Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/10/2015 1:53 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 Oct 2015, at 12:11 PM, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


So psychological continuation is very dependent on the exact details 
of the case, and if copying of consciousness ever becomes possible, 
then, by and large, it will simply be regarded as another way of 
creating new people -- it will not be a recipe for immortality in any 
except a very impoverished sense.


The example I was thinking of was destructive copying. This is 
equivalent to being knocked out and carried to another place. It 
doesn't matter how far or if there is a time delay, since you don't 
experience this. It also doesn't matter if there is a causal 
connection, as there would be in teleportation or being knocked out 
and carried, or if the copying occurs randomly. There is no way for 
you to know from introspection how you have come to wake up in a new 
place.
You might not then be able to tell by introspection whether you had been 
destructively copied to a new location or simply carried there while 
unconscious. That is why one needs independent external evidence to be 
sure about what is going on. If personal copying is essentially 
unavailable in your experience, then you might believe that you had 
simply been carried somewhere while unconscious. If personal duplication 
were commonplace in your experience, you would require more evidence to 
tell what might have happened. In either case, introspection is a poor 
guide to the nature of reality.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

> On 5 Oct 2015, at 12:11 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
>> On 5/10/2015 11:41 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On 5 October 2015 at 09:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>  
 On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will think it is 
 you and have all your physical and psychological qualities. This relies on 
 the assumption that your physical and psychological qualities are due to 
 the configuration of matter in your body. It does not rely on the further 
 assumption that the copy be verified.
>>> 
>>> But thinking (or knowing) that it is a copy does require the transfer of 
>>> information. Otherwise the only sensible position to take is that there are 
>>> two independent persons.
>> 
>> The copy will feel that it is a continuation of the original. In general the 
>> copy will not know it is a copy unless it is supplied with the information 
>> or encounters the original, and even then it will feel it is the original, 
>> despite knowing intellectually that it is a copy.
> 
> It all depends on the information available. If the person does not know that 
> he is a copy of someone else, then there will be no reason to suspect such. 
> If one does know that one is a copy, then you will regard yourself as a new 
> independent person who shares some background with another independently 
> existing person.
> 
> 
>  
>> 
>>> I think I have lost track of exactly what you are trying to establish by 
>>> this line of argument. Perhaps we should start with a clear statement of 
>>> what you think these copies actually achieve.
>> 
>> To simplify so that only one version of you is extant at a time: I think 
>> that if you died and a copy of you at the moment prior to death was made 
>> somewhere else, you would survive in that copy, regardless of how it was 
>> made or how far away it was.
> 
> That might depend on how you died. If the disease from which you died was an 
> intrinsic part of you, then the resurrected individual would also be dead. If 
> not, it differs in essential ways.
> 
> I think it is of some importance where the copy is reconstructed. If you are 
> copied non-destructively, then you continue as the same individual. If the 
> copy is reconstructed at much the same place and time, then there is an 
> identifiable copy that then goes on to his own independent life. It is no 
> longer me in any useful sense because of the inevitable divergence of 
> experience. If the copy is reconstructed far away, then the difference in 
> environment is sufficient to make it a less close continuation. If it is 
> reconstructed much later in time, then it is largely irrelevant because the 
> original has moved on in that time. I am not the same person as I was twenty 
> years ago, even though I am the unique continuer of that person. So 
> reconstructing a copy of me made twenty years ago, now has every bit as 
> little resemblance to me as another individual.
> 
> If the copying process is destructive, and the reconstruction is immediate, 
> then there is a sense in which there is a continuer, but it could also be 
> argued that death is death, and that the copy is a new individual, with some 
> carry-over of memories and features -- not essentially more than could be 
> gained by close knowledge of the original person, and a bit of facial 
> reconstruction.
> 
> So psychological continuation is very dependent on the exact details of the 
> case, and if copying of consciousness ever becomes possible, then, by and 
> large, it will simply be regarded as another way of creating new people -- it 
> will not be a recipe for immortality in any except a very impoverished sense.

The example I was thinking of was destructive copying. This is equivalent to 
being knocked out and carried to another place. It doesn't matter how far or if 
there is a time delay, since you don't experience this. It also doesn't matter 
if there is a causal connection, as there would be in teleportation or being 
knocked out and carried, or if the copying occurs randomly. There is no way for 
you to know from introspection how you have come to wake up in a new place.

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Re: A scary theory about IS

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 10:24 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 9/27/2015 12:55 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno, it seems I cannot shake you out from the 'classical' format that
>  -WHOEVER (Nominative, not: "whomever" which is Accusative) *lies*
> himself into getting the (questionable?) majority of the voting population
> (and THEN can do WHATEVER his interest dictates - in the name of such
> majority  - )
> means *D E M O C R A C Y *.  NO, it does not. You may call it a
> distortion, or any political malaise, but democracy (the cratos of the
> demos) is the rule of the (entire) population, not a select majority only,
> leaving any size of minority suppressed in the system.
> It is not timely, to implement such system in our (ongoing) World. - So be
> it. - I try to keep the vocabulary clean and do not compromise for ongoing
> corruptions.
>
>
> That's not even a system.  Rule by the entire population would require the
> entire population to agree on rules.  As Lyndon Johnson once said, "If two
> people agree on everything only one of them is doing the thinking."  A
> democracy necessarily must have some way of deciding rules that people do
> not all agree on.  Majority vote seem to be the only workable one; although
> there are many variants to deal with multiple choices (plurality, ranking,
> run-offs...).  The way to avoid suppression of minorities is to limit the
> range of action of the government.  Define individual rights which are
> beyond the reach of majority vote.
>

Right, but who does the suppressing? The common approach in the West seems
to be to have a constitution, that we respect for historical reasons and
make very hard to change. So, at this level, there's democracy with a lot
of drag built into the system, so that brash decisions and appealing to the
sensibilities of a narrow point in time is almost impossible.

In practice, this has been hacked. The trick is not to change the
constitution but to re-interpret it or just operate in secret.

The first trick grants immense power to special courts and a very small
priesthood, that gets to decide that words mean the opposite of what we
thought they meant.

The second trick is executed under our noses, through "trade agreements".
We are in the midst of the largest of such attempts, TTIP. Trade agreements
essentially work like this: your democracy can decide whatever it wants,
but my corporation can then go to an arbitration "court" and sue for loss
of profits. Guess who these arbitrators are? Layers from the same top layer
firms that big corporations employ. Mainstream media mostly does not report
on this (naturally, they are owned by the same corporations), Of course
these trade agreements are illegal in light of the constitution of most
countries, but there is really little we can do about it except going to
demonstrations and perhaps telling more people about them.

Check this talk if you're interested:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fDCbf4O-0s

Best,
Telmo.


>
> Brent
>
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Re: Mandela effect?

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very fast and 
randomly, indeed. It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a 
statistical mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the 
Big Bang. here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge 
is not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and then 
use this against despair. Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best 
resolved by hypercomputing. This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, 
to achieve this goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to 
decide when we are pleased with the result. 

 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
Subject: Re: Mandela effect?







On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

Never heard of it before.

http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/




I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with what 
Bruno said).


It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas though:
https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect


I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a bar, 
started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with the sort of 
ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular before in 
smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation. Our hypothesis 
was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a random path, we 
would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep up". It didn't work, 
but these days we could have started an Internet movement.


Best,

Telmo.




