Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

Tone is often difficult to convey or perceive accurately in e-mail
messages.  How is asking a sincere question prompted by a genuine desire to
clarify someone else's views "not appropriate here"?  I always welcome
feedback from the moderators, and am confident that one of them will inform
me if I am out of line.  Besides, the thread topic is connected directly
with "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," so this particular
question is quite relevant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 9:23 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> I think this is inquisitory in tone, and not appropriate here. Also, both
> of you: I appreciate your differences, but this is getting tiresome.
>
> Thanks, Mike
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jon,
I think this is inquisitory in tone, and not appropriate here.
Also, both of you: I appreciate your differences, but this is
getting tiresome.
Thanks, Mike


On 9/14/2016 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
  wrote:


  Edwina, List:


I am not asserting anything, just asking a sincere
  question.  As an atheist (by your own description), do you
  acknowledge that your view is
clearly different from that of Peirce regarding the Reality
of God?  No interpretation is required here, just a
  simple yes or no.


Thanks,


Jon


  
  On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 7:54 PM,
Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

  
Jon, list:
What a bizarre question. You
can't be asserting that an atheist cannot interpret
Peirce's analysis of God - for such a claim would be
untenable. You can't be asserting that I SHOULD
interpret his claim - since I was very clear that I
would not discuss it. Therefore, I've no idea of the
intentionality of your question.

 
Edwina
  

-
  Original Message - 
From:
  Jon Alan Schmidt 
To:
  Edwina
Taborsky 
Cc:
  Peirce-L 
  
  

  Sent:
Wednesday, September 14, 2016 8:07 PM
  Subject:
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
  
  
  Edwina, List:


Since you mentioned earlier that you are an
  atheist, do you acknowledge that your view is
  clearly different from that of Peirce
  regarding the Reality of God?


Thanks,


Jon

  

  


  

  
  On Wed, Sep 14, 2016
at 3:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

  
Jon, list;
Yes, this is how I interpret Peirce.
You interpret him differently. 
Again, as I've said before, I will
not get into any interaction with
you if you self-define YOUR
interpretation as 'the true Peirce'.
 
And yes, I
know that some people on this list
agree with your interpretations and
others agree with mine - and I'm
sure others agree with neither. 
 
Edwina

-
  Original Message - 
From:
  Jon Alan Schmidt

To:
  Edwina Taborsky

Cc:
  Peirce-L 
  
Sent:
  Wednesday, September 14, 2016 3:56
  PM
Subject:
  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of
  Thinking


  
  Edwina, List:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I am not asserting anything, just asking a sincere question.  As an atheist
(by your own description), do you acknowledge that your view is clearly
different from that of Peirce regarding the Reality of God?  No
interpretation is required here, just a simple yes or no.

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 7:54 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list:
> What a bizarre question. You can't be asserting that an atheist cannot
> interpret Peirce's analysis of God - for such a claim would be untenable.
> You can't be asserting that I SHOULD interpret his claim - since I was very
> clear that I would not discuss it. Therefore, I've no idea of the
> intentionality of your question.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 14, 2016 8:07 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Since you mentioned earlier that you are an atheist, do you acknowledge
> that your view is clearly different from that of Peirce regarding the
> Reality of God?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 3:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list; Yes, this is how I interpret Peirce. You interpret him
>> differently.  Again, as I've said before, I will not get into any
>> interaction with you if you self-define YOUR interpretation as 'the true
>> Peirce'.
>>
>> And yes, I know that some people on this list agree with your
>> interpretations and others agree with mine - and I'm sure others agree with
>> neither.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 14, 2016 3:56 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET:  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any
>> interaction! ... And I don't define the modal categories as having any
>> objective reality outside of the semiosic articulation ... I don't think
>> that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' but are instead
>> integral modes of organization of that phenomena. As for Firstness and
>> Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation within Signs - I don't
>> agree with that ... Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be
>> feeling OF something/a quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has
>> to be habits OF something. Thirdness as mediation obviously has no
>> 'reality' without an embodiment ...
>>
>>
>> I acknowledge that these are your views.  Just to be clear--do you also
>> believe that they were Peirce's views?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>> Yes, we do indeed interpret Peirce very differently.
>>>
>>> As noted, my view is that semiosis is dynamic and interactional.
>>>
>>> ET: I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no
>>> such thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate
>>> 'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the
>>> categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted,
>>> this organization takes place within interactions.
>>>
>>> Therefore - I don't confine Signs [the triad] as operational only within
>>> the mode of Secondness [individual separate existence]. That would,  for
>>> example, deny both the Qualisign, the Iconic Legisign, the Rhematic Symbol
>>> and the Argument as Signs.
>>>
>>> And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any
>>> interaction! By this I include even a crystal as a  Sign - in interaction
>>> with its past formation and its current situation.
>>>
>>>  And I don't define the modal categories as having any objective reality
>>> outside of the semiosic articulation.
>>>
>>> I don't think that the Representamen is itself a triad, but it operates
>>> within a triad of relations: the R-O; R-R; and R-I. Each can be in a
>>> different  categorical mode. The Full Triad - I refer to as the Sign.
>>>
>>> I don't think that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of
>>> phenomena' but are instead integral modes of organization of that phenomena.
>>>
>>> As for Firstness and Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation
>>> within Signs - I don't agree with that, for I don't agree with the
>>> separation of *modes of organization* from
>>> instantiative existentiality. After all, Firstness, as 'feeling', as
>>> 'quality', has to be feeling OF something/a quality OF something. And
>>> Thirdness, as habits, has to be habits OF something. Thirdness as mediation
>>> obviously has no 'reality' without an embodiment. Neither Firstness nor
>>> Thirdness can exist without such embediment within 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:
What a bizarre question. You can't be asserting that an atheist cannot 
interpret Peirce's analysis of God - for such a claim would be untenable. You 
can't be asserting that I SHOULD interpret his claim - since I was very clear 
that I would not discuss it. Therefore, I've no idea of the intentionality of 
your question.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 8:07 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List:


  Since you mentioned earlier that you are an atheist, do you acknowledge that 
your view is clearly different from that of Peirce regarding the Reality of God?


  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 3:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jon, list; Yes, this is how I interpret Peirce. You interpret him 
differently.  Again, as I've said before, I will not get into any interaction 
with you if you self-define YOUR interpretation as 'the true Peirce'.

And yes, I know that some people on this list agree with your 
interpretations and others agree with mine - and I'm sure others agree with 
neither. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 3:56 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List: 


ET:  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any 
interaction! ... And I don't define the modal categories as having any 
objective reality outside of the semiosic articulation ... I don't think that 
the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' but are instead integral 
modes of organization of that phenomena. As for Firstness and Thirdness as 
'being Real' outside of instantiation within Signs - I don't agree with that 
... Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF something/a 
quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be habits OF something. 
Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality' without an embodiment ...


  I acknowledge that these are your views.  Just to be clear--do you also 
believe that they were Peirce's views?



  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
wrote:

Jon, list:

Yes, we do indeed interpret Peirce very differently.

As noted, my view is that semiosis is dynamic and interactional. 
  ET: I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no 
such thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 
'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the 
categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, 
this organization takes place within interactions.

  Therefore - I don't confine Signs [the triad] as operational only 
within the mode of Secondness [individual separate existence]. That would,  for 
example, deny both the Qualisign, the Iconic Legisign, the Rhematic Symbol and 
the Argument as Signs.

  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any 
interaction! By this I include even a crystal as a  Sign - in interaction with 
its past formation and its current situation.

   And I don't define the modal categories as having any objective 
reality outside of the semiosic articulation. 

  I don't think that the Representamen is itself a triad, but it 
operates within a triad of relations: the R-O; R-R; and R-I. Each can be in a 
different  categorical mode. The Full Triad - I refer to as the Sign.

  I don't think that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of 
phenomena' but are instead integral modes of organization of that phenomena.

  As for Firstness and Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of 
instantiation within Signs - I don't agree with that, for I don't agree with 
the separation of modes of organization from instantiative existentiality. 
After all, Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF 
something/a quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be habits OF 
something. Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality' without an 
embodiment. Neither Firstness nor Thirdness can exist without such embediment 
within the particular. And the only way to embody...is within the  semiosic 
triad.

  What is, to me, the Real? I consider, as Peirce wrote, "there are 
Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about 
them" 5.384. This, i think, was to act as a rejection of relativism and 
conceptualism/nominalism.

  This is not the same as 'realism', which refers to the 
reality-of-universals or generals, which means, to my understanding, that the 
commonality, or the universal is not a 'post hoc' concept but a truth - even if 
we don't current perceive it.

  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Since you mentioned earlier that you are an atheist, do you acknowledge
that your view is clearly different from that of Peirce regarding the
Reality of God?

