subject:"RE\: What gives philosophers a bad name\?"



On 07 Oct 2013, at 18:23, John Clark wrote:




Pointless unless you think it is a virtue to quite literally know  
what you are talking about. Bruno keeps throwing around words like  
"I" and "you" and "he" and it is very clear that Bruno doesn't know  
what those words mean in a world with duplicating chambers.


Very clear?
Each time I gave you the definition, you mocked it with "pee pee", and  
two post later you come back with the idea that it is not clear,  
without ever quoting and cricticizing the definitions. I have  
introduced the key 1-person/3-person distinction, presented in a pure  
third person way, to address this issue, but you never commented it  
nor make any clearer.





Bruno says "he" has been duplicated, so now there are TWO,


In the third person sense. But the chance evaluation have been asked  
on the possible (accessible from Helsinki) first person experiences.





but then Bruno demands to know the ONE thing


Yes, because in the comp context, you can, in Helsinki, understand  
that, although your body-copy will be in two places, you can feel to  
be in only one place.





and only the ONE thing that "he" will do; and this is nonsense.


Not" will do". The question is which city will he observed. It can  
only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.


That is why it is "like" the throw of a coin, like you have already  
agreed, or like a quantum superposition, but for a different reason,  
and that is exploited in the next steps.


Nobody seems to understand your point, so try to make it more precise,  
and stop pretending it is "very clear", as nobody understand you. I am  
still waiting for Chris explanation, as he pretend to follow your  
point, but I see not the explanation coming.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 07 Oct 2013, at 19:38, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> > Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound  
importance  simply glossed over with the slapdash use of personal  
pronouns. And that's pretty damn sloppy for a mathematician.

> That's again an unconvincing rhetorical tricks. Be specific please.

Bruno, are you trying to convince people that I haven't made DOZENS  
of specific complaints about your sloppy use of personal pronouns  
that is unacceptable in a world with duplicating chambers?

I have introduced the duplicating chamber to explain the difference of  
the 1-I and 3-I, and all I got from you where that is pee-pee stuff.

people can verify: you have not produced any specific complain.

On the contrary you have pretended that it is like antic throw of a  
coin, but that was exactly my point.

You are stuck in a denying psychological state.

Are you saying I've never asked "Who the hell is "he" ?" and gotten  
no reply?

I have always replied. Always. You have ignored the answer, and never  
comment them, except sometimes with your "pee-pee" vocabulary.

If duplicating chambers were not involved then it would indeed be  
ridiculous nit picking, but NOT if they do exist. In your thought  
experiments typically "the guy" is duplicated so now there are TWO,

Like in Everett QM self-superposition, but then you should condemn, as  
Quentin told you more than once, the use of probability in QM.

and then

?
Le us not mix the experiment that e are comparing.

"the guy" flips a coin and you demand to know what the ONE and only  
ONE result that "the guy" will see. And this is not just ridiculous  
it is logically inconsistent.

?
If a guy throws a coin, he will see only one outcome among two possible.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi John,

Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time

The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.

Who is the Y guy? I guess you mean the guy in Helsinki.

Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no
consequential resolution?

Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!

"It" was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M"

Not with the protocol in step 3. You just push on a button, and you
are read, annihilated, and reconstituted in two places (W and M) in
the state which has just been scanned in Helsinki.
Some times go by, but not a lot, and the question is about what you
will live. With comp, it is clear that you will live in W OR in M, but
that any more precise prediction will fail.

that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you
are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical
you 'feel' to be.
That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it
deserves) is false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered
usually as time???)

Then both the probability used in the throwing on a coin, or in QM, in
fact all use of prediction become useless. You argument condemns the
whole field of statistics and probability. If the whether broadcast
says that if will rain at the end of the day, you might say that is
nonsense, as we will be all dead before.

So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.

I can see that 'panta rhei', because I stay myself enough in the
process.

...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use
such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)

The question is not about identity, but about predicting some
happenings to first person view. With your argument I cannot believe
that I will drink a cup of coffee when I am preparing it.
In fact your argument would entail that the probability is zero to
survive with an artificial brain, so you are assuming non-comp. No
problem with that, but my goal is the study of the consequence of comp.

Bruno

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

> you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one
(a case where Leibniz identity rule fails,

If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it
most certainly has NOT failed.

I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will
not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).

The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and
which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the
"he" refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or
of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation
of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and
I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try
to understand.

There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not
interested in learning.

Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the
indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some
good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.

