date:20170302

Clark, list,

That's a good question. I've tended to think of it this way. Truth
enters logic as a regulative idea that one can hardly doubt in
particular cases; in other words, one thinks that one's idea of truth is
true in particular cases. In committing to inquire into various
questions, one commits to the idea of truths about various questions.
This commitment to the idea of truth applies even when the inquiry is
about truth itself. One ends up with _/practical/_ certainty that there
is truth even if, at the theoretical level, the principle remains
regulatory, not speculative. In his brief intellectual autobiography
(1904), Peirce says that philosophy concerns ideas whose truth or
falsehood is the object of no science (i.e., no theoretical research)
because they can hardly be doubted. Moreover, Peirce behaves as a
serious theorist - from his ideas about truth, the real, and fallibility
in particular, he draws nontrivial conclusions in metaphysics, involving
continuity and spontaneity a.k.a. absolute chance. See Peirce (1897)
"Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution", CP 1.141–75
http://www.textlog.de/4248.html , placed by the CP editors directly
after "F.R.L." (1899, CP 1.135–40)
https://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm

. I just don't know how far beyond regulative conceptions he goes in
that case. In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without
providing a reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be
recognized by the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since
synechism is a normative or regulative principle, not a theory of
existence."

It's when one looks at the set of regulative ideas collectively and
philosophically that one can entertain some sort of doubt and regard
those ideas as hopes rather than as something surer. One keeps the door
open to the idea that possibly there's something vaguely wrong in that set.

In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W 5:222-235 (see
227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:

The problem whether a given question will ever get answered or not
is not so simple; the number of questions asked is constantly
increasing, and the capacity for answering them is also on the
increase. If the rate of the latter increase is greater than that of
the former the probability is unity that any given question will be
answered; otherwise the probability is _/zero/_. [] But I will
admit (if the reader thinks the admission has any meaning, and is
not an empty proposition) that some finite number of questions, we
can never know which ones, will escape getting answered forever.
[] Let us suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that some
questions eventually get settled, and that some others,
indistinguishable from the former by any marks, never do. In that
case, I should say that the conception of reality was rather a
faulty one, for while there is a real so far as a question that will
get settled goes, there is none for a question that will never be
settled; for an unknowable reality is nonsense. [] In that way,
if we think that some questions are never going to get settled, we
ought to admit that our conception of nature as absolutely real is
only partially correct. Still, we shall have to be governed by it
practically; because there is nothing to distinguish the
unanswerable questions from the answerable ones, so that
investigation will have to proceed as if all were answerable. In
ordinary life, no matter how much we believe in questions ultimately
getting answered, we shall always put aside an innumerable throng of
them as beyond our powers. [] From this practical and economical
point of view, it really makes no difference whether or not all
questions are actually answered, by man or by God, so long as we are
satisfied that investigation has a universal tendency toward the
settlement of opinion; and this I conceive to be the position of
Thrasymachus.

If there be any advantage to religion in supposing God to be
omniscient, this sort of scepticism about reality can do no
practical harm. We can still suppose that He knows all that there is
of reality to be known. [] The scepticism just spoken of would
admit this omniscience as a regulative but not a speculative
conception. I believe that even that view is more religiously
fruitful than the opinion of Dr. Royce.

A while back, Gary F. quoted from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in Sandra
B. Rosenthal's 1994 book _Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism_:

An Occurrence, which Thought analyzes into Things and Happenings, is
necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even imagined in all
its infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand[,] is so much of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

Yes, and I remember years ago when researching for the "Abductive 
reasoning" article at Wikipedia, I found papers treating abduction as a 
way to infer how one might achieve a pre-designated goal or end, as 
opposed to inferring how nature or people did arrive at an observed 
outcome or phenomenon.


On 3/2/2017 8:45 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Thread:
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg3.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg5.html
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg9.html

Jon,

Thanks for the reply.

When it comes to the complementarity between thought and conduct,
information and control, it is often forgotten — and indeed it was
only by coincidence or synchronicity that a discussion elsewhere on
the web brought it back to mind — the same double aspect is already
evident in Aristotle's original formulation of apagoge or abduction,
where he gives two cases (1) a problem of description or explanation
and (2) a problem of construction or invention, as geometers call it.

Here is a place where I discussed this before:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/02/17/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-3/ 



Aristotle’s apagoge, variously translated as abduction, reduction, or
retroduction, is a form of reasoning common to two types of situations.
It may be (1) the operation by which a phenomenon (a fact to grasp, to
understand) is factored through an explanatory hypothesis, or (2) the
operation by which a problem (a fact to make, to accomplish) is factored
through an intermediate construction.  Aristotle gives one example of 
each

type in Prior Analytics 2.25.  I give some discussion here:

Aristotle’s “Apagogy” : Abductive Reasoning as Problem Reduction
• 
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#1.4._Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy.E2.80.9D_:_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction


Regards,

Jon




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Ingenuity

Clark, List:

Not at all, and I agree with you about the distinction between pre-modern
trades and modern engineering.  I think that the fairly ubiquitous use
of *mathematical
*models (i.e., diagrams) to *analyze *artifacts in advance of actually
making or building them is what mainly distinguishes the latter.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 9:50 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

>
> On Mar 1, 2017, at 8:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Your points are well-taken.  As I observed at the end of the article,
> modern engineering reasoning relies largely on the relatively stable habits
> of matter, whereas ethical deliberation involves the much more malleable
> habits of mind that manifest in human behavior.  We can model the former
> quite successfully with mathematics, but the latter are typically amenable
> only to less reliably predictive approaches, such as narrative.
>
>
> Oh fully agree and I hope you didn’t take me as dismissive. I rather liked
> it. I just think that pre-modern vs. modern where science and engineering
> become intertwined is very different even though both depend upon
> stabilities in matter.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Dear all,

I think my point was missed.

*It's murder by numbers...one two three..*
*it's as easy to learn as your C A Bs*

The problem as I see it, is to discover that something that is infinitely
knowable, admit at the outset our genuine doubt as to whether it's knowable
or not to illustrate the genuine uncertainty of the problem,
and then demonstrate that we can know it.

The thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it.

