents of legislators they want a vote from. But if you're interested in "quadratic
voting" you should read this

http://rangevoting.org/MonetizedRV.html

by a Warren D. Smith.

Brent

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


meekerdb wrote:

On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett 

Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI,
but that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a
physical computer. It would go no distance towards establishing
the comp hypothesis.

Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as 
a computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. 
It's a definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not 
shareable.


It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital 
computer (assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a 
change).  But the digital computer is still a physical device (which 
presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime continuum); so it doesn't 
prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from the UD's 
infinite threads of computation.


It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used for 
idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent 
digital device and preserve ones consciousness.  That's a fairly widely 
held opinion.  But then "comp" is also used to mean although 
consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical 
inferences, just a reductio.  The two "comp's" are not the same.


Yes, I find the same problem. The assumption -- stemming from Bruno 
himself I think -- seems to be that if you accept that some brain 
functions could be simulated on a computer at some substitution level 
(strong AI), then all the rest of Bruno's 'comp' thesis follows 
logically. I do not think that this is the case. That is why I think 
that the wider 'comp' thesis can be criticized on the basis that it has 
not led to substantive results -- there is no indication that any useful 
physics can be obtained by 'questioning the machine'.


Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>
>

It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we
have to
have everything sort out
before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
and therefore false.
But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
show that
our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
measure problem cannot be solvable...
Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
extracted
and must exist.

But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".

Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
practice...

But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that "If my theory
is true then such a measure must exist." If you show no progress,
then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
point.

Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would
be a
strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by
engeenering,
succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence
it's the
same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically
we can
in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find
yourself
surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like
quantum
suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but nonetheless, it
would
still be the best proof you will ever have and hope)... without a
measure theory.

Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
computationalism. It
would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that just means that
consciousness
can be simulated with a physical computer. It would go no distance towards
establishing the comp hypothesis.

Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a computational
entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a definitive a proof from
your own perspective, but it is not shareable.

It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a digital computer
(assuming your judgement can be trusted after so drastic a change). But the digital
computer is still a physical device (which presumably obeys QM and exists in a spacetime
continuum); so it doesn't prove anything about the UD and the recovery of physics from the
UD's infinite threads of computation.

It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that "comp" is used for idea that parts
of ones brain could be replaced with an equivalent digital device and preserve ones
consciousness. That's a fairly widely held opinion. But then "comp" is also used to mean
although consequences Bruno says follow, consequences which are not logical inferences,
just a reductio. The two "comp's" are not the same.

Brent

Having only AGI, is an indication computationalism is true, but as we wouldn't have
proof they are conscious as we are, it would be just that an indication... but if you
undergo yourself and it works, for you it's a proof, for us you arguing you're still
yourself, is still just an indication that computationalism is true (and not a proof)
but a stronger one than AGI IMO.

Quentin

Bruce

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei

Thanks Liz! You're awesome in every dimension :)

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> ana and kata if I remember correctly.
>
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Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 11:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 09:25, meekerdb  wrote:

On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb  wrote:

On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment
ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly
equal degrees of similarity.

Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.


What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying
consciousness with memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the
similarities of successive experiences.  In the above example "you" is
ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body.  But on
Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body
were based on some quantum event, "I" would end up in two different places.

Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original
transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you
say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather
than the park?

Ask John Clark. :-)

Seriously, one can only talk about what "you" expect given a definition of
"you".  If "you" means your closest continuation then waking up at home is
closer than waking up in the park.  We tend to think of this as uncertainty
because all the similarities of body and memory mean that the difference
between the park and home is almost neglegible compared to the similarities.
But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except into the body of an
eighty year old black woman with one leg.  Would you still find yourself
waking up in the park?

This sort of thing actually happens on a daily basis: people are
injured in serious accidents and wake up with parts of their body
missing and major changes in memories, cognitive abilities and
personality.


Right. And we identify them as the same person based on the continuity of their physical 
being - even if they are not conscious.


