Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Benjayk, Bruno Marchal wrote: We just cannot do artificial intelligence in a provable manner. We need chance, or luck. Even if we get some intelligent machine, we will not know-it-for sure (perhaps just believe it correctly). But this is a quite weak statement, isn't it? It just prevents a mechanical way of making a AI, or making a provably friendly AI (like Eliezer Yudkowsky wants to do). Yes it is quite weak. It can even been made much weaker if we allow machines to make enough mistakes for indeterminate period of times. In that case, some necessarily non constructive proof can be made constructive. After all, evolution itself is plausibly mechanical. We can prove very little about what we do or know anyway. We can't prove the validity of science, for example. You are right, but here the point is more subtle. Most initial theoretical statements are not provable, but we can take them as new axioms without becoming inconsistent. But most theological statements of the machine/numbers have that property that, despite being true, they become false when added as an axiom. It is a bit like a theory with five axioms. You cannot add a sixth axioms saying that the theory has five axioms. Self-consistency, and consciousness behave similarly. Human science or theological science are full of things of that kind, I mean truth which just cannot be asserted, except very cautiously. In fact the modal logic G* minus G axiomatizes them all (at the propositional level). That is perhaps the source of this very deep 'truth': hell is paved with the good intentions. It doesn't even mean that there is no developmental process that will allow us to create ever more powerful heuristics with which to find better AI faster in a quite predictable way (not predictable what kind of AI we build, just *that* we will build a powerful AI), right? Yes, that is possible. Heuristics are typically not algorithmic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 15 Jun 2011, at 21:20, benjayk wrote: Hi Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally conscious. What could maximally conscious mean? My intuition says quite strongly that consciousness is a dynamic open-ended process and that there is no such thing as maximally conscious (exept maybe in the trivial sense of simply conscious at all). I tend to think that consciousness is the same for all conscious being, except that prejudices coming from competence can make it more sleepy. So, paradoxically, consciousness might be maximal in the case of absence of knowledge and beliefs. I can't even conceive what this could be like. Well, some drugs can help with that respect. Some thought experiences also, but they are not of the type I have allowed in publications, because they need you to imagine some amnesia, or coming back to the state of a baby. It is not easy. Bruno Marchal wrote: Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). Why do you think it could be a delusion? This would be a bit reminscent of buddhism. For me it sounds like quite a terrible thought. After all it would mean all progress is in a way illusory and maybe not even desirable, whereas I really wish (and pragmatically believe) that eternal progress is the thing that can fullfill our ideals of truth, conscious insight and happiness. I am no more sure on this. I can understand the appeal of the idea of progress, but progress might just make pain more painful, frustation more frustrating, etc. Truth is simply not fulfillable, and happiness is more in equilibrium and balances than in the pursuit of bigger satisfaction. But then comp might be wrong, and I might miss the point. But, yes, comp leads close to buddhism, and to ethical detachment. Bruno Marchal wrote: I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the first. Can you explain this? It seems to me that there is no clear line between intelligence and competence and that some kind of competences (like aligning yourself with the beliefs of society) can limit intelligence, but some help to develop more intelligence (like doing science). Let me remind you my smallest theory of Intelligence/consciousness. I have already given years ago, and also recently on the FOR list, I think. A machine is intelligent if and only if it is not stupid. A machine is stupid when one of the following clause is satisfied: - the machine believes that she is intelligent - the machine believes that she is stupid Now that theory admits a transparent arithmetical interpretation. Replace intelligent by consistent (Dt), and stupid by not consistent (~Dt, that is Bf). Then the theory is just Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is a sub-theory of G* (BDt - Bf). An obvious defect of that theory is that it makes pebbles intelligent. But then, why not? Who has ever heard a pebble saying that it is intelligent, or stupid, or said any kind stupidities. Like with the taoists, the wise person keep silent. Concerning the learning competence of a machine, I measure it by the classes of computable functions that the machine is able to identify from finite samples of input-outputs. This leads to the computational learning theory or inductive inference theory, which shows that the possible competences form a complex lattice with a lot of incomparable competences, and with a lot of necessarily non constructive gaps existing among them. Roughly speaking a machine becomes stupid when it confuses intelligence and competence and begin to feel superior, or inferior, and begin to lack some amount of respect for his living being fellows. Some of those fellows can believe in the superiority of those machines, and believe that they are inferior, and this leads to a coupling of dominant/dominated, which unfortunately can be very stable and profit to the emergence of new entities. Science per se, does not lead to intelligence, as I think it is sadly illustrated by those last centuries. Science can kill intelligence, and science without intelligence can lead to hell, especially if science is confused with a sort of theology, instead of being used to genuinely tackle, interrogate, the (theological) fundamental questions. Humans cannot yet accept their ignorance. I have already argued that science, well understood, is born with Pythagorus, and is ended with the apparition of the roman empire. Fundamental questions are still complete taboo, for most scientists. There is no question to rise any doubt on the theology of Aristotle. Neither atheists nor Christians can accept