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Clark, list,
>
> That's a good question. I've tended to think of it this way. Truth enters
> logic as a regulative idea that one can hardly doubt in particular cases;
> in other words, one thinks that one's idea of truth is true in particular
> cases. In committing to inquire into various questions, one commits to the
> idea of truths about various questions. This commitment to the idea of
> truth applies even when the inquiry is about truth itself. One ends up with
> _*practical*_ certainty that there is truth even if, at the theoretical
> level, the principle remains regulatory, not speculative. In his brief
> intellectual autobiography (1904), Peirce says that philosophy concerns
> ideas whose truth or falsehood is the object of no science (i.e., no
> theoretical research) because they can hardly be doubted. Moreover, Peirce
> behaves as a serious theorist - from his ideas about truth, the real, and
> fallibility in particular, he draws nontrivial conclusions in metaphysics,
> involving continuity and spontaneity a.k.a. absolute chance. See Peirce
> (1897) "Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution", CP 1.141–75
> http://www.textlog.de/4248.html , placed by the CP editors directly after
> "F.R.L." (1899, CP 1.135–40) https://web.archive.org/web/
> 20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm . I just
> don't know how far beyond  regulative conceptions he goes in that case. In
> the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a
> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by
> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a
> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."
>
> It's when one looks at the set of regulative ideas collectively and
> philosophically that one can entertain some sort of doubt and regard those
> ideas as hopes rather than as something surer. One keeps the door open to
> the idea that possibly there's something vaguely wrong in that set.
>
> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see
> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:
>
> The problem whether a given question will ever get answered or not is not
> so simple; the number of questions asked is constantly increasing, and the
> capacity for answering them is also on the increase. If the rate of the
> latter increase is greater than that of the former the probability is unity
> that any given question will be answered; otherwise the probability is _
> *zero*_. [] But I will admit (if the reader thinks the admission has
> any meaning, and is not an empty proposition) that some finite number of
> questions, we can never know which ones, will escape getting answered
> forever. [] Let us suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that some
> questions eventually get settled, and that some others, indistinguishable
> from the former by any marks, never do. In that case, I should say that the
> conception of reality was rather a faulty one, for while there is a real so
> far as a question that will get settled goes, there is none for a question
> that will never be settled; for an unknowable reality is nonsense. []
> In that way, if we think that some questions are never going to get
> settled, we ought to admit that our conception of nature as absolutely real
> is only partially correct. Still, we shall have to be governed by it
> practically; because there is nothing to distinguish the unanswerable
> questions from the answerable ones, so that investigation will have to
> proceed as if all were answerable. In ordinary life, no matter how much we
> believe in questions ultimately getting answered, we shall always put aside
> an innumerable throng of them as beyond our powers. [] From this
> practical and economical point of view, it really makes no difference
> whether or not all questions are actually answered, by man or by God, so
> long as we are satisfied that investigation has a universal tendency toward
> the settlement of opinion; and this I conceive to be the position of
> Thrasymachus.
>
> If there be any advantage to religion in supposing God to be omniscient,
> this sort of scepticism about reality can do no practical harm. We can
> still suppose that He knows all that there is of reality to be known.
> [] The scepticism just spoken of would admit this omniscience as a
> regulative but not a speculative conception. I believe that even that view

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

Jon A., Ben, List:

Thanks for the links.  As usual with Peirce, what matters is one's *purpose*;
retroduction can be (and is) employed to posit both plausible *explanations*
for how the world *is* and plausible *designs *for how the world *could *be.
In both cases, I also like the suggestion that it serves the subsidiary
purpose of "problem reduction"; we take a complex situation and *reduce *it
to a simple (or at least simpler) diagram, in order to facilitate
subsequent (deductive) analysis.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Yes, and I remember years ago when researching for the "Abductive
> reasoning" article at Wikipedia, I found papers treating abduction as a way
> to infer how one might achieve a pre-designated goal or end, as opposed to
> inferring how nature or people did arrive at an observed outcome or
> phenomenon.
>
> On 3/2/2017 8:45 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
>> Thread:
>> JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg3.html
>> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg5.html
>> JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg9.html
>>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Thanks for the reply.
>>
>> When it comes to the complementarity between thought and conduct,
>> information and control, it is often forgotten — and indeed it was
>> only by coincidence or synchronicity that a discussion elsewhere on
>> the web brought it back to mind — the same double aspect is already
>> evident in Aristotle's original formulation of apagoge or abduction,
>> where he gives two cases (1) a problem of description or explanation
>> and (2) a problem of construction or invention, as geometers call it.
>>
>> Here is a place where I discussed this before:
>>
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/02/17/abduction-deductio
>> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-3/
>>
>> Aristotle’s apagoge, variously translated as abduction, reduction, or
>> retroduction, is a form of reasoning common to two types of situations.
>> It may be (1) the operation by which a phenomenon (a fact to grasp, to
>> understand) is factored through an explanatory hypothesis, or (2) the
>> operation by which a problem (a fact to make, to accomplish) is factored
>> through an intermediate construction.  Aristotle gives one example of each
>> type in Prior Analytics 2.25.  I give some discussion here:
>>
>> Aristotle’s “Apagogy” : Abductive Reasoning as Problem Reduction
>> • http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:
>> _Inquiry_and_Analogy#1.4._Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy
>> .E2.80.9D_:_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Dear all,

I neglected to mention;

that thing that is infinitely knowable must also be worth achieving,
necessarily admirable in itself.
But what in the world is admirable in itself?
And it must be infinitely knowable?
Man, ain't that the Truth...

Best,
J

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> I think my point was missed.
>
> *It's murder by numbers...one two three..*
> *it's as easy to learn as your C A Bs*
>
> The problem as I see it, is to discover that something that is infinitely
> knowable, admit at the outset our genuine doubt as to whether it's knowable
> or not to illustrate the genuine uncertainty of the problem,
> and then demonstrate that we can know it.
>
> The thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it.
>
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
>> Clark, list,
>>
>> That's a good question. I've tended to think of it this way. Truth enters
>> logic as a regulative idea that one can hardly doubt in particular cases;
>> in other words, one thinks that one's idea of truth is true in particular
>> cases. In committing to inquire into various questions, one commits to the
>> idea of truths about various questions. This commitment to the idea of
>> truth applies even when the inquiry is about truth itself. One ends up with
>> _*practical*_ certainty that there is truth even if, at the theoretical
>> level, the principle remains regulatory, not speculative. In his brief
>> intellectual autobiography (1904), Peirce says that philosophy concerns
>> ideas whose truth or falsehood is the object of no science (i.e., no
>> theoretical research) because they can hardly be doubted. Moreover, Peirce
>> behaves as a serious theorist - from his ideas about truth, the real, and
>> fallibility in particular, he draws nontrivial conclusions in metaphysics,
>> involving continuity and spontaneity a.k.a. absolute chance. See Peirce
>> (1897) "Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution", CP 1.141–75
>> http://www.textlog.de/4248.html , placed by the CP editors directly
>> after "F.R.L." (1899, CP 1.135–40) https://web.archive.org/web/20
>> 120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm . I just
>> don't know how far beyond  regulative conceptions he goes in that case. In
>> the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a
>> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by
>> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a
>> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."
>>
>> It's when one looks at the set of regulative ideas collectively and
>> philosophically that one can entertain some sort of doubt and regard those
>> ideas as hopes rather than as something surer. One keeps the door open to
>> the idea that possibly there's something vaguely wrong in that set.
>>
>> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see
>> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:
>>
>> The problem whether a given question will ever get answered or not is not
>> so simple; the number of questions asked is constantly increasing, and the
>> capacity for answering them is also on the increase. If the rate of the
>> latter increase is greater than that of the former the probability is unity
>> that any given question will be answered; otherwise the probability is _
>> *zero*_. [] But I will admit (if the reader thinks the admission has
>> any meaning, and is not an empty proposition) that some finite number of
>> questions, we can never know which ones, will escape getting answered
>> forever. [] Let us suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that some
>> questions eventually get settled, and that some others, indistinguishable
>> from the former by any marks, never do. In that case, I should say that the
>> conception of reality was rather a faulty one, for while there is a real so
>> far as a question that will get settled goes, there is none for a question
>> that will never be settled; for an unknowable reality is nonsense. []
>> In that way, if we think that some questions are never going to get
>> settled, we ought to admit that our conception of nature as absolutely real
>> is only partially correct. Still, we shall have to be governed by it
>> practically; because there is nothing to distinguish the unanswerable
>> questions from the answerable ones, so that investigation will have to
>> proceed as if all were answerable. In ordinary life, no matter how much we
>> believe in questions ultimately getting answered, we shall always put aside
>> an innumerable throng of them as beyond our powers. [] From this
>> practical and economical point of view, it really makes no difference
>> whether or not all questions are actually answered, by man or by God, so
>> long as we are satisfied that investigation has a universal tendency toward
>> the settlement of opinion; and this I conceive to be t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity


Jon S, list,

In your Part 4 "Beyond Engineering", you wrote,

   pronounced “rep-re-sen-TAY-men”

Happy to see the correct stress placement (as Peirce had it in the 
Century Dictionary, and John Deely pushed for it too), but it'd be even 
better if the "s" were a "z".