Brent

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Wednesday, May 6, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> ana and kata if I remember correctly.
>

Which are "up" and "down" in Greek.


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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

ana and kata if I remember correctly.

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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 10:26 PM, Dennis Ochei  wrot

> What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward
> ??/?? ?
>

I don't think there's a name for that, but here's a nice game in 4D:
http://miegakure.com/

They project 4D to 3D and let you switch between which 3 dimensions you see.


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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei

...

*Spatial* 4th dimension. Not a temporal movement

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, Jason Resch  wrote:

> Past/Future
>
> On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Dennis Ochei  > wrote:
>
>> What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward
>> ??/?? ?
>>
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Re: Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Jason Resch

Past/Future

On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Dennis Ochei 
wrote:

> What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward
> ??/?? ?
>
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Re: quadratic voting

2015-05-05 Thread John Mikes

Quadratic, or not there are two things about voting:

1. The 'pre-WWII' Hungarian system (I am far from suggesting Hungary as a
good political pattern) with 2 lists per party: one of the districts and
one latent  national for the leading names in the party.
EVERY VOTE COUNTS: if somebody gets within the District the fixed number of
votes for being elected, so be it and the excess goes to the national list.
If somebody does NOT get elected, all the votes (s)he got go onto the
national list, from where the names are considered one after the other as
the (pre)fixed number of votes accumulated for an election-need.
As I hear the system is still on.

This is much superior than the Gerrymandered unjustice of the USA.

2. I do not approve a 'voting' of just "YES-men". There should be a way to
express a  " N O " to the candidate, or proposal.

What I completely disapprove is the Big Money influence on the voting. Any
candidate should get identical expense-money once fulfilled the conditions
of running lawfully and NO MORE from NO SOURCE. Give the voter a chance to
freely compare the proposals and make up their mind in the privacy of their
home.
Nobody should be inundated with ads etc.

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
>>  On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>> Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
>>> for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
>>> distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
>>> their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?
>>>
>>
>>  The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In
>> the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally
>> distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial
>> capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author
>> proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an
>> equal distribution of political power.
>>
>>  Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea
>> fail miserably, but it's fun to think about.
>>
>>Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the
> current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending
> is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy
> the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment.
>
>  Where does the money go once it's bought votes?
>
>
> It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
> next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
> back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
> spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
> attack ads with their billion.
>
> Brent
>
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Translation in the Fourth Spatial Dimension

2015-05-05 Thread Dennis Ochei

What are the terms for it? We have up/down left/right forward/backward 
??/?? ?

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 May 2015, at 08:00, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 5 mai 2015 07:38, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 5/4/2015 10:30 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 5 mai 2015 07:26, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >
>> > On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >> >
>> >> > On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb"  a  
écrit :

>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb   
wrote:

>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> The initial point that we were making was that  
copying at the quantum level
>> >> >> >>> of substitution is not possible, in principle.  
Accidental copies in another
>> >> >> >>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious"  
copies. They are irrelevant

>> >> >> >>> to the argument.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> You implied that if you did not know about the copy  
because it was not
>> >> >> >> prepared deliberately that would make a difference,  
but I don't see

>> >> >> >> why it should.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we  
know the set-up: we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate  
substitution level and duplicated -- at two different locations.  
Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the  
comp hypothesis.

>> >> >> 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit  
the criteria by definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be  
copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated"... step  
0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there  
is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you  
already have rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on  
it have already been rejected by you as you reject step 0.

>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any  
first person indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a  
duplicate that you could be.

>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Why?
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it  
or not is irrelevant.

>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Then that's third person indeterminancy.
>> >>
>> >> What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more  
than one future first person perspective. Are you playing with words  
now?

>> >
>> >
>> > Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk.  What does first person  
indeterminancy mean except that one is uncertain about one's future.

>>
>> It's not something about the knowledge of it. It just means that  
you have more than one future *first person* perspective. Under an  
unique universe theory, there's obviously no FPI at all, just  
randomness.