I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with
QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.

Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense
only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some
distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds,
but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.

But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol
given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation.
The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the
lack of definition of "world"), but it seems to me that Everett use
both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 8:42 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/7/2013 7:02 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>>>> Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
>>>>> accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the
>>>>> comp
>>>>> duplication experience.
>>>
>>> But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is
>>> taken
>>> very seriously by Everetians and their critics.
>>>
>>> In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
>>> chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will,
>>> I
>>> suspect, be similar in that regard.
>>>
>>> So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
>>> with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make
>>> sense
>>> at all.
>>>
>>> It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least
>>> in
>>> MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
>>> equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
>>> duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
>>> will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all,
>>> there
>>> is not two of me yet ...
>>>
>>> But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
>>> Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.
>>
>> I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
>> there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
>> _both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
>> continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
>> each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
>> Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
>> perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
>> probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
>> models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
>> weird idea of "randomness" that seems to defy explanation.
>

Hi Brent,

> But the complete symmetry of the duplication makes it too easy.  If the
> probabilities are 1/3 and 2/3 are three worlds instantiated in MWI or only
> two worlds with different "weights".

Three world at least, I would say. Of course, I imagine n worlds where
n/3 worlds contain one outcome and 2n/3 the other. I imagine n to be a
very large number and each slice to contain many variations of other
outcomes we are not controlling for in this case.

>  What if the probabilities are 1/pi and
> (1-1/pi)?

I don't think a probability with an irrational value would make sense
in this model.

>  Or (1-epsilon) and epsilon, where epsilon is just to account for
> all those things you haven't thought of, but are really improbable?

No problem. A very small percentage of the gazillion worlds will
contain the improbable outcome.

>>
>> So when you make a statement about the probability of something
>> happening, you are always making a statement about a possible
>
>
> There's where the problem comes in - what does "possible" cover?

It's easier to explain what impossible means - I die (not that it's
impossible for me to die, but that no continuation exists from that
state).
Possible means anything else, but specific outcomes will be more or
less numerous in the gazillion continuations. We are already in a very
specific are of the multiverse -- one where human beings exit on earth
and so forth. This comes with asymmetries.

I'm not surprised if this is very naif though, and I have no intention
of postulating.

Telmo.

> Brent
>
>> continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
>> fact, "happening" becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
>> anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
>> mysterious property called "randomness".
>>
>> You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
>> the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.
>>
>> I think.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>> 
>>> From: allco...@gmail.com
>>> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
>>>
>>>

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both*
> from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
> consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
> duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
> destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
> MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
> Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.
>

 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
less odd than competing explanations.

*Bruno's "proof" is about the continuous feeling of self, and that has
nothing to do with predictions in general or probabilities in particular;
it is about remembering who you were yesterday.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 08 Oct 2013, at 18:05, John Clark wrote:





On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
 wrote:


> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do  
*both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream  
of consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before  
duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for  
the destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE  
SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT  
IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better  
than random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works  
as well as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but  
only a little) less odd than competing explanations.


*Bruno's "proof" is about the continuous feeling of self,


It is a reasoning starting from the invariance of consciousness for a  
digital substitution (computationalism).




and that has nothing to do with predictions in general or  
probabilities in particular;



That invariance entails that physics has to emerge from a statistics  
on computations, and we can already technically compare many things in  
the comp-physics and the usual physics, so that we can already refute  
a version of comp (comp + the classical theory of knowledge).





it is about remembering who you were yesterday.


With a self-duplication in between. Yes, that step 3. You remember  
that you were in Helsinki, and you see that you are in Washington, for  
example. You see also that in the notebook you predicted that you will  
feel to be in Washington and in Moscow, but obviously you see only  
Washington, so you conclude that you were wrong or did not understand  
the question (and with some chance, now you know better, as we will  
reiterate the experience.


With step seven, there will be (like in Deutsch interpretation of  
Everett QM) aleph_0 copies "in between", and things will get more  
interesting and precise about the relationship between consciousness  
and physical realities (and other realities). It might be better, at  
some point, to talk, like Deutsch, on consciousness differentiation,  
instead of universe multiplication, as the term "universe" is quite  
fuzzy.


IN AUDA (arithmetical universal dovetailer argument), we "model" the  
machine's believability by the assertability by an ideal correct  
universal machine believing in induction, which makes their logic of  
provability axiomatized by Löb's formula, and derive the quantum logic  
by defining the probability one by Bp & Dt (with all the technical  
details provided).


