Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 03:40:48PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: This is a false distinction. Arithmetical 'truth' is no more fundamental or final than physical truth. Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. Yes - but comp actually doesn't depend on standard arithmetic either. What it depends on is the Church-Turing thesis to define what is meant by computation. Standard arithmetic is convenient, as it contains CT-thesis universal computers within it, but not essential. Any other ontology supporting the CT-thesis will do. The assumption of CT-thesis is not trivial, however. As David Deutsch would point out, one could assume the Hilbert Hotel, and get a form of hypercomputation. DD argues that lack of hypercomputers around us is evidence that physical reality cannot support more powerful computational models that the Turing one, but a more neutral way of putting it is to say that ontology (which may or may not be physical) cannot support more powerful models, effectively demarcating parts of Platonia. That is an interesting observation. One formulation of the CT thesis is that a Turing machine can do any calculation that can be done with pencil and paper. This relates Turing computations quite strongly to what is possible in the physical world. Deutsch's observation about hypercomputation is interesting here -- apart from some speculative possibilities in rotating black holes, hypercomputation is not possible in this physical universe. So is comp actually delineated by the physical world? And not as /a priori/ as might otherwise have been thought? The physical world determines comp, and not the reverse? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 03:40:48PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: This is a false distinction. Arithmetical 'truth' is no more fundamental or final than physical truth. Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. Yes - but comp actually doesn't depend on standard arithmetic either. What it depends on is the Church-Turing thesis to define what is meant by computation. Standard arithmetic is convenient, as it contains CT-thesis universal computers within it, but not essential. Any other ontology supporting the CT-thesis will do. The assumption of CT-thesis is not trivial, however. As David Deutsch would point out, one could assume the Hilbert Hotel, and get a form of hypercomputation. DD argues that lack of hypercomputers around us is evidence that physical reality cannot support more powerful computational models that the Turing one, but a more neutral way of putting it is to say that ontology (which may or may not be physical) cannot support more powerful models, effectively demarcating parts of Platonia. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
You wrote: *(Brent):* *But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable.* *(Bruno):* *Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self-referentially correct machine theory.* *...* The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the *Entirety*, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics, universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc. *Theory* of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less sophisticated believers (scientists?). One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super-intelligence. I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are talking about is 'super' indeed. I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter-lego) i.o.w. to consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In such respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain. IFFF? Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I went with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature) upon relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety. Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to humans (machines). With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness) JM On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 2:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications for physics which are not metaphysical. There are many speculative theories of physics that are based on information as the ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist theory of the world would have something to say about them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily) make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true, but might be of the type G* minus G.) What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way? That is exactly my criticism of your theory. I think you do need to invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes everything. But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how computation instantiates thought you can't use thought to explain the universe. It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I have never understood; white rabbits are common). It's all very well to say thought is computation and all computation is implicit in arithmetic so all thought is implicit in arithmetic. The problem is getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications for physics which are not metaphysical. There are many speculative theories of physics that are based on information as the ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist theory of the world would have something to say about them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
Samiya, thank you for (now the first time) you moved out of your calm. (I did it!). Then you concluded with the habituel scripture-loving phrase upon which Brent had a brilliant reply S: A person's concern for their own future should be reason enough to urgently explore the scriptures! Br: No, it's a reason to get rid of scriptures and pay attention to people and the world. John M On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 at 11:17 PM, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 12:44 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: If this John is me: to keep my reply short (concentrate on Islam) Why should I study scripts the followers of which behead, flog, stone, dismember live humans and claim full credit for such cruelty in the afterlife? briefly (concentrate on science) The same reason why people should study the sciences the followers (scientists / engineers / technicians / governments / military / businesses) of which experiment with, damage, kill live humans and animals, destroy ecosystems, etc. and claim full credit for being leaders of human civilisation! A reasonable person should run away from such inhumanity, especially after our centuries of enlightenment. 'our centuries of enlightenment'? really? creating deadly weapons of mass destruction and using them, poisoning the planet and creating imbalance in the ecosystem, rendering entire species extinct, toying with the weather, ... enlightenment??? and where can we run away from it all? except in trying to find meaning in this suffering and trial? A person's concern for their own future should be reason enough to urgently explore the scriptures! Samiya Thanks for reflecting John M On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: John, I wonder if you were studying the scriptures / ideologies as well? I get the impression that you were studying the human condition: the results of (mis)interpretations and (mis)applications of religions / ideologies and naturally being revolted by it! Throughout history, humans have pursued wealth, power, pleasures: desires which within moral limits are permissible and constructive for the evolution of society, yet humans have mostly transgressed all bounds and have caused much suffering. What humans don't seem to understand is that their actions are essentially self-destructive. According to my study of the scriptures, time and again, whenever human civilisations advanced to the point of self-destruction, the Most Compassionate, True God has intervened, first by sending His Messengers and His Scriptures to warn humans about their self-destructive actions, and then saving humanity by wiping out those criminals who were bent upon destroying the world. If, for a while, you can suspend the notion that we are the most advanced that humans have ever been, and the notion that God is a terrible, heartless person that people imagine; perhaps a (re)read of the scriptures will help you realise that God is indeed the Most Kind and Most Loving, and enable you to appreciate His Commandments as those which guide humans to protect themselves from harm, lead to better their condition and enable them to build a beautiful future! Our world is also advancing towards self-destruction, all in the name of progress, and we are setting humanity up for much harm and suffering. I believe that since the last Messenger (Mohammad) and the last Scripture (Quran) have arrived, now the time for humanity 'brief stay' on Earth is coming towards its end. People of many faiths, including Muslims, are awaiting the arrival of the Anti-Christ / Beast. It is stated in the Quran: And when (is) fulfilled the word against them, We will bring forth for them a creature from the earth speaking to them, that the people were, of Our Signs, not certain. [http://www.islamawakened.com/quran/27/82/ ] However, as each one of us is in pledge for our own beliefs and deeds, so there is still hope for salvation and eternal bliss! God promises to help and guide those who WILL faith and submit to God's guidance. Samiya On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 at 2:12 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Samiya: I was learning about Communism (30s and 50s) and I disliked it because of unjust cruelty against certain people. (Rakosi, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot etc.) I was learning about Nazism (40s) and I dislliked it because of unjust cruelty against certain people. (Hitler, Skin-Heads, Szalasi, etc.) I am learning about Islam (10s) and I dislike it because of unjust cruelty against certain people. (IS and Saudi beheadings, etc.) In my studies I also learned about Catholicism and I disliked it becuase the unjust (dogmatic?) cruelty against certain people in the Inquisition etc. I learned about Judaism and disliked it because unjust cruelty against women. It also invoked the cruelty of anti-semites against themselves. I did not learn enough about Hinduism and Buddhism to