>
>
> And under the "closest continuation" theory

Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your  
current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to  
be considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the  
current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next. If you want  
a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure  
theory who can assign such. Bruno never claimed he has one, just  
that it has to be extracted and must exist.


IN UDA. And I certainly don't claim having a measure, but I do claim  
giving a method to extract it, and it enable us to have already the  
logic of "certainty" or "measure one". It is the logic of the sigma_1  
proposition which are intensionnaly defined by provable & consistant  
(& true).
(It happens that []p & p on p sigma_1 already provide a quantization  
making Plotionus even closer to the machine than my own intuition!).


The machine distinguishes by itself the eight arithmetical points of  
view:



p  (example 2 + 2 = 4, or fermat, or the machine i utters k on j, or  
the register of the machine p has been erased at time-step m, of  
computation (UD; 678, 56, 890), etc.)

[]p(example "beweisbar("2+2=4") or "beweisbar"2+2=5"), ...
[]p & p (example beweisbar("2+2=4") & 2 + 2 = 4.
[]p & <>p (example beweisbar("2+2=4") & ~ beweisbar ~ ("2+2=4"))
[]p & <>p & p  (example: beweisbar("2+2=4") & ~ beweisbar ~ ("2+2=4")  
& 2 + 2 = 4.


[]p splits into G and G*, and the modality with "& <>p" inherite the  
splits. Formidably, the logic of []p & p (S4Grz) does not split.


All admit a representation theorem in G, for exam

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 05 May 2015, at 09:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb not my theory. It's not mine either... do we have to have
everything sort out before discussing ? You can't have any theory,
because one sure thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is
incomplete, and therefore false.
But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show
that

our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a
failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we
don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such measure
problem cannot be solvable... Bruno never claimed he has
one, just that it has to be extracted

and must exist.
But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".
Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
practice...

But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that "If my theory
is true then such a measure must exist."

But it is not my theory. It is the digital version the antic mechanist
theory, suggested in the King Milinda, equivocated with rationalism
by Diderot, used explicitly or implicitly by those people who brush
away mystic experience as hallucination, it is used by
neurophysiologist, and most biologist (when they pretend not using
mecanism they are usually confusing automata with machine is the
Turing sense).
And there is no clue that a process in nature is not computable, a
good things because it is also the hypothesis used in darwinian type
of explanation.

Now, some people come ans say, no there is a real physical universe,
and it is needed to make some computations more real than others.

UDA+MGA shows that such an explanation does not work, and add
implicitly magic to both mind and matter, for which there is no
evidence today.

Then Quentin forget to mention that after UDA there is AUDA, where I
explain that if e are machine and can solve that machine, then machine
can solve that problem, and so why not interviewing the machine.
It happens that we are living a wonderful period, and that Gödel, Löb,
and others have already begin the interview, and Solovay even
axiomatised it entirely at the propositional level.

UDA shows that a "physical events" are associated to sigma_1
propositions which are simultaneously

- provable (in a "p way, at the right subst;level, by construction),
- consistent (they are realized by some truth, I use the completeness
theorem)
- true (this can be explained to be necessary to get the first person,
and is traditional since Theaetetus).

So I predicted a long way ago that the logic of either []p & p, []p &
<>p, []p & <>p & p, provides arithmetical interpretation of
intuitionist logics, and quantum logics when p is restricted to the
sigma_1 sentences (which emulates the universal dovetailer in
arithmetic).

If you show no progress,

Gödel, Löb, Kleene, Curry, ... is the progress, and AUDA is the
discovery that introspective machine get quickly the propositional
part. That is not nothing at all. And you are invited to refute
machine physics by showing a quantum proposition separating the
empirical quantum from the comp quantum.

Of course, if there is a difference, it can be fatal: refuting comp
(that would be revolutionary), or it could be non fatal, just that I
did not express myself correctly to the machine.

then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
should be abandoned.

It is up to you to show me the actual infinities that you need to
avoid the theory. usually, people invoke nit just gods, which might
make some sense, they invoke fairy tales.