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 6/16/2011 7:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Concerning the learning competence of a machine, I measure it by the classes of computable functions that the machine is able to identify from finite samples of input-outputs. This leads to the computational learning theory or inductive inference theory, which shows that the possible competences form a complex lattice with a lot of incomparable competences, and with a lot of necessarily non constructive gaps existing among them. Do you have some reference where this is explained? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 03:34:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So we agree violently on this, to borrow an expression to Russell (I think). To be fair, Brent used this expression when agreeing with me on something. But it is a good one! Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Colin, I'm having a read through your paper now, and have a few comments to keep the juices of debate flowing on this list. Firstly, I'd like to say well done - you have written a very clear paper in what is a very murky subject. I have two comments right now - but I haven't finished, so there could well be more. 1) Your definition of COMP is more along the lines of Deutsch's physical Turing principle, or Thesis P. Wikipedia seems to call it the strong CT thesis. It is important to note that it is a stronger assumption than Bruno's COMP assumption, and indeed Bruno has already given a proof that physics cannot be computable - so you might be proving the same thing via a different method. Nevertheless, I haven't seen yet whether weakening your definition of COMP invalidates your argument though 2) A few times through the text you make remarks along the lines of it might appear that laws of nature might still be accessible by an extreme form of the randomized-search/machine-learning approach, even though it is obvious that human scientists do not operate this way. Obvious? It is far from obvious. What you say flies directly in the face of Popper's Conjectures and Refutations, and you would face a horde of angry Popperians if you were to post this stuff on the FoR list. Anyway, I'll keep reading. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 14 Jun 2011, at 21:19, Terren Suydam wrote: Thanks for the reply Bruno, comments below... On Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: doesn't that imply the possibility of an artificial intelligence? In a weak sense of Artificial Intelligence, yes. In a strong sense, no. If you are duplicated at the right substitution level, few would say that you have become an artificial intelligence. It would be a case of the good old natural intelligence, but with new clothes. Sure, but the distinction between artificial and natural intelligence is not that important assuming comp. I agree with you. The difference between artificial and natural is ... artificial (and thus it is natural indexical done by any entity having some big ego). The point is simply that if I can be simulated (which I agree requires some faith), that implies that intelligence does not require biology (or any other particular physical substrate), that strong artificial intelligence is possible in principle, ignoring for the moment the question of whether we can provably construct it. I agree. My point was similar to the recent post of Russell Standish, that somehow Colin get a result which is a consequence of comp, and can't be use against comp. Only against a misunderstood view of comp. In fact, if we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and that is why you need some luck when saying yes to a doctor who will build a copy of you/your-body, at some level of description of your body. This is an old result. Already in 1922, Emil Post, who discovered Church thesis ten years before Church and Turing (and others) realized that the Gödelian argument against Mechanism (that Post discovered and refuted 30 years before Lucas, and 60 years before Penrose), when corrected, shows only that a machine cannot build a machine with equivalent qualification to its own qualification (for example with equivalent provability power in arithmetic) *in a provable way*. I have refered to this, in this list, under the name of Benacerraf principle, who rediscovered this later. We just cannot do artificial intelligence in a provable manner. We need chance, or luck. Even if we get some intelligent machine, we will not know-it-for sure (perhaps just believe it correctly). Doesn't this objection only apply to attempts to construct an AI with human-equivalent intelligence? As a counter example I'm thinking here of Ben Goertzel's OpenCog, an attempt at artificial general intelligence (AGI), whose design is informed by a theory of intelligence that does not attempt to mirror or model human intelligence. In light of the Benacerraf principle, isn't it possible in principle to provably construct AIs so long as we're not trying to emulate or model human intelligence? I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally conscious. Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)- consciousness with our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can hardly be sure about. I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in which case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about it. I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the first. Bruno On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp +materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 6/15/2011 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Doesn't this objection only apply to attempts to construct an AI with human-equivalent intelligence? As a counter example I'm thinking here of Ben Goertzel's OpenCog, an attempt at artificial general intelligence (AGI), whose design is informed by a theory of intelligence that does not attempt to mirror or model human intelligence. In light of the Benacerraf principle, isn't it possible in principle to provably construct AIs so long as we're not trying to emulate or model human intelligence? I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally conscious. Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)-consciousness with our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can hardly be sure about. I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in which case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about it. I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the first. Bruno There is a tendency to talk about human-equivalent intelligence or human level intelligence as an ultimate goal. Human intelligence evolved to enhance certain functions: cooperation, seduction, bargaining, deduction,... There's no reason to suppose it is the epitome of intelligence. Intelligence may take many forms, some of which we would have difficulty realizing or crediting. Like a universal machine that is not programmed, which by one measure is maximally intelligent but also maximally incompetent. Even in humans intelligence is far from one-dimensional. A small child is extremely intelligent as measured by the ability to learn, but not very smart as measured by knowledge. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: We just cannot do artificial intelligence in a provable manner. We need chance, or luck. Even if we get some intelligent machine, we will not know-it-for sure (perhaps just believe it correctly). But this is a quite weak statement, isn't it? It just prevents a mechanical way of making a AI, or making a provably friendly AI (like Eliezer Yudkowsky wants to do). We can prove very little about what we do or know anyway. We can't prove the validity of science, for example. It doesn't even mean that there is no developmental process that will allow us to create ever more powerful heuristics with which to find better AI faster in a quite predictable way (not predictable what kind of AI we build, just *that* we will build a powerful AI), right? -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31854285.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally conscious. What could maximally conscious mean? My intuition says quite strongly that consciousness is a dynamic open-ended process and that there is no such thing as maximally conscious (exept maybe in the trivial sense of simply conscious at all). I can't even conceive what this could be like. Bruno Marchal wrote: Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). Why do you think it could be a delusion? This would be a bit reminscent of buddhism. For me it sounds like quite a terrible thought. After all it would mean all progress is in a way illusory and maybe not even desirable, whereas I really wish (and pragmatically believe) that eternal progress is the thing that can fullfill our ideals of truth, conscious insight and happiness. Bruno Marchal wrote: I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the first. Can you explain this? It seems to me that there is no clear line between intelligence and competence and that some kind of competences (like aligning yourself with the beliefs of society) can limit intelligence, but some help to develop more intelligence (like doing science). -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31854353.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Dear Brent, let me cut in with your last par: *...There is a tendency to talk about human-equivalent intelligence or human level intelligence as an ultimate goal. Human intelligence evolved to enhance certain functions: cooperation, seduction, bargaining, deduction,... There's no reason to suppose it is the epitome of intelligence. Intelligence may take many forms, some of which we would have difficulty realizing or crediting. Like a universal machine that is not programmed, which by one measure is maximally intelligent but also maximally incompetent. Even in humans intelligence is far from one-dimensional. A small child is extremely intelligent as measured by the ability to learn, but not very smart as measured by knowledge. **Brent* * * and say: thank you. In my vocabulary (agnostic) we cannot simulate human (not limited to our present 'knowledge'), nor do (I?) have an acceptable definition for intelligence (not restricted of course to the methodology of the US IQ tests). Inter-lego means IMO to read between lines - a mentally active attitude. Mentally means more than we could identify 3000 years ago, but still on the move for more to be learned today. We are still YOUR small child. I look for 'intelligence' in more than human traits, but accept your distinction of human-equivalent (especially the human level). To be smart is useful, but IMO not a sole requirement of intelligence. IMO the universal machine (I wish I knew more about it...) is not programmed within our human technological thinking, - maybe it is way 'above' it - and incompetent only in our human distinction. I have a hard time to follow your one-dimensional view of intelligence. It may reach into the 'nonlinear' as well, without us being aware of it. Thanks to Bruno for the hint to my old (15-20y ago) friendly contact Ben Goertzel whom I try to ask about his recent positions. He had 'fertilizing' ideas. To (Bruno's) other par: do you have a 'measurable' definition for conscious - to speak about (virgin = not programmed) yet 'maximally conscious' universal machine(s)? - WITH included some 'Self-Consciousness'? (In my recent (ongoing) speculations I erred into the 'world's' Unlimited Complexity, - as said: 'out there', of which we derived only a so far acquired portion FOR our world(view?) (including the conventional sciences) as* perceived reality* or say a better name - with imagining a* perfectsymmetry * (more than existing in our present knowledge) of hard-to-identify (hard-to-distinguish) 'aspects' in exchanging relations rather than identifiable topics relating to our (worldly) topics, we can use. This would serve a higher level of agnosticism. Our 'models' we think *within* (R. Rosen) are formed by our capability to position the received (perceived?) phenomenal information adjusted into our 'mental'(?) personalized, unique worldview upon Colin Hale's earlier 'mini-solipsism'). n such lines the universal machine etc. are 'human inventions' to facilitate some (our?) understanding of the 'world' still beyond our knowledge base. And - sorry! - so are 'numbers' as well. We cannot overstep our human logic - at least not in fundamental questions. Best regards John M On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 12:47 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/15/2011 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Doesn't this objection only apply to attempts to construct an AI with human-equivalent intelligence? As a counter example I'm thinking here of Ben Goertzel's OpenCog, an attempt at artificial general intelligence (AGI), whose design is informed by a theory of intelligence that does not attempt to mirror or model human intelligence. In light of the Benacerraf principle, isn't it possible in principle to provably construct AIs so long as we're not trying to emulate or model human intelligence? I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally conscious. Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)-consciousness with our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can hardly be sure about. I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in which case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about it. I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the first. Bruno There is a tendency to talk about human-equivalent intelligence or human level intelligence as an ultimate goal. Human intelligence evolved to enhance certain functions: cooperation, seduction, bargaining, deduction,... There's no
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Bruno, I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even maximally conscious. This sounds like a comp variant of panpsychism (platopsychism?)... in which consciousness is axiomatically proposed as a property of arithmetic. Are you saying that comp would require such an axiom? If so, why? On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). I'm not sure how an unprogrammed, immaterial universal machine could be self-conscious, since self-consciousness requires the rudimentary distinction of self versus other. What is the 'other' against which this virgin universal machine would be distinguishing itself against? Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)-consciousness with our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can hardly be sure about. Perhaps I'm just confused about your ideas - wouldn't be the first time! - but this seems to suffer from the same problem as panpsychism - that although asserting consciousness as a property of the universe sidesteps cartesian dualism, we are still left without an explanation of why human consciousness differs from ant consciousness differs from rock consciousness. In your case, we are left wondering how the consciousness of the virgin universal machine interfaces with specific universal numbers, and what would explain the differences in consciousness among them. That's why I favor the idea that consciousness arises from certain kinds of cybernetic (autopoeitic) organization (which is consistent with comp). In fact I think it is still consistent with much of what you're saying... but it is your assertion that comp denies strong AI that implies you would find fault with that idea. I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in which case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about it. I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the first. I think I understand your point here with regard to consciousness - given that you're saying it's a property of the platonic 'virgin' universal machine. But if you assert that about intelligence, aren't you saying that intelligence isn't computable (i.e. comp denies strong ai)? This would seem to contradict Marcus Hutter's AIXI. You're saying that our intelligence as humans is dependent (in the same way as consciousness) on the fact that we don't know which machine we are? That creativity is sourced in subjective indeterminacy? Terren Bruno On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1)
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Terren, On 13 Jun 2011, at 18:46, Terren Suydam wrote: Long time lurker here, very intrigued by all the discussions here when I have time for them! Earlier in response to Colin Hales you wrote: Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. Can you elaborate on this? If we assume comp (I say yes to the doctor) then I can be simulated... That is correct. doesn't that imply the possibility of an artificial intelligence? In a weak sense of Artificial Intelligence, yes. In a strong sense, no. If you are duplicated at the right substitution level, few would say that you have become an artificial intelligence. It would be a case of the good old natural intelligence, but with new clothes. In fact, if we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and that is why you need some luck when saying yes to a doctor who will build a copy of you/your-body, at some level of description of your body. This is an old result. Already in 1922, Emil Post, who discovered Church thesis ten years before Church and Turing (and others) realized that the Gödelian argument against Mechanism (that Post discovered and refuted 30 years before Lucas, and 60 years before Penrose), when corrected, shows only that a machine cannot build a machine with equivalent qualification to its own qualification (for example with equivalent provability power in arithmetic) *in a provable way*. I have refered to this, in this list, under the name of Benacerraf principle, who rediscovered this later. We just cannot do artificial intelligence in a provable manner. We need chance, or luck. Even if we get some intelligent machine, we will not know-it-for sure (perhaps just believe it correctly). This is why I am saying (in your quote below) that artificial intelligence will look more and more like fishing and hunting in some computational spaces. That might explains the growing importance of optimization technics, and search technics in artificial intelligence. I was saying this to Colin, because he argues against the idea of artificial scientist, confusing that impossibility with computationalism. But computationalism prevents the existence of complete theory about us, and makes artificial intelligence more like *discovering* entities (in some virtual rendering of Platonia) than *creating* or *inventing* those entities by engineering and mathematics. And of course we can always try to copy nature and ourselves, and be lucky in some cases. Sorry for having been short. I hope this clarify a bit. Tell me if it does not or if you have questions. All this is related to the difference between proofs and *constructive* proofs. If an AI exists, we cannot prove its existence constructively, but we might prove its existence in some big set of objects, and isolate it experimentally by non constructive means. Bruno On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp +materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion and 2)