We exploit the gap between G and G*, to get namable but non rationally  
believable  truth for those machines, which provides natural candidate  
for qualia, and here too there are formal confirmations. this has been  
verified by many people, but you can verify it by yourself, in you  
study a bit of logic.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:




On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux > wrote:


> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do *both* 
from a
3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of consciousness 
which is
*either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the probability (or 
measure
of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV if the guy 
standing in H.
*IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE 
ABOUT IT ON
EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than random guessing 
in predicting if a event will be seen.


*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does 
that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less odd than competing 
explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread LizR

On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>  > You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do
>> *both* from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of
>> consciousness which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before
>> duplication, the probability (or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the
>> destinations from the POV if the guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN
>> MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR YOU CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*.
>> Be consistant and reject MWI as an obvious BS crap.
>>
>
>  And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:
>
> *Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than
> random guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.
>
> *Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well
> as it does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little)
> less odd than competing explanations.
>
>
> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
> interpretation?
>

That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from,
so how do you get the Born rule there? (for example).

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb


On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:
On 9 October 2013 06:19, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 10/8/2013 9:05 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> You are spitting non-sense... that's not what is asked. He will do 
*both*
from a 3rd POV but each Bruno can only live *ONE* stream of 
consciousness
which is *either* M or W, it's not both. So before duplication, the 
probability
(or measure of you prefer) is 50/50 for the destinations from the POV 
if the
guy standing in H. *IT'S THE SAME THING IN MWI SETTING AND I DON'T HEAR 
YOU
CRYING NONSENSE ABOUT IT ON EVERY POST*. Be consistant and reject MWI 
as an
obvious BS crap.


 And You are mixing apples and oranges and bananas:

*Quantum Mechanics is about finding a probability that works better than 
random
guessing in predicting if a event will be seen.

*Many Worlds is a theory that explains why Quantum Mechanics works as well 
as it
does that some think (including me) is a little (but only a little) less 
odd than
competing explanations.


How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


That is the $64000 question! But surely it also equally applies to other 
interpretations, e.g. Copenhagen has an infinity of values to select from, so how do you 
get the Born rule there? (for example).


In the CI the Born rule is just a postulate.  There are never an infinity of possible 
observed values because the finite resolution of all instruments.  If you can associate 
probabilities to worlds then you can apply Gleason's theorem to get the Born rule.  But 
it's not clear what constitutes 'a world' apart from the circular requirement that it's 
something you get a measurement in.


But I'm asking JKC specifically, because I'm curious as to how his explanation of 
probabilities under MWI is different from Bruno's in his duplication experiment?


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread meekerdb


On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:

That is the $64000 question!


Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.  But I'm old 
enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on the radio program "The $64 
Question".


How old are you Liz?

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-08 Thread LizR

On 9 October 2013 10:40, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/8/2013 1:50 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> That is the $64000 question!
>
>
> Incidentally I haven't heard anyone use that expression in thirty years.
> But I'm old enough to remember when Johnny Carson was the quiz master on
> the radio program "The $64 Question".
>
> How old are you Liz?
>

Old enough to know better.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>  [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in only one
> place.
>

If the copies are really identical then "you" feel to be in only one place
(insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking about
consciousness) because "you" really are in only one place, regardless of
how many copies are made or where those bodies are.

> The question is which city will [he] observed.

The question is will "he" turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,
and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information "he"
receives.

> It can only be one city, unless you introduce some non-comp telepathy.
>

No idea what that means.

 John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
> interpretation?
>

Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part
of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his
ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that its
competitors can do better. The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad
explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.

  John K Clark

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10 October 2013 06:35, John Clark  wrote:

> The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
> Mechanics works.
>

Nicely summed up!

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb


On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds 
interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part of the Many 
Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but not in a way that 
feels entirely satisfactory, not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds 
interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability and personal identity 
as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Bruno

>> I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 
>> to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, 
>> etc.) to find oneself alive. 

This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in 
both your view and mine.

>> P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) 
>> events. 

That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no 
person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment 
will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each 
outcome.

Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order 
to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I think what 
is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are 
none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is 
relevant.

He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, 
one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are 
related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. 
There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than 
Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time 
when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other 
relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.

It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% 
to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's 
shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your analysis 
violates the yes doctor axiom.

This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the 
same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and 
Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that 
asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is 
not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity 
maintaining version of him will be in each location.