 

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 4 October 2015 at 09:05, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 4/10/2015 6:03 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:21 PM, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> On 3/10/2015 1:52 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between local copies,
> obeying the laws of physics and information transfer, and remote copies
> outside our particle horizon. The latter are of absolutely no relevance to
> me here-and-now because there is no possibility of information transfer.
>
>
> Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the
> Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition*
> think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it being
> far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no physical
> connection with you.
>
> That is still within the forward light cone, so information could be
> transmitted. Information is physical. If there is no transfer of
> information, there is no way one could test what the copy thought.
>
>
> Are you saying that the copy would not really be a copy until it verified
> this by establishing contact with the original, or that the mere
> possibility of establishing contact with the original is necessary and
> sufficient?
>
>
> You would no know you had a copy until the two were compared -- and that
> involves the transfer of information.
>

No, you wouldn't know you were a copy - you would probably think you were
the original.

> Alternatively, what could it possibly mean for the 'copy' to think -- I am
> the person that was born in another galaxy a million years ago? Perhaps
> people think crazy things like that all the time, but they are usually put
> away so that they can do no more harm to themselves.
>
>
> A lot of people believe that they are someone else, and they are deluded,
> because it isn't possible in the world we live in. They would not
> necessarily be deluded if it were possible.
>
> Even if copies were possible, being deluded would also be possible. We
> would only ever be able to tell the difference by checking our thoughts
> against independent evidence from the world around us, other people, etc,
> etc.
>
> None of these checks is possible for purported copies outside our light
> cone, or at remote times and locations.
>

If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will think it is
you and have all your physical and psychological qualities. This relies on
the assumption that your physical and psychological qualities are due to
the configuration of matter in your body. It does not rely on the further
assumption that the copy be verified.

> Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have defined you
> were *inadequately* copied last night in your sleep. You believe you're
> Bruce Kellett, have his memories, look like him, and everyone who knew
> Bruce agrees that he seems to be the same guy. However, the atoms just
> weren't put in place using the right procedure, whatever that might be.
> What difference does the knowledge of this deficit make to you? What
> difference does it make to anyone else?
>
>
> How does such an implausible scenario differ from the observation that I
> sloughed off some flakes of skin during the night, some cells died, and
> some new cells grew, nourished by the food I ate for dinner last night?
> Minor changes do not disrupt bodily continuity, and all these changes are
> subject to the laws of physics, so are completely traceable and
> understandable.
>
>
> Yes, but as far as I can tell you think that there is some possible
> scenario where your psychological continuity is preserved in the sense I
> have described but physical continuity is not preserved.
>
> No, I don't think that. I think 'psychological continuity' is an empty
> phrase when there is no physical information transfer.
>
>
> So this is exactly what I am asking you to consider. Someone who looks
> like you, behaves like you, knows everything that you know, etc. wakes up
> in your bed this morning. Overnight, some physical changes have occurred.
> If you (the person waking up in your bed) are informed that these changes
> consist of a few cells dying and being replaced, you are not worried. But
> what if you are reliably informed that the physical changes involve a
> random process, or something else that would render 'psychological
> continuity' an empty phrase, as you say. You (the person waking up in your
> bed) still feel the same either way, and everyone who knows you agrees you
> seem to be the same person. Would you go around claiming that you were not
> Bruce, or that you are Bruce but have experienced a psychological
> discontinuity, or that you haven't experienced a psychological
> discontinuity because it's meaningless, or what?
>
>
> 

Re: Violation of Bell inequality. Last big progress.

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 9:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.05949v1
>>
>> ​> ​
>> But of course, this does not make Einstein wrong. This shows local non
>> locality, so to speak,
>>
>
> ​No, it does make Einstein wrong because Einstein detested
> non locality
> ​ even more than he hated non determinism. ​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> The multiverse, or the solution of some universal wave equation describes
>> a deterministic local evolution,
>>
>
> ​From a philosophical point of view ​the universal wave equation is of no
> more importance than lines of latitude and longitude, only the square of
> the absolute value is of any importance and even then it is only a
> probability,  at least latitude and longitude define a exact position.
>

Perhaps you mean from a practical view?
>From a philosophical view, the mathematical entity from where the
probabilities are derived seems quite interesting.

Telmo.


>
>   John K Clark
>
>
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Re: Mandela effect?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Never heard of it before.
>
> http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/
>


I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with
what Bruno said).

It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas
though:
https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect

I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a
bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with
the sort of ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular
before in smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation.
Our hypothesis was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a
random path, we would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep
up". It didn't work, but these days we could have started an Internet
movement.

Best,
Telmo.



>
> Brent
>
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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 4 October 2015 at 07:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:


>
> On 10/3/2015 11:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/2/2015 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the
 Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition*
 think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it being
 far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no physical
 connection with you.

>>> Yes, it would think so, but would it be right?  In what sense is it
>>> possible to right?
>>>
>> I don't think the difficulty of verification invalidates the point I am
>> making. A sceptical challenge could be mounted in everyday life - we could
>> have false memories and false beliefs about ourselves.
>>
>
> But we check those against the consistency of our environment, physics and
> our friends - which I think is the crux of Bruce's idea that you have to
> reproduce a big chunk of the surrounding world in order to get the kind of
> continuity you need.


Not really. If you unexpectedly found yourself in a weird environment,
floating in a bubble in space with no recollection of how you got there for
example, I think you would become anxious, theorise about how you might
have got there and what might happen next, and so on. I can't imagine that
your first thought would be that, with most normal environmental cues gone,
you would forget who you were.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Mandela effect?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very fast
> and randomly, indeed.


Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only computes
some sphere around the current part of the universe you're observing. Then
it might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute likely future states.
Driving randomly would be an attempt to fuck with that algorithm. Of course
this would have to be a scenario where our perception channels are hijacked
but our cognition is performed in the real world. If Our cognition is part
of the simulation, it can just take more outside-the-simulation time to
compute the next simulation moment and the inhabitants of the simulation
won't notice.


> It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical
> mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the Big
> Bang.


My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's the
common ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far enough in time
your are bound to observe it. My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of
the big bang is shared by all universes and belongs to all histories.


> here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge is
> not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and
> then use this against despair.


I agree.


> Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by
> hypercomputing. This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to
> achieve this goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to
> decide when we are pleased with the result.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Telmo Menezes 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
> Subject: Re: Mandela effect?
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> Never heard of it before.
>>
>> http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/
>>
>
>
> I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with
> what Bruno said).
>
> It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas
> though:
> https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect
>
> I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a
> bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with
> the sort of ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular
> before in smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation.
> Our hypothesis was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a
> random path, we would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep
> up". It didn't work, but these days we could have started an Internet
> movement.
>
> Best,
> Telmo.
>
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> --
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>
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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Oct 2015, at 01:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 3/10/2015 1:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Oct 2015, at 06:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:

"Your" consciousness? Your series of questions above all involve a  
physical transfer of information, in which case light cones are  
relevant, because there can be no physical transfer of information  
from you now to a point outside your future light cone. If there  
is a purported copy of you outside your past and future light  
cones, then there is no way that it can be verified that it is  
actually a copy. So the question is purely hypothetical, without  
operational content.


The point is that the copy might see the difference, like observing  
the start from a different view points allowing the conclusion that  
it has been copied outside its light cone.


If the copy is to "see a difference" then there must have been  
information transfer outside the light cone.


Assuming your non-comp hypothesis, you are right.

But assuming the brain is emulable at some finitely describable level,  
then there is no need of information transfer. Information selection  
is enough.


I think we agree on many things, Bruce. You assume materialism and non- 
computationalism.