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 3:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list; Yes, this is how I interpret Peirce. You interpret him
> differently.  Again, as I've said before, I will not get into any
> interaction with you if you self-define YOUR interpretation as 'the true
> Peirce'.
>
> And yes, I know that some people on this list agree with your
> interpretations and others agree with mine - and I'm sure others agree with
> neither.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 14, 2016 3:56 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any
> interaction! ... And I don't define the modal categories as having any
> objective reality outside of the semiosic articulation ... I don't think
> that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' but are instead
> integral modes of organization of that phenomena. As for Firstness and
> Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation within Signs - I don't
> agree with that ... Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be
> feeling OF something/a quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has
> to be habits OF something. Thirdness as mediation obviously has no
> 'reality' without an embodiment ...
>
>
> I acknowledge that these are your views.  Just to be clear--do you also
> believe that they were Peirce's views?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>> Yes, we do indeed interpret Peirce very differently.
>>
>> As noted, my view is that semiosis is dynamic and interactional.
>>
>> ET: I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no
>> such thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate
>> 'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the
>> categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted,
>> this organization takes place within interactions.
>>
>> Therefore - I don't confine Signs [the triad] as operational only within
>> the mode of Secondness [individual separate existence]. That would,  for
>> example, deny both the Qualisign, the Iconic Legisign, the Rhematic Symbol
>> and the Argument as Signs.
>>
>> And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any
>> interaction! By this I include even a crystal as a  Sign - in interaction
>> with its past formation and its current situation.
>>
>>  And I don't define the modal categories as having any objective reality
>> outside of the semiosic articulation.
>>
>> I don't think that the Representamen is itself a triad, but it operates
>> within a triad of relations: the R-O; R-R; and R-I. Each can be in a
>> different  categorical mode. The Full Triad - I refer to as the Sign.
>>
>> I don't think that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena'
>> but are instead integral modes of organization of that phenomena.
>>
>> As for Firstness and Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation
>> within Signs - I don't agree with that, for I don't agree with the
>> separation of *modes of organization* from instantiative existentiality.
>> After all, Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF
>> something/a quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be
>> habits OF something. Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality'
>> without an embodiment. Neither Firstness nor Thirdness can exist without
>> such embediment within the particular. And the only way to embody...is
>> within the  semiosic triad.
>>
>> What is, to me, the Real? I consider, as Peirce wrote, "there are Real
>> things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about
>> them" 5.384. This, i think, was to act as a rejection of relativism and
>> conceptualism/nominalism.
>>
>> This is not the same as 'realism', which refers to the
>> reality-of-universals or generals, which means, to my understanding, that
>> the commonality, or the universal is not a 'post hoc' concept but a truth -
>> even if we don't current perceive it.
>>
>> So- obviously, we interpret Peirce very differently. I think we will have
>> to acknowledge this - and continue to examine and explore.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 14, 2016 2:54 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET:  I don't think that you  should 'assume that any 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Stephen C. Rose]

Jon wrote:
*While signs indeed "exist only within interaction" (Secondness), both
Qualisigns (Firstness) and Legisigns (Thirdness) have Being that is
independent of any interaction; i.e., they are Real apart from actually
being instantiated as Sinsigns.*

I have no idea regarding the actual uses of Peirce's riffs on the term
signs. Signs I thought were vague things that come up in reality and are in
this sense the origin of thought and therefore firsts. As I ponder the
premise that first second and third are not an order I find myself saying
they are. Firsts are the penumbrous beginning of conscious thinking. As he
walks into the woods perhaps. Those blunt things he calls an index come
SECOND -- they are big, like a list of values or a batch of qualifiers. Am
I to take the time on my stroll to deal with quali and legi and categories?
Is that rquired to think of a sign and two subsequent things?. Not if I am
an ordinary bloke who fancies that thinking is this or that sign modified
by this or that index leads to... Oh and  what does it lead to? Well, why
not a third stage which, do we dare? Which takes its cue from the Pragmatic
Maxim and might issue in an expression which one might publish, an act. Or
making up with your wife. Or taking the garbage out. Please do not tell me
Peirce did not want to influence the world. That the triadic is not
something we should sing from the rooftops to stave off binary madness. I
know he did. Oh he might be very angry to read this simplistic post but at
the same time a bit put out over the way his own hash obscures a more
general application of his thought.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 2:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in
> our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions.
> BUT - there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there
> is no doubt.
>
>
> I agree that no one should *assume *that one of us is right here.
> Peirce, even more so than many other philosophers, seems to require the
> hard work of doing your own thinking in response to his writings.  The NA,
> in particular, is something that he specifically said could not be directly
> argued or explained to someone, only described to and then experienced by
> someone.
>
> ET:  I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no
> such thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate
> 'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the
> categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted,
> this organization takes place within interactions.
>
>
> These comments highlight what seem to be our three most fundamental points
> of disagreement.  My very different understanding of Peirce's views is as
> follows.
>
>- While signs indeed "*exist *only within interaction" (Secondness),
>both Qualisigns (Firstness) and Legisigns (Thirdness) have *Being *that
>is independent of any interaction; i.e., they are *Real *apart from
>actually being instantiated as Sinsigns.
>- Both "sign" and "Sign" refer to a tradic representamen that *has 
> *relations
>with its object and interpretant, rather than the capitalized word
>referring instead to a triad that *includes* the representamen,
>object, and interpretant, along with all of the relations among them.
>- The categories are three distinct "Universes of Experience"--aspects
>of phenomena that we distinguish when we analyze the Phaneron, which is
>whatever is present to any mind at any time--rather than "the
>method-of-organization of matter/concepts."
>
> Your notions strike me as going beyond anything that Peirce himself wrote,
> which (in my opinion) makes it challenging to maintain clarity about how we
> are using the terms.
>
> ET:  Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to
> be a basic first step in discussing any 'reality'.
>
>
> Presumably we should start with Peirce's definitions in "A Neglected
> Argument" as published, and one of its drafts.
>
> CSP:  The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is the
> definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really
> creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)
>
> CSP:  The first proposition of Natural Theology:  what single other
> subject has been worn so threadbare!  Moreover, whoever, from prelate to
> ploughboy, has deeply pondered the matter is, I suppose, familiar with the
> chain of thought which this paper is to consider, and which it will be
> convenient to designate as "the neglected argument."  Indeed, meaning by
> "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the Being whose Attributes
> are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, Omniscience, Omnipotence,
> Infinite Benignity, a Being *not *"immanent in" the Universes of Matter,
> Mind, and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Clark Goble]

(Sorry I thought I sent this before I left my office yesterday only to find it 
still on my screen. I know the discussion has moved on but I figured I’d post 
it anyway)

> On Sep 13, 2016, at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark- yes, I think that the disagreements in interpretation of Peirce go 
> beyond semantics. The way I see it, there are some who view the Peircean 
> framework in a linear, mechanical reductionist sense; i.e., 'this ..followed 
> by ..this..followed by..this..and...
>  
> That's where you get the focus on the representamen alone being called 'the 
> sign' - and you get the loss of the triadic frame which, in my view, is one 
> of the two basic formats of the Peircean framework. [The other is the three 
> categories].


Yes I tend to agree. While I admit in several the debates I’m more persuaded by 
Jon and company on the matter of representationalism that I know John and a few 
others hold I just disagree. I think thirdness as thought even when tied to 
subject/predicate can’t neglect the place of the object in the sign. That 
object may be firstness as a kind of raw qualia or a more proper “object out 
there.” But regardless the Peircean conception of representation is just 
radically different (IMO) from how we see representationalism in psychology and 
cognitive science typically. To my eyes Peircean signs are much more embodied 
in their nature.

Fundamentally the issue is the relationship of firstness to thought. That is 
should we consider the ineffable as part of thought? When the ineffable is no 
longer original, it becomes effable because it is part of a sign.

While not the quote I was searching for, this one is relevant.

The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all conception 
of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second 
to that second. The first must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to 
be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is 
second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and 
free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid 
and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It 
precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unityand no parts. It 
cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its 
characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something 
else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the 
day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had 
become conscious of his own existence -- that is first, present, immediate, 
fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and 
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it (CP 
1.357).

I think what is key is that the mind recognizes the sign and the thing 
signified are not the same. The implication being that while we have feelings 
and qualia as firstness we’re also simultaneously cut off from these. They 
can’t be repeated without being a sign rather than firstness.

The part that I think is the semantic question is whether we consider firstness 
and secondness when not objects of a sign as thoughts. My somewhat tentative 
view is that Peirce uses thought just in terms of thirdness. That’s because a 
thought is part of thinking which is a process. I think he always recognizes 
these other aspects in terms of firstness and secondness but he’s still largely 
adopting the language that is brought in by Descartes and largely persists in 
philosophy and much of science to this day. However simultaneously when using 
the broader term of experience a lot more is going on. Likewise he uses mind a 
little more loosely. 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list; Yes, this is how I interpret Peirce. You interpret him differently.  
Again, as I've said before, I will not get into any interaction with you if you 
self-define YOUR interpretation as 'the true Peirce'.