Despite the strange consequences, that QM confirms, the theory is
believed by almost all rationalist, up to some variants which leads to
similar consequences.

You are the one invoking your ontological commitment, to hide an
unsolved problem (the mind-body problem).

You are not doing theology in the greek sense. You are doing theology
in the dogmatic sense of the authoritative institutions.

Computationalism explains the quantum, it explains the indeterminacy,
the non-locality and the non-cloning, almost trivially, as it predicts
the white rabbits also, but this is what AUDA shows less trivial to
prove.
And, by the G/G* Gödelian splitting between what is true on a machine
with what the machine can justify on itself, it explains, the
communicable and non communicable part of the psychology, physics, and
theology.

Comp, already explains a lot, and is used by practically all
s

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 Thread John Clark

On Mon, May 4, 2015  Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>
  >>>  We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is
>>> necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.
>>
>>
>> >> Nonsense, we have a ASTRONOMICAL  amount of evidence that is not
>> necessary! Your quantum state changes well over a million billion times
>> every nanosecond and yet you continue to feel like the same person.
>>
>
> > Of course personal identity is retained under internal changes.


Then why all this silliness about a copy needing to be absolutely perfect?



> > But why are you so confident that the persistent quantum state of some
> molecules is not important for some memories or functions?


Because at room temperature, and even more so at 98.6F, molecules have no
persistent quantum state, they change quantum states many billions of times
a second. The only reason we don't have Quantum Computers today is that
it's so difficult to keep things in the same quantum state for more than a
fraction of a second even at liquid helium temperatures.

  John K Clark








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Re: quadratic voting

On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
>>  On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>> Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
>>> for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
>>> distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
>>> their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?
>>>
>>
>>  The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In
>> the end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally
>> distributed by the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial
>> capital to influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author
>> proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an
>> equal distribution of political power.
>>
>>  Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea
>> fail miserably, but it's fun to think about.
>>
>>Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the
> current system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending
> is allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy
> the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment.
>
>  Where does the money go once it's bought votes?
>
>
> It's redistributed.  So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the
> next election to cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get
> back $6.88 (plus the $1 they put in plus a share of whatever other big
> spenders put in).  Actually I think the Bros will be better off buying
> attack ads with their billion.
>

Which is a better situation than we have now, where they can just buy the
laws for much cheaper.

Telmo.


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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 04 May 2015, at 10:23, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 10:08 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
>>> mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
>>> current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.
>>>
>>> That would just mean the terminology isn't very good. It would be more
>> accurate to say you do (or don't) believe in ghosts.
>>
>
> That's a good point.
> Of course the non-materialist deals with ontological problems. Do entities
> perceived under the influence of psychoactive drugs exist in some sense?
>
>
>
> At Iridia, there has been a talk and demo of Virtual Reality. I have been
> very often disappointed, but this time I have been quite impressed. They
> have solved the main problems, and the immersion feeling was quite realist,
> in all direction where you looked, without any screen border, and perfect
> real time synchronization for any type of the move of your head or eyes.
>

William Gibson felt the same :)
https://twitter.com/perrychen/status/579058927511334912

"They did it!", said the guy who has been writing and dreaming about this
stuff for decades.


> In one demo there was a creature, was it real? Those things are relatively
> real. Like in personal nocturnal dream, or when reading a novel, and with
> comp, like with physicalism, there is a physical reality, which is a priori
> different from a machine (as it is a sum of the work of all machine)
> "acting" below our substitution level. In arithmetic, one virtual reality
> is less virtual than all the others, as it has the "correct" comp bottom.
> That define a notion of "physically real", and most entities perceived in
> inebriated state are very often not physically real. But they might still
> be images of important routine operating in the brain of a large class of
> possible subject, and be entities living on alternate reality planes, but
> still there by Turing-Universal + FPI.
>
> Virtual reality might help people for the thought experiences, and many
> (new) things.
>
> But in the long run, we have to be careful, as the poor might one day not
> afford visiting a non virtual reality. If we don't think a bit, we might
> end up all in brains in vats.
>

Some economists are already working on this, namely Robin Hanson. He used
to be at the center of a very lively discussion about these topics. Maybe
you'd like to take a look at his blog when you have time:
http://www.overcomingbias.com/

He's an interesting guy, in any case.