As scientists, we don't know the truth, all right. I study the  
consequence of the computationalist assumptions, and I do think nature  
provides evidences of its origin in the laws of the universal machines  
dreams (sigma_1 sentences as seen from a person points of view,  
technically: what the 8 "hypostases" describe).





This is physically impossible.


Honestly, even with non-comp, that is an open problem. Even if I am  
actually infinite, there might be a non null possibility that "I" am  
copying by other actually infinite beings.


If you believe that you are an infinite being (as you basically need  
for having non-comp), you still obeys the laws of the infinite beings,  
and they too are confronted to even higher infinities.


After Cantor, the infinite might not be usable to escape the self- 
multiplicity.




And if comp allows such information transfer, then comp is disproved  
by the observed physics.



It does not allow that transfer of information. But comp allow the  
same information to reappear in different space-time, or even realm  
(like arithmetical/physical) and it disallow the person supported by a  
universal number to distinguish that reality from an emulation of that  
reality by another universal number. So below our substitution level  
things behave like if they belonged to different computations: we get  
a problem of statistics on the (terminating) computations. The measure  
one is modeled by the machine's view defined by the intensional  
variant of the logic of self-reference (from Gödel, Löb, Solovay, ...).


More simply, by remembering my dreams (in which I often try to  
convince myself that I am not dreaming) I conclude that a mechanism  
can make me believe in realities, and then, by Gödel and Turing,  
Church's work, it is well known (although expressed differently) that  
those mechanism, all of them actually, are emulated in a tiny part of  
the arithmetical reality.  The logical emergence of the physical laws  
has  a reason and get constraint by the possible experience of the  
soul of the universal Turing machine, with soul, a Theaetetus'  
intensional variant of formal or representable consistency/provability.


The advantage is that we get the sharable quanta (if we get them, OK,  
progress have been made) but also we get the non sharable, sometime  
non describable, qualia. We avoid the materialist elimination of the  
person, by a simple definition of the person, in arithmetic, and stay  
rationalist in abandoning only a disputable fact: the ontological  
character of the physical).


With computationalism, to put it roughly, the physical becomes the  
border of the (sigma_1) arithmetical seen from inside.


The real question: why the exceptional groups, and why groups anyway?  
Or is the number 24 really the master of gravitation-space-time?


There are progresses in quantum logic, so if the comp physic's logic  
get close enough to those quantum logic, the idea to derive the  
physical reality theory from the mind of the universal machine might  
become more palpable in our normal futures. At least as a natural  
program to do.


I can only hope you are not dogmatic about (weak) materialism and/or  
physicalism.
Personally I love physics so much that I would be pleased it can be  
explained in terms of numbers (meaning number relations and limits on  
number relations made, or not, by numbers or limits of number  
relations).


Call me an atheist. I don't believe in a real physical universe as  
long as there are no evidence. I give tools to test this in the  
computationalsit frame, and thanks to QM, it fits well, formally, but  
also intuitively for the open minded many-worlder or everythinger,  
having not to much problem with the 

Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Oct 2015, at 02:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/2/2015 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So much the worse for the computationalist doctrine! It becomes a  
matter of unverifiable faith,


I think that it is important in our context that the belief in any  
reality (different from my consciousness here-and-now) requires  
unverifiable faith.


The implication that any belief that is not verified in held on  
faith is a rhetorical trick.  There are degrees of belief which  
should be proportioned to the evidence.  That the evidence doesn't  
rise to the level of verification (certainty?) doesn't make my  
belief the sun will rise tomorrow a matter of faith.


But at the level of rigor we need to dialog on what should be really  
assumed at the start, or not, we must admit that believing that the  
sun will rise tomorrow requires faith.


Or you have clairvoyant ability.

I am aware that evolution, a plausible theory, suggest that such a  
faith is quasi hard-wired in our brain, as doubting the existence of  
the predators will not help. But that requires a faith in something  
akin to self-consistency, and that is why we have to attach <>t to the  
[]p, as we can't prove effectively, as consistent machine, that we are  
consistent or that there is a reality.


It would be a rhetorical trick if that was used to suppress a program  
to visit Mars, but the goal here is to get a rational theoretical  
approach explaining the appearances and the different points of view  
of what could be. Or you are begging the question, and assume the  
primary physical at the start.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Mandela effect?

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Ha! Your imagery of messing with the simulation, reminds me of the old film The 
13th Floor. If it is indeed a sim, then its really, really, big. Not 
impossible, but much bigger and much more complex than a game. I read this from 
one of the physicists on FQXI, some years ago. "It could be all real, with 
strong similarities to a sim, or it could be a sim, with solid aspects of a 
genuine reality." My guess if that there is a Multiverse, it has some kind of 
regulator controlling, spawning, an array, an If Then Else code. We, as a 
species, find evidence of all this, if such exists, and then, if discovered or 
even suggested, we need to apply this to our lives and civilization. 
 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 9:27 am
Subject: Re: Mandela effect?







On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:

As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very fast and 
randomly, indeed. 


Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only computes 
some sphere around the current part of the universe you're observing. Then it 
might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute likely future states. Driving 
randomly would be an attempt to fuck with that algorithm. Of course this would 
have to be a scenario where our perception channels are hijacked but our 
cognition is performed in the real world. If Our cognition is part of the 
simulation, it can just take more outside-the-simulation time to compute the 
next simulation moment and the inhabitants of the simulation won't notice.

 
It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical mechanics 
analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the Big Bang.


My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's the common 
ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far enough in time your are 
bound to observe it. My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of the big bang is 
shared by all universes and belongs to all histories.

 
 here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge is not 
merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and then use 
this against despair.


I agree.

 
 Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by 
hypercomputing. This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to achieve 
this goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to decide when 
we are pleased with the result. 


 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
Subject: Re: Mandela effect?







On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

Never heard of it before.

http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/




I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with what 
Bruno said).


It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas though:
https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect


I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a bar, 
started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with the sort of 
ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular before in 
smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation. Our hypothesis 
was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a random path, we 
would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep up". It didn't work, 
but these days we could have started an Internet movement.


Best,

Telmo.




 

Brent

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Re: Violation of Bell inequality. Last big progress.

[John Clark]

On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 5:26 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> From a philosophical point of view ​the universal wave equation is of no
>> more importance than lines of latitude and longitude, only the square of
>> the absolute value is of any importance and even then it is only a
>> probability, at least latitude and longitude define a exact position.
>>
>
>
​> ​
> Perhaps you mean from a practical view?
> ​ ​
> From a philosophical view, the mathematical entity from where the
> probabilities are derived seems quite interesting.
>

​
The probabilities are interesting but the wave itself not so much.
​ ​
Latitude and longitude
​ ​
and Schrodinger's Wave are all important from a practical point of view
because they are tools to help us understand reality, but we should
remember they are not reality they are human tools.
​ ​
If you want to talk about reality you've got to
​ ​
square
​ ​
the
​ ​
wave function, and even then all you get is a probability not a certainty.
And it is even further removed from reality than that because the wave
function contains imaginary numbers
​ ​
(square root of -1)
​ ​
so 2
​ ​
very
​ ​
different wave functions can yield the exact same
​ ​
probability
​ ​
at a point
​ ​
when you square it.