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 1:01 PM, John Mikes wrote: You wrote: /(Brent):/ /But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable*.*/ /(Bruno):/ /Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self-referentially correct machine theory./ /.../ / / The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the *Entirety*, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics, universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc. */_Theory_/* of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less sophisticated believers (scientists?). One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super-intelligence. I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are talking about is 'super' indeed. I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter-lego) i.o.w. to consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In such respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain. IFFF? Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I went with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature) upon relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety. Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to humans (machines). With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness) JM On Fri, Ju That sounds like Darwin's worry when he concluded that we were descended from an ape ancestor that he could not trust his own thought processes because they were also descended from an ape ancestor. To which someone no doubt replied, Whose thoughts will you trust if not your own. Samiya has an answer to this, but I think Darwin would have chosen to stick with his own. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
Well, one point at least. On 13 June 2015 at 16:23, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The point of responding is that if a faith is indeed the word of god, it should have answers to all the major metaphysical and philosophical questions that might be asked of it. On 13 June 2015 at 16:01, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: Dear All, I do not know if I should be responding to any of the posts on this thread as we seem to just keep repeating ourselves. I do not understand why those who have decided and declared themselves as atheists even bother to respond to my posts. I do however wish that those who consider themselves agnostics do read the scriptures. God willing, they might find the answers to the questions in their heart. A word of caution: The Quran itself recommends that every time one studies the Quran, to first pray for Allah's protection from the Devil who attempts to misguide those who seek guidance. Allah repeatedly offers forgiveness guidance throughout the Quran, and the text also explains why guidance is withheld from whom and why. May the scriptures enlighten us. Amen. Samiya On 13-Jun-2015, at 5:46 am, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Just to put my own dim consciousness into this arena, I did inquire of a young Pakistani, what he thought was the main motivation behind jihad. I asked if it was the great reward of being with Allah forever, and the women, etc. This guy corrected me and indicated, no it was not the great reward driving the jihad, but, rather, the eternal death in the grave, and the dual notion of gahannom (gehenim) in a fiery punishment for betraying Allah's eddicts. I over simplify on all this, but I believe also, that islamic teachings indicate, that they are Dar es Salaam, the House of Peace, and that we, the Qfar, or infidels, are the House of War, and that true peace is never to be offered to the Qfar, on a truce (hudna) can be offered. Thus, peace is never to be attained, as we understand it because those in the Uma, risk being burned up forever, by defiling Allah and themselves, with the uncleaness, of the Qfar or traitor, aka Infidel. So there is zero incentive for being peaceful (unless a temporary truce) with the infidel. Who wishes eternal damnation upon themselves, and their families and friends by angering Allah? There is then, no incentive to be offered that can rival the punishment and reward of Allah. Its a no brainer. It does put the frame of reverence of behaviors if one recognizes this feature of how the other fellows feel and think. By their belief system, they would consider themselves to be insane, and humiliated, by offering anything to the traitors to God. Sent from AOL Mobile Mail -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jun 12, 2015 08:15 PM Subject: Re: Quran Audio On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: to keep my reply short (concentrate on Islam) Why should I study scripts the followers of which behead, flog, stone, dismember live humans and claim full credit for such cruelty in the afterlife? briefly (concentrate on science) If you concentrate on science there won't be much to say about Muslims. Although Muslims make up 23% of the world's population since 1900 only one Muslim has won a Nobel Prize in science, Ahmed Zewail won for chemistry in 1999. Abdus Salam won for physics in 1979 and his tombstone said First Muslim Nobel Laureate, but the Pakistani government officially decreed that Abdus Salam was NOT a Muslim and ordered that the word Muslim be erased from his tombstone. The same reason why people should study the sciences the followers (scientists / engineers / technicians / governments / military / businesses) of which experiment with, damage, kill live humans and animals, destroy ecosystems, etc. and claim full credit for being leaders of human civilisation! Science can explain how a H-bomb works but says nothing about how or if they should be used, that is a function of the empathy of the bomb builder and his fear of retaliation. Islam can not say one intelligent word about how a H-bomb works or even how a conventional chemical explosive works, but that doesn't prevent it from telling people exactly how they should be used. And Islam says you shouldn't have empathy for those who frequent a different religious franchise than your do, and it also says that you shouldn't fear death because if you do what Islam tells you to do then when you die you'll live forever in Santa Claus's workshop in the sky. So we have a combination of cruelty and stupidity, and that is a dangerous combination. . A person's concern for their own future should be reason enough to urgently explore the scriptures! I don't see how reading the fairy tales of illiterate bronze age
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 6/12/2015 6:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 12 June 2015 at 17:40, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. So you say, and you may be right. Or you may not. The question is whether 2+2=4 independently of human beings (and aliens who may have invented, or discovered as the case may be, arithmetic). It may well be independent of humans or other (alien) beings, but it has no meaning until you have defined what the symbols '2','4','+', and '=' mean. Then it is a tautology. Bruce It is commonly thought to be discovered and so to be ought there independent of human beings or any cognition. But when considered more carefully what was discovered is that one can group pairs to things together (at least in imagination) and have four things. So two fathers grouped with two sons is four people. Except when it's three people. So we said OK we'll *define* units to be things that obey the rules that 2+2=4. Then we discovered that these rules implied a lot of things we hadn't thought of. But they aren't out there, they're in our language. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 6:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 12 June 2015 at 17:40, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. So you say, and you may be right. Or you may not. The question is whether 2+2=4 independently of human beings (and aliens who may have invented, or discovered as the case may be, arithmetic). It may well be independent of humans or other (alien) beings, but it has no meaning until you have defined what the symbols '2','4','+', and '=' mean. Then it is a tautology. Bruce It is commonly thought to be discovered and so to be ought there independent of human beings or any cognition. But when considered more carefully what was discovered is that one can group pairs to things together (at least in imagination) and have four things. So two fathers grouped with two sons is four people. Except when it's three people. So we said OK we'll *define* units to be things that obey the rules that 2+2=4. Then we discovered that these rules implied a lot of things we hadn't thought of. But they aren't out there, they're in our language. Brent I agree. But I think that the attraction of Platonism lies in the fact that if you abstract the notion of 'twoness' from all groups of two things, such as fathers, sons, pebbles, and so on, then you get an underlying perfect form that is independent of imperfections: such as the possibility that two fathers plus two sons might be only three people (or even only two people); or the unpleasant fact that two drops of water plus two drops of water might make only one drop of water. Platonism is a search for an escape from the 'ugliness' of reality. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