Telmo.


>
> Bruno
>
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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 5:59 PM, PGC  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, May 4, 2015 at 4:03:50 PM UTC+2, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Alberto G. Corona 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
 mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
 current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.

>>>
>>> So what?
>>>
>>
>> No problem, my only dogma is that reality is intelligible -- i.e. it is
>> possible to discover laws that approximate how things work. Beyond the
>> empirical successes of science, I choose this belief because I see no point
>> in believing otherwise (if it's wrong, there is really no point in
>> believing anything).
>>
>> Choosing things to disbelief a priori is unscientific, but of course we
>> are mortal so we guide ourselves by some heuristic. I go in the direction
>> of the things I find more likely to be true and I'm sure you do the same.
>>
>
> Not necessarily. I find discovery of universal machine to be more
> unbelievable than strangeness that is cited in the esoteric-unexplained
> category, which is close in terms of content to children's fantasies and
> Star Wars. And yet the latter remains unsupported conjecture while the
> former is a number relation which exists provably as consequence of
> arithmetic. I'm not convinced by arguments like "I see pattern in this
> strangeness and can categorize them; and we can see these patterns in
> science or in the work of so-and-so"
>

I think most people, who are untrained in thinking about these topics, have
a simple heuristic guided by strangeness. You are more trained, so your
heuristic is more sophisticated. You say you find the universal machine
more unbelievable than
the Star Wars universe, and yet you give it more credence. I would say this
just means that you trained yourself to ignore biologically encoded
emotional responses when seeking truth.

The quacks, instead of encouraging people to improve their reasoning
skills, appeal to the fundamental strangeness of reality to peddle whatever
snake oil they are interested in selling at a given moment.


>
> I need evidence and clear algorithm. If say a Shulgin lays out how
> precisely to modify some molecule to ingest something that will result in
> mystical experience with paranormal content, than this is "reasonable": If
> subject x ingest function of some molecule => fuzzy experience with
> features a,b,c, mystical union or whatever etc.
>

But then you respect empiricism somehow. You must, otherwise how could you
have learned to play music?


>
> But citing strangeness of unknown without being able to repeat the result
> or make it repeatable to skeptics is probably advertising again, which
> tries to sell itself as truth regardless whether in respected journal,
> obscure blog, TV... Advertising without being genuine about it and masking
> it as science, without properly situating it in tenable hypothesis => I can
> find "interesting patterns in dog shit and the mud". Don't feel the need to
> post about it because I feel that too often basic rationality is left at
> the door for hidden reasons of self-glory of authors.
>

Ok.


>
> And I like reasoning about the craziest shit. But I'm too often
> disappointed by barrages of cheap psychological tricks playing to the
> "unknown", instead of clear reasoning where somebody states a clean,
> discrete ontology clearly.
>

Yes, I stole this remark above, as you can see.


> That's why I think a lot of this stuff can be ignored. We're not in realm
> of explanation and basic rationality is left at the door... which is
> profitable and self-fulfilling (there will be more weird patterns in the
> mud to "substantiate" what I'm saying). With Shulgin type approach as
> contrast (he also carries extraordinary claim and is attacked as crackpot),
> we can verify mystical propositions for ourselves because the algorithms of
> how to get there and build such molecule are accessible and precise enough.
> PGC
>

But then we are back at an heuristic, and that is unavoidable. The search
for knowledge cannot operate blindly, there is just too much stuff to
explore.