And Schrodinger's Wave is not the only tool that can find those
probabilities; about 6 months before Schrodinger invented his wave
Heisenberg used Matrix mechanics
​,​
which has nothing to do with waves
​,​
to find probabilities. For a few years there was debate about which method
was correct then it was discovered
​the 2 methods ​
were equivalent. The decision to use waves or matrices to solve a
particular real world problem, that is to say find a real world
probability, is entirely a matter of taste.
​  Sometimes it makes things easier to calculate using one method and
sometimes it's easier to use the other, but they both work. It is true that
unlike Heisenberg's more abstract Matrix Schrodinger's wave does allow you
to form a mental picture in your mind about what's going on but
Physicists have both tools in their toolbox.

  John K Clark​

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Re: What day is it?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​> ​
> But you're assuming the copy is in an evironment equivalent this world.
>

​If the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite distance away
there *IS* ​a Bruce Kellet in a world with a radius of 13.8 billion light
years identical to the Bruce Kellet in our world. In fact there are a
infinite number of them.


> ​> ​
> Suppose this Bruce Kellet copy were in a world just like this EXCEPT that
> everybody in his world knew him as John Clark?
>

​If
 the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite distance away
there *IS* ​a
​person identical to ​our
Bruce Kellet
​ in every way EXCEPT he's ​named John Clark not
Bruce Kellet
​.
In fact there are a infinite number of them.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Oct 2015, at 01:48, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/2/2015 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Oct 2015, at 21:17, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/1/2015 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Oct 2015, at 17:54, John Clark wrote:



​> ​ Many worlds is nothing more than a hypothetical  
construct.


​True. ​




Nice we all agree!

Note that one world is as much an hypothetical construct.


No, you can kick it and it kicks back.


That illustrates the existence of a physical reality, but that  
cannot count as an argument for its uniqueness, nor for its  
primitive or prior fundamental existence. On the contrary, QM and  
computationalism can both be used to argue of the consistency of  
either the  0 physical universes hypothesis  (there would be only a  
first person sharable "video game") or for the many worlds  
hypothesis (like Everett, Dewitt,  ...).


But the point is that there's ONE universe you can kick and feel it  
kick back.  That ONE is less a hypothetical construct than all those  
others in MWI and eternal inflation.


That depends on the interpretation. Deustch would argue that today and  
tomorrow are already parallel universe in the quantized space-time,  
and if the theory is simpler with the many relative views, why not  
taking it seriously.
Then in my dreams, I can also got the strong feeling that reality  
kicks back. It is the type of things that universal number do: making  
a person into believing. In video game like second-life, reality seems  
also to kick back, where of course the normal gamer don't forget  
completely the reality he started the game in, but even without the  
formal confirmation, the fact that arithmetic contains all universal  
games, makes me think that asserting the primariness of the physical  
reality might be ... premature. Especially when that materialist  
tradition is based on using authoritative arguments on the mind-body  
problem, or eliminating the person.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Oct 2015, at 02:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 3/10/2015 10:37 am, smitra wrote:

On 03-10-2015 02:10, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 3/10/2015 9:59 am, smitra wrote:

On 03-10-2015 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I have always thought this. I am a physicist with a lifelong  
interest in astronomy. In particular, the structure of the CMB  
is a topic of particular interest. So for any copy in another  
universe to be "me" in all detail, that copy must be able to  
observe exactly the same structure in the CMB. Now the CMB is  
the echo of the big bang and is the furthest object that we can  
now observe: it defines our "particle horizon", beyond which no  
data or interaction is possible. In order to get this right, the  
whole universe would have to be the same in every detail.


You can only have access to a small fraction of the information  
inside one Hubble volume.


No, you can have access to it all, but you can only retain a very
small portion of that total.

If your physical state would only be compatible with one unique  
physical state for the entire Hubble volume, then we don't have  
to bother studying the universe, we can just peer into your body  
and brain and be done with it.


An admirable non seqitur! I do not have to contain all the  
information

in the Hubble volume -- I need only have detailed memory of some
aspects of the CMB for that knowledge to be incompatible with
differences in other details. That small piece of knowledge is
sufficient to say that in orderto reproduce me, you have to  
reproduce

the entire universe, in all its detail: that knowledge of the CMB is
an essential part of what it is to be me!

The latter part of your statement above is just silly.

Bruce


Then that reproduction procedure would define a one to one mapping  
from your physical state to that of the entire universe, and from  
that we could in principle extract what some ET in some far away  
galaxy is having for dinner.


If you knew that map in detail. But you don't, and can't, so there's  
an end to it.


But if there is an end to it, it means that the copy of you, where the  
only error made is about the meal of ET, will not see any difference,  
but then he will be undetermined on all ET's meals. That's what QM  
describes, you can locally unentangle yourself by isolation of  
systems, that is what we do when we prepare pure states.


Whatever low the level of substitution is chosen, if there is an "end  
of it", you can't escape the consequence of the multi-preparation in  
the universal wave or in whatever emerge from arithmetic seen from  
inside.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Mandela effect?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Oct 2015, at 15:26, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List  wrote:
As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive  
very fast and randomly, indeed.


Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only  
computes some sphere around the current part of the universe you're  
observing. Then it might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute  
likely future states. Driving randomly would be an attempt to fuck  
with that algorithm. Of course this would have to be a scenario  
where our perception channels are hijacked but our cognition is  
performed in the real world. If Our cognition is part of the  
simulation, it can just take more outside-the-simulation time to  
compute the next simulation moment and the inhabitants of the  
simulation won't notice.


It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical  
mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the  
Big Bang.


My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's  
the common ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far  
enough in time your are bound to observe it.


I tend to agree, but I think this should be derived when Qm will be  
derived.




My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of the big bang is shared by  
all universes and belongs to all histories.


With all the Coebe dispersion, making already a lot of quasi-classical  
histories possible, but with all the same physical laws. But a sooner  
diffraction of realities exist too.


Now, I can' be sure that what we call the big bang is the real big  
bang or start of the physical histories. It might be a collision of  
branes, or just a very big explosion, among infinitely many, I mean  
the "terrestrial reality" can run very deep.





here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The  
challenge is not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover  
what is true, and then use this against despair.


I agree.


Despair is a complex topic. I do think that the pursuit of truth can  
help or should help.
The lies and the false, which can help locally, only make things  
harder later.






Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by  
hypercomputing.


I comment on spudboy100, here. I don't think so. With hyper-computing,  
you will get only hyper-problem, and you will need to pay hypertaxes.   
Of course, that is good investment, especially if the humans want to  
remained connected when colliding with Andromeda.


The harm reduction is more in the acceptance of lack of perfect  
solution, and in detaching from certainty, which can help solidify the  
basic perhaps eternal values.






This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to achieve this  
goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to decide  
when we are pleased with the result.


A basic implementation of a basic loop, OK.

Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
Subject: Re: Mandela effect?



On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker   
wrote:

Never heard of it before.

http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/


I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and  
with what Bruno said).


It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird  
ideas though:

https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect

I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls  
at a bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We  
came up with the sort of ideas that later became popular in the  
Matrix (and were popular before in smaller circles, of course), and  
decided to test the simulation. Our hypothesis was that, if we  
started driving fast and always choosing a random path, we would  
eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep up". It didn't  
work, but these days we could have started an Internet movement.


Best,
Telmo.



Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/10/2015 2:49 am, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


​ > ​
But you're assuming the copy is in an evironment equivalent this
world.


​If the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite distance 
away there *IS* ​a Bruce Kellet in a world with a radius of 13.8 
billion light years identical to the Bruce Kellet in our world. In 
fact there are a infinite number of them.


​ > ​
Suppose this Bruce Kellet copy were in a world just like this
EXCEPT that  everybody in his world knew him as John Clark?