And yes, I know that some people on this list agree with your interpretations 
and others agree with mine - and I'm sure others agree with neither. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 3:56 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List:


ET:  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any 
interaction! ... And I don't define the modal categories as having any 
objective reality outside of the semiosic articulation ... I don't think that 
the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' but are instead integral 
modes of organization of that phenomena. As for Firstness and Thirdness as 
'being Real' outside of instantiation within Signs - I don't agree with that 
... Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF something/a 
quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be habits OF something. 
Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality' without an embodiment ...


  I acknowledge that these are your views.  Just to be clear--do you also 
believe that they were Peirce's views?



  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jon, list:

Yes, we do indeed interpret Peirce very differently.

As noted, my view is that semiosis is dynamic and interactional. 
  ET: I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no 
such thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 
'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the 
categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, 
this organization takes place within interactions.

  Therefore - I don't confine Signs [the triad] as operational only within 
the mode of Secondness [individual separate existence]. That would,  for 
example, deny both the Qualisign, the Iconic Legisign, the Rhematic Symbol and 
the Argument as Signs.

  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any 
interaction! By this I include even a crystal as a  Sign - in interaction with 
its past formation and its current situation.

   And I don't define the modal categories as having any objective reality 
outside of the semiosic articulation. 

  I don't think that the Representamen is itself a triad, but it operates 
within a triad of relations: the R-O; R-R; and R-I. Each can be in a different  
categorical mode. The Full Triad - I refer to as the Sign.

  I don't think that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' 
but are instead integral modes of organization of that phenomena.

  As for Firstness and Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation 
within Signs - I don't agree with that, for I don't agree with the separation 
of modes of organization from instantiative existentiality. After all, 
Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF something/a quality 
OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be habits OF something. 
Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality' without an embodiment. 
Neither Firstness nor Thirdness can exist without such embediment within the 
particular. And the only way to embody...is within the  semiosic triad.

  What is, to me, the Real? I consider, as Peirce wrote, "there are Real 
things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them" 
5.384. This, i think, was to act as a rejection of relativism and 
conceptualism/nominalism.

  This is not the same as 'realism', which refers to the 
reality-of-universals or generals, which means, to my understanding, that the 
commonality, or the universal is not a 'post hoc' concept but a truth - even if 
we don't current perceive it.

  So- obviously, we interpret Peirce very differently. I think we will have 
to acknowledge this - and continue to examine and explore.

  Edwina 


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 2:54 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List: 


ET:  I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' 
in our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions. 
BUT - there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there is no 
doubt.


  I agree that no one should assume that one of us is right here.  Peirce, 
even more so than many other philosophers, seems to require the hard work of 
doing your own thinking in response to his writings.  The NA, in particular, is 
something that he specifically said could not be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any
interaction! ... And I don't define the modal categories as having any
objective reality outside of the semiosic articulation ... I don't think
that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' but are instead
integral modes of organization of that phenomena. As for Firstness and
Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation within Signs - I don't
agree with that ... Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be
feeling OF something/a quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has
to be habits OF something. Thirdness as mediation obviously has no
'reality' without an embodiment ...


I acknowledge that these are your views.  Just to be clear--do you also
believe that they were Peirce's views?

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> Yes, we do indeed interpret Peirce very differently.
>
> As noted, my view is that semiosis is dynamic and interactional.
>
> ET: I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such
> thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate
> 'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the
> categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted,
> this organization takes place within interactions.
>
> Therefore - I don't confine Signs [the triad] as operational only within
> the mode of Secondness [individual separate existence]. That would,  for
> example, deny both the Qualisign, the Iconic Legisign, the Rhematic Symbol
> and the Argument as Signs.
>
> And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any
> interaction! By this I include even a crystal as a  Sign - in interaction
> with its past formation and its current situation.
>
>  And I don't define the modal categories as having any objective reality
> outside of the semiosic articulation.
>
> I don't think that the Representamen is itself a triad, but it operates
> within a triad of relations: the R-O; R-R; and R-I. Each can be in a
> different  categorical mode. The Full Triad - I refer to as the Sign.
>
> I don't think that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena'
> but are instead integral modes of organization of that phenomena.
>
> As for Firstness and Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation
> within Signs - I don't agree with that, for I don't agree with the
> separation of *modes of organization* from instantiative existentiality.
> After all, Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF
> something/a quality OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be
> habits OF something. Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality'
> without an embodiment. Neither Firstness nor Thirdness can exist without
> such embediment within the particular. And the only way to embody...is
> within the  semiosic triad.
>
> What is, to me, the Real? I consider, as Peirce wrote, "there are Real
> things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about
> them" 5.384. This, i think, was to act as a rejection of relativism and
> conceptualism/nominalism.
>
> This is not the same as 'realism', which refers to the
> reality-of-universals or generals, which means, to my understanding, that
> the commonality, or the universal is not a 'post hoc' concept but a truth -
> even if we don't current perceive it.
>
> So- obviously, we interpret Peirce very differently. I think we will have
> to acknowledge this - and continue to examine and explore.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 14, 2016 2:54 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in
> our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions.
> BUT - there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there
> is no doubt.
>
>
> I agree that no one should *assume *that one of us is right here.
> Peirce, even more so than many other philosophers, seems to require the
> hard work of doing your own thinking in response to his writings.  The NA,
> in particular, is something that he specifically said could not be directly
> argued or explained to someone, only described to and then experienced by
> someone.
>
> ET:  I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no
> such thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate
> 'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the
> categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted,
> this organization takes place within interactions.
>
>
> These comments highlight what seem to be our three most fundamental points
> of disagreement.  My very 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:

Yes, we do indeed interpret Peirce very differently.

As noted, my view is that semiosis is dynamic and interactional. 
  ET: I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such 
thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 
'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the 
categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, 
this organization takes place within interactions.

  Therefore - I don't confine Signs [the triad] as operational only within the 
mode of Secondness [individual separate existence]. That would,  for example, 
deny both the Qualisign, the Iconic Legisign, the Rhematic Symbol and the 
Argument as Signs.

  And I don't consider that Signs have ' being' independent of any interaction! 
By this I include even a crystal as a  Sign - in interaction with its past 
formation and its current situation.

   And I don't define the modal categories as having any objective reality 
outside of the semiosic articulation. 

  I don't think that the Representamen is itself a triad, but it operates 
within a triad of relations: the R-O; R-R; and R-I. Each can be in a different  
categorical mode. The Full Triad - I refer to as the Sign.

  I don't think that the modal categories are merely 'aspects of phenomena' but 
are instead integral modes of organization of that phenomena.

  As for Firstness and Thirdness as 'being Real' outside of instantiation 
within Signs - I don't agree with that, for I don't agree with the separation 
of modes of organization from instantiative existentiality. After all, 
Firstness, as 'feeling', as 'quality', has to be feeling OF something/a quality 
OF something. And Thirdness, as habits, has to be habits OF something. 
Thirdness as mediation obviously has no 'reality' without an embodiment. 
Neither Firstness nor Thirdness can exist without such embediment within the 
particular. And the only way to embody...is within the  semiosic triad.

  What is, to me, the Real? I consider, as Peirce wrote, "there are Real 
things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them" 
5.384. This, i think, was to act as a rejection of relativism and 
conceptualism/nominalism.

  This is not the same as 'realism', which refers to the reality-of-universals 
or generals, which means, to my understanding, that the commonality, or the 
universal is not a 'post hoc' concept but a truth - even if we don't current 
perceive it.

  So- obviously, we interpret Peirce very differently. I think we will have to 
acknowledge this - and continue to examine and explore.

  Edwina








  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 2:54 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List:


ET:  I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in 
our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions. BUT 
- there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there is no 
doubt.


  I agree that no one should assume that one of us is right here.  Peirce, even 
more so than many other philosophers, seems to require the hard work of doing 
your own thinking in response to his writings.  The NA, in particular, is 
something that he specifically said could not be directly argued or explained 
to someone, only described to and then experienced by someone.


ET:  I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such 
thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 
'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the 
categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, 
this organization takes place within interactions.