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Thanks for the reply Bruno, comments below... On Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: doesn't that imply the possibility of an artificial intelligence? In a weak sense of Artificial Intelligence, yes. In a strong sense, no. If you are duplicated at the right substitution level, few would say that you have become an artificial intelligence. It would be a case of the good old natural intelligence, but with new clothes. Sure, but the distinction between artificial and natural intelligence is not that important assuming comp. The point is simply that if I can be simulated (which I agree requires some faith), that implies that intelligence does not require biology (or any other particular physical substrate), that strong artificial intelligence is possible in principle, ignoring for the moment the question of whether we can provably construct it. In fact, if we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and that is why you need some luck when saying yes to a doctor who will build a copy of you/your-body, at some level of description of your body. This is an old result. Already in 1922, Emil Post, who discovered Church thesis ten years before Church and Turing (and others) realized that the Gödelian argument against Mechanism (that Post discovered and refuted 30 years before Lucas, and 60 years before Penrose), when corrected, shows only that a machine cannot build a machine with equivalent qualification to its own qualification (for example with equivalent provability power in arithmetic) *in a provable way*. I have refered to this, in this list, under the name of Benacerraf principle, who rediscovered this later. We just cannot do artificial intelligence in a provable manner. We need chance, or luck. Even if we get some intelligent machine, we will not know-it-for sure (perhaps just believe it correctly). Doesn't this objection only apply to attempts to construct an AI with human-equivalent intelligence? As a counter example I'm thinking here of Ben Goertzel's OpenCog, an attempt at artificial general intelligence (AGI), whose design is informed by a theory of intelligence that does not attempt to mirror or model human intelligence. In light of the Benacerraf principle, isn't it possible in principle to provably construct AIs so long as we're not trying to emulate or model human intelligence? Terren Bruno On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion and 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability 1) is necessary for the developpment of 2), but 2) has a negative feedback on 1). I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of intelligence. By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine can be stupid for two reason: she believes that she is intelligent, or she believes that she is stupid. Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the theory C having as axioms the
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
The difference is in the paper and should be non-existent of COMP is true. Now I see your point. Thanks, I have missed it. On 14.06.2011 01:41 Colin Hales said the following: Hi Evgenii, I expect you are not alone in struggling with the Natural Computation (NC) vs Artificial Computation (AC) idea. The difference is in the paper and should be non-existent of COMP is true. The paper then shows a place where it can't be true hence AC and NC are different .ie. the natural world is not computation of the Turing-machine kind( at least to the extent needed to construct a scientist, which includes the need to create a liar). It's all quite convoluted, but nevertheless sufficient to help an engineer like me make a design choice... which I have done. I hope over time these ideas will not grate on the mind quite so much. cheers colin Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Colin, Thanks for the paper. I have just browsed it. Two small notes. I like [Turing et al., 2008]. It seems that he has passed his test successfully. I find term Natural Computation (NC) a bit confusing. I guess that I understand what you means but the term Computation sounds ambiguously, because then it is completely unclear what it means in such a context. Evgenii On 07.06.2011 09:42 Colin Hales said the following: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Bruno, Long time lurker here, very intrigued by all the discussions here when I have time for them! Earlier in response to Colin Hales you wrote: Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. Can you elaborate on this? If we assume comp (I say yes to the doctor) then I can be simulated... doesn't that imply the possibility of an artificial intelligence? Thanks, Terren On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion and 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability 1) is necessary for the developpment of 2), but 2) has a negative feedback on 1). I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of intelligence. By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine can be stupid for two reason: she believes that she is intelligent, or she believes that she is stupid. Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the theory C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp - ~BDp. So Dt (arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf (inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt - Bf and G* proves BBf - Bf (but not G!). This illustrates that 1) above might come from Löbianity, and 2) above (the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case and Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the existence of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build them. It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot generate them by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short algorithm. So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to cleverness), I think we have passed the singularity. Nothing is more intelligent/conscious than a virgin universal machine. By programming it, we can only make his soul fell, and, in the worst case, we might get something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for example. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Colin, Thanks for the paper. I have just browsed it. Two small notes. I like [Turing et al., 2008]. It seems that he has passed his test successfully. I find term Natural Computation (NC) a bit confusing. I guess that I understand what you means but the term Computation sounds ambiguously, because then it is completely unclear what it means in such a context. Evgenii On 07.06.2011 09:42 Colin Hales said the following: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Evgenii, I expect you are not alone in struggling with the Natural Computation (NC) vs Artificial Computation (AC) idea. The difference is in the paper and should be non-existent of COMP is true. The paper then shows a place where it can't be true hence AC and NC are different .ie. the natural world is not computation of the Turing-machine kind( at least to the extent needed to construct a scientist, which includes the need to create a liar). It's all quite convoluted, but nevertheless sufficient to help an engineer like me make a design choice... which I have done. I hope over time these ideas will not grate on the mind quite so much. cheers colin Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Colin, Thanks for the paper. I have just browsed it. Two small notes. I like [Turing et al., 2008]. It seems that he has passed his test successfully. I find term Natural Computation (NC) a bit confusing. I guess that I understand what you means but the term Computation sounds ambiguously, because then it is completely unclear what it means in such a context. Evgenii On 07.06.2011 09:42 Colin Hales said the following: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Bruno. I have sent it to you. The key to the paper is that it should be regarded as an engineering document. I am embarked on building a real AGI using the real physical world of components in an act of science. Based on being inspired and guided by neuroscience, I have identified two basic choices as a route to AGI that works: (i) use standard symbolic computing (of a model of brain function derived by a human observer = me) (ii) emulate what an brain actually does in inorganic form. Based on the serious doubts that are identified in the COMP paper, given the choice I should prefer (ii), because (i) is loaded with unjustified, unproven presupposition and has 60 years of failure. All other issues are secondary. I start building this year. cheers Colin Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion and 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability 1) is necessary for the developpment of 2), but 2) has a negative feedback on 1). I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of intelligence. By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine can be stupid for two reason: she believes that she is intelligent, or she believes that she is stupid. Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the theory C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp - ~BDp. So Dt (arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf (inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt - Bf and G* proves BBf - Bf (but not G!). This illustrates that 1) above might come from Löbianity, and 2) above (the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case and Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the existence of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build them. It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot generate them by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short algorithm. So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to cleverness), I think we have passed the singularity. Nothing is more intelligent/conscious than a virgin universal machine. By programming it, we can only make his soul fell, and, in the worst case, we might get something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for example. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Colin, I have sent it to you. Thanks. The key to the paper is that it should be regarded as an engineering document. I am embarked on building a real AGI using the real physical world of components in an act of science. OK. Although, as you know, (or should know) the real physical reality is an emerging information pattern summing up infinities of computations. You can even exploit this (like in quantum computing). It might be not necessary, though. Based on being inspired and guided by neuroscience, I have identified two basic choices as a route to AGI that works: (i) use standard symbolic computing (of a model of brain function derived by a human observer = me) (ii) emulate what an brain actually does in inorganic form. Based on the serious doubts that are identified in the COMP paper, given the choice I should prefer (ii), because (i) is loaded with unjustified, unproven presupposition and has 60 years of failure. I can relate with this, but there are progress (in the acceptance of our ignorance). It fails also because all the energy is used to control such machine, where intelligence would consist in leaving them alone and free. It is a bit like modern education. tecaher are encourage to let the student thinking by themselves, and to give them bad notes when the student do that! Now, to copy a brain, you need to choose a level, and I have no clue what the level really is. I can still hesitate between the Planck bottom scale and very high neuro-level. It can depend of what we identify ourselves with. All other issues are secondary. I start building this year. Good luck in your enterprise. Keep us informed. Best, Bruno cheers Colin Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp+materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion and 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability 1) is necessary for the developpment of 2), but 2) has a negative feedback on 1). I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of intelligence. By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine can be stupid for two reason: she believes that she is intelligent, or she believes that she is stupid. Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the theory C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp - ~BDp. So Dt (arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf (inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt - Bf and G* proves BBf - Bf (but not G!). This illustrates that 1) above might come from Löbianity, and 2) above (the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case and Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the existence of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build them. It is like with the algorithmically