​ If
 the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite distance 
away there *IS* ​a

​ person identical to ​our
Bruce Kellet
​ in every way EXCEPT he's ​named John Clark not
Bruce Kellet
​ .
In fact there are a infinite number of them.

Prove it! And I mean *prove*, not just wave your hands a bit.

Bruce

PS. If the copy is named 'Bruce Kellet', then it is not me, because that 
is not my name!


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Re: Mandela effect?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 04 Oct 2015, at 15:26, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very
>> fast and randomly, indeed.
>
>
> Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only
> computes some sphere around the current part of the universe you're
> observing. Then it might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute likely
> future states. Driving randomly would be an attempt to fuck with that
> algorithm. Of course this would have to be a scenario where our perception
> channels are hijacked but our cognition is performed in the real world. If
> Our cognition is part of the simulation, it can just take more
> outside-the-simulation time to compute the next simulation moment and the
> inhabitants of the simulation won't notice.
>
>
>> It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical
>> mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the Big
>> Bang.
>
>
> My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's the
> common ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far enough in time
> your are bound to observe it.
>
>
> I tend to agree, but I think this should be derived when Qm will be
> derived.
>

Sure, I don't claim the above to be anything more than a hunch.


>
>
>
> My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of the big bang is shared by all
> universes and belongs to all histories.
>
>
> With all the Coebe dispersion, making already a lot of quasi-classical
> histories possible, but with all the same physical laws. But a sooner
> diffraction of realities exist too.
>
> Now, I can' be sure that what we call the big bang is the real big bang or
> start of the physical histories. It might be a collision of branes, or just
> a very big explosion, among infinitely many, I mean the "terrestrial
> reality" can run very deep.
>

Ok, but even then I'm not sure the both ideas are mutually exclusive. Can
the multiverse contain two copies of the same moment? What would that mean?

I have a similar position in regards to simulations. Suppose you have a
perfect simulation of the middle ages running in a computer. The
inhabitants are not aware that they are in a simulation, but their entire
universe is exactly the same as the original in terms of information
content. Can you really claim that you created a "copy" of the middle ages,
or did you just figure out a way to make all the information available from
your perspective?

I see the simulation hypothesis as more of a way to connect dots in a graph
more than a model of nested dolls. I think the latter implies mysticism --
that the computational medium as any bearing on the experience of the
computed entities.


>
>
>
>
>> here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge is
>> not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and
>> then use this against despair.
>
>
> I agree.
>
>
> Despair is a complex topic. I do think that the pursuit of truth can help
> or should help.
>

I think so too.


> The lies and the false, which can help locally, only make things harder
> later.
>

Yes, and lies can be very subtle.


>
>
>
>
>
>> Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by
>> hypercomputing.
>
>
> I comment on spudboy100, here. I don't think so. With hyper-computing, you
> will get only hyper-problem, and you will need to pay hypertaxes.  Of
> course, that is good investment, especially if the humans want to remained
> connected when colliding with Andromeda.
>
> The harm reduction is more in the acceptance of lack of perfect solution,
> and in detaching from certainty, which can help solidify the basic perhaps
> eternal values.
>
>
>
>
>
> This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to achieve this goal. We
>> use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to decide when we are
>> pleased with the result.
>>
>
> A basic implementation of a basic loop, OK.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Telmo Menezes 
>> To: everything-list 
>> Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
>> Subject: Re: Mandela effect?
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Never heard of it before.
>>>
>>> http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/
>>>
>>
>>
>> I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with
>> what Bruno said).
>>
>> It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas
>> though:
>> https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect
>>
>> I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a
>> bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with
>> the sort of ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and 

Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/4/2015 12:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 4 October 2015 at 07:31, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/3/2015 11:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 10/2/2015 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were
made in the Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it
would still *by definition* think it was you despite
being made of different matter, despite it being far
removed in space and time, despite it possibly having
no physical connection with you.

Yes, it would think so, but would it be right?  In what
sense is it possible to right?

I don't think the difficulty of verification invalidates the
point I am making. A sceptical challenge could be mounted in
everyday life - we could have false memories and false beliefs
about ourselves.


But we check those against the consistency of our environment,
physics and our friends - which I think is the crux of Bruce's
idea that you have to reproduce a big chunk of the surrounding
world in order to get the kind of continuity you need.


Not really. If you unexpectedly found yourself in a weird environment, 
floating in a bubble in space with no recollection of how you got 
there for example, I think you would become anxious, theorise about 
how you might have got there and what might happen next, and so on. I 
can't imagine that your first thought would be that, with most normal 
environmental cues gone, you would forget who you were.


Sure.  But if you can find no causal explanation connecting your 
circumstances to your memories you might well doubt your memories were 
veridical, especially if you knew duplication of humans was possible.


Brent

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Re: Mandela effect?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 8:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>
>
> 2015-10-04 15:26 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes :
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very
>>> fast and randomly, indeed.
>>
>>
>> Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only
>> computes some sphere around the current part of the universe you're
>> observing. Then it might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute likely
>> future states. Driving randomly would be an attempt to fuck with that
>> algorithm.
>>
>
> That presupose you're not part yourself of the algorithm... so where is
> your consciousness computed ?
>

Well, I guess this would have to be a Matrix-like scenario. You are just
alive in some other reality but have your nervous system hijacked so that
inputs/outputs to through the simulation.

Give me a break, I was 18 and heart-broken :)


> If you're computed along everything else... you can't escape it, as from
> the pov of what is computing, you don't do something unpredicted, because
> that would mean you're doing something the algorithm has not computed...
> but it's a plain contradiction with the premises which is you're computed
> by it.
>

Yes, if you are a native of the simulation what you say follows. But you
can imagine convoluted scenarios like the one above, more useful for sci-fi
than real science.

Telmo.


>
> Quentin
>
>
>> Of course this would have to be a scenario where our perception channels
>> are hijacked but our cognition is performed in the real world. If Our
>> cognition is part of the simulation, it can just take more
>> outside-the-simulation time to compute the next simulation moment and the
>> inhabitants of the simulation won't notice.
>>
>>
>>> It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical
>>> mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the Big
>>> Bang.
>>
>>
>> My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's the
>> common ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far enough in time
>> your are bound to observe it. My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of
>> the big bang is shared by all universes and belongs to all histories.
>>
>>
>>> here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge is
>>> not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and
>>> then use this against despair.
>>
>>
>> I agree.
>>
>>
>>> Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by
>>> hypercomputing. This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to
>>> achieve this goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to
>>> decide when we are pleased with the result.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -Original Message-
>>> From: Telmo Menezes 
>>> To: everything-list 
>>> Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
>>> Subject: Re: Mandela effect?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Never heard of it before.

 http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/

>>>
>>>
>>> I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and
>>> with what Bruno said).
>>>
>>> It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas
>>> though:
>>> https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect
>>>
>>> I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at
>>> a bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with
>>> the sort of ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular
>>> before in smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation.
>>> Our hypothesis was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a
>>> random path, we would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep
>>> up". It didn't work, but these days we could have started an Internet
>>> movement.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Telmo.
>>>
>>>
>>>

 Brent

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>>>
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Re: Mandela effect?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-04 15:26 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes :

>
>
> On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very
>> fast and randomly, indeed.
>
>
> Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only
> computes some sphere around the current part of the universe you're
> observing. Then it might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute likely
> future states. Driving randomly would be an attempt to fuck with that
> algorithm.
>

That presupose you're not part yourself of the algorithm... so where is
your consciousness computed ? If you're computed along everything else...
you can't escape it, as from the pov of what is computing, you don't do
something unpredicted, because that would mean you're doing something the
algorithm has not computed... but it's a plain contradiction with the
premises which is you're computed by it.