  These comments highlight what seem to be our three most fundamental points of 
disagreement.  My very different understanding of Peirce's views is as follows.
a.. While signs indeed "exist only within interaction" (Secondness), both 
Qualisigns (Firstness) and Legisigns (Thirdness) have Being that is independent 
of any interaction; i.e., they are Real apart from actually being instantiated 
as Sinsigns.

b.. Both "sign" and "Sign" refer to a tradic representamen that has 
relations with its object and interpretant, rather than the capitalized word 
referring instead to a triad that includes the representamen, object, and 
interpretant, along with all of the relations among them.

c.. The categories are three distinct "Universes of Experience"--aspects of 
phenomena that we distinguish when we analyze the Phaneron, which is whatever 
is present to any mind at any time--rather than "the method-of-organization of 
matter/concepts."
  Your notions strike me as going beyond anything that Peirce himself wrote, 
which (in my opinion) makes it challenging to maintain clarity about how we are 
using the terms.


ET:  Plus, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in
our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions.
BUT - there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there
is no doubt.


I agree that no one should *assume *that one of us is right here.  Peirce,
even more so than many other philosophers, seems to require the hard work
of doing your own thinking in response to his writings.  The NA, in
particular, is something that he specifically said could not be directly
argued or explained to someone, only described to and then experienced by
someone.

ET:  I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such
thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate
'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the
categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted,
this organization takes place within interactions.


These comments highlight what seem to be our three most fundamental points
of disagreement.  My very different understanding of Peirce's views is as
follows.

   - While signs indeed "*exist *only within interaction" (Secondness),
   both Qualisigns (Firstness) and Legisigns (Thirdness) have *Being *that
   is independent of any interaction; i.e., they are *Real *apart from
   actually being instantiated as Sinsigns.
   - Both "sign" and "Sign" refer to a tradic representamen that *has
*relations
   with its object and interpretant, rather than the capitalized word
   referring instead to a triad that *includes* the representamen, object,
   and interpretant, along with all of the relations among them.
   - The categories are three distinct "Universes of Experience"--aspects
   of phenomena that we distinguish when we analyze the Phaneron, which is
   whatever is present to any mind at any time--rather than "the
   method-of-organization of matter/concepts."

Your notions strike me as going beyond anything that Peirce himself wrote,
which (in my opinion) makes it challenging to maintain clarity about how we
are using the terms.

ET:  Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to be
a basic first step in discussing any 'reality'.


Presumably we should start with Peirce's definitions in "A Neglected
Argument" as published, and one of its drafts.

CSP:  The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is the
definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)

CSP:  The first proposition of Natural Theology:  what single other subject
has been worn so threadbare!  Moreover, whoever, from prelate to ploughboy,
has deeply pondered the matter is, I suppose, familiar with the chain of
thought which this paper is to consider, and which it will be convenient to
designate as "the neglected argument."  Indeed, meaning by "God," as
throughout this paper will be meant, the Being whose Attributes are, in the
main, those usually ascribed to Him, Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite
Benignity, a Being *not *"immanent in" the Universes of Matter, Mind, and
Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them, without
exception,—when we consider how much an assurance of His Reality would help
men to govern their conduct by the best attainable lights, how can we
refrain from expecting of His Benignity, in case He really is, that we
shall find some sound reason to believe in Him that is open to every human
mind, high and low?  Now if such reason there be, it will be for the reader
to judge, after he has learned what "the neglected argument" is, whether
such sound reason can be any other than "the neglected argument." (R 843)


Note also Peirce's designations here for the three Universes--Matter
(Secondness), Mind (Thirdness), and Ideas (Firstness).

CSP:  But I do not, by 'God,' mean, with some writers, a being so
inscrutable that nothing at all can be known of Him.  I suppose most of our
knowledge of Him must be by similitudes.  Thus, He is so much like a mind,
and so little like a singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object
that Exists, a thing subject to brute constraints, and reacting with all
other Existents,) and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility,
that we may loosely say that He is a Spirit, or Mind. (R 843)


Presumably this is why Peirce, in the published (second) additament,
referred to the NA as "that course of meditation upon the three Universes
which gives birth to the hypothesis and ultimately to the belief that they,
or at any rate two of the three, have a Creator independent of them" (CP
6.483).  Since God may be loosely characterized as a Mind, that Universe
(Thirdness) is in some sense primoridal relative to the other two.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:39 PM, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Arbitariness of the Sign / Centenary of the Cours de Linguistique Générale / Ferdinand de Saussure

[jean-yves beziau]

Thanks Kirsti
that sounds very good
if you or someone else  wants to come to our workshop in Geneva next January
 to talk about Jakobson (s)he most welcome.
Best Wishes
Jean-Yves

2016-09-14 18:48 GMT+02:00 :

> Dear Jean-Yves Beziau & the list!
>
> The one and only linguist, who knew both Saussure and Peirce ' by heart',
> was Roman Jakobson. He never agreed with the idea of arbitrariness of the
> sign. He even took the famous 'Cours' compiled by the students of Saussure
> as a misunderstanding, a misintepretation of the views of de Saussure.
>
> Roman Jakobson was a linguist with a great influence on French (European)
> structuralism, However, it was only his work on distictions of phonemes,
> with Halle, that was taken into attention. La differance became the focus.
> Leaving his work on sound similarities (with e.g. Waugh) in shadow. Sound
> and meaning are intimately connected, according to Jakobson.
>
> The idea of icons and iconicity stems from visual metaphors. Sound shapes
> cannot be understood or studied from this perspective. Sound shapes are
> something experientally familiar to every child before birth. It is only
> after birth that a child looks and sees. The sound shapes of the mother
> tongue are deeply familiar to every child before birth.
>
> From all we know, this is a logical conclusion. In no need of empirical
> verification (whatever it may mean in practice).
>
> As a linguist, Jakobson was an experimentalist, just as was Peirce.
> Saussure, on the other hand, was a thoroughbread theorist, a prime example
> of 'seminary philosophy', in Peirce's terms.
>
> The mistake Saussure (according to his students) made, was to take a WORD
> as a good-enough approximation of basic units of language.
>
> Anyone capable of thinking, can understand that this view on the units of
> language applies perfectly to nouns. But not to language, in general.
>
> Peirce expressed his annoyance in respect to prevalent terminology in
> grammar. He stated that it is 'preposterous' to call PRONOUNS byt that
> name. They should be called PREDEMONSTRATIVES was his firm view.
>
>
> The famous picture in the Cours presents a picture of a tree and ITS NAME.
> So, the whole of Saussure's theorizing relies on naming things. (Just as
> Foucault originally titled his book  Le Mots et le choses. )
>
> Nominalism, the main target of Peirce's  critique, was and still is about
> Le Mots et le chose. Naming objects.
>
> Hilbert took a pint of beer on a table as his example of mathematical
> (imaginary) objects. Mathematics, however, is not about naming objects, but
> about making connections.
>
> The same goes for language, as a vehicle in conveying ideas and thoughts.
> It is all about making connections.
>
> The dead-line for abstracts in this most interesting workshop lies just a
> few days ahead this date of announcement in the Peirce list.
>
> So I just express a wish to have Roman Jacobson and his work  taken up, in
> one way or another, during this meeting & discussions in Genova.
>
> With respect,
>
> Kirsti Määttänen,
> University of Tampere,School of Social Sciences and Humanities.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> jean-yves beziau kirjoitti 14.9.2016 15:27:
>
>> This year  is the centenary of Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de
>> Linguistique Générale.
>> I am organizing a workshop next January in Geneva within the
>> centenary congress:
>>
>> The Arbitariness of the Sign
>> http://www.clg2016.org/en/geneva/programme/workshops/the-
>> arbitrariness-of-the-sign/
>> [1]
>>
>> This  is a follow up of a workshop I have organized at the University
>> of
>> Neuchâtel in 2005, with the followig book as byproduct:
>> La pointure du symbole
>> https://www.editionspetra.fr/livres/la-pointure-du-symbole [2]
>>
>> The deadline to submit an abstract (either in English or French) is
>> September 18.
>>
>> Jean-Yves Beziau
>> http://www.jyb-logic.org/ [3]
>>
>>
>> Links:
>> --
>> [1]
>> http://www.clg2016.org/en/geneva/programme/workshops/the-
>> arbitrariness-of-the-sign/
>> [2] https://www.editionspetra.fr/livres/la-pointure-du-symbole
>> [3] http://www.jyb-logic.org/
>>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - I disagree that scepticism towards the validity of someone else's 
interpretation is also a 'loss of morality' or a movement towards 
pluralism/relativism.

After all - should I, centuries ago, have accepted the Church's view that the 
sun went around the earth? Should I have accepted that disease was caused by 
malevolent thoughts?

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 2:14 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Hi list:



  “Ben - I don't think that you should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in our 
interpretations of Peirce.”



  This is the first dangerous step toward loss of morality induced by a move 
toward pluralism when it is not warranted.  But then again, why not this when 
the alternative is no better?  Why should this not be warranted?



  Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to be a 
basic first step in discussing any 'reality'. 