I'd guess that you'd count such "ruling arts" (their old label) as 
design, architecture, community planning, — arts of governing, being 
governed, and self-governing, — as parts of engineering (and other 
productive sciences/arts such as medicine) in some broad sense.


A decade or more ago, I used to argue here at peirce-l that there's 
difference between (A) will, decision-making, character,  ethics, etc., 
and (B) ability, carrying-out, competence, (and what I dubbed 
"cheiromenics"), etc.; for example, we don't regard flaws of character 
per se as flaws of competence per se, or vice versa (although for 
example a character flaw such as recklessness can lead to needlessly 
incompetent practice). Well, I got tired of arguing about it, obviously.


Anyway, I'd still regard design etc. as knowledge, or at least 
conception, of forces, strengths, impetuses, whereby to decide things 
or, at any rate, for things to get decided, as opposed to engineering 
etc. as know-how, knowledge of means. Apparently, at one time design was 
seen by many as simply the application of maths of optimization. 
Engineering obviously involves the application of probability maths and 
statistics, although in its design aspects it does get involved with 
optimization.


What I'm saying is that design, architecture, community planning, 
constitution-writing, education intending the building of character, 
etc., don't seem to be simply aimed, as in the old formula, at "useful + 
beautiful", i.e., engineering with aesthetic art along for the ride in 
an added sidecar.


The distinction seems parallel to that between two kinds of 
decision-making itself (A) political (and martial) affairs 
(decision-making in regard to decision-making, deciding who or what gets 
to decide) and (B) economic, business, financial affairs 
(decision-making as to means, resources, etc.).


I seem to remember that I broached this subject with you once before, 
but I forget. I doubt that I'll convince any Peirceans that the 
will-ability distinction is quite basic (they tend to be satisfied with 
Peirce's trichotomy of will, feeling, and general conception), still I'd 
draw your attention to the above distinction as worth attention at some 
level, if not the most basic level, in your work and meditation on the 
logic of ingenuity.


Best, Ben

On 3/1/2017 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


List:

Part 4, subtitled "Beyond Engineering," is now online at 
http://www.structuremag.org/?p=11107. It discusses how /anyone /can 
use the logic of ingenuity to imagine possibilities, assess 
alternatives, and choose one of them to actualize.  I have argued for 
years that just as science is perceived as an especially systematic 
way of /knowing/, likewise engineering could be conceived as an 
especially systematic way of /willing/; and if this is really the 
case, then the distinctive reasoning process of engineers /should/ be 
paradigmatic for other kinds of decision-making, including ethical 
deliberation.


Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 7:50 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:


List:

Part 3, subtitled "Engineering Reasoning," is now online at
http://www.structuremag.org/?p=10592
. It discusses how engineers
use the logic of ingenuity to simulate contingent events with
necessary reasoning.  This is my attempt to explain Peirce's whole
notion of diagrammatic reasoning, using a variety of quotes from
his writings.

Regards,

Jon

On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 8:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:

List:

I meant to post this back around the first of the month, and
then kept forgetting to do so.  Part 2, subtitled "Engineering
Analysis," is now online at
http://www.structuremag.org/?p=10490
. It discusses how
engineers use the logic of ingenuity to solve real problems by
analyzing fictitious ones.  It mostly consists of quotes from
and comments on CP 3.559, which is part of Peirce's 1898
article in /Educational Review/, "The Logic of Mathematics in
Relation to Education"
(http://www.pragmaticism.net/works/csp_ms/P00653.pdf
). It is
the passage that opened up to me this whole understanding of
engineering thinking, when I first encountered it in the
volume edited by Matthew E. Moore, /Philosophy of Mathematics:
 Selected Writings/.

Regards,

Jon

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 10:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
mailto:jo

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Invitation to a ttend a talk by Fernando Zalamea, March 1, 2017, NYC

2017-03-02 Thread Gary Richmond

List,

Fernando Zalamea's talk last evening at the Microsoft Technology Center
was, in my opinion, in every way extraordinary.

I was delighted to see some friends and colleagues in attendance, and hope
that others on this list and on the Semiotics Web list as well were able to
join us remotely via GoToMeeting. Much thanks to Bev Corwin for brilliantly
organizing this event.

As was evident in his month long seminar at Pratt University a couple of
years ago, and perhaps even more so last evening, Fernando has a knack for
offering much material for deep reflection by a general audience for whom
some of the mathematics may seem daunting. Indeed, the way in which. for
example, he interwove mathematics and art last night was impressive and
quite stimulating, suggested by the very lively Q&A which followed his
talk.

Given his intellect and talents, Fernando is in ways a very modest person
such that I hope I did not embarrass him too much with my rather effusive
introduction. Still, it is for good reason that, as I mentioned last
evening, he has been included in *100 Global Minds: The Most Daring
Cross-Disciplinary Thinkers in the World* (Roads, 2015).

In my opinion it is the cross- and inter-disciplinary aspect of his
voluminous work (he has written over 20 books around mathematics,
philosophy, and cultural studies) along with his cutting edge work in
mathematics (his book, *Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics*
has already has some considerable impact), which may prove to be his most
influential and enduring legacy. One can only hope that in the years to
come that much more of his work will be translated into English.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 11:22 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> This is a reminder that Fernando Zalamea's talk at the Microsoft
> Technology Center, 11 Times Square, is happening tonight,3 2/1/17 at 6:30.
>
> If you are not in the city or have not registered at the Semiotics Web
> site, you might consider attending the talk remotely. To do so register for
> the meetup here https://www.meetup.com/SemioticsWeb/events/237584711/?
>
> Bev Corwin will be posting a GoToMeeting link at the start of the meeting
> (two short talks are at 6:00) and you can attend remotely. Note that you
> will be on the waiting list, but you'll still have the GoToMeeting link
> available. Thanks to Jeff Downard for suggesting that we provide remote
> access, and to Terry Moore for his willingness to provide technical support
> if needed.
>
> I know that several of the members of this forum will be at the talk; I
> look forward to seeing you this evening and especially to hearing Fernando.
>
> Here is a précis of the talk which Fernando provided. More information is
> on the Semiotics Web meetup/mashup sitelinked to above.
>
> (1) Some main philosophical perspectives will be presented along a double
> semiotic triad (closed: relativization, analysis, differentiation) (open:
> universalization, synthesis, integration), and the back-and-forth transits
> between differentiation and integration will be explored. Poets like
> Novalis and Valéry, and cultural critics like Warburg and Benjamin, will
> lead the way. The role of contemporary poetess Jan Zwicky will be
> highlighted.
>
> (2) Some main mathematical perspectives will be presented along a double
> semiotic triad (closed: logicization, punctualization, typification) (open:
> geometrization, sheafification, archetypification), and the back-and-forth
> transits between localization and globalization will be explored.
> Mathematicians like Galois, Riemann and Grothendieck will lead the way. The
> role of modern mathematician Emmy Noether will be highlighted.
>
> (3) Some main logical perspectives will be presented along a double
> semiotic triad (closed: sintaxis, classicism, completeness) (open:
> pragmatics, intuitionism, incompleteness), and the back-and-forth transits
> between positivity and negativity will be explored. Logicians like Peirce,
> Gödel and Girard will lead the way. The role of contemporary logician
> Olivia Caramello will be highlighted.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> Bev Corbin (Semiotic Web) and I have arranged for a talk by Fernando
>> Zalamea to be delivered at Microsoft Technology Center, 11 Times Square, New
>> York, NY on Wednesday, March 1 from 6 to 8 (see details below).
>>
>> Those of us who were fortunate enough to have attended his series of
>> seminars at the Pratt Institute Graduate Center in Media Studies
>> (Manhattan) in October of 2015, or who