I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to 
feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary 
Greaves "Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse". 
Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and 
argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. 
This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to 
know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes 
have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been 
peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand 
waving scoffs some academics here have been offering.

All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark
  wrote:

  On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb 
wrote:

> How do you explain quantum
  mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
  interpretation?

Not very well, assigning probabilities is
  unquestionably the weakest part of the Many Worlds theory.
  True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but
  not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that
  its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds
  interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
  Mechanics works.

So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a
physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him
splitting and observing all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how
people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say)
50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I
guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only
because our brains are "wired" to think in terms of the single universe
view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think
about things in everyday life.

Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man *then* has a
50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only
being the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this
was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how
he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming "folk psychology"
is involved (ditto for the physicist).

However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday
attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb


On 10/9/2013 6:25 PM, chris peck wrote:

Hi Bruno

/>> I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 to feel 
oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, etc.) to find 
oneself alive. /


This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in both your 
view and mine.


/>> P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) 
events. /

That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no person, 
Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment will experience both 
simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each outcome.


Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order to induce 
a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I think what is required is some 
ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows 
all there is to know about the situation that is relevant.


But one of the essential things about quantum mechanics is futures are uncertain even give 
complete knowldge.  If you use MWI then you expect that after observing a quantum random 
outcome that there will be two (or more) copies of you that share the same memories up to 
the observation, but are different after.  So Bruno is just trying to show that the 
uncertainty can be in "which copy is observing" instead of "which value was observed".


Whether this uncertainty can be represented as a probability is, I think, a problem in 
both Bruno's thought experiment and in MWI of QM.


Brent



He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, one in 
Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are related to him in a 
manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. There will be no sense in which 
Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes 
doctor'. So, at the point in time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, 
there are no other relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.


It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% to either 
outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's shares a relationship of 
identity with him. This is why I say your analysis violates the yes doctor axiom.


This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the same 
question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and Bruno-Moscow are 
ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that asking the question at 
this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. 
Because he has no doubt that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each 
location.


I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to feel like 
I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary Greaves 
"Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse". Section 4.1 
discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and argues for the exact same 
conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right 
or wrong, but it gives me confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a 
foregone conclusion as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is 
an analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants 
more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been offering.


All the best

--
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part 
of the
Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but 
not in a
way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that its competitors can do 
better. The
Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum 
Mechanics works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability and personal 
identity as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-10-09 Thread meekerdb

On 10/9/2013 6:37 PM, LizR wrote:
If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to him
being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI
will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes.
This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that
he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI,

The physicist is only interested in what he can publish in PhysRev. He knows that
replication is essential. So goes back to Helsinki and tries is again...and again...and
again... And he keeps careful notes. After a few thousand replications he is ready to
publish his findings that the probability of arriving in Washington via teleportation from
Helsinki is 0.48_+_0.06. Of course JKC will complain that I have used an ambiguous
pronoun "he", but in this case, except for a group of vanishing measure, it doesn't matter
which "he" is meant.

Brent

and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because
our brains are "wired" to think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's
take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man /then/ has a 50% chance of
being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the single unique copy
of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for
Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming
"folk psychology" is involved (ditto for the physicist).

However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude often
doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Liz

>> This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
>> feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
>> knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
>> arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are "wired" to think in terms 
>> of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
>> terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

>> Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
>> chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
>> the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
>> chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

>>So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
>>arriving in Moscow, assuming "folk psychology" is involved (ditto for the 
>>physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are "wired" to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming "folk psychology" is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude 
often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.





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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Brent

But one of the essential things about quantum mechanics is futures are 
uncertain even give complete knowldge. 

I disagree. This is still 'up for grabs' and dependent on whether the 
interpretation is indeterminsitic (copenhagen,etc) or deterministic (MWI). Its 
a feature of MWI that all outcomes get their branch, there isn't uncertainty 
about that.

If you use MWI then you expect that after observing a quantum random outcome 
that there will be two (or more) copies of you that share the same memories up 
to the observation, but are different after.  So Bruno is just trying to show 
that the uncertainty can be in "which copy is observing" instead of "which 
value was observed".

I think "which copy is observing" and "which value was observed" are 
functionally equivolent vis a vis the step 3 experiment. Nevertheless, the 
question asked is definately 'what value will you see?'

Whether this uncertainty can be represented as a probability is, I think, a 
problem in both Bruno's thought experiment and in MWI of QM.