  Seth: That never came up. I do remember him saying, toward the end of his 
life, "Oh, I now realize you always knew this. But I've just come to recognize 
how central the question 'Quid sit deus?'is." 

  ~Benardete on Bloom, Encounters and Reflections



  “Hegel above all, and his numerous successors have failed to pay proper 
attention to the philosophic concept of the city as exhibited by classical 
political philosophy.  For what is “first for us” is not the philosophic 
understanding of the city but that understanding which is inherent in the city 
as such, in the pre-philosophic city, according to which the city sees itself 
as subject and subservient to the divine in the ordinary understanding of the 
divine or looks up to it. 



  Only by beginning at this point will we be open to the full impact of the 
all-important question which is coeval with philosophy although the 
philosophers do not frequently pronounce it- the question quid sit deus.” 

  ~Strauss, The City and Man



  Can we be good without God?  

  Can we be just without Nature?  

  Can we know truth without revelation?

  Can we recognize the Beautiful without a clear conception of the Divine?

  What would God be?



  Hth,

  Jerry Rhee



  On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Ben - I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in 
our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions. BUT 
- there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there is no 
doubt.

I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such 
thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 
'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the 
categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, 
this organization takes place within interactions.

Therefore, in differentiation from Jon, for example, I don't see Firstness 
as having any isolational reality. ALL of the three categorical modes funcion 
only within the interactional dynamics that is semiosis.

My interpretation, as I said, is that an interaction [which is itself a 
Relation or a triadic Sign] can function in a mode of Firstness - which is to 
say, it is a qualitative feeling in that instant of the interaction. The brute 
or immediate reaction to this stimuli is in a mode of Secondness. The habitual 
reaction that might guide this first brute reaction and decision of 'what to 
do'  would be in a mode of Thirdness.

As for the other questions on God's reality - as an atheist - I'll stay out 
of that. Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to be 
a basic first step in discussing any 'reality'. And if one moves into 
nominalism - as the Anselm conceptualism seems to do - well...that's not going 
into reality!

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Ben Novak 
  To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 10:54 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


   Dear Jon: 


  There are several issues floating around. 


  1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness


  You disagree with my example, as well as its amendment, but give a 
definition of secondness that, unfortunately, does not compute for me.  I 
assume you are right, but you may be at a level of abstraction that is way 
above my pay grade, as it were. 


  In any event, I suggest that you think, at least in relation to me, on a 
pedagogical level, i.e., teaching at the level of the student. For example, in 
physics, I am told, introductory courses still begin with the old idea of the 
atom with planet-like things called electrons whirling around a nucleus--even 
though in more advanced courses in quantum physics these rudimentary examples 
will be shown to be quite inaccurate. Nevertheless, once a clear, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi list:



“Ben - I don't think that you should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in
our interpretations of Peirce.”



This is the first dangerous step toward loss of morality induced by a move
toward pluralism when it is not warranted.  But then again, why not this
when the alternative is no better?  Why should this not be warranted?



Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to be a
basic first step in discussing any 'reality'.



*Seth:* That never came up. I do remember him saying, toward the end of his
life, "Oh, I now realize you always knew this. But I've just come to
recognize how central the question *'Quid sit deus?'*is."

~Benardete on Bloom, Encounters and Reflections



“Hegel above all, and his numerous successors have failed to pay proper
attention to the philosophic concept of the city as exhibited by classical
political philosophy.  For what is “first for us” is not the philosophic
understanding of the city but that understanding which is inherent in the
city as such, in the pre-philosophic city, according to which the city sees
itself as subject and subservient to the divine in the ordinary
understanding of the divine or looks up to it.



Only by beginning at this point will we be open to the full impact of the
all-important question which is coeval with philosophy although the
philosophers do not frequently pronounce it- the question *quid sit deus*.”

~Strauss, The City and Man



Can we be good without God?

Can we be just without Nature?

Can we know truth without revelation?

Can we recognize the Beautiful without a clear conception of the Divine?

What would God be?



Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Ben - I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in
> our interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions.
> BUT - there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there
> is no doubt.
>
> I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily *interactional*; there is no such
> thing as a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an
> isolate 'thing-in-itself'. Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see
> the categories as the method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as
> noted, this organization takes place within interactions.
>
> Therefore, in differentiation from Jon, for example, I don't see Firstness
> as having any isolational reality. ALL of the three categorical modes
> funcion only within the interactional dynamics that is semiosis.
>
> My interpretation, as I said, is that an interaction [which is itself a
> Relation or a triadic Sign] can function in a mode of Firstness - which is
> to say, it is a* qualitative feeling in that instant of the interaction*.
> The brute or immediate reaction to this stimuli is in a mode of Secondness.
> The habitual reaction that might guide this first brute reaction and
> decision of 'what to do'  would be in a mode of Thirdness.
>
> As for the other questions on God's reality - as an atheist - I'll stay
> out of that. Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would
> have to be a basic first step in discussing any 'reality'. And if one moves
> into nominalism - as the Anselm conceptualism seems to do - well...that's
> not going into reality!
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Ben Novak 
> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt  ; Edwina Taborsky
>  ; Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 14, 2016 10:54 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
>  Dear Jon:
>
> There are several issues floating around.
>
> 1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness
>
> You disagree with my example, as well as its amendment, but give a
> definition of secondness that, unfortunately, does not compute for me.  I
> assume you are right, but you may be at a level of abstraction that is way
> above my pay grade, as it were.
>
> In any event, I suggest that you think, at least in relation to me, on a
> pedagogical level, i.e., teaching at the level of the student. For example,
> in physics, I am told, introductory courses still begin with the old idea
> of the atom with planet-like things called electrons whirling around a
> nucleus--even though in more advanced courses in quantum physics these
> rudimentary examples will be shown to be quite inaccurate. Nevertheless,
> once a clear, simple, and elementary example is implanted, it is far easier
> to correct an elementary example later by adding complicating factors, than
> to insist on the most complications at the beginning, because the latter
> will likely prevent the student from ever grasping the concept. In other
> words, start simple.
>
> There is an old saying that wherever you have two philosophers together,
> there are at least three opinions. In this regard, I am honored that Edwina
> agrees with my example. Thank you, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Edwina Taborsky]

Ben - I don't think that you  should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in our 
interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions. BUT - 
there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there is no doubt.

I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such thing as 
a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 'thing-in-itself'. 
Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the categories as the 
method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, this organization 
takes place within interactions.

Therefore, in differentiation from Jon, for example, I don't see Firstness as 
having any isolational reality. ALL of the three categorical modes funcion only 
within the interactional dynamics that is semiosis.

My interpretation, as I said, is that an interaction [which is itself a 
Relation or a triadic Sign] can function in a mode of Firstness - which is to 
say, it is a qualitative feeling in that instant of the interaction. The brute 
or immediate reaction to this stimuli is in a mode of Secondness. The habitual 
reaction that might guide this first brute reaction and decision of 'what to 
do'  would be in a mode of Thirdness.

As for the other questions on God's reality - as an atheist - I'll stay out of 
that. Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to be a 
basic first step in discussing any 'reality'. And if one moves into nominalism 
- as the Anselm conceptualism seems to do - well...that's not going into 
reality!

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Ben Novak 
  To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 10:54 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


   Dear Jon:


  There are several issues floating around. 


  1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness


  You disagree with my example, as well as its amendment, but give a definition 
of secondness that, unfortunately, does not compute for me.  I assume you are 
right, but you may be at a level of abstraction that is way above my pay grade, 
as it were. 


  In any event, I suggest that you think, at least in relation to me, on a 
pedagogical level, i.e., teaching at the level of the student. For example, in 
physics, I am told, introductory courses still begin with the old idea of the 
atom with planet-like things called electrons whirling around a nucleus--even 
though in more advanced courses in quantum physics these rudimentary examples 
will be shown to be quite inaccurate. Nevertheless, once a clear, simple, and 
elementary example is implanted, it is far easier to correct an elementary 
example later by adding complicating factors, than to insist on the most 
complications at the beginning, because the latter will likely prevent the 
student from ever grasping the concept. In other words, start simple.


  There is an old saying that wherever you have two philosophers together, 
there are at least three opinions. In this regard, I am honored that Edwina 
agrees with my example. Thank you, Edwina, for chiming in. You make things much 
more lively.


  2. Original thread topic


  Moving on, there is another issue raised in Jon's email of 11:18 yesterday. 
First, he thanks me for "steer(ing) the  the discussion back to the original 
thread topic". The original thread topic listed four questions that needed to 
be addressed:


1.. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the 
nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their 
"logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or 
something else?
2.. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with "the 
hypothesis of God's reality"?
3.. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of 
thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively 
trace and inductively test?
4.. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the nature of 
thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would thereby also be 
"proved.
  My suggestion was that the best way to answer the question posed in #1, is to 
begin with the questions posed in #2, #3, and #4. 