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

2017-03-02 Thread Clark Goble

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a 
> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by the 
> synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a normative 
> or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."

Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have answered my 
question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming it’s merely 
regulative.

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see 
> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:

That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve tended of 
late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean writings. i.e. after 
1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus of course it helps that EP2 is 
available on Kindle while inexplicably EP1 is not.

But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I was having 
over unknowable things and Peirce.

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can 
> even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague (as 
> indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object, compatible 
> with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and that, in any 
> case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the idea of some 
> secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead a matter of 
> deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes scramble 
> information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it according to 
> standards of value and interest.
> 

An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15 years into his 
modal realist period. I rather like his keeping actuality and reality separate 
since that was what confused me the most all those years ago.

What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems wrapped up in his 
modal realism yet recognizes something is knowable in one possible world but 
not in the other. It’s hard not to think of the hamiltanian equation in the 
wave collapse model of quantum mechanics (say the Dirac Equation). There you 
have all the possible states as real but not actual. As soon as one makes one 
measurement then that constrains the possibilities. So Peirce is recognizing on 
a practical economics of epistemology something akin to uncertainty relations. 
(Here making just an analogy and not saying they are really the same sort of 
thing)

> On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was 
> stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make Our 
> Ideas Clear" (1878).

I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very early phrase. 
Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I tend to see his modal realism 
as the most important idea. It’s connecting realism and possibility that seems 
like the leap that fully makes his ideas work (and leads him back to a certain 
kind of platonism defined in terms of possibilities)

> Of course his fellow pragmatists were not such strong realists as Peirce, and 
> William James later wrote of liking to think that J,S. Mill if he were still 
> alive would be the pragmatists' leader.
> 

Yes James definitely wasn’t and was more focused on what individuals think 
rather than the logical and community angle Peirce focused on. Dewey seems to 
be much more of a realist of the style of Peirce even if he doesn’t quite 
embrace Peirce’s logic. The rest (except perhaps for Royce depending upon how 
one looks at him) are too caught up in the nominalism of philosophy IMO.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

"To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness
and superiority, *is to argue without an object*; in practical life,
particular facts count more than generalizations.

Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the
reverse, of past or future fact, and of the relative greatness or smallness
of things."

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a
> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by
> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a
> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."
>
>
> Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have answered
> my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming it’s
> merely regulative.
>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see
> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:
>
>
> That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve tended
> of late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean writings. i.e.
> after 1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus of course it helps that
> EP2 is available on Kindle while inexplicably EP1 is not.
>
> But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I was
> having over unknowable things and Peirce.
>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can
> even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague
> (as indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object,
> compatible with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and
> that, in any case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the
> idea of some secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead
> a matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes
> scramble information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it
> according to standards of value and interest.
>
> An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15 years into
> his modal realist period. I rather like his keeping actuality and reality
> separate since that was what confused me the most all those years ago.
> What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems wrapped up
> in his modal realism yet recognizes something is knowable in one possible
> world but not in the other. It’s hard not to think of the hamiltanian
> equation in the wave collapse model of quantum mechanics (say the Dirac
> Equation). There you have all the possible states as real but not actual.
> As soon as one makes one measurement then that constrains the
> possibilities. So Peirce is recognizing on a practical economics of
> epistemology something akin to uncertainty relations. (Here making just an
> analogy and not saying they are really the same sort of thing)
>
> On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was
> stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make
> Our Ideas Clear" (1878).
>
>
> I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very early
> phrase. Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I tend to see his
> modal realism as the most important idea. It’s connecting realism and
> possibility that seems like the leap that fully makes his ideas work (and
> leads him back to a certain kind of platonism defined in terms of
> possibilities)
>
> Of course his fellow pragmatists were not such strong realists as Peirce,
> and William James later wrote of liking to think that J,S. Mill if he were
> still alive would be the pragmatists' leader.
>
> Yes James definitely wasn’t and was more focused on what individuals think
> rather than the logical and community angle Peirce focused on. Dewey seems
> to be much more of a realist of the style of Peirce even if he doesn’t
> quite embrace Peirce’s logic. The rest (except perhaps for Royce depending
> upon how one looks at him) are too caught up in the nominalism of
> philosophy IMO.
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Clark, List:

CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
assuming it’s merely regulative.


How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in
Baldwin's *Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)?

CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the
synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him,
especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they
can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the
matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to
be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were
looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist
cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute
metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing
what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. (CP 6.173)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a
> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by
> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a
> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."
>
>
> Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have answered
> my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming it’s
> merely regulative.
>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see
> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:
>
>
> That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve tended
> of late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean writings. i.e.
> after 1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus of course it helps that
> EP2 is available on Kindle while inexplicably EP1 is not.
>
> But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I was
> having over unknowable things and Peirce.
>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can
> even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague
> (as indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object,
> compatible with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and
> that, in any case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the
> idea of some secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead
> a matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes
> scramble information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it
> according to standards of value and interest.
>
> An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15 years into
> his modal realist period. I rather like his keeping actuality and reality
> separate since that was what confused me the most all those years ago.
> What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems wrapped up
> in his modal realism yet recognizes something is knowable in one possible
> world but not in the other. It’s hard not to think of the hamiltanian
> equation in the wave collapse model of quantum mechanics (say the Dirac
> Equation). There you have all the possible states as real but not actual.
> As soon as one makes one measurement then that constrains the
> possibilities. So Peirce is recognizing on a practical economics of
> epistemology something akin to uncertainty relations. (Here making just an
> analogy and not saying they are really the same sort of thing)
>
> On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was
> stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make
> Our Ideas Clear" (1878).
>
>
> I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very early
> phrase. Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I tend to see his
> modal realism as the most important idea. It’s connecting realism and
> possibility that seems like the leap that fully makes his ideas work (and
> leads him back to a certain kind of platonism defined in terms of
> possibilities)
>
> Of course his fellow pragmatists were not such strong realists as Peirce,
> and William James later wrote of liking to think that J,S. Mill if he were
> still alive would be the pragmatists' leader.
>
> Yes James definitely wasn’t and was more focused on what individuals think
> rather than the logical and community angle Peirce focused on. Dewey seems
> to be much more of a realist of the style of Peirce even if he doesn’t
> quite embrace Peirce’s logic. The rest

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity


Jon S., list,

I just remembered that Bernard Morand, now retired, of Institut 
Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique, who 
used to be quite active on peirce-l, wrote a book published in 2004 
_Logique de la Conception: Figures de sémiotique générale d'après 
Charles S. Peirce _ [Logic of Design: Illustrations of General Semiotic 
After Charles S. Peirce] 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/pastbooks.htm#morand 
 .