>
>
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Alberto.
>>>
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Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

Hi Mitch,

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 4:00 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Totally agree, Telmo, regarding communication. On the Bostrom concept of
> Sims and, by extension, our reality being a sim, I like the concept, but in
> a way, it seems too simple, Rather than life being an illusion, let us
> conceive that its the result of a great program running and producing us as
> a result. Moreover, our program can be either revised, copied, or both,
> etc. This is one reason professor, Eric Steinhart's work seems compelling
> to me. The following summary is available from his book, Your Digital
> Afterlives, but here is a taste, from Steinhart's website-
>
>  http://ericsteinhart.com/FLESH/flesh-chabs.html
>

I will have to read this more carefully, but I think I get the gist of it.
Most of the ideas are not new to me, and correspond to things that I enjoy
thinking about myself.

I have gone through several revisions of my belief system about these
topics, so it's likely that I can be convinced by good, new ideas.

Just in case you don't know, I really enjoyed this book at some point:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Never-Ending-Days-Being-Dead/dp/0571220568

It's mostly a sampler of theories on these topics, and some have already
been falsified (like the omega point, I believe).

>
> The best of these theories is Promotion, but Steinhart views his own idea
> as flawed, because he wants it to be progressive rather then regressive. I
> don't see the logical regression he seemed concerned about, He did come up
> with Revision theory, as workable, however, these are merely, *better-off
> clones* of ourselves, and miss the continuity, that infers identity.
> Promotion is better, because it does exactly this, via pipelines,
> processes, data transfers, as well as uploading and teleportation.
>

Ok, I have no problem with any of this stuff. I will try to summarize how
my current view of things intersects with these topics.

I think immortality is a given. I suspect we are all versions of the same
thing (as conscious entities) and that all moments are eternal. I think the
perception of a time line arises inside each eternal observer moment.

What does not appear possible, at the moment, is to have very long "story
lines". I cannot be Telmo for a time span of many centuries (disregarding
Quantum Immortality issues). It would be nice if we could do that. I think
there is potentially great value in having human being that extend their
personal development way beyond our biological limitations.

So the issue becomes: how to preserve a set of memories and transfer them
to another medium, so that we can extend story lines? This could take the
form of Promotion, trans-humanism, mind uploading, who know what else...

I would just say that the story lines problem is somewhat tangencial to the
simulated reality problem.

Sorry if I'm rambling, I don't have a lot of time at the moment...

> This is one reason I want to see if Ben Goetzel has an
> afterlife-resurrection theory, because they both appeared to have come to
> the same conclusions, independently,  on several other concepts.
>
> Steinhart, like Goetzel, is a computationalist (digitalist) - (5 minute
> video)
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfDB35y-5Z0
>

I am mostly ok with this video. My only objection is that time must not
exist in the maximally simple universe, so thinking about causality between
universes seems problematic. This is part of what attracts me to Platonia
and this list: the idea that everything already exists, and what is called
causality is just structure.

>
>
> Please let me know if you uncover anything concerning Ben Goetzel's views.
> Thanks.
>

The AGI conference is going to be in my city in the end of July. I am not
sure I will be able to attend, but if I can I will try to ask Ben in person.

Telmo.

>
> Mitch
>
>
>  -Original Message-
> From: Telmo Menezes 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 9:08 am
> Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
>
>
>
>  On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last,
>> number 26th, the last one.
>
>
>  Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting
> there, it's a small world.
>
>  My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an
> infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us.
>
>
>>  This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist
>> stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems
>> unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with
>> information.
>
>
>  I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and
> non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is
> personal value in exploring the internal world -- although

Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

It's a question to which the answer could be

"yes, I would be the man in the box or the man in the prestige" (believes
only one is the original, and the other is a copy that doesn't preserve the
original's consciousness)

or

"yes, I will be the man in the box and the man in the prestige" (believes
the original is duplicated and ends up as both)

or

"no, I won't be either of them" (believes the original is destroyed and two
copies are created)

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 19:42, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
> computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that
> just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It
> would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.
>
> It depends on whether the consciousness is simulated or actual. If the AI
is actually conscious, that IS the comp hypothesis (plus a couple of
ancillary things like the Church-Turing thesis). If it's just passing the
Turing test by appearing to be conscious, but actually isn't, then I'm not
sure that counts as strong AI anyway?