  In his most recent email, however, Jon disagrees, writing,


  I am not asking about the NA itself; I am asking about the "theory of the 
nature of thinking" that Peirce does not clearly identify, but claims is 
logically connected with "the hypothesis of God's Reality" in such a way that a 
proof of the former would also constitute a proof of the latter.



  Now, I appreciate Jon's desire to attack the problem of the Peirce's theory 
of thinking frontally, but sometimes the best way to attack it is to go around 
it, i.e., search out a weakness in the flanks or rear (to use a military 
analogy). Such an opening is suggested in the very quotation from Peirce that 
Jon offers, where Peirce says: "the hypothesis of God's Reality is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Ben, Harold, Jon, Edwina, Gary list:



This whole business of *one two three; one three two; Firstness Secondness
Thirdness; Firstness Thirdness, Secondness; what is First or Second when
speaking of an object *appears irresolvable.  Everyone has his/her own pet
theory for which it ought to be and why it ought to be that way.  Surely,
that is what Peirce wanted, for why not create such confusion and why not
leave it at that?



If we recall that *it is truth we’re after* and “*the elements of every
concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make
their exit at the gate of purposive action*”, then what does any of this
have to do with truth?  How can we settle why any one thing should ever be
said to be any better than another?  Why even use this corrupted system if
it takes us no farther than any other?  For certainly it is impossible to
make a truth determination if we can’t even get our statement clear and
there is no getting this statement clear.  Where is this logic of vagueness
that is supposed to help us?



Perhaps I’m wrong.  Maybe it is us who are corrupted for we’d rather ignore
purposive action and piddle with fragmentary thoughts that satisfy our
desires than proceed in inquiry.  Maybe it is not truth we’re after,
regardless of appearing to be genuine inquirers.



Best,

Jerry R

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 11:25 AM,  wrote:

> Ben,
>
>
>
> The difference between Firstness and Secondness is not really that
> complicated; I think if you look at the way Peirce defines them in the
> “Neglected Argument” essay itself (as the first and second Universes,
> EP2:435), you’ll see that Jon has it exactly right. Perhaps you’re confused
> by trying to think of them *sequentially*, as ‘action and reaction.’ But
> for Peirce, “brute forces” and actual events (such as “sound or other
> shock waves hitting my body,” your original example, or any other physical
> collision) are just as much “reactions” in the Peircean sense, and occur in
> the second Universe, just as much as your subsequent bodily reaction to the
> event. Of course any *phenomenon*, i.e. any actual thing or event that
> *appears* (to anyone), has its own quality or Firstness, but in this case
> it’s the Firstness of a Secondness; it has no singularity or individuality
> of its own, as all things do in the Universe of Secondness, where
> interactions occur.
>
>
>
> This should be clear even if you read the whole text that Edwina selected
> a couple of texts from CP 1.307-8 (1907):
>
> [[[ 306. By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness
> which involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor
> consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of
> consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its own positive
> quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it
> is, however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is
> present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at every
> moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple definition, I
> will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of
> consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of
> anything else.
>
> 307. A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass,
> since a coming to pass cannot be such unless there was a time when it had
> not come to pass; and so it is not in itself all that it is, but is
> relative to a previous state. A feeling is a *state,* which is in its
> entirety in every moment of time as long as it endures. But a feeling is
> not a single state which is other than an exact reproduction of itself. For
> if that reproduction is in the same mind, it must be at a different time,
> and then the being of the feeling would be relative to the particular time
> in which it occurred, which would be something different from the feeling
> itself, violating the definition which makes the feeling to be all that it
> is regardless of anything else. Or, if the reproduction were simultaneous
> with the feeling, it must be in another mind, and thus the identity of the
> feeling would depend upon the mind in which it was, which is other than the
> feeling; and again the definition would be violated in the same way. Thus,
> any feeling must be identical with any exact duplicate of it, which is as
> much as to say that the feeling is simply a quality of immediate
> consciousness. ]]]
>
>
>
> As for the theological issue … now that IS complicated.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Ben Novak [mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 14-Sep-16 10:55
> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt ; Edwina Taborsky <
> tabor...@primus.ca>; Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
>
>
>  Dear Jon:
>
>
>
> There are several issues floating around.
>
>
>
> 1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness
>
>
>
> You 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Arbitariness of the Sign / Centenary of the Cours de Linguistique Générale / Ferdinand de Saussure

[kirstima]

Dear Jean-Yves Beziau & the list!

The one and only linguist, who knew both Saussure and Peirce ' by 
heart', was Roman Jakobson. He never agreed with the idea of 
arbitrariness of the sign. He even took the famous 'Cours' compiled by 
the students of Saussure as a misunderstanding, a misintepretation of 
the views of de Saussure.


Roman Jakobson was a linguist with a great influence on French 
(European) structuralism, However, it was only his work on distictions 
of phonemes, with Halle, that was taken into attention. La differance 
became the focus. Leaving his work on sound similarities (with e.g. 
Waugh) in shadow. Sound and meaning are intimately connected, according 
to Jakobson.


The idea of icons and iconicity stems from visual metaphors. Sound 
shapes cannot be understood or studied from this perspective. Sound 
shapes are something experientally familiar to every child before birth. 
It is only after birth that a child looks and sees. The sound shapes of 
the mother tongue are deeply familiar to every child before birth.


From all we know, this is a logical conclusion. In no need of empirical 
verification (whatever it may mean in practice).


As a linguist, Jakobson was an experimentalist, just as was Peirce. 
Saussure, on the other hand, was a thoroughbread theorist, a prime 
example of 'seminary philosophy', in Peirce's terms.


The mistake Saussure (according to his students) made, was to take a 
WORD as a good-enough approximation of basic units of language.


Anyone capable of thinking, can understand that this view on the units 
of language applies perfectly to nouns. But not to language, in general.


Peirce expressed his annoyance in respect to prevalent terminology in 
grammar. He stated that it is 'preposterous' to call PRONOUNS byt that 
name. They should be called PREDEMONSTRATIVES was his firm view.



The famous picture in the Cours presents a picture of a tree and ITS 
NAME. So, the whole of Saussure's theorizing relies on naming things. 
(Just as Foucault originally titled his book  Le Mots et le choses. )


Nominalism, the main target of Peirce's  critique, was and still is 
about Le Mots et le chose. Naming objects.


Hilbert took a pint of beer on a table as his example of mathematical 
(imaginary) objects. Mathematics, however, is not about naming objects, 
but about making connections.


The same goes for language, as a vehicle in conveying ideas and 
thoughts.  It is all about making connections.


The dead-line for abstracts in this most interesting workshop lies just 
a few days ahead this date of announcement in the Peirce list.


So I just express a wish to have Roman Jacobson and his work  taken up, 
in one way or another, during this meeting & discussions in Genova.


With respect,

Kirsti Määttänen,
University of Tampere,School of Social Sciences and Humanities.










jean-yves beziau kirjoitti 14.9.2016 15:27:

This year  is the centenary of Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de
Linguistique Générale.
I am organizing a workshop next January in Geneva within the
centenary congress:

The Arbitariness of the Sign
http://www.clg2016.org/en/geneva/programme/workshops/the-arbitrariness-of-the-sign/
[1]

This  is a follow up of a workshop I have organized at the University
of
Neuchâtel in 2005, with the followig book as byproduct:
La pointure du symbole
https://www.editionspetra.fr/livres/la-pointure-du-symbole [2]

The deadline to submit an abstract (either in English or French) is
September 18.

Jean-Yves Beziau
http://www.jyb-logic.org/ [3]


Links:
--
[1]
http://www.clg2016.org/en/geneva/programme/workshops/the-arbitrariness-of-the-sign/
[2] https://www.editionspetra.fr/livres/la-pointure-du-symbole
[3] http://www.jyb-logic.org/




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[gnox]

Ben,

 

The difference between Firstness and Secondness is not really that complicated; 
I think if you look at the way Peirce defines them in the “Neglected Argument” 
essay itself (as the first and second Universes, EP2:435), you’ll see that Jon 
has it exactly right. Perhaps you’re confused by trying to think of them 
sequentially, as ‘action and reaction.’ But for Peirce, “brute forces” and 
actual events (such as “sound or other shock waves hitting my body,” your 
original example, or any other physical collision) are just as much “reactions” 
in the Peircean sense, and occur in the second Universe, just as much as your 
subsequent bodily reaction to the event. Of course any phenomenon, i.e. any 
actual thing or event that appears (to anyone), has its own quality or 
Firstness, but in this case it’s the Firstness of a Secondness; it has no 
singularity or individuality of its own, as all things do in the Universe of 
Secondness, where interactions occur. 