In 2004 I had no idea that it was about design, I didn't know that the 
French word _/conception/_ can simply mean "design." A few years ago I 
got him to agree to translate into English its foreword which was 
available gratis online. The English translation of the foreword is at 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/morand/conception-fwd.htm 
 
.


He once provided us with this image of Peirce's diagram of the three 
sign trichotomies:

http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/220287/2-2/moz-screenshot-1.jpg
which now adorns the top of the Peirce Blog http://csp3.blogspot.com/

In his 2004 book, he makes an argument for the ordering of the ten 
sign-trichotomies as:

3-2-1-4-10-9-8-7-6-5

He discussed it at peirce-l in "Re: Symbol vs. iconized index" 
2008-10-27 16:23:57

http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=2105468#2105468

Here's a diagram that I made showing his view:
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/207/2/10ad3.GIF

Best, Ben

On 3/2/2017 1:24 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Jon S, list,

In your Part 4 "Beyond Engineering", you wrote,

pronounced “rep-re-sen-TAY-men”

Happy to see the correct stress placement (as Peirce had it in the 
Century Dictionary, and John Deely pushed for it too), but it'd be 
even better if the "s" were a "z".


I'd guess that you'd count such "ruling arts" (their old label) as 
design, architecture, community planning, — arts of governing, being 
governed, and self-governing, — as parts of engineering (and other 
productive sciences/arts such as medicine) in some broad sense.


A decade or more ago, I used to argue here at peirce-l that there's 
difference between (A) will, decision-making, character,  ethics, 
etc., and (B) ability, carrying-out, competence, (and what I dubbed 
"cheiromenics"), etc.; for example, we don't regard flaws of character 
per se as flaws of competence per se, or vice versa (although for 
example a character flaw such as recklessness can lead to needlessly 
incompetent practice). Well, I got tired of arguing about it, obviously.


Anyway, I'd still regard design etc. as knowledge, or at least 
conception, of forces, strengths, impetuses, whereby to decide things 
or, at any rate, for things to get decided, as opposed to engineering 
etc. as know-how, knowledge of means. Apparently, at one time design 
was seen by many as simply the application of maths of optimization. 
Engineering obviously involves the application of probability maths 
and statistics, although in its design aspects it does get involved 
with optimization.


What I'm saying is that design, architecture, community planning, 
constitution-writing, education intending the building of character, 
etc., don't seem to be simply aimed, as in the old formula, at "useful 
+ beautiful", i.e., engineering with aesthetic art along for the ride 
in an added sidecar.


The distinction seems parallel to that between two kinds of 
decision-making itself (A) political (and martial) affairs 
(decision-making in regard to decision-making, deciding who or what 
gets to decide) and (B) economic, business, financial affairs 
(decision-making as to means, resources, etc.).


I seem to remember that I broached this subject with you once before, 
but I forget. I doubt that I'll convince any Peirceans that the 
will-ability distinction is quite basic (they tend to be satisfied 
with Peirce's trichotomy of will, feeling, and general conception), 
still I'd draw your attention to the above distinction as worth 
attention at some level, if not the most basic level, in your work and 
meditation on the logic of ingenuity.


Best, Ben

On 3/1/2017 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


List:

Part 4, subtitled "Beyond Engineering," is now online at 
http://www.structuremag.org/?p=11107 .  It discusses how /anyone / 
can use the logic of ingenuity to imagine possibilities, assess 
alternatives, and choose one of them to actualize.  I have argued for 
years that just as science is perceived as an especially systematic 
way of /knowing/ , likewise engineering could be conceived as an 
especially systematic way of /willing/ ; and if this is really the 
case, then the distinctive reasoning process of engineers /should/ be 
paradigmatic for other kinds of decision-making, including ethical 
deliberation.


Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 7:50 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:


List:

Part 3,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

still no object...

J

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>
>
> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's 
> *Dictionary
> of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)?
>
> CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the
> synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him,
> especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they
> can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the
> matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to
> be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were
> looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist
> cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute
> metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing
> what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. (CP 6.173)
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>
>> In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a
>> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by
>> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a
>> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."
>>
>>
>> Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
>> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
>> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>
>> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see
>> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:
>>
>>
>> That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve tended
>> of late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean writings. i.e.
>> after 1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus of course it helps that
>> EP2 is available on Kindle while inexplicably EP1 is not.
>>
>> But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I was
>> having over unknowable things and Peirce.
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>
>> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can
>> even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague
>> (as indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object,
>> compatible with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and
>> that, in any case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the
>> idea of some secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead
>> a matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes
>> scramble information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it
>> according to standards of value and interest.
>>
>> An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15 years into
>> his modal realist period. I rather like his keeping actuality and reality
>> separate since that was what confused me the most all those years ago.
>> What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems wrapped up
>> in his modal realism yet recognizes something is knowable in one possible
>> world but not in the other. It’s hard not to think of the hamiltanian
>> equation in the wave collapse model of quantum mechanics (say the Dirac
>> Equation). There you have all the possible states as real but not actual.
>> As soon as one makes one measurement then that constrains the
>> possibilities. So Peirce is recognizing on a practical economics of
>> epistemology something akin to uncertainty relations. (Here making just an
>> analogy and not saying they are really the same sort of thing)
>>
>> On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was
>> stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make
>> Our Ideas Clear" (1878).
>>
>>
>> I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very early
>> phrase. Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I tend to see his
>> modal realism as the most important idea. It’s connecting realism and
>> possibility that seems like the leap that fully makes his ideas work (and
>> leads him back to a certain kind of platonism defined in terms of
>> possibilities)
>>
>> Of course his fellow pragmatists were not such strong realists as Peirce,
>> and William James later wrote of liking to think that J,S. Mill if he were
>> still alive would be the pragmatists' leader.
>>
>> Yes James definitely wasn’t and was more focused on what indiv

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real


Jon S., list,

By jove, I think you've got it. I've just added it as a reference at the 
Synechism wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synechism#Hypotheses . - 
Best, Ben


On 3/2/2017 3:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Clark, List:

CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would
have answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just
someone assuming it’s merely regulative.


How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in 
Baldwin's /Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology/ (1902)?


CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle
for the synechist not to generalize from that which experience
forces upon him, especially since it is only so far as facts can
be generalized that they can be understood; and the very reality,
in his way of looking at the matter, is nothing else than the way
in which facts must ultimately come to be understood. There would
be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were looked upon as
something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist cannot
consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and
absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of
logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be
entertained and examined. (CP 6.173)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble > wrote:




On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote:

In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without
providing a reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate
may be recognized by the synechist without abandoning his
standpoint, since synechism is a normative or regulative
principle, not a theory of existence."


Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just
someone assuming it’s merely regulative.


On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote:

In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235
(see 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:


That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve
tended of late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean
writings. i.e. after 1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus
of course it helps that EP2 is available on Kindle while
inexplicably EP1 is not.

But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I
was having over unknowable things and Peirce.


On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote:

In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be
known or can even be imagined. What is left is the idea that
details may remain vague (as indeed a house that one sees is a
kind of "statistical" object, compatible with the existence of
innumerable alternate microstates and that, in any case, the
object as it is "in itself" does not involve the idea of some
secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead a
matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material
processes scramble information, and life interpretively
unscrambles some of it according to standards of value and interest.


An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15
years into his modal realist period. I rather like his keeping
actuality and reality separate since that was what confused me the
most all those years ago.

What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems
wrapped up in his modal realism yet recognizes something is
knowable in one possible world but not in the other. It’s hard not
to think of the hamiltanian equation in the wave collapse model of
quantum mechanics (say the Dirac Equation). There you have all the
possible states as real but not actual. As soon as one makes one
measurement then that constrains the possibilities. So Peirce is
recognizing on a practical economics of epistemology something
akin to uncertainty relations. (Here making just an analogy and
not saying they are really the same sort of thing)


On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's
realism was stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote
things like "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878).


I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very
early phrase. Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I
tend to see his modal realism as the most important idea. It’s
connecting realism and possibility that seems like the leap that
fully makes hi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

must have the object to really get it.
therefore, not really reasoned (by Jove) completely.

J

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 2:33 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Jon S., list,
>
> By jove, I think you've got it. I've just added it as a reference at the
> Synechism wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synechism#Hypotheses . -
> Best, Ben
>
>
> On 3/2/2017 3:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Clark, List:
>
> CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>
>
> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's 
> *Dictionary
> of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)?
>
> CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the
> synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him,
> especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they
> can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the
> matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to
> be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were
> looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist
> cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute
> metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing
> what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. (CP 6.173)
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>
>> In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a
>> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by
>> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a
>> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence."
>>
>>
>> Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
>> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
>> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>
>> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W  5:222-235 (see
>> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says:
>>
>>
>> That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve tended
>> of late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean writings. i.e.
>> after 1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus of course it helps that
>> EP2 is available on Kindle while inexplicably EP1 is not.
>>
>> But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I was
>> having over unknowable things and Peirce.
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>>
>> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can
>> even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague
>> (as indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object,
>> compatible with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and
>> that, in any case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the
>> idea of some secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead
>> a matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes
>> scramble information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it
>> according to standards of value and interest.
>>
>> An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15 years into
>> his modal realist period. I rather like his keeping actuality and reality
>> separate since that was what confused me the most all those years ago.
>> What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems wrapped up
>> in his modal realism yet recognizes something is knowable in one possible
>> world but not in the other. It’s hard not to think of the hamiltanian
>> equation in the wave collapse model of quantum mechanics (say the Dirac
>> Equation). There you have all the possible states as real but not actual.
>> As soon as one makes one measurement then that constrains the
>> possibilities. So Peirce is recognizing on a practical economics of
>> epistemology something akin to uncertainty relations. (Here making just an
>> analogy and not saying they are really the same sort of thing)
>>
>> On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was
>> stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make
>> Our Ideas Clear" (1878).
>>
>>
>> I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very early
>> phrase. Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I tend to see his
>> modal realism as the most important idea. It’s connecting realism and
>> possibility that seems like the leap that fully makes his ideas work (and
>> leads him back to a certain kind of platonism defined in t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

Ben, List:

Thanks for the comments and links.  I read some of those old threads where
Bernard laid out his theory about the ten trichotomies when I was trying to
figure out my own view.  Where I sit right now is the rather conventional
3-2-1-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, except that I adjust Peirce's terminology such that 5
(Ii) is a range of possible feelings/actions/thoughts, 6 (Id) is an actual
feeling/action/thought, 7 (S-Id) is rheme/dicent/argument, 8 (If) is a
habit of feeling/action/thought, and 9 (S-If) is
suggestive/imperative/indicative
(or presented/urged/submitted).  Of course, further discussion about this
would belong in a new thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 2:15 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Jon S., list,
>
> I just remembered that Bernard Morand, now retired, of Institut
> Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique, who used
> to be quite active on peirce-l, wrote a book published in 2004 _Logique
> de la Conception: Figures de sémiotique générale d'après Charles S. Peirce
> _ [Logic of Design: Illustrations of General Semiotic After Charles S.
> Peirce] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/pastbooks.htm#morand .
>
> In 2004 I had no idea that it was about design, I didn't know that the
> French word _*conception*_ can simply mean "design." A few years ago I
> got him to agree to translate into English its foreword which was available
> gratis online. The English translation of the foreword is at
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/morand/co
> nception-fwd.htm .
>
> He once provided us with this image of Peirce's diagram of the three sign
> trichotomies:
> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/220287/2-2/moz-screenshot-1.jpg
> which now adorns the top of the Peirce Blog http://csp3.blogspot.com/
>
> In his 2004 book, he makes an argument for the ordering of the ten
> sign-trichotomies as:
> 3-2-1-4-10-9-8-7-6-5
>
> He discussed it at peirce-l in "Re: Symbol vs. iconized index" 2008-10-27
> 16:23:57
> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=2105468#2105468
>
> Here's a diagram that I made showing his view:
> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/207/2/10ad3.GIF
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 3/2/2017 1:24 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Jon S, list,
>
> In your Part 4 "Beyond Engineering", you wrote,
>
> pronounced “rep-re-sen-TAY-men”
>
> Happy to see the correct stress placement (as Peirce had it in the Century
> Dictionary, and John Deely pushed for it too), but it'd be even better if
> the "s" were a "z".
>
> I'd guess that you'd count such "ruling arts" (their old label) as design,
> architecture, community planning, — arts of governing, being governed, and
> self-governing, — as parts of engineering (and other productive
> sciences/arts such as medicine) in some broad sense.
>
> A decade or more ago, I used to argue here at peirce-l that there's
> difference between (A) will, decision-making, character,  ethics, etc., and
> (B) ability, carrying-out, competence, (and what I dubbed "cheiromenics"),
> etc.; for example, we don't regard flaws of character per se as flaws of
> competence per se, or vice versa (although for example a character flaw
> such as recklessness can lead to needlessly incompetent practice). Well, I
> got tired of arguing about it, obviously.
>
> Anyway, I'd still regard design etc. as knowledge, or at least conception,
> of forces, strengths, impetuses, whereby to decide things or, at any rate,
> for things to get decided, as opposed to engineering etc. as know-how,
> knowledge of means. Apparently, at one time design was seen by many as
> simply the application of maths of optimization. Engineering obviously
> involves the application of probability maths and statistics, although in
> its design aspects it does get involved with optimization.
>
> What I'm saying is that design, architecture, community planning,
> constitution-writing, education intending the building of character, etc.,
> don't seem to be simply aimed, as in the old formula, at "useful +
> beautiful", i.e., engineering with aesthetic art along for the ride in an
> added sidecar.
>
> The distinction seems parallel to that between two kinds of
> decision-making itself (A) political (and martial) affairs (decision-making
> in regard to decision-making, deciding who or what gets to decide) and (B)
> economic, business, financial affairs (decision-making as to means,
> resources, etc.).
>
> I seem to remember that I broached this subject with you once before, but
> I forget. I doubt that I'll convince any Peirceans that the will-ability
> distinction is quite basic (they tend to be satisfied with Peirce's
> trichotomy of will, feeling, and general conception), still I'd draw your
> attention to the above distinction as worth attention at some level, if not
> the most basic level, in your work and meditation on the logic of in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