There are two problems I think. firstly, is there room for subjective 
uncertainty? and secondly, how does the proportionality of a 'copenhagen' 
random event get represented. MWI has the problem that if the outcome depends 
on say 1/3 vs 2/3 the world will still split into just 2 outcomes, with nothing 
to represent proportionality. Im not sure Bruno's UD suffers from that issue, 
though being 'comp' and presumably therefore dealing with things discretely, 
there maybe issues whenever irrational numbers appear in denominators. 1/PI vs. 
1-1/PI as you have said before.

All the best.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 02:21:01 +




Hi Liz

>> This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
>> feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
>> knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
>> arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are "wired" to think in terms 
>> of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
>> terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

>> Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
>> chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
>> the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
>> chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

>>So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
>>arriving in Moscow, assuming "folk psychology" is involved (ditto for the 
>>physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are "wired" to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being M

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to "his" chances of appearing in
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities,
because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a
"post-facto indeterminism" like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid
to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI).
(Which is to say, it isn't *really *valid at all, but I still think I know
what is intended!)

Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Hi Liz

>>
Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.






(Or then again, I won't...)

Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means 
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to "his" chances of appearing in 
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities, because 
the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a "post-facto 
indeterminism" like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the extent 
that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI). (Which is to say, 
it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I know what is intended!)


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)





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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

I will also be spontaneously combusting, rocketing to the Moon, and being
proclaimed Queen of the Universe.


On 10 October 2013 16:50, chris peck  wrote:

> Hi Liz
>
>
> *>>
> *
> *Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.
> * *
> *
> * *
> *(Or then again, I won't...)*
>
> Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)
>
>
>
> ------
> Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
>
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno
> means when he asks H-man to assign a probability to "his" chances of
> appearing in Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about
> probabilities, because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at
> least give a "post-facto indeterminism" like a quantum measurement does, so
> it's valid to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming
> the MWI). (Which is to say, it isn't *really *valid at all, but I still
> think I know what is intended!)
>
> Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.
>
> (Or then again, I won't...)
>
> --
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 09 Oct 2013, at 19:23, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>  [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in  
only one place.

If the copies are really identical then "you" feel to be in only one  
place (insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking  
about consciousness)

Which it has not. We both have agreed already on this. And the copies  
are identical, as bodies reconstitiuted at the right substitution  
level, but they are in two different place, as they will notice when  
opening the door. And the Hesnki man knows that in advance, so he  
knows that (whoever he is and will be) there is 1/2 chance to see M  
(or W).

because "you" really are in only one place, regardless of how many  
copies are made or where those bodies are.

Exactly.

> The question is which city will [he] observed.

The question is will "he" turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington  
Man,

Yes. And it is (and can be justified entirely with math) a non  
constructive "OR".

and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information  
"he" receives.

Not at all. It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will  
have will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for  
all possible "he's" relevant).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

ysis that  
has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants  
more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been  
offering.



I prefer avoiding authoritative arguments. Yet, as you mention this,  
my PhD thesis has been peer-reviewed by three juries, and the  
scientific members of those juries have all declare not having seen  
any errors.
Only literary continental philosophers have problems, but they refer  
explicitly to personal convictions, without any further ado. Some  
scientists seem to defend those philosophers for reason which seems to  
be academical solidarity (or worst, but that's beyond our topic).
Anyway, it is preferable to get the point by oneself, and not rely on  
any authority, as we live in a lasting era where many people identify  
science with Aristotle theology.


Best,

Bruno





All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many  
Worlds interpretation?


Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest  
part of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule  
from his ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory,  
not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds  
interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics  
works.


So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability  
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.


Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:37, LizR wrote:

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%  
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places.  
Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100%  
probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes.  
This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The  
physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin- 
up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels  
the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains  
are "wired" to think in terms of the single universe view. I think  
Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about  
things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then  
has a 50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of  
always only being the single unique copy of himself would lead him  
to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno  
to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in  
Moscow, assuming "folk psychology" is involved (ditto for the  
physicist).


OK.




However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our  
everyday attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the  
universe works.


The probabilities does not depend on how the universe work, but only  
on computer science, which does not assume anything physical (note  
even a physical reality).
Then the (easy) probability calculus we got here is part of the  
explanation of how the universe works, and indeed why we are  
confronted with an apparent universe/multiverses, although this is  
part of the difficult remaining work (to get the correct hamiltonian  
and things like that).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?