The point of responding is that if a faith is indeed the word of god, it should have answers to all the major metaphysical and philosophical questions that might be asked of it. On 13 June 2015 at 16:01, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: Dear All, I do not know if I should be responding to any of the posts on this thread as we seem to just keep repeating ourselves. I do not understand why those who have decided and declared themselves as atheists even bother to respond to my posts. I do however wish that those who consider themselves agnostics do read the scriptures. God willing, they might find the answers to the questions in their heart. A word of caution: The Quran itself recommends that every time one studies the Quran, to first pray for Allah's protection from the Devil who attempts to misguide those who seek guidance. Allah repeatedly offers forgiveness guidance throughout the Quran, and the text also explains why guidance is withheld from whom and why. May the scriptures enlighten us. Amen. Samiya On 13-Jun-2015, at 5:46 am, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Just to put my own dim consciousness into this arena, I did inquire of a young Pakistani, what he thought was the main motivation behind jihad. I asked if it was the great reward of being with Allah forever, and the women, etc. This guy corrected me and indicated, no it was not the great reward driving the jihad, but, rather, the eternal death in the grave, and the dual notion of gahannom (gehenim) in a fiery punishment for betraying Allah's eddicts. I over simplify on all this, but I believe also, that islamic teachings indicate, that they are Dar es Salaam, the House of Peace, and that we, the Qfar, or infidels, are the House of War, and that true peace is never to be offered to the Qfar, on a truce (hudna) can be offered. Thus, peace is never to be attained, as we understand it because those in the Uma, risk being burned up forever, by defiling Allah and themselves, with the uncleaness, of the Qfar or traitor, aka Infidel. So there is zero incentive for being peaceful (unless a temporary truce) with the infidel. Who wishes eternal damnation upon themselves, and their families and friends by angering Allah? There is then, no incentive to be offered that can rival the punishment and reward of Allah. Its a no brainer. It does put the frame of reverence of behaviors if one recognizes this feature of how the other fellows feel and think. By their belief system, they would consider themselves to be insane, and humiliated, by offering anything to the traitors to God. Sent from AOL Mobile Mail -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jun 12, 2015 08:15 PM Subject: Re: Quran Audio On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: to keep my reply short (concentrate on Islam) Why should I study scripts the followers of which behead, flog, stone, dismember live humans and claim full credit for such cruelty in the afterlife? briefly (concentrate on science) If you concentrate on science there won't be much to say about Muslims. Although Muslims make up 23% of the world's population since 1900 only one Muslim has won a Nobel Prize in science, Ahmed Zewail won for chemistry in 1999. Abdus Salam won for physics in 1979 and his tombstone said First Muslim Nobel Laureate, but the Pakistani government officially decreed that Abdus Salam was NOT a Muslim and ordered that the word Muslim be erased from his tombstone. The same reason why people should study the sciences the followers (scientists / engineers / technicians / governments / military / businesses) of which experiment with, damage, kill live humans and animals, destroy ecosystems, etc. and claim full credit for being leaders of human civilisation! Science can explain how a H-bomb works but says nothing about how or if they should be used, that is a function of the empathy of the bomb builder and his fear of retaliation. Islam can not say one intelligent word about how a H-bomb works or even how a conventional chemical explosive works, but that doesn't prevent it from telling people exactly how they should be used. And Islam says you shouldn't have empathy for those who frequent a different religious franchise than your do, and it also says that you shouldn't fear death because if you do what Islam tells you to do then when you die you'll live forever in Santa Claus's workshop in the sky. So we have a combination of cruelty and stupidity, and that is a dangerous combination. . A person's concern for their own future should be reason enough to urgently explore the scriptures! I don't see how reading the fairy tales of illiterate bronze age tribes will help, not even if your mommy and daddy said it will. John K Clark
Re: Quran Audio
Dear All, I do not know if I should be responding to any of the posts on this thread as we seem to just keep repeating ourselves. I do not understand why those who have decided and declared themselves as atheists even bother to respond to my posts. I do however wish that those who consider themselves agnostics do read the scriptures. God willing, they might find the answers to the questions in their heart. A word of caution: The Quran itself recommends that every time one studies the Quran, to first pray for Allah's protection from the Devil who attempts to misguide those who seek guidance. Allah repeatedly offers forgiveness guidance throughout the Quran, and the text also explains why guidance is withheld from whom and why. May the scriptures enlighten us. Amen. Samiya On 13-Jun-2015, at 5:46 am, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Just to put my own dim consciousness into this arena, I did inquire of a young Pakistani, what he thought was the main motivation behind jihad. I asked if it was the great reward of being with Allah forever, and the women, etc. This guy corrected me and indicated, no it was not the great reward driving the jihad, but, rather, the eternal death in the grave, and the dual notion of gahannom (gehenim) in a fiery punishment for betraying Allah's eddicts. I over simplify on all this, but I believe also, that islamic teachings indicate, that they are Dar es Salaam, the House of Peace, and that we, the Qfar, or infidels, are the House of War, and that true peace is never to be offered to the Qfar, on a truce (hudna) can be offered. Thus, peace is never to be attained, as we understand it because those in the Uma, risk being burned up forever, by defiling Allah and themselves, with the uncleaness, of the Qfar or traitor, aka Infidel. So there is zero incentive for being peaceful (unless a temporary truce) with the infidel. Who wishes eternal damnation upon themselves, and their families and friends by angering Allah? There is then, no incentive to be offered that can rival the punishment and reward of Allah. Its a no brainer. It does put the frame of reverence of behaviors if one recognizes this feature of how the other fellows feel and think. By their belief system, they would consider themselves to be insane, and humiliated, by offering anything to the traitors to God. Sent from AOL Mobile Mail -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jun 12, 2015 08:15 PM Subject: Re: Quran Audio On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: to keep my reply short (concentrate on Islam) Why should I study scripts the followers of which behead, flog, stone, dismember live humans and claim full credit for such cruelty in the afterlife? briefly (concentrate on science) If you concentrate on science there won't be much to say about Muslims. Although Muslims make up 23% of the world's population since 1900 only one Muslim has won a Nobel Prize in science, Ahmed Zewail won for chemistry in 1999. Abdus Salam won for physics in 1979 and his tombstone said First Muslim Nobel Laureate, but the Pakistani government officially decreed that Abdus Salam was NOT a Muslim and ordered that the word Muslim be erased from his tombstone. The same reason why people should study the sciences the followers (scientists / engineers / technicians / governments / military / businesses) of which experiment with, damage, kill live humans and animals, destroy ecosystems, etc. and claim full credit for being leaders of human civilisation! Science can explain how a H-bomb works but says nothing about how or if they should be used, that is a function of the empathy of the bomb builder and his fear of retaliation. Islam can not say one intelligent word about how a H-bomb works or even how a conventional chemical explosive works, but that doesn't prevent it from telling people exactly how they should be used. And Islam says you shouldn't have empathy for those who frequent a different religious franchise than your do, and it also says that you shouldn't fear death because if you do what Islam tells you to do then when you die you'll live forever in Santa Claus's workshop in the sky. So we have a combination of cruelty and stupidity, and that is a dangerous combination. . A person's concern for their own future should be reason enough to urgently explore the scriptures! I don't see how reading the fairy tales of illiterate bronze age tribes will help, not even if your mommy and daddy said it will. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Quran Audio