2017-03-02 Thread Clark Goble

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have 
> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming 
> it’s merely regulative.
> 
> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's 
> Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902)?
> 
> CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the 
> synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him, 
> especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they can 
> be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the matter, is 
> nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to be 
> understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were looked 
> upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist cannot 
> consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute 
> metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing 
> what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. (CP 6.173)

That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which I 
highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be 
examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the way 
the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while synechism isn’t 
a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and continuity can still entail 
metaphysical doctrines once those are examined as a hypothesis.

His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that things 
aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable. But that 
doesn’t mean of course we have a metaphysical answer for my question.

Now if we simply extend from the idea of continuity to metaphysics we’re doing 
it wrong. However if we’re extending from modal realism to the question of 
whether there is a real possibility of stability (i.e. something beyond the 
regulative) I think we’re making a different sort of argument. Maybe I’m wrong 
in that though.
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

2017-03-02 Thread Jon Awbrey


Ben, List,

I think it was Herbert Simon who I first recall lumping
engineering under the heading of the “design sciences”
but I don't know if that usage was original with him.

Coincidentally, again, if you believe in such things,
I've been reviewing a number of old discussions on the
Peirce List in preparation for getting back to my study
of Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives and there are a few
places where the exchanges with Bernard Morand branched
off onto the classification of signs.

Here is the initial exchange:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_10

Bernard gives his Table of the “Ten Divisions of Signs” here:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_13

Most of you know this is not really my thing — I prefer
to think of these taxonomies or typologies as detailing
the “Aspects or Modes of Sign Functionality” as opposed
to mutually exclusive and exhaustive ontologies of signs.
So I just submit them FWIWTWIMC ...

Regards,

Jon

On 3/2/2017 3:15 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

Jon S., list,

I just remembered that Bernard Morand, now retired, of Institut Universitaire 
de Technologie (France), Département
Informatique, who used to be quite active on peirce-l, wrote a book published 
in 2004 _Logique de la Conception: Figures
de sémiotique générale d'après Charles S. Peirce _ [Logic of Design: 
Illustrations of General Semiotic After Charles S.
Peirce] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/pastbooks.htm#morand 
 .

In 2004 I had no idea that it was about design, I didn't know that the French 
word _/conception/_ can simply mean
"design." A few years ago I got him to agree to translate into English its 
foreword which was available gratis online.
The English translation of the foreword is at
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/morand/conception-fwd.htm

 .

He once provided us with this image of Peirce's diagram of the three sign 
trichotomies:
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/220287/2-2/moz-screenshot-1.jpg
which now adorns the top of the Peirce Blog http://csp3.blogspot.com/

In his 2004 book, he makes an argument for the ordering of the ten 
sign-trichotomies as:
3-2-1-4-10-9-8-7-6-5

He discussed it at peirce-l in "Re: Symbol vs. iconized index" 2008-10-27 
16:23:57
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=2105468#2105468

Here's a diagram that I made showing his view:
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/207/2/10ad3.GIF

Best, Ben



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

Jon A., List:

It was also Herbert Simon who (rightly, in my view) observed that design in
general, and engineering in particular, is a matter of satisficing rather
than optimization--"good enough" rather than "best possible."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 3:40 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Ben, List,
>
> I think it was Herbert Simon who I first recall lumping
> engineering under the heading of the “design sciences”
> but I don't know if that usage was original with him.
>
> Coincidentally, again, if you believe in such things,
> I've been reviewing a number of old discussions on the
> Peirce List in preparation for getting back to my study
> of Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives and there are a few
> places where the exchanges with Bernard Morand branched
> off onto the classification of signs.
>
> Here is the initial exchange:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_
> 1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_10
>
> Bernard gives his Table of the “Ten Divisions of Signs” here:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_
> 1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_13
>
> Most of you know this is not really my thing — I prefer
> to think of these taxonomies or typologies as detailing
> the “Aspects or Modes of Sign Functionality” as opposed
> to mutually exclusive and exhaustive ontologies of signs.
> So I just submit them FWIWTWIMC ...
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

2017-03-02 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon- I would agree with you. I think of these terminologies as terms
for typologies of the types of relations within the semiosic triad,
according to modal category. Since the Peircean semiosic triad [the
Sign] is dynamic and interactive, then, I don't see the functionality
of setting up seemingly rigid types.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 02/03/17  4:40 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Ben, List, 
 I think it was Herbert Simon who I first recall lumping 
 engineering under the heading of the “design sciences” 
 but I don't know if that usage was original with him. 
 Coincidentally, again, if you believe in such things, 
 I've been reviewing a number of old discussions on the 
 Peirce List in preparation for getting back to my study 
 of Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives and there are a few 
 places where the exchanges with Bernard Morand branched 
 off onto the classification of signs. 
 Here is the initial exchange: 

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_10
[1] 
 Bernard gives his Table of the “Ten Divisions of Signs” here: 

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_13
[2] 
 Most of you know this is not really my thing — I prefer 
 to think of these taxonomies or typologies as detailing 
 the “Aspects or Modes of Sign Functionality” as opposed 
 to mutually exclusive and exhaustive ontologies of signs. 
 So I just submit them FWIWTWIMC ... 
 Regards, 
 Jon 
 On 3/2/2017 3:15 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: 
 > Jon S., list, 
 > 
 > I just remembered that Bernard Morand, now retired, of Institut
Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département 
 > Informatique, who used to be quite active on peirce-l, wrote a
book published in 2004 _Logique de la Conception: Figures 
 > de sémiotique générale d'après Charles S. Peirce _ [Logic of
Design: Illustrations of General Semiotic After Charles S. 
 > Peirce] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/pastbooks.htm#morand [3]  . 
 > 
 > In 2004 I had no idea that it was about design, I didn't know that
the French word _/conception/_ can simply mean 
 > "design." A few years ago I got him to agree to translate into
English its foreword which was available gratis online. 
 > The English translation of the foreword is at 
 >
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/morand/conception-fwd.htm
[4] 
 >  . 
 > 
 > He once provided us with this image of Peirce's diagram of the
three sign trichotomies: 
 >
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/220287/2-2/moz-screenshot-1.jpg
[6] 
 > which now adorns the top of the Peirce Blog
http://csp3.blogspot.com/ [7] 
 > 
 > In his 2004 book, he makes an argument for the ordering of the ten
sign-trichotomies as: 
 > 3-2-1-4-10-9-8-7-6-5 
 > 
 > He discussed it at peirce-l in "Re: Symbol vs. iconized index"
2008-10-27 16:23:57 
 > http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=2105468#2105468 [8] 
 > 
 > Here's a diagram that I made showing his view: 
 > http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/207/2/10ad3.GIF [9] 
 > 
 > Best, Ben 
 > 
 --  
 inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ [10] 
 academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey [11] 
 oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey [12] 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

2017-03-02 Thread Charles Pyle

I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion of 
truth. 