Quentin


> Of course this would have to be a scenario where our perception channels
> are hijacked but our cognition is performed in the real world. If Our
> cognition is part of the simulation, it can just take more
> outside-the-simulation time to compute the next simulation moment and the
> inhabitants of the simulation won't notice.
>
>
>> It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical
>> mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the Big
>> Bang.
>
>
> My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's the
> common ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far enough in time
> your are bound to observe it. My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of
> the big bang is shared by all universes and belongs to all histories.
>
>
>> here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge is
>> not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and
>> then use this against despair.
>
>
> I agree.
>
>
>> Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by
>> hypercomputing. This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to
>> achieve this goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to
>> decide when we are pleased with the result.
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Telmo Menezes 
>> To: everything-list 
>> Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
>> Subject: Re: Mandela effect?
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Never heard of it before.
>>>
>>> http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/
>>>
>>
>>
>> I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with
>> what Bruno said).
>>
>> It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas
>> though:
>> https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect
>>
>> I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a
>> bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with
>> the sort of ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular
>> before in smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation.
>> Our hypothesis was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a
>> random path, we would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep
>> up". It didn't work, but these days we could have started an Internet
>> movement.
>>
>> Best,
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>> --
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>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
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>>>
>>
>> --
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>
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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/4/2015 8:49 AM, John Clark wrote:



On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


​ > ​
But you're assuming the copy is in an evironment equivalent this
world.


​If the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite distance 
away there *IS* ​a Bruce Kellet in a world with a radius of 13.8 
billion light years identical to the Bruce Kellet in our world. In 
fact there are a infinite number of them.


​ > ​
Suppose this Bruce Kellet copy were in a world just like this
EXCEPT that  everybody in his world knew him as John Clark?


​ If
 the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite distance 
away there *IS* ​a

​ person identical to ​our
Bruce Kellet
​ in every way EXCEPT he's ​named John Clark not
Bruce Kellet
​ .
In fact there are a infinite number of them.


But does that mean that he IS Bruce Kellet or does it mean the Bruce 
Kellet who posts on this list is really John Clark.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/4/2015 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Oct 2015, at 02:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/2/2015 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So much the worse for the computationalist doctrine! It becomes a 
matter of unverifiable faith,


I think that it is important in our context that the belief in any 
reality (different from my consciousness here-and-now) requires 
unverifiable faith.


The implication that any belief that is not verified in held on faith 
is a rhetorical trick.  There are degrees of belief which should be 
proportioned to the evidence.  That the evidence doesn't rise to the 
level of verification (certainty?) doesn't make my belief the sun 
will rise tomorrow a matter of faith.


But at the level of rigor we need to dialog on what should be really 
assumed at the start, or not, we must admit that believing that the 
sun will rise tomorrow requires faith.


Only if "believing" means to hold as certain.  I'm not even sure what 
you might mean by "requires faith"?  Does it just mean to act even 
without certainty?  In my dictionary "faith" means belief which is 
immune to contrary evidence.




Or you have clairvoyant ability.

I am aware that evolution, a plausible theory, suggest that such a 
faith is quasi hard-wired in our brain, as doubting the existence of 
the predators will not help. But that requires a faith in something 
akin to self-consistency, and that is why we have to attach <>t to the 
[]p, as we can't prove effectively, as consistent machine, that we are 
consistent or that there is a reality.


It would be a rhetorical trick if that was used to suppress a program 
to visit Mars, but the goal here is to get a rational theoretical 
approach explaining the appearances and the different points of view 
of what could be. Or you are begging the question, and assume the 
primary physical at the start.


Assuming the primary physical as an evidenced hypothesis is no more 
faith than assuming every number has a successor.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

> On 5 Oct 2015, at 5:14 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 10/4/2015 12:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4 October 2015 at 07:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 On 10/3/2015 11:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 10/2/2015 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the 
>> Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition* 
>> think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it 
>> being far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no 
>> physical connection with you.
> Yes, it would think so, but would it be right?  In what sense is it 
> possible to right?
 I don't think the difficulty of verification invalidates the point I am 
 making. A sceptical challenge could be mounted in everyday life - we could 
 have false memories and false beliefs about ourselves.
>>> 
>>> But we check those against the consistency of our environment, physics and 
>>> our friends - which I think is the crux of Bruce's idea that you have to 
>>> reproduce a big chunk of the surrounding world in order to get the kind of 
>>> continuity you need.
>> 
>> Not really. If you unexpectedly found yourself in a weird environment, 
>> floating in a bubble in space with no recollection of how you got there for 
>> example, I think you would become anxious, theorise about how you might have 
>> got there and what might happen next, and so on. I can't imagine that your 
>> first thought would be that, with most normal environmental cues gone, you 
>> would forget who you were.
> 
> Sure.  But if you can find no causal explanation connecting your 
> circumstances to your memories you might well doubt your memories were 
> veridical, especially if you knew duplication of humans was possible.

But this doesn't mean that the sense of continuing as the same person is 
dependent on replicating the whole visible universe.

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[Kim Jones]

> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> When I say "physical computation" ​ and you demand a definition of that and 
> when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a 
> definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to 
> either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition 
> of my own, a definition of definition.

You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An 
academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse straighto 
from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore 
consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental midget; 
the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a 
lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when 
people engage with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to 
indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This list might 
have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago but for you. There used 
to be a lively exchange of ideas going on here.

Kim

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Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 4 October 2015 at 09:05, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 4/10/2015 6:03 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:21 PM, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> On 3/10/2015 1:52 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>> I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between local copies,
>> obeying the laws of physics and information transfer, and remote copies
>> outside our particle horizon. The latter are of absolutely no relevance to
>> me here-and-now because there is no possibility of information transfer.
>>
>>
>> Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the
>> Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition*
>> think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it being
>> far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no physical
>> connection with you.
>>
>> That is still within the forward light cone, so information could be
>> transmitted. Information is physical. If there is no transfer of
>> information, there is no way one could test what the copy thought.
>>
>>
>> Are you saying that the copy would not really be a copy until it verified
>> this by establishing contact with the original, or that the mere
>> possibility of establishing contact with the original is necessary and
>> sufficient?
>>
>>
>> You would no know you had a copy until the two were compared -- and that
>> involves the transfer of information.
>>
>
> No, you wouldn't know you were a copy - you would probably think you were
> the original.
>
>
> *An* original. You would have no reason to suspect that there was another
> person bearing any very close resemblance to you. To claim there is a
> 'copy', means that you must have compared the two and found them identical,
> or have a causal chain linking one (original) to the other (copy).
>

If two authors independently wrote the book "Moby Dick", word for word,
comma for comma, and the two authors never talked to nor collaborated with
each other, would you deny that the two stories were identical on account
of the fact that the two authors never communicated?