Just to put my own dim consciousness into this arena, I did inquire of a young Pakistani, what he thought was the main motivation behind jihad. I asked if it was the great reward of being with Allah forever, and the women, etc. This guy corrected me and indicated, no it was not the great reward driving the jihad, but, rather, the eternal death in the grave, and the dual notion of gahannom (gehenim) in a fiery punishment for betraying Allah's eddicts. I over simplify on all this, but I believe also, that islamic teachings indicate, that they are Dar es Salaam, the House of Peace, and that we, the Qfar, or infidels, are the House of War, and that true peace is never to be offered to the Qfar, on a truce (hudna) can be offered. Thus, peace is never to be attained, as we understand it because those in the Uma, risk being burned up forever, by defiling Allah and themselves, with the uncleaness, of the Qfar or traitor, aka Infidel. So there is zero incentive for being peaceful (unless a temporary truce) with the infidel. Who wishes eternal damnation upon themselves, and their families and friends by angering Allah? There is then, no incentive to be offered that can rival the punishment and reward of Allah. Its a no brainer. It does put the frame of reverence of behaviors if one recognizes this feature of how the other fellows feel and think. By their belief system, they would consider themselves to be insane, and humiliated, by offering anything to the traitors to God. Sent from AOL Mobile Mail -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jun 12, 2015 08:15 PM Subject: Re: Quran Audio div id=AOLMsgPart_2_749812e6-702c-47fa-8cd3-c7739f2c864a div dir=ltr div class=aolmail_gmail_extra div class=aolmail_gmail_quote On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 Samiya Illias span dir=ltra target=_blank href=mailto:samiyaill...@gmail.com;samiyaill...@gmail.com/a/span wrote: blockquote class=aolmail_gmail_quote style=margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex div dir=ltr div class=aolmail_gmail_extra div class=aolmail_gmail_quote span blockquote class=aolmail_gmail_quote style=margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex div dir=ltr div div to keep my reply short (concentrate on Islam) Why should I study scripts the followers of which behead, flog, stone, dismember live humans and claim full credit for such cruelty in the afterlife? /div /div /blockquote /span briefly (concentrate on science) /div /div /div /blockquote If you concentrate on science there won't be much to say about Muslims. Although Muslims make up 23% of the world's population since 1900 only one Muslim has won a Nobel Prize in science, Ahmed Zewail won for chemistry in 1999. Abdus Salam won for physics in 1979 and his tombstone said First Muslim Nobel Laureate, but the Pakistani government officially decreed that Abdus Salam was NOT a Muslim and ordered that the word Muslim be erased from his tombstone. /div div class=aolmail_gmail_quote blockquote class=aolmail_gmail_quote style=margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex div dir=ltr div class=aolmail_gmail_extra div class=aolmail_gmail_quote The same reason why people should study the sciences the followers (scientists / engineers / technicians / governments / military / businesses) of which experiment with, damage, kill live humans and animals, destroy ecosystems, etc. and claim full credit for being leaders of human civilisation! /div /div /div /blockquote Science can explain how a H-bomb works but says nothing about how or if they should be used, that is a function of the empathy of the bomb builder and his fear of retaliation. Islam can not say one intelligent word about how a H-bomb works or even how a conventional chemical explosive works, but that doesn't prevent it from telling people exactly how they should be used. And Islam says you shouldn't have empathy for those who frequent a different religious franchise than your do, and it also says that you shouldn't fear death because if you do what Islam tells you to do then when you die you'll live forever in Santa Claus's workshop in the sky. So we have a combination of cruelty and stupidity, and that is a dangerous combination. . blockquote class=aolmail_gmail_quote style=margin:0px 0px 0px
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
LizR wrote: On 12 June 2015 at 17:40, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. So you say, and you may be right. Or you may not. The question is whether 2+2=4 independently of human beings (and aliens who may have invented, or discovered as the case may be, arithmetic). It may well be independent of humans or other (alien) beings, but it has no meaning until you have defined what the symbols '2','4','+', and '=' mean. Then it is a tautology. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 12 June 2015 at 17:40, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: You also say that 1p phenomena - in a physical theory - have to be eliminated (as per Dennett) or elevated to something we could call supernatural (for the sake of argument - in any case, something not covered by the underlying physics). But the alternative is apparently that subjective phenomena exist inside assumed-to-be-real arithmetic, and the (appearance of a) physical world somehow emerges from that. Both of these are problematic. The first seems plausible to me (in the elimiativist mode), but implausible in that it reifies matter and doesn't have an ontological status that could be called final, but merely one that is contingent (i.e. we're here because we're here because...) while arithmetical truth, if there is such a thing, does. This is a false distinction. Arithmetical 'truth' is no more fundamental or final than physical truth. I'm glad you have access to a metaphysical oracle which tells you these things. The rest of us have to remain agnostic, (which is why I said if there is such a thing). Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. So you say, and you may be right. Or you may not. The question is whether 2+2=4 independently of human beings (and aliens who may have invented, or discovered as the case may be, arithmetic). Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: to keep my reply short (concentrate on Islam) Why should I study scripts the followers of which behead, flog, stone, dismember live humans and claim full credit for such cruelty in the afterlife? briefly (concentrate on science) If you concentrate on science there won't be much to say about Muslims. Although Muslims make up 23% of the world's population since 1900 only one Muslim has won a Nobel Prize in science, Ahmed Zewail won for chemistry in 1999. Abdus Salam won for physics in 1979 and his tombstone said First Muslim Nobel Laureate, but the Pakistani government officially decreed that Abdus Salam was NOT a Muslim and ordered that the word Muslim be erased from his tombstone. The same reason why people should study the sciences the followers (scientists / engineers / technicians / governments / military / businesses) of which experiment with, damage, kill live humans and animals, destroy ecosystems, etc. and claim full credit for being leaders of human civilisation! Science can explain how a H-bomb works but says nothing about how or if they should be used, that is a function of the empathy of the bomb builder and his fear of retaliation. Islam can not say one intelligent word about how a H-bomb works or even how a conventional chemical explosive works, but that doesn't prevent it from telling people exactly how they should be used. And Islam says you shouldn't have empathy for those who frequent a different religious franchise than your do, and it also says that you shouldn't fear death because if you do what Islam tells you to do then when you die you'll live forever in Santa Claus's workshop in the sky. So we have a combination of cruelty and stupidity, and that is a dangerous combination. . A person's concern for their own future should be reason enough to urgently explore the scriptures! I don't see how reading the fairy tales of illiterate bronze age tribes will help, not even if your mommy and daddy said it will. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way? That is exactly my criticism of your theory. I think you do need to invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes everything. But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how computation instantiates thought you can't use thought to explain the universe. It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I have never understood; white rabbits are common). You mean that you don't get the allusion to 'Alice in Wonderland'? All the best phrases come from Lewis Carroll. Like 'Humpty Dumpty Dictionary' and 'What I tell you three times is true.' Bruce It's all very well to say thought is computation and all computation is implicit in arithmetic so all thought is implicit in arithmetic. The problem is getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 14:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. So a computer computing without us, is not computing The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a transition table relating the states. Yes, and the mapping is defined, and implemented in arithmetic by the universal number. As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ? It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Well, I guess it is not weird, as Bruce seems to have also that typical negative tone of those who criticizing without studying. Why people does that is beyond my comprehension, but I am interested, as this is rather frequent (with humans). Bruno Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. I'm interested. I know that more best in the journal I publish in, more difficult it is to get it without being in an institution, but this is explained in most paper. You need to understand many representation theorem. That computability can be represented in arithmetic by sigma_1 provability, that sigma_1 provability represent an idea scientist having self- referential abilities, that the logic of