 

This should be clear even if you read the whole text that Edwina selected a 
couple of texts from CP 1.307-8 (1907):

[[[ 306. By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which 
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in 
whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is 
distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which consists 
in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may have 
been brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, 
it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that time. To reduce this 
description to a simple definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an 
instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it is 
positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. 

307. A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass, since a 
coming to pass cannot be such unless there was a time when it had not come to 
pass; and so it is not in itself all that it is, but is relative to a previous 
state. A feeling is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time 
as long as it endures. But a feeling is not a single state which is other than 
an exact reproduction of itself. For if that reproduction is in the same mind, 
it must be at a different time, and then the being of the feeling would be 
relative to the particular time in which it occurred, which would be something 
different from the feeling itself, violating the definition which makes the 
feeling to be all that it is regardless of anything else. Or, if the 
reproduction were simultaneous with the feeling, it must be in another mind, 
and thus the identity of the feeling would depend upon the mind in which it 
was, which is other than the feeling; and again the definition would be 
violated in the same way. Thus, any feeling must be identical with any exact 
duplicate of it, which is as much as to say that the feeling is simply a 
quality of immediate consciousness. ]]]

 

As for the theological issue … now that IS complicated.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Ben Novak [mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 14-Sep-16 10:55
To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Edwina Taborsky 
; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

 

 Dear Jon:

 

There are several issues floating around. 

 

1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness

 

You disagree with my example, as well as its amendment, but give a definition 
of secondness that, unfortunately, does not compute for me.  I assume you are 
right, but you may be at a level of abstraction that is way above my pay grade, 
as it were. 

 

In any event, I suggest that you think, at least in relation to me, on a 
pedagogical level, i.e., teaching at the level of the student. For example, in 
physics, I am told, introductory courses still begin with the old idea of the 
atom with planet-like things called electrons whirling around a nucleus--even 
though in more advanced courses in quantum physics these rudimentary examples 
will be shown to be quite inaccurate. Nevertheless, once a clear, simple, and 
elementary example is implanted, it is far easier to correct an elementary 
example later by adding complicating factors, than to insist on the most 
complications at the beginning, because the latter will likely prevent the 
student from ever grasping the concept. In other words, start simple.

 

There is an old saying that wherever you have two philosophers together, there 
are at least three opinions. In this regard, I am honored that Edwina agrees 
with my example. Thank you, Edwina, for chiming in. You make things much more 
lively.

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Apparently we disagree once more, and I will try to be more careful going
forward about how I express my interpretation of Peirce.   My understanding
is that he classified anything "singular," any *event *that happens or
occurs, as Secondness; and that he considered any "interaction" to be
Secondness,
because it entails (at least) two subjects reacting with each other.
Again, Firstness is that which is as it is, independent of anything else.
An extended excerpt from "The Logic of Mathematics:  An Attempt to Develop
My Categories from Within" (1896) is pertinent here.

CSP:  We remark among phenomena three categories of elements.

The first comprises the qualities of phenomena, such as red, bitter,
tedious, hard, heartrending, noble; and there are doubtless manifold
varieties utterly unknown to us ... It is sufficient that wherever there is
a phenomenon there is a quality; so that it might almost seem that there is
nothing else in phenomena.  The qualities merge into one another.  They
have no perfect identities, but only likenesses, or partial identities.
Some of them, as the colors and the musical sounds, form well-understood
systems.  Probably, were our experience of them not so fragmentary, there
would be no abrupt demarcations between them, at all.  Still, each one is
what it is in itself without help from the others. They are single but
partial determinations.

The second category of elements of phenomena comprises the actual facts.
The qualities, in so far as they are general, are somewhat vague and
potential.  But an occurrence is perfectly individual.  It happens here and
now.  A permanent fact is less purely individual; yet so far as it is
actual, its permanence and generality only consist in its being there at
every individual instant.  Qualities are concerned in facts but they do not
make up facts.  Facts also concern subjects which are material substances.
We do not see them as we see qualities, that is, they are not in the very
potentiality and essence of sense.  But we feel facts resist our will.
That is why facts are proverbially called brutal.  Now mere qualities do
not resist.  It is the matter that resists.  Even in actual sensation there
is a reaction.  Now mere qualities, unmaterialized, cannot actually react
... All that I here insist upon is that quality is one element of
phenomena, and fact, action, actuality is another.  We shall undertake the
analysis of their natures below.

The third category of elements of phenomena consists of what we call laws
when we contemplate them from the outside only, but which when we see both
sides of the shield we call thoughts.  Thoughts are neither qualities nor
facts.  They are not qualities because they can be produced and grow, while
a quality is eternal, independent of time and of any realization ... A
thought then is not a quality.  No more is it a fact.  For a thought is
general.  I had it.  I imparted it to you.  It is general on that side.  It
is also general in referring to all possible things, and not merely to
those which happen to exist.  No collection of facts can constitute a law;
for the law goes beyond any accomplished facts and determines how facts
that *may be*, but *all *of which never can have happened, shall be
characterized.  There is no objection to saying that a law is a general
fact, provided it be understood that the general has an admixture of
potentiality in it, so that no congeries of actions here and now can ever
make a general fact.  As *general*, the law, or general fact, concerns the
potential world of quality, while as *fact*, it concerns the actual world
of actuality.  Just as action requires a peculiar kind of subject, matter,
which is foreign to mere quality, so law requires a peculiar kind of
subject, the thought, or, as the phrase in this connection is, the mind, as
a peculiar kind of subject foreign to mere individual action. Law, then, is
something as remote from both quality and action as these are remote from
one another. (CP 1.418-420)


This is also another example of where I see Peirce rather explicitly
associating all thought(s) with Thirdness.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 7:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Ben - I think you are correct in your example and definition of Firstness
> and Secondness. That is, the sound/shock wave that you  feel in your body
> IS an example of Firstness. As Peirce writes, this is a STATE, not a
> reaction [which would be Secondness].
>
> "A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to passa
> feeling is a *state*, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as
> long as it endures". 1.307.
>
> Think of Firstness as a STATE, a singular experience, a whole
> feeling. Firstness is a *state* that affects another body, so to speak.
> It is not just the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Edwina Taborsky]

Ben - I think you are correct in your example and definition of Firstness and 
Secondness. That is, the sound/shock wave that you  feel in your body IS an 
example of Firstness. As Peirce writes, this is a STATE, not a reaction [which 
would be Secondness]. 

"A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to passa feeling 
is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as long as it 
endures". 1.307. 

Think of Firstness as a STATE, a singular experience, a whole feeling. 
Firstness is a state that affects another body, so to speak. It is not just the 
sound/shock wave isolate from interaction but is instead the interaction of 
that sound/shockwave with another. That interaction, which is a qualitative 
state, is Firstness. Remember, Peircean semiosis requires a network, an 
interaction; nothing is isolate-in-itself.

Secondness develops when the other part of the interaction reacts. So, 
Secondness, just as you point out, is your body's flinching or other reaction.

All of this is part of the process of Mind. Again, as Peirce writes "Every 
operation of the mind, however complex, has its absolutely simple feeling, the 
emotion of the tout ensemble" 1.311.

This points to, again, the fact that Firstness is not an isolate state but an 
interactional state. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Ben Novak 
  To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:12 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Dear Jon:


  I am confused, but perhaps something I said created the confusion. So, let's 
see if I can obtain a state  of unconfusement. The problem is whether my 
example of firstness, etc. can be corrected. Here is my original example:


  I am a student sitting in a class listening to an interesting lecture, when 
suddenly an explosion occurs. It could be a firecracker under behind the 
professor's desk, or a truck wreck on the street right outside the classroom 
windows. The sound of true explosion, whatever it is, is  sudden, unexpected, 
and immediate.  The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute 
firstness--I feel them. Secondness is what my body does in reaction, which is 
to  immediately and involuntarily, raise my head, flinch, and commence other 
bodily reactions to the explosion waves reaching me. Thirdness occurs next, 
when my mind begins to wonder what just happened.



  In correcting me, you write:
BN:  The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute firstness--I 
feel them.
  I would be inclined to associate this more with Secondness, because it is 
Reaction of the shock waves and your body, not a Quality that is what it is 
independent of anything else.



  What I am proposing is that I delete the words "--I feel them." 
  What I intended to convey was the idea that you earlier corrected me on, 
where you distinguish between reality and existence this way:


  Reality consists of that which has whatever characters it has, regardless of 
whether anyone thinks or believes that it has those characters; existence 
consists of that which interacts or reacts with other things.



  What I mean in the example of firstness, etc. above is that the shock or 
sound waves constitute firstness, i.e., brute reality. By secondness in the 
example I mean that when the sound or shock wave hit me, I become aware of 
them, and my body involuntarily and without conscious thinking reacts. And by 
thirdness, I first wonder what made the sound or shock waves. Can I achieve 
this by deleting "--I feel them," and is the example then sound?