Jason


>
>
> Alternatively, what could it possibly mean for the 'copy' to think -- I am
>> the person that was born in another galaxy a million years ago? Perhaps
>> people think crazy things like that all the time, but they are usually put
>> away so that they can do no more harm to themselves.
>>
>>
>> A lot of people believe that they are someone else, and they are deluded,
>> because it isn't possible in the world we live in. They would not
>> necessarily be deluded if it were possible.
>>
>> Even if copies were possible, being deluded would also be possible. We
>> would only ever be able to tell the difference by checking our thoughts
>> against independent evidence from the world around us, other people, etc,
>> etc.
>>
>> None of these checks is possible for purported copies outside our light
>> cone, or at remote times and locations.
>>
>
> If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will think it is
> you and have all your physical and psychological qualities. This relies on
> the assumption that your physical and psychological qualities are due to
> the configuration of matter in your body. It does not rely on the further
> assumption that the copy be verified.
>
>
> But thinking (or knowing) that it is a copy does require the transfer of
> information. Otherwise the only sensible position to take is that there are
> two independent persons.
>
>
> Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have defined you
>> were *inadequately* copied last night in your sleep. You believe you're
>> Bruce Kellett, have his memories, look like him, and everyone who knew
>> Bruce agrees that he seems to be the same guy. However, the atoms just
>> weren't put in place using the right procedure, whatever that might be.
>> What difference does the knowledge of this deficit make to you? What
>> difference does it make to anyone else?
>>
>>
>> How does such an implausible scenario differ from the observation that I
>> sloughed off some flakes of skin during the night, some cells died, and
>> some new cells grew, nourished by the food I ate for dinner last night?
>> Minor changes do not disrupt bodily continuity, and all these changes are
>> subject to the laws of physics, so are completely traceable and
>> understandable.
>>
>>
>> Yes, but as far as I can tell you think that there is some possible
>> scenario where your psychological continuity is preserved in the sense I
>> have described but physical continuity is not preserved.
>>
>> No, I don't think that. I think 'psychological continuity' is an empty
>> phrase when there is no 

Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 5 October 2015 at 09:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>
> On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will think it is
> you and have all your physical and psychological qualities. This relies on
> the assumption that your physical and psychological qualities are due to
> the configuration of matter in your body. It does not rely on the further
> assumption that the copy be verified.
>
>
> But thinking (or knowing) that it is a copy does require the transfer of
> information. Otherwise the only sensible position to take is that there are
> two independent persons.
>

The copy will feel that it is a continuation of the original. In general
the copy will not know it is a copy unless it is supplied with the
information or encounters the original, and even then it will feel it is
the original, despite knowing intellectually that it is a copy.

> So this is exactly what I am asking you to consider. Someone who looks
>> like you, behaves like you, knows everything that you know, etc. wakes up
>> in your bed this morning. Overnight, some physical changes have occurred.
>> If you (the person waking up in your bed) are informed that these changes
>> consist of a few cells dying and being replaced, you are not worried. But
>> what if you are reliably informed that the physical changes involve a
>> random process, or something else that would render 'psychological
>> continuity' an empty phrase, as you say. You (the person waking up in your
>> bed) still feel the same either way, and everyone who knows you agrees you
>> seem to be the same person. Would you go around claiming that you were not
>> Bruce, or that you are Bruce but have experienced a psychological
>> discontinuity, or that you haven't experienced a psychological
>> discontinuity because it's meaningless, or what?
>>
>>
>> Psychological continuity is empty in many of the cases you propose
>> because no independent checking is possible. Psychological continuity, if
>> interpreted to mean only some commonality of memories, temperament and the
>> like, might have some content as part of the muli-dimensional character of
>> personal identity. But it is by no means sufficient, and possibly (in
>> extreme cases) not even necessary.
>>
>
> I don't think checking the copies is necessary, for the reasons given
> above. But do you agree at least that if the copies are checked and are
> similar enough then continuity of identity is established, and it does not
> matter how the copies were made?
>
>
> I think that if there are to be 'copies', then there has to be an original
> that is copied. And that copying is a physical process, subject to the
> normal laws of physics and causality, so that the common origin can be
> traced by independent investigation. If the purported 'copy' arose by
> chance, or in another galaxy, or in another universe, so that there is no
> causal connection, then use of the word 'copy' is misleading -- copies have
> an original that is causally connected. Remove that causal connection and
> you have no more than chance resemblance that would have to be established
> by some form of information transfer. The two persons thus resembling each
> other would each, quite rightly, regard themselves as independent persons,
> not copies of anything. Continuity of identity is not established by mere
> resemblance, no matter how close.
>

Call it a pseudo-copy, if you wish, it's just a matter of semantics. The
copy or pseudocopy will still feel that it is a continuation of the
original.


> I think I have lost track of exactly what you are trying to establish by
> this line of argument. Perhaps we should start with a clear statement of
> what you think these copies actually achieve.
>

To simplify so that only one version of you is extant at a time: I think
that if you died and a copy of you at the moment prior to death was made
somewhere else, you would survive in that copy, regardless of how it was
made or how far away it was.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 October 2015 at 09:05, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 4/10/2015 6:03 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:21 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 3/10/2015 1:52 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett
>
wrote:


I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between local
copies, obeying the laws of physics and information transfer,
and remote copies outside our particle horizon. The latter are
of absolutely no relevance to me here-and-now because there is
no possibility of information transfer.


Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in
the Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by
definition* think it was you despite being made of different
matter, despite it being far removed in space and time, despite
it possibly having no physical connection with you.

That is still within the forward light cone, so information
could be transmitted. Information is physical. If there is no
transfer of information, there is no way one could test what the
copy thought.


Are you saying that the copy would not really be a copy until it
verified this by establishing contact with the original, or that
the mere possibility of establishing contact with the original is
necessary and sufficient?


You would no know you had a copy until the two were compared --
and that involves the transfer of information.


No, you wouldn't know you were a copy - you would probably think you 
were the original.


*An* original. You would have no reason to suspect that there was 
another person bearing any very close resemblance to you. To claim there 
is a 'copy', means that you must have compared the two and found them 
identical, or have a causal chain linking one (original) to the other 
(copy).



Alternatively, what could it possibly mean for the 'copy' to
think -- I am the person that was born in another galaxy a
million years ago? Perhaps people think crazy things like that
all the time, but they are usually put away so that they can do
no more harm to themselves.


A lot of people believe that they are someone else, and they are
deluded, because it isn't possible in the world we live in. They
would not necessarily be deluded if it were possible.

Even if copies were possible, being deluded would also be
possible. We would only ever be able to tell the difference by
checking our thoughts against independent evidence from the world
around us, other people, etc, etc.

None of these checks is possible for purported copies outside our
light cone, or at remote times and locations.


If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will think it 
is you and have all your physical and psychological qualities. This 
relies on the assumption that your physical and psychological 
qualities are due to the configuration of matter in your body. It does 
not rely on the further assumption that the copy be verified.


But thinking (or knowing) that it is a copy does require the transfer of 
information. Otherwise the only sensible position to take is that there 
are two independent persons.




Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have
defined you were *inadequately* copied last night in your
sleep. You believe you're Bruce Kellett, have his memories,
look like him, and everyone who knew Bruce agrees that he
seems to be the same guy. However, the atoms just weren't put
in place using the right procedure, whatever that might be.
What difference does the knowledge of this deficit make to
you? What difference does it make to anyone else?


How does such an implausible scenario differ from the
observation that I sloughed off some flakes of skin during the
night, some cells died, and some new cells grew, nourished by
the food I ate for dinner last night? Minor changes do not
disrupt bodily continuity, and all these changes are subject
to the laws of physics, so are completely traceable and
understandable.


Yes, but as far as I can tell you think that there is some
possible scenario where your psychological continuity is
preserved in the sense I have described but physical continuity
is not preserved.

No, I don't think that. I think 'psychological continuity' is an
empty phrase when there is no physical information transfer.