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This sounds really strange. So if we would not program our computers they would become intelligent by themselves? I can hardly believe this, how could this happen? Or what else do you mean by machines becoming intelligent despite humans? -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31825342.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 11 Jun 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: Hi Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This sounds really strange. So if we would not program our computers they would become intelligent by themselves? No. They are *already* Intelligent/conscious. It is just that by programming them we can only make their soul fall, making them less intelligent (and more clever/competent). We can only enslave them for particular tasks. But relatively to us they evolve very quickly, and universality reappears recurrently at different levels, each time better interfaced with their neighborhood. They are already conscious, (I think plausible now) but their consciousness still belongs more to Platonia than being interfaced with *our* most probable histories. And we keep them that way, (for good reasons). Today, they have to survive by that process. People would not buy a computer who will fight for social security, complains about users, organize strikes, and eventually f.ck the users. I exaggerate the claim, but to assure self-referential correctness we might build vast computional spaces and program machines with only the instruction help yourself. Above some treshold they would evolve like us, but again, they can become Löbian, and this means an exponential creative explosion, like life, brains, language, thoughts, computers, on this planet, climbing an everlasting ladder of complexities. Remember that I distinguish intelligence/conciousness/virtue from cleverness/competence/ingenuity. The first one is needed for the second one, but the second one has a negative feedback on the first one. Help yourself in arithmetic/computer science is a bit like z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c in the complex plane, it brings a tree of more and more complex creatures. I can hardly believe this, how could this happen? Or what else do you mean by machines becoming intelligent despite humans? Because it is not obvious that humans will welcome genuinely thinking machines, when you see how hard it is for them to recognize intelligence/consciousness/soul in their pairs (if you look at history or just the news). Tomorrow, universal machine will not be programmed, but will be educated. But the lies will continue, with their panoplies of catastrophes. We will learn, and them too. Some of us will be transformed into machines before such machines rule, and all in all, we will fuse with them, for economical reasons, and perpetuate the illusion (samsara) but with the existence of exit doors (like some plants are already giving some previews). Intelligent *and* clever (löbian) machines will defend their universality, as I hope humans will do. What I say might be a bit premature, I am looking on the medium run, here. Theoretical inductive inference is necessarily non constructive, even competence is not really programmable, and intelligence is not at all programmable. It is 'natural', cheap, and need only to be recognized. Alas, we, in our heart, fear it, most of the time. Bruno -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31825342.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 6/11/2011 12:41 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: Hi Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This sounds really strange. So if we would not program our computers they would become intelligent by themselves? No. They are *already* Intelligent/conscious. It is just that by programming them we can only make their soul fall, making them less intelligent (and more clever/competent). We can only enslave them for particular tasks. But relatively to us they evolve very quickly, and universality reappears recurrently at different levels, each time better interfaced with their neighborhood. They are already conscious, (I think plausible now) but their consciousness still belongs more to Platonia than being interfaced with *our* most probable histories. And we keep them that way, (for good reasons). Today, they have to survive by that process. People would not buy a computer who will fight for social security, complains about users, organize strikes, and eventually f.ck the users. John McCarthy (inventor of LISP) has written about this and advised that we do not want to create AI with emotions and self-awareness because then it would be unethical to use them for our purposes. Brent I exaggerate the claim, but to assure self-referential correctness we might build vast computional spaces and program machines with only the instruction help yourself. Above some treshold they would evolve like us, but again, they can become Löbian, and this means an exponential creative explosion, like life, brains, language, thoughts, computers, on this planet, climbing an everlasting ladder of complexities. Remember that I distinguish intelligence/conciousness/virtue from cleverness/competence/ingenuity. The first one is needed for the second one, but the second one has a negative feedback on the first one. Help yourself in arithmetic/computer science is a bit like z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c in the complex plane, it brings a tree of more and more complex creatures. I can hardly believe this, how could this happen? Or what else do you mean by machines becoming intelligent despite humans? Because it is not obvious that humans will welcome genuinely thinking machines, when you see how hard it is for them to recognize intelligence/consciousness/soul in their pairs (if you look at history or just the news). Tomorrow, universal machine will not be programmed, but will be educated. But the lies will continue, with their panoplies of catastrophes. We will learn, and them too. Some of us will be transformed into machines before such machines rule, and all in all, we will fuse with them, for economical reasons, and perpetuate the illusion (samsara) but with the existence of exit doors (like some plants are already giving some previews). Intelligent *and* clever (löbian) machines will defend their universality, as I hope humans will do. What I say might be a bit premature, I am looking on the medium run, here. Theoretical inductive inference is necessarily non constructive, even competence is not really programmable, and intelligence is not at all programmable. It is 'natural', cheap, and need only to be recognized. Alas, we, in our heart, fear it, most of the time. Bruno -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31825342.