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> 2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb > 
>>
>> It's not my theory. It's not mine either... do we
>> have to have everything sort out
>> before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
>> thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
>> and therefore false.
>>  But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
>> show that
>> our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
>>
>> That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
>> a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
>> we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
>> consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
>> measure problem cannot be solvable...
>> Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
>> extracted
>> and must exist.
>>
>> But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".
>>
>> Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
>> theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
>> computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
>> intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
>> practice...
>>
>>
>> But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
>> suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that "If my theory
>> is true then such a measure must exist." If you show no progress,
>> then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
>> should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
>> on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
>> made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
>> point.
>>
>> Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would
>> be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by
>> engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having
>> confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if
>> technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo
>> uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that
>> it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that
>> proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have
>> and hope)... without a measure theory.
>>
>
> Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
> computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but that
> just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical computer. It
> would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.


Hmm... if you undergo the procedure and find yourself surviving it as a
computational entity... I don't know what more proof you would want. It's a
definitive a proof from your own perspective, but it is not shareable.

Having only AGI, is an indication computationalism is true, but as we
wouldn't have proof they are conscious as we are, it would be just that an
indication... but if you undergo yourself and it works, for you it's a
proof, for us you arguing you're still yourself, is still just an
indication that computationalism is true (and not a proof) but a stronger
one than AGI IMO.

Quentin

>
>
> Bruce
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Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett 

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>
It's not my theory. 
It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out

before discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure
thing I can say about any theory, it's that it is incomplete,
and therefore false.
 But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to
show that
our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be
a failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact
we don't have it, is not a problem for the discussion of the
consequences. It would be a problem, if you could show such
measure problem cannot be solvable...
Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be
extracted
and must exist.

But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".

Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the
theory fails... that's part of the fact you can prove
computationalism to be false... If in fact, this become
intractable... well it would not be falsifiable with that in
practice...


But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a
suitable measure. It is not enough just to claim that "If my theory
is true then such a measure must exist." If you show no progress,
then your theory can be labelled a degenerating research program and
should be abandoned. Computationalism does not have to be disproved
on its own terms: it just has to be shown that no progress has been
made after many years of trying. I think we are fast reaching this
point.

Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would 
be a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by 
engeenering, succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having 
confidence it's the same person, it would also be a strong indication... 
if technologically we can in the future do that, and you personally 
undergo uploading and find yourself surviving it, it would be a proof 
for you that it must be so (like quantum suicide experiment, you could 
not share that proof, but nonetheless, it would still be the best proof 
you will ever have and hope)... without a measure theory.


Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for 
computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI, but 
that just means that consciousness can be simulated with a physical 
computer. It would go no distance towards establishing the comp hypothesis.


Bruce

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> 2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb > It's not my theory.
>> It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before
>> discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say
>> about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false.
>>  But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that
>> our world, as some class, is not too improbable.
>>
>> That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a
>> failure. So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have
>> it, is not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a
>> problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable...
>> Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted
>> and must exist.
>>
>> But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".
>>
>> Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory
>> fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be
>> false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be
>> falsifiable with that in practice...
>>
>
> But one has to show some progress in the direction of providing a suitable
> measure. It is not enough just to claim that "If my theory is true then
> such a measure must exist." If you show no progress, then your theory can
> be labelled a degenerating research program and should be abandoned.
> Computationalism does not have to be disproved on its own terms: it just
> has to be shown that no progress has been made after many years of trying.
> I think we are fast reaching this point.


Well even without the measure theory, if we succeed to do AGI, it would be
a strong indication that it is somehow correct... if we can by engeenering,
succeed to upload a person and by interviewing her having confidence it's
the same person, it would also be a strong indication... if technologically
we can in the future do that, and you personally undergo uploading and find
yourself surviving it, it would be a proof for you that it must be so (like
quantum suicide experiment, you could not share that proof, but
nonetheless, it would still be the best proof you will ever have and
hope)... without a measure theory.

Quentin


>
>
> Bruce
>
>
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The dovetailer disassembled