self-reference is axiomatized (that the modal propositional level) by *two* logic: G and G* (also know as GL and GLS, Prl and prl-omega, K4W (for G) in the literature). That a logic of knowledge is canonically associated, and can be represented in G and G* (but there they coincide). That an intuitionist logic is associated, and can be represented, by that logic of knowledge. That a logic of observability (in a simple direct sense provided by the UDA, which I illustrate recently (thank to John Clark!) with the step 3 protocol + the 2 coffees. That logic of observability is a B- type of modal logic. That quantum type of logic admits representation in term of B-type of modal logic. All the representation theorem are constructive, and all logics, and the multimodal logic (like the 3-1 notions) are, by composition of representations; inherit the decidability of G. G* itself is representable, mechanical emulable, by G. making all of the material logic decidable, but they are also untractable, when you get many modal nesting. G is what the machine can say about itself, about what it can say and not say. G* is what is true about what the machine can say and not say. Typically, self-consistency, belongs to G* minus G, the proper classical theology of the machine looking inward. I don't believe that PA is a zombie, even if that discourse, in the third person way, appears to be atemporal: it is itself infinity recurrent in arithmetic. You need only a passive, but genuine, understanding of Gödel's paper, fundamentally. He is the one starting the interview. He missed the reversal, because he was sceptical on mechanism. he missed the Church- thesis too, and the *universal* beast. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure, I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time existence belong to the physical. I have explained this, but this needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid group, and some relation with the comp Quantum Logic. Where have you explained it? On this list? Yes. You might search on temperley and/or lieb on the archive. The winner might be a universal subgroup of the braid group. the physicist in me suspect some Moonshine Magic and role for finite simple group, and the number 24 (which might intervene in dimension comp theory). But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. If the stability of consciousness is not explained then consciousness is not explained. Agreed. It's no good saying, There must be an explanation if my theory is right. It depends. When you do reasoning on reasoning, this can be done in valid, or not, way. But when you bet on some theory, if you throw out the theory at a first problem, you might never solve that first problem. If physicists would have abandoned Newton each time it was contradicted, they would never have found relativity and the quantum. Löbianity allow a sort of arithmetical valid way to beg the question, but, here, I allude to something slightly different (yet related). There must be an explanation if my theory is right. can be put: let us assume P and we see that we have that problem. But that is the whole point: comp leads to a very interesting problem, formulable in the arithmetical language, and look, machines like PA and ZF can already provide unexpected incredible light on that subject. I am the guy who say that there is a problem, and who show
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:48, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au LizR wrote: I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a /reductio/ on the physical supervenience thesis, It seemed to me that the argument was directed against the notion of primitive physicalism, rather than just the supervenience thesis. MGA alone is a reductio ad absurdo of the physical supervenience, but not of comp supervenience. I do not remember Bruno explicitly denying supervenience. Only physical supervenience (called supervenience by most (materialist) philosophers). It would be strange if he did, since brain replacement by a computer at the appropriate substitution level is the beginning of the argument. No doubt. But, as I have argued, the argument against primitive physicalism fails because nothing is introduced that actually depends on primitive physicalism. That is why the whole enterprise appears to backfire. ? What you say does not make sense. I introduce both comp and primitive physicalism to get the contracdition. Physicis does not rely, indeed, on primitive physicalism, and that'w why there is no prblem with physics at all. The problem is for the computationalist only: they have to retrieve physics from machine self-reference. Then I show PA has already done the job at the propositional part. assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains). But there are other assumptions. Showing a contradiction only shows that your starting point is inconsistent (assuming that all the other stages of the reasoning are correct). It doesn't point to *which* assumption is at fault. That comes down to metaphysics, so it is all irrelevant for understanding the real world of experience. I just show a problem for the computationalist, and to avoid people makes easy conclusion, i show how machine as clever as PA can already debunk the use of such result to argue that comp is false. Then I am strike by the functional morphism between neoplatonism and the discourse of the machine introspecting itself. The point is that with comp, metaphysics can be proceeded with the scientific way, without any metaphysical ontological commitment, but the terms of the theory. It seems to me that you are the one doing a metaphysical commitment, if not, why would you like comp false, or useless, etc. Bruno Bruce You don't like my metaphsysics? That's all right -- I have a whole draw full of alternative metaphysics available... ** With apologies to Groucho Marx. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:06, LizR wrote: On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is not possible that we might simply not yet know everything? Just illustrative. The other available alternatives to reality being computable are oracles, hypercomputers, the physical existence of a continuum, and maybe a few other things this margin is too small to contain. I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a reductio on the physical supervenience thesis, assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains). I think that's correct. I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I've misunderstood. It is correct. The idea is that I make comp clear, even if at first using the physical image (doctor, real artificial brain, etc.), then when making clear the physical supervenience thesis, we get the contradiction. At that stage, people can still be materialist, but have to abandon computationalism. yet, in AUDA, I illustrate that such a move can also be premature, because, when asked, the machine illustrates that self-reference does put non trivial constraints on the knowable and bettable (observable). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily) make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true, but might be of the type G* minus G.) What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/ knowledge come from, in a testable way? I know that there is bad news, like some amount of math, and then a sequence of more and more complex questions. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, That does not follow. Something non computable can emulate something computable. It has too, if we want universal machine and brain there. which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. yes, we inherit each time the normality of our neighborhood. (I find this a bit frightening but then God know which theory is true, isn't it?) With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable notion, a priori. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. OK. (But then there is no problem). There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains. ? Only the Sigma_1 truth is emulated. The Pi_1 and Sigma_2 truth and above are not mechanically emulable. You can define corresponding divine being capable of emulating them, but that is not logically necassery. yet those are well defined truth (even definable in PA) approximating the non definable, by PA, union of all those truth. Yes, what Gödel, Turing, Church results illustrate is that the computable lives in a complicated relation with the non computable. In philosophy of mind (and matter) this is doubly so due to the FPI, which makes us confronted with infinities at the border of our Turing emulable parts. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 Jun 2015, at 01:47, LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK. Er, you are not answering me here. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the brain so I assumed you knew what you were talking about. I see you are ware of that, but the quote above suggests differently. We agree of course. What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't very long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being employed. Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in different ways. But Bruce made clear that he is not interested in the problem. It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:24, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions, not that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to the quantum MWI, when taken from the material points of view. No, it has nothing to do with it. You are arguing that since my dog has four legs, and my cat also has four legs, then my dog is a cat. Not at all. You abstract yourself from the UDA. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 11 Jun 2015, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote: On 6/11/2015 6:58 AM, David Nyman wrote: Recent discussions on the purported 'reversal' of the relation between 'machine psychology' and physics seem to be running, as ever, into the sand over disagreements on the meaning and significance of rather complex arguments like the MGA. I'd like to try another tack. The computational theory of mind (CTM) asserts, in effect, that all experience is a simulation - i.e. is the net effect of some form of computational activity. Bruno's starting assumption, at the beginning of the UDA, is that a 'computation' be understood, conventionally, as any sequence of physical actions whose net effect adequately approximates that computation. This is essentially what I understand to be the standard physical notion of computation. One of its consequences, noted in step 7 of the UDA, is that a physical computer capable of instantiating the trace of a universal dovetailer (UD) would thereby simulate all possible experiences. If a computer running such a program were indeed to exist, it would be impossible to distinguish whether any given experience was a consequence of its activity or that of some other 'primitive' (i.e. non-simulated) physical system. Indeed, the quasi- fractal, super-redundancy of the trace of the UD would render it overwhelmingly improbable that the origin of any given experience lay outside of its domain. Of course, such a notion can be attacked by denying that any actual physical universe in which we are situated is sufficiently robust (i.e. extensive in space and time) to support the running of such a computer, or even if it were so robust, that any such device must necessarily be found in it. However, even at this point in the argument it may be a little disturbing to realise that we might escape the 'reversal' only by appealing to what might appear to be contingent, rather than essential, considerations. In order to torpedo these final objections, Bruno deploys the MGA, which is intended to show that any brute equivalence between net physical activity and computation, accepted previously, is in fact unsound. However, the issue of what the MGA does or does not demonstrate seems to open up a never-ending conversational can of worms. Perhaps there are simpler arguments that can be accepted, or at least that might lead to a clearer form of disagreement. My suggestion would be to re-examine the notion of computation itself as a foundation for a theory of mind. ISTM that as long as we restrict discussion to third-person (3p) notions, there is no unusual difficulty, in principle, in justifying an equivalence between some psychological state and the action of some physical system, understood as approximating a computation. This is the sort of thing we mean (or at least is implied) when we say that human psychology supervenes on the activity of the brain. According to the tried and tested principles of physical reduction (which essentially boil down to 'no strongly emergent phenomena') a psychological state supervening on the physical activity of the brain (at whatever level) should be understood as being nothing over and above the combined effects of more fundamental physical events and relations that underlie it. In other words, both 'psychology' and 'computation' should here be understood as composite terms that subsume a great mass of reducible sub- concepts, 'all the way down' to whatever level of physics we consider, for present purposes, as 'given'. None of this, as said before, occasions any special difficulty in explaining correlations between such concepts as psychology and computation, as long as it is realised that any new effects 'emerging' from the underlying physical sub-strata are ultimately to be understood as merely composites of more fundamental events and relations. If none of the foregoing presents any special theoretical difficulty so long as we restrict our arguments to the familiar 3p mode of discussion, the same can't be said of its application to first personal (1p) concepts. This is the point, I feel, where sheep and goats begin to shuffle apart (sheepishly or goatishly) in the matter of theories of mind. What too often gets lost in our discussions, ISTM, is the essential distinction between any third- person account of the first-person (e.g. as I am now doing in these paragraphs) and the 1p phenomenon itself. Whereas the former can be understood without special theoretical difficulties as a weakly emergent (i.e. composite) effect, the latter cannot, at least not without implicitly dismissing its status as an independently real phenomenon, in the manner of the Graziano theory recently discussed. It's perhaps not so surprising that this distinction is elusive, as there is no other circumstance, AFAIK, in which this consideration arises. Putatively
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Meh! I have read that some theorists now predict that dark whatever will cause a new contraction and that this is already occuring. Its the sort of thing that gets mentioned in ARIXV, and physorg. Please note, I am not waiting up for the next x-billion years to see if this occurs or not? Predict? The only thing I've heard is that because nobody knows what Dark Energy is we can't entirely rule out the possibility that in trillions of years it will suddenly reverse direction even though there is absolutely no sign of that happening now. But no amount of spin can change the fact that the discovery of an accelerating universe was a devastating blow to Tipler's Omega Theory. And how do you explain away Tipler's incorrect predictions about the value of the Hubble constant and the mass of the Higgs boson when Tipler wrote in black and white that those predictions HAD to be correct or his theory wouldn't work? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. Not really. It is a sequence of states brought by a universal machine (and then by infinities of such universal machines). With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Any sequence of physical state can be made into any computation, by changing the universal machine. computation is a relative notion. you need to make precise the universal machine you talk about when mentioning a computation. This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. That does not follow. With computationalism, almost everything is NOT a computation. The computable part of arithmetic is only a tiny part of arithmetical truth. That play some role in the measure problem. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:43, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the computations of the dovetailer? By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and- now (defined indexically with the DX=XX method). Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the winner is given by infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial approximations. The first person invariance for the UD delays play a crucial role here. But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable. Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- referentially correct machine theory. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Conway Life emulating Conway Life
On 15 Apr 2015, at 10:55, LizR wrote: That's rather mind-boggling - GOL rather than GOD? If GOL is God, we are all trivially God. We, the universal interpreters (Fortran, Lisp, combinators, numbers, etc.). Sometimes I call that God, the little God. It is one that you *can* name, but once you name it, it multiplies and get other name (computer, apple, microsoft, algol, GOL, Lisp, Paul, Jack, Liz, John, Samya, etc. The apparition of computer is an abstract big-bang, a sort of creative explosion, with infinitely many echoes, leading to layers and layers of universality: universes, lives, brains, languages, computers, ... Bruno On 15 April 2015 at 20:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi, Here is a wonderful video showing an emulation of the game of life, programmed in the game of life. It illustrates well the notion of emulation. In fact the program is supposed to emulate itself, so there is a nice inception effect, also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xP5-iIeKXE8 I have to go, Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:20, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. Exactly. Bruno Quentin This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 Jun 2015, at 10:18, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Solipsist! That does not follow. Dreams can be shared, like with second-life video games, or the MWI. The point was in your suggestion that dreamers might not wake -- nothing to do with shared dreams. Shared dreams refer to a different form of dream -- as in I dream of winning the lottery. The idea that our experience of life is just a dream leads to solipsism. Very often indeed. My point was just that t is a common invalid move, and this can easily be understood in term of multi-user video game (to build the counter-example: not to pretend anything on what is real or not). With computationalism, there is only shared dreaming, and so we never wake, but we can wake relatively to a layer of universality. Yet, empirically, we can be pretty sure that the quantum realities are at the bottom core of the physical reality. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:21, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, You mean that work on the basis that conscious supervenes on the physical brain, Not really. At least conscious supervenes on the physical brain is ambiguous. No, I meant the idea that what is relevant in the brain for consciousness does not invoke actual infinities, nor non computable elements so that we can survive with a brain/body computer. and that that brain operates according to regular physical laws. That will do, as those laws are computable, as far as we know. You don't have to accept comp, even unknowingly, to believe that. Once you believe that, modula the prcision I just gave, this is equivalent with comp1, and this ential comp2. except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non-computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. And I have given such an account, many times. I have not seen them. Please give a link, or make a summary. In any case, I can criticize comp without having to provide an alternative. One can say that general relativity and QM are mutually incompatible without having to solve the problem of quantum gravity. Like we can show that computationalism and physicalism is incompatible. Fair enough. But I have missed your argument against comp1 (and I have show the flaw in your argument that comp1 does not lead to comp2). I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. And what did you find? The truth is that you have not tested any of these ideas in practice, In practice? I just prove theorems. I am a theoretician. There is no practical application, except learning that science has not yet really begun, given that we use incompatibe theological ideas, like comp and the beliefs in a primitive physical reality. The practice of this needs theology to come back in academy. nor have you produced a conscious program or computer. Here is one: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x + for all F first order arithmetical formula: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x). That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the work. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:44, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. What quantum operator is that? Frequency operator, a bit like in some paper by Graham, Hartle, but recasted in the Z and X logic. I can do that tnaks to work done in quantum logic (Dalla Chiara, Goldblatt, Bell, ...). And with what other quantum operator does it fail to commute. Other yes-No question/operator. I don't want to explain this right now. I need you first to understand the UDA. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. You claim that physics emerges from the UD, I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from the UD. but you just happen not to be sure about time and space.? because time and space might be a geographical notion. What, in your opinion then, is physics? A set of dynamical laws describing the behaviour of material objects in time and space, or what? Yes, laws, which have to be true everywhere, for all machines. But comp cannot explain geographico-historical happenings (nor do the physical law; that is why geography is not physics). If the modalities of the material hypostases would have collapsed, like most people thought a long time ago, then physics might have become, assuming comp, entirely geographical, and this would have lead to a continous multiverse, incarnating all physical/geographical laws. But now, the modalities do not collapse, and we know (with comp) that there is a genuine physical reality. You need to be a bit more precise about what you consider to be geographical (contingent) and what you consider to be derivable physics. You need to understand the way I proceed. I start from comp, and show only that physics is derivable, so we will see clearly what is genuinely physical and what is contingent. The contingencies are differnet for each material hypostases, and described by 0, 1, 2, 3, in arithmetic. Physics is often taken to be a set of dynamical laws together with some boundary conditions. The hope of some is that we can subsume more and more of the boundary into the dynamics, so that a true TOE is only physics, with no boundary conditions, geography, or contingencies at all. You need to come clean on what the dovetailer can actually give -- What precisely. you have shown that you don't know what a computation is, so I doubt that you can assess what has already be done, to be frank. we have to be ably to check this against observable physics in order to verify it, after all. This has been done. It is, like for any theory on reality, an infinite task, and the problem now is to solve open question in computer science/mathematical logic. the quantum proposition physics has already been extracted. But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. Comp does not explain why there is consciousness, it assumes it. It assumes it in UDA, but we got the complete explanation in AUDA, up to something which is explained as being not explainable for logical reason. And what is more, it doesn't actually tell us anything useful about consciousness. It explains completely why consciousness is not a computation, nor matter can be computable. According to your recent statements, consciousness is not even a computation. Yes, that is an example of application of comp. Also, there is no requirement for me to offer any theory of consciousness, as I have explained in detail elsewhere. So, you have just a negative tone, but you have neither find a flaw in comp and its consequences, nor propose any alternative. I am not sure what is your goal. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non- computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. But you only assume it instantiates your consciousness because it instantiates all possible Turing computations. So it's validation of your theory depends on assuming your theory. But I am not defending the idea that comp is true at all. I was obviously assuming comp. I work in that theory. You know that since the start. I tell only consequence of that theory. I only show the problem (UDA), and the machine's solution (AUDA), which I compare to the human solution (the Plato-type one, and the Aristotle type one). I think you made a sort of straw man thing here. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 Jun 2015, at 16:56, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about the belief that you are the only mind and that all other minds are you as well? The crime is intellectual dishonesty. I don't believe anyone this side of a looney bin really believes in solipsism except when arguing on the internet or standing in front of a classroom full of sophomore philosophy students trying to sound provocative. I agree. Solipsism is an ultra-pathetic thought, unless you interpret solipsism in Kim's sense, which is God solipsism, which logically does not only NOT making the other disappearing, but it makes the other like doppelganger à-la Washington/Moscow type, except that the split occurred a much longer time ago. But I would not follow Kim to call that solipsism, which is usually the more naive idea that I am actually dreaming of the others, and that they are sort of zombie images. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:34, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is comp for a materialist: but that position is proved to be nonsense. Comp is just I am a digitalizable machine. String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be able to think too. But in saying I am a digitalizable machine you implicitly assume that machine exists in the environment that you exist in. That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of environments, played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence are relative, and phenomenological. It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning to the digital thoughts of the machine. I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning? It undermines the MGA because it shows that whether a physical process instantiates a computation is a wholistic question, one whose answer is relative to the environment and interaction with that environment. This means that isolating the movie graph and then showing that it is absurd to regard it as a computation is not a legitimate move. The boolean graph contained the part of the simulation of the environment. That doesn't solve the problem. The simulation of the environment refers to the environment outside the simulation (that's why it's a simulation). So if someone asks how the computation gets meaning the answer is contagious and extends indefinitely far in time and space. Why. All those environment/brain situations are emulated infinitely often in arithmetic. or you are placing something magical in the environment, or in the use of therm meaning. Then the movie graph does not emulate a computation, and that is what lead to the absurdity. Or you mean that the environment needs primitive matter, but then the boolean graph already does not the relevant computation. I'm confused on that point. I agree it is subtle. I am confused too on this, but the contrary would be astonishing. Consciousness and theology, in the comp frame is easy (as John K said), but not that easy. Comp1 is the proposition that the brain can be replaced by a digital computer at some level of emulation. OK. It can be replaced, in the physical reality, at the substitution level. The brain's function must be Turing emulable. At least those relevant for the relevant computations. OK. But then after going through the argument to show that conscious thoughts, as computations, Careful, you might associate consciousness to cpmputation, but actually, consciousness, like knowledge is associated to computations, but also to God (Truth). exist independent of material processes, you somehow jump to the conclusion that neither conscious thoughts nor physical processes are Turing emulable (which is why I called those conclusions part of comp2). This is because you are indetermined below your substitution level, and matter stabilizes on the FPI on a*all* computation. And consciousness is related to Truth, which is not even definable. I might say more later, if when going again through the step 7. It is not simple, and highly counter-intuitive, but it is important that people understand better the fact that arithmetic emulates the computations, beyond describing them. I have realized lately that this is not obvious for more than one people on this list. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 12 Jun 2015, at 08:13, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 03:40:48PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: This is a false distinction. Arithmetical 'truth' is no more fundamental or final than physical truth. Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. Yes - but comp actually doesn't depend on standard arithmetic either. What it depends on is the Church-Turing thesis to define what is meant by computation. Standard arithmetic is convenient, as it contains CT-thesis universal computers within it, but not essential. Any other ontology supporting the CT-thesis will do. The assumption of CT-thesis is not trivial, however. As David Deutsch would point out, one could assume the Hilbert Hotel, and get a form of hypercomputation. DD argues that lack of hypercomputers around us is evidence that physical reality cannot support more powerful computational models that the Turing one, but a more neutral way of putting it is to say that ontology (which may or may not be physical) cannot support more powerful models, effectively demarcating parts of Platonia. Yes. It is the precise demarcation, in the arithmetical platonia, between the sigma_1 reality, and the pi_i and sigma_i more complex, non computable (but still well definite arithmetically) realities. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 12 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: You also say that 1p phenomena - in a physical theory - have to be eliminated (as per Dennett) or elevated to something we could call supernatural (for the sake of argument - in any case, something not covered by the underlying physics). But the alternative is apparently that subjective phenomena exist inside assumed-to-be- real arithmetic, and the (appearance of a) physical world somehow emerges from that. Both of these are problematic. The first seems plausible to me (in the elimiativist mode), but implausible in that it reifies matter and doesn't have an ontological status that could be called final, but merely one that is contingent (i.e. we're here because we're here because...) while arithmetical truth, if there is such a thing, does. This is a false distinction. Arithmetical 'truth' is no more fundamental or final than physical truth. Arithmetic is, after all, only an axiomatic system. Sorry, but here you show that you have no knowledge of modern mathematical logic. Arithmetical truth, or reality, is subsumed in the usual structure (N, 0, +, *). Since Gödel we know that this is not a computable reality, and indeed that it escapes *all* effective theories. An axiomatic system, like RA, or PA, or ZF, can only scratch on the surface of the arithmetical reality. What is true, is that with comp, everything is determined by the much more tiny sigma_1 arithmetical truth, which is the arithmetical UD. From inside, the phenomenological is richer, and cannot be bounded in non computable complexity. Most machine's predicate are not computable. We can make up an indefinite number of axiomatic systems whose theorems are every bit as 'independent of us' as those of arithmetic. Once you assume one universal system, you get all the other for free. from now one I assume only the combinators K and S, and their combinations. That will help for the physical derivation. Are these also to be accepted as 'really real!'? Once one is real, all the other are real too. The robinson arithmetical axioms becomes theorem in combinatory algebra. Standard arithmetic is only important to us because it is useful in the physical world. It is invented, not fundamental. Amen. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 12 Jun 2015, at 07:24, Bruce Kellett wrote: David Nyman wrote: Recent discussions on the purported 'reversal' of the relation between 'machine psychology' and physics seem to be running, as ever, into the sand over disagreements on the meaning and significance of rather complex arguments like the MGA. I'd like to try another tack. It is useful to have a different perspective. You have helped clarify some of the issues, for me at least. The computational theory of mind (CTM) asserts, in effect, that all experience is a simulation - i.e. is the net effect of some form of computational activity. Bruno's starting assumption, at the beginning of the UDA, is that a 'computation' be understood, conventionally, as any sequence of physical actions whose net effect adequately approximates that computation. This is essentially what I understand to be the standard physical notion of computation. One of its consequences, noted in step 7 of the UDA, is that a physical computer capable of instantiating the trace of a universal dovetailer (UD) would thereby simulate all possible experiences. If a computer running such a program were indeed to exist, it would be impossible to distinguish whether any given experience was a consequence of its activity or that of some other 'primitive' (i.e. non-simulated) physical system. Indeed, the quasi- fractal, super-redundancy of the trace of the UD would render it overwhelmingly improbable that the origin of any given experience lay outside of its domain. Of course, such a notion can be attacked by denying that any actual physical universe in which we are situated is sufficiently robust (i.e. extensive in space and time) to support the running of such a computer, or even if it were so robust, that any such device must necessarily be found in it. However, even at this point in the argument it may be a little disturbing to realise that we might escape the 'reversal' only by appealing to what might appear to be contingent, rather than essential, considerations. In order to torpedo these final objections, Bruno deploys the MGA, which is intended to show that any brute equivalence between net physical activity and computation, accepted previously, is in fact unsound. However, the issue of what the MGA does or does not demonstrate seems to open up a never-ending conversational can of worms. Perhaps there are simpler arguments that can be accepted, or at least that might lead to a clearer form of disagreement. The MGA fails because it is a thought experiment that seeks to establish a metaphysical result, namely, that there is no role for 'primitive' materialism. However, if the argument were valid, it would only establish some sort of dualism between consciousness and brain activity, whether the brain were physical or not. Because it is undoubtedly the case that consciousness does supervene on brain activity -- the experimental evidence for this is overwhelming. There are evidence that consciousness can be associated to brain activity, but some would say that there are evidence that consciousness does not need anything non computable in the brain, and there is no evidence that the consciousness does not supervene on the infinity of brain in arithmetic: on the contrary, even physicists are brought to the idea that our consciousness might depend on those infinities, like with Everett. We would not say yes to a doctor, if we did not believe in some local physical supervenience thesis. The reasoning just show tools to evaluate the clues that the physical itself emerges from coherence conditions in number (or combinators, ...) relations. One can't remove the brain (or some substituted physical equivalent) and still have consciousness. Remove where? If your brain is remove here, but not there, you will still not know that your brain has been removed. It is important to distinguish the first person view and the third person view. My suggestion would be to re-examine the notion of computation itself as a foundation for a theory of mind. ISTM that as long as we restrict discussion to third-person (3p) notions, there is no unusual difficulty, in principle, in justifying an equivalence between some psychological state and the action of some physical system, understood as approximating a computation. This is the sort of thing we mean (or at least is implied) when we say that human psychology supervenes on the activity of the brain. According to the tried and tested principles of physical reduction (which essentially boil down to 'no strongly emergent phenomena') a psychological state supervening on the physical activity of the brain (at whatever level) should be understood as being nothing over and above the combined effects of more fundamental physical events and relations that underlie it. In other words, both 'psychology' and 'computation'
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: nor have you produced a conscious program or computer. Here is one: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x + for all F first order arithmetical formula: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x). That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the work. That seems more absurd than the reductio of the MGA. One must ask of what is the program conscious?...all theorems of PA? That's not only very different from what I am aware of, it's also infinitely greater. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You claim that physics emerges from the UD, I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from the UD. But I don't think you've shown that. Comp1 doesn't imply that all possible computations exist. That's a separate assumption you slip in that all computations or all arithmetic exists. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