  Thanks,
  Ben N.




  Ben Novak
  5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
  Telephone: (814) 808-5702

  "All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts 
themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart 
will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes 
may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message 
will have gone." Oswald Spengler



  On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 11:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:

Ben N., List:


Thanks for attempting to steer the discussion back to the original thread 
topic. :-)


  BN:  The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute 
firstness--I feel them.


I would be inclined to associate this more with Secondness, because it is 
Reaction of the shock waves and your body, not a Quality that is what it is 
independent of anything else.


  BN:  So, let's go back to Jon's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, because I 
think he is on to something:


While I appreciate the vote of confidence, I believe that we still need to 
address the first question first--to what was Peirce specifically referring as 
"a theory of the nature of thinking" or "this theory of thinking"?


These were both unusual expressions for him to use; neither appears 
anywhere else in the Collected Papers.  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Ben N., List:

BN:  What I mean in the example of firstness, etc. above is that the shock
or sound waves constitute firstness, i.e., brute reality.


In Peircean terminology as I understand it, "brute reality" is a muddled
notion.  Anything "brute" is Secondness, and therefore *exists*.  That
includes the shock or sound waves, since those react with other things
regardless of whether any human being is in the vicinity to experience
them.  The *qualities *of the shock or sound waves--such as loudness--are
examples of Firstness, but only as they are *in themselves*, not as they
are *actually *sensed by someone.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 11:12 PM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear Jon:
>
> I am confused, but perhaps something I said created the confusion. So,
> let's see if I can obtain a state  of unconfusement. The problem is whether
> my example of firstness, etc. can be corrected. Here is my original example:
>
> I am a student sitting in a class listening to an interesting lecture,
> when suddenly an explosion occurs. It could be a firecracker under behind
> the professor's desk, or a truck wreck on the street right outside the
> classroom windows. The sound of true explosion, whatever it is, is  sudden,
> unexpected, and immediate.  The sound or other shock waves hitting my body
> constitute firstness--I feel them. Secondness is what my body does in
> reaction, which is to  immediately and involuntarily, raise my head,
> flinch, and commence other bodily reactions to the explosion waves reaching
> me. Thirdness occurs next, when my mind begins to wonder what just happened.
>
> In correcting me, you write:
>
> BN:  The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute
> firstness--I feel them.
>
> I would be inclined to associate this more with Secondness, because it is
> Reaction of the shock waves and your body, not a Quality that is what it is
> independent of anything else.
>
> What I am proposing is that I delete the words "--I feel them."
> What I intended to convey was the idea that you earlier corrected me on,
> where you distinguish between reality and existence this way:
>
> Reality consists of that which has whatever characters it has, regardless
> of whether anyone thinks or believes that it has those characters;
> existence consists of that which interacts or reacts with other things.
>
> What I mean in the example of firstness, etc. above is that the shock or
> sound waves constitute firstness, i.e., brute reality. By secondness in the
> example I mean that when the sound or shock wave hit me, I become aware of
> them, and my body involuntarily and without conscious thinking reacts. And
> by thirdness, I first wonder what made the sound or shock waves. Can I
> achieve this by deleting "--I feel them," and is the example then sound?
>
> Thanks,
> Ben N.
>
> *Ben Novak *
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>

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line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Arbitariness of the Sign / Centenary of the Cours de Linguistique Générale / Ferdinand de Saussure

[jean-yves beziau]

This year  is the centenary of Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de
Linguistique Générale.
I am organizing a workshop next January in Geneva within the  centenary
congress:

The Arbitariness of the Sign
http://www.clg2016.org/en/geneva/programme/workshops/the-arbitrariness-of-the-sign/

This  is a follow up of a workshop I have organized at the University of
Neuchâtel in 2005, with the followig book as byproduct:
La pointure du symbole
https://www.editionspetra.fr/livres/la-pointure-du-symbole

The deadline to submit an abstract (either in English or French) is
September 18.

Jean-Yves Beziau
http://www.jyb-logic.org/

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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Transcending scientism - new book

[Stephen Jarosek]

Dear members,

 

My latest ebook:

http://www.lulu.com/shop/http://www.lulu.com/shop/stephen-jarosek/transcendi
ng-scientism-mending-broken-cultures-broken-science/ebook/product-22859816.h
tml
 

 

In fairness to this scholarly forum, I should point out that the book
references Peirce, biosemiotics and semiotics but not from the scholarly
perspective that we know and love here. Principally, my references to the
topic are in the simplified context of fundamental principles, like
habituation, association, motivation, pragmatism, etc, as it is meant for a
more general readership. Some might find the book controversial or
provocative. again, steer clear if controversy offends J

 

A printed version is in the pipeline, not ready yet.

 

Regards,

sj


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[Harold Orbach]

Pardon my intrusion into this unending mishmash:

1.  Peirce's neglected argument is for the REALITY of God  not  the EXISTENCE 
of God.

2. Anselm's ontological argument for the EXISTENCE of God is not "pretty nearly 
the most famous argument in the history of philosophy," only in the history of 
a small segment of the so-called WESTERN world, a minor part of the total areas 
and populations of what is termed "the earth" that came to dominate and 
"discover" most of the other areas for a few hundred years up to the present 
compared with other civilizations or empires that had dominance over larger and 
smaller areas for thousands of years.

3.  Other lands and peoples have and have had different views on the nature of 
God or Gods or Goddesses or if there are any that EXIST and how anyone might 
come to know this.  They also have and have had different kinds of "things" 
that were believed to be gods or sacred.

Harold L. Orbach
PhD, University of Minnesota Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology
Emeritus, Kansas State University
Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 13, 2016, at 10:32 PM, Ben Novak 
> wrote:

Dear Jerry, List:

You ask two questions. First, what is Anselm's ontological argument. 
Thankfully, that is easy to answer. It is short, and I append it to this email 
at the end.

Your second question is why "you are imposing the question on us, which 
includes me [Jerry Rhee]?

First. let me clarify for the record: I am not from Missouri, and only used 
that phrase assuming everyone is familiar with it, in order to get to the "show 
me" part. Further, I do not know whether everyone in Missouri has heard of 
Anselm's ontological argument, though I assume not.

However, I would expect (silly me!) that anyone with a Ph.D. would have heard 
of it, since it is pretty nearly the most famous argument about God's existence 
in the history of philosophy, and would be expected to be brought up in any 
introductory, or history of, philosophy course or in any conversation or study 
anytime anyone questions whether God exists.

Further, since we are talking about Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the 
Reality of God," Anselm's argument would naturally come to mind as soon as 
anyone inquires into why Peirce thought his argument had been "neglected." In 
other words, the very title of Peirce's paper points to other arguments for 
God's existence in the context of which he is placing his. But it is worth 
noting that Peirce did not claim that he had a new argument, but suggests by 
his title that it may have arisen before and was merely "neglected." So he was 
bringing a long neglected argument back into view. At least I take that to be 
one possible interpretation of the suggestion in his title.(On the other hand, 
I take Peirce's title to imply that he felt his argument had been neglected 
because it was so simple that no one thought to dignify it previously. 
Silly me.)

Since the original questions that commenced this chain include "How exactly is 
"this theory of thinking" logically connected with "the hypothesis of God's 
reality"? I assumed that that was to be one of the major questions dealt with 
in the discussion, which Jon thought to begin by asking his four questions.

Now, the ontological argument has evoked a stupendous literature in philosophy 
and logic, because it seems to prove the existence of God by a purely logical 
and non-empirical method. That is why it is called ontological, i.e., the 
argument proceeds only from being (onto=being).  Philosophers agree that Anselm 
makes at least two different arguments in chapters II and III, though some 
philosophers find three and even four separate arguments. Many logicians have 
wrestled with it, and some logicians see it as a "modal" argument.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a very brief and readable 
description of Anselm's ontological argument: Be sure  to read sections 1, 2a, 
3, and 4.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/

I hope that you will agree, after reading the brief account in the link above 
that Anselm is quite relevant to placing Peirce's "neglected" argument into 
context. The connection is that both Anselm and Peirce seek to prove God's 
existence purely from a thought process.

Now, if you want to read a different take on Anselm's understanding of what is 
meant by "existence," I invite you to read my article entitled "Anselm on 
Nothing," in the International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 3, 
September 2008, pages 305-320, which you may read on line here:

https://www.academia.edu/13891780/Anselm_on_Nothing

For this second link, it must be borne in mind that Anselm wrote two tracts 
relating to God's existence (or being), and the first link deals with his 
second work, the Proslogion, where his famous ontological argument is found 
(appended below), while the second link (my article) deals mostly with Anselm's 
arguments in his first work, the Monologion.