So this is exactly what I am asking you to consider. Someone who
looks like you, behaves like you, knows everything that you know,
etc. wakes up in your bed this morning. Overnight, some physical
changes have occurred. If you (the 

Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/10/2015 11:07 am, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 October 2015 at 09:05, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 4/10/2015 6:03 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:21 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 3/10/2015 1:52 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:


I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between
local copies, obeying the laws of physics and information
transfer, and remote copies outside our particle horizon.
The latter are of absolutely no relevance to me
here-and-now because there is no possibility of
information transfer.


Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made
in the Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would
still *by definition* think it was you despite being made
of different matter, despite it being far removed in space
and time, despite it possibly having no physical
connection with you.

That is still within the forward light cone, so information
could be transmitted. Information is physical. If there is
no transfer of information, there is no way one could test
what the copy thought.


Are you saying that the copy would not really be a copy
until it verified this by establishing contact with the
original, or that the mere possibility of establishing
contact with the original is necessary and sufficient?


You would no know you had a copy until the two were compared
-- and that involves the transfer of information.


No, you wouldn't know you were a copy - you would probably think
you were the original.


*An* original. You would have no reason to suspect that there was
another person bearing any very close resemblance to you. To claim
there is a 'copy', means that you must have compared the two and
found them identical, or have a causal chain linking one
(original) to the other (copy).


If two authors independently wrote the book "Moby Dick", word for 
word, comma for comma, and the two authors never talked to nor 
collaborated with each other, would you deny that the two stories were 
identical on account of the fact that the two authors never communicated?


You would only know that they were identical if you compared them bit by 
bit -- by the exchange of information. Until that time, there are just 
two books by two independent authors.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/4/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 5 Oct 2015, at 5:14 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:





On 10/4/2015 12:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 4 October 2015 at 07:31, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/3/2015 11:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 10/2/2015 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you
were made in the Andromeda Galaxy a billion years
hence, it would still *by definition* think it was
you despite being made of different matter, despite
it being far removed in space and time, despite it
possibly having no physical connection with you.

Yes, it would think so, but would it be right?  In what
sense is it possible to right?

I don't think the difficulty of verification invalidates the
point I am making. A sceptical challenge could be mounted in
everyday life - we could have false memories and false
beliefs about ourselves.


But we check those against the consistency of our environment,
physics and our friends - which I think is the crux of Bruce's
idea that you have to reproduce a big chunk of the surrounding
world in order to get the kind of continuity you need.


Not really. If you unexpectedly found yourself in a weird 
environment, floating in a bubble in space with no recollection of 
how you got there for example, I think you would become anxious, 
theorise about how you might have got there and what might happen 
next, and so on. I can't imagine that your first thought would be 
that, with most normal environmental cues gone, you would forget who 
you were.


Sure.  But if you can find no causal explanation connecting your 
circumstances to your memories you might well doubt your memories 
were veridical, especially if you knew duplication of humans was 
possible.


But this doesn't mean that the sense of continuing as the same person 
is dependent on replicating the whole visible universe.


Is that what the argument is about?  Whether one can have the "sense of 
continuity"?  I'm pretty sure that's possible without even a very close 
duplication.  What does it consist of? ...knowing a name, some memories 
associated with that name...


Brent

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 5 October 2015 at 10:06, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/4/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 Oct 2015, at 5:14 AM, Brent Meeker < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/4/2015 12:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4 October 2015 at 07:31, Brent Meeker < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 10/3/2015 11:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker < 
 meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:



 On 10/2/2015 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the
> Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition*
> think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it being
> far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no physical
> connection with you.
>
 Yes, it would think so, but would it be right?  In what sense is it
 possible to right?

>>> I don't think the difficulty of verification invalidates the point I am
>>> making. A sceptical challenge could be mounted in everyday life - we could
>>> have false memories and false beliefs about ourselves.
>>>
>>
>> But we check those against the consistency of our environment, physics
>> and our friends - which I think is the crux of Bruce's idea that you have
>> to reproduce a big chunk of the surrounding world in order to get the kind
>> of continuity you need.
>
>
> Not really. If you unexpectedly found yourself in a weird environment,
> floating in a bubble in space with no recollection of how you got there for
> example, I think you would become anxious, theorise about how you might
> have got there and what might happen next, and so on. I can't imagine that
> your first thought would be that, with most normal environmental cues gone,
> you would forget who you were.
>
>
> Sure.  But if you can find no causal explanation connecting your
> circumstances to your memories you might well doubt your memories were
> veridical, especially if you knew duplication of humans was possible.
>
>
> But this doesn't mean that the sense of continuing as the same person is
> dependent on replicating the whole visible universe.
>
>
> Is that what the argument is about?  Whether one can have the "sense of
> continuity"?  I'm pretty sure that's possible without even a very close
> duplication.  What does it consist of? ...knowing a name, some memories
> associated with that name...
>

In ordinary life there is a sense of surviving from moment to moment as the
same person. I may have lost track of what everyone on this thread is
arguing about, but what I was interested in was how this sense of
continuity can be preserved apart from the usual way.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/10/2015 11:41 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2015 at 09:37, Bruce Kellett > wrote:



On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will
think it is you and have all your physical and psychological
qualities. This relies on the assumption that your physical and
psychological qualities are due to the configuration of matter in
your body. It does not rely on the further assumption that the
copy be verified.


But thinking (or knowing) that it is a copy does require the
transfer of information. Otherwise the only sensible position to
take is that there are two independent persons.


The copy will feel that it is a continuation of the original. In 
general the copy will not know it is a copy unless it is supplied with 
the information or encounters the original, and even then it will feel 
it is the original, despite knowing intellectually that it is a copy.


It all depends on the information available. If the person does not know 
that he is a copy of someone else, then there will be no reason to 
suspect such. If one does know that one is a copy, then you will regard 
yourself as a new independent person who shares some background with 
another independently existing person.




I think I have lost track of exactly what you are trying to
establish by this line of argument. Perhaps we should start with a
clear statement of what you think these copies actually achieve.


To simplify so that only one version of you is extant at a time: I 
think that if you died and a copy of you at the moment prior to death 
was made somewhere else, you would survive in that copy, regardless of 
how it was made or how far away it was.


That might depend on how you died. If the disease from which you died 
was an intrinsic part of you, then the resurrected individual would also 
be dead. If not, it differs in essential ways.


I think it is of some importance where the copy is reconstructed. If you 
are copied non-destructively, then you continue as the same individual. 
If the copy is reconstructed at much the same place and time, then there 
is an identifiable copy that then goes on to his own independent life. 
It is no longer *me *in any useful sense because of the inevitable 
divergence of experience. If the copy is reconstructed far away, then 
the difference in environment is sufficient to make it a less close 
continuation. If it is reconstructed much later in time, then it is 
largely irrelevant because the original has moved on in that time. I am 
not the *same* person as I was twenty years ago, even though I am the 
unique continuer of that person. So reconstructing a copy of me made 
twenty years ago, now has every bit as little resemblance to me as 
another individual.


If the copying process is destructive, and the reconstruction is 
immediate, then there is a sense in which there is a continuer, but it 
could also be argued that death is death, and that the copy is a new 
individual, with some carry-over of memories and features -- not 
essentially more than could be gained by close knowledge of the original 
person, and a bit of facial reconstruction.


So psychological continuation is very dependent on the exact details of 
the case, and if copying of consciousness ever becomes possible, then, 
by and large, it will simply be regarded as another way of creating new 
people -- it will not be a recipe for immortality in any except a very 
impoverished sense.


Bruce

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