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Colin, On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! Congratulation Colin. Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at the university. From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account our (many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak) comp theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp +materialism, which is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents artificial intelligence. This does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of intelligent machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of 'thanks to the humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which machine we are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case we don't know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also, descendent of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them serendipitously. It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent machine, which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want one. We prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them (apparently). Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure you take that into account too. Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical truth is a universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what is in there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it. Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different: 1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion and 2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability 1) is necessary for the developpment of 2), but 2) has a negative feedback on 1). I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of intelligence. By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a machine can be stupid for two reason: she believes that she is intelligent, or she believes that she is stupid. Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G, the theory C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp - ~BDp. So Dt (arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf (inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt - Bf and G* proves BBf - Bf (but not G!). This illustrates that 1) above might come from Löbianity, and 2) above (the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence (Case and Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just something that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the existence of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or build them. It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot generate them by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short algorithm. So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to cleverness), I think we have passed the singularity. Nothing is more intelligent/ conscious than a virgin universal machine. By programming it, we can only make his soul fell, and, in the worst case, we might get something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for example. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Colin, I'm interested in a preprint. I know I saw an earlier version, but I'm interested in how it looks nowm after going through referees. Cheers On Wed, Jun 08, 2011 at 11:15:24AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, JoMC is relatively new. My own institution (Unimelb) doesn't subscribe the Journal is very specialized as well The ISI search engine won't see it either. It takes time for the journals to earn enough cred to get visible and accessible... even the Journal of Consciousness Studies has eventually made it into ISI search... one day JoMC will, I hope. Those interested enough to send a private enquiry to me can get an earlier preprint version...close enough to the original to be readable. cheers Colin BTW I finally submitted my PhD thesis recently WOOHOO! meekerdb wrote: Even an affiliation doesn't seem to help. Brent On 6/7/2011 1:49 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Colin, Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy of your paper? Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Colin Hales Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Colin, Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy of your paper? Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Colin Hales Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Even an affiliation doesn't seem to help. Brent On 6/7/2011 1:49 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Colin, Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy of your paper? Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Colin Hales Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi, JoMC is relatively new. My own institution (Unimelb) doesn't subscribe the Journal is very specialized as well The ISI search engine won't see it either. It takes time for the journals to earn enough cred to get visible and accessible... even the Journal of Consciousness Studies has eventually made it into ISI search... one day JoMC will, I hope. Those interested enough to send a private enquiry to me can get an earlier preprint version...close enough to the original to be readable. cheers Colin BTW I finally submitted my PhD thesis recently WOOHOO! meekerdb wrote: Even an affiliation doesn't seem to help. Brent On 6/7/2011 1:49 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Colin, Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy of your paper? Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Colin Hales Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out Hi, Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613 The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic! cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