In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the 
fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in 
caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and in 
which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an assertion. 


Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while truth 
is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?


I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth 
cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot be 
known.  


> On March 2, 2017 at 3:54 PM Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> > > On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > > > > CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along 
> > those lines that would have answered my question directly. I suspect though 
> > that is just someone assuming it’s merely regulative.
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in 
> > Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902)?
> > 
> > 
> > > > > CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary 
> > to his own principle for the synechist not to generalize from that which 
> > experience forces upon him, especially since it is only so far as facts can 
> > be generalized that they can be understood; and the very reality, in his 
> > way of looking at the matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts 
> > must ultimately come to be understood. There would be a contradiction here, 
> > if this ultimacy were looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; 
> > but the synechist cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an 
> > ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle 
> > of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and 
> > examined. (CP 6.173)
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which 
> > I highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be 
> > examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the 
> > way the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while 
> > synechism isn’t a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and 
> > continuity can still entail metaphysical doctrines once those are examined 
> > as a hypothesis.
> 
> His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that 
> things aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable. 
> But that doesn’t mean of course we have a metaphysical answer for my question.
> 
> Now if we simply extend from the idea of continuity to metaphysics we’re 
> doing it wrong. However if we’re extending from modal realism to the question 
> of whether there is a real possibility of stability (i.e. something beyond 
> the regulative) I think we’re making a different sort of argument. Maybe I’m 
> wrong in that though.
> 


 

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> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

2017-03-02 Thread Gary Richmond

Charles, List,

You wrote:

In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the
fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in
caps). It is  represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and
in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an
assertion.

Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while
truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?

I think that you may be correct about TRUTH in all caps (or even one cap,
Truth). But Peirce also in some places remarks that Truth corresponds to
Reality, and it seems to me that much as we can approach the truth (small
't') of some matters, we do experience the reality (small 'r') of some
things (and one should note that in this smaller sense, there is certainly
untruth/falsehood and unreality/fantasy, the latter in the sense recently
discussed here that the content of a dream isn't real even while the
dreaming of it most assuredly is).

I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth
cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot
be known.

But it seems to me (and I recall Peirce saying that the progress of
science, for example, strongly suggests it) that we *can* approach truth
(albeit fallibly) in some matters even as we can experience reality (albeit
partically)--and both involving, it seems to me in good part, signs.

Would you explain what you mean by writing that that although you believe
that truth can't be know through signs that "this does not imply that it
cannot be known"?

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Charles Pyle 
wrote:

> I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion
> of truth.
>
>
> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the
> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in
> caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and
> in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an
> assertion.
>
>
> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while
> truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?
>
>
> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth
> cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot
> be known.
>
>
> On March 2, 2017 at 3:54 PM Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>
> On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>
>
> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's 
> *Dictionary
> of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)?
>
> CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the
> synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him,
> especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they
> can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the
> matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to
> be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were
> looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist
> cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute
> metaphysical doctrine; *it is a regulative principle of logic,
> prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined.*
> (CP 6.173)
>
>
> That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which I
> highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be
> examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the
> way the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while
> synechism isn’t a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and
> continuity can still entail metaphysical doctrines once those are examined
> as a hypothesis.
>
> His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that
> things aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable.
> But that doesn’t mean of course we have a metaphysical answer for my
> question.
>
> Now if we simply extend from the idea of continuity to metaphysics we’re
> doing it wrong. However if we’re extending from modal realism to the
> question of whether there is a real possibility of stability (i.e.
> something beyond the regulative) I think we’re making a different sort of
> argument. Maybe I’m wrong in that though.
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@l

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Charles, Gary R., List:

Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of
signs"?  If all thought is in signs, as Peirce clearly held, then this
would seem to entail that truth cannot be known at all.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Charles, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the
> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in
> caps). It is  represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and
> in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an
> assertion.
>
> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while
> truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?
>
> I think that you may be correct about TRUTH in all caps (or even one cap,
> Truth). But Peirce also in some places remarks that Truth corresponds to
> Reality, and it seems to me that much as we can approach the truth (small
> 't') of some matters, we do experience the reality (small 'r') of some
> things (and one should note that in this smaller sense, there is certainly
> untruth/falsehood and unreality/fantasy, the latter in the sense recently
> discussed here that the content of a dream isn't real even while the
> dreaming of it most assuredly is).
>
> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth
> cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot
> be known.
>
> But it seems to me (and I recall Peirce saying that the progress of
> science, for example, strongly suggests it) that we *can* approach truth
> (albeit fallibly) in some matters even as we can experience reality (albeit
> partically)--and both involving, it seems to me in good part, signs.
>
> Would you explain what you mean by writing that that although you believe
> that truth can't be know through signs that "this does not imply that it
> cannot be known"?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Charles Pyle 
> wrote:
>
>> I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion
>> of truth.
>>
>> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the
>> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in
>> caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and
>> in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an
>> assertion.
>>
>> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while
>> truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?
>>
>> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth
>> cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot
>> be known.
>>
>> On March 2, 2017 at 3:54 PM Clark Goble  wrote:
>>
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
>> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
>> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>>
>> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's 
>> *Dictionary
>> of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)?
>>
>> CSP:  It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the
>> synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him,
>> especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they
>> can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the
>> matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to
>> be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were
>> looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist
>> cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute
>> metaphysical doctrine; *it is a regulative principle of logic,
>> prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined.*
>> (CP 6.173)
>>
>> That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which I
>> highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be
>> examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the
>> way the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while
>> synechism isn’t a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and
>> continuity can still entail metaphysical doctrines once those are examined
>> as a hypothesis.
>>
>> His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that
>> things aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable.
>> But th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

2017-03-02 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Charles, List,

Jon wrote: Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by
means of signs"?

I don't believe that Peirce ever did say anything of the sort. It seems to
me that what Charles may be claiming is that since the sheet of assertion
represents TRUTH, than that and that alone is the *only* Truth and that
signs are like pencil scratches on the sheet of assertion which represents
TRUTH.

But if this is so, then why inscribe diagams (create signs) upon the sheet
of assertion at all (which Peirce certainly did an extraordinary amount
of)? If Charles' theory is correct, then that would seem to be the vainest
of exercises.

Yet, as Jon noted, Peirce makes it clear that all thought is in signs; and,
further, the whole point of thought, of Peircean-style inquiry--or at least
it seems to me--is to discover what small 't' truths we can (that is,
which, we can discern as and through signs); and further that, at least in
some cases it has been possible to meliorate our human condition because of
such *sign*ificant discoveries.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 6:05 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Charles, Gary R., List:
>
> Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of
> signs"?  If all thought is in signs, as Peirce clearly held, then this
> would seem to entail that truth cannot be known at all.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Charles, List,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the
>> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in
>> caps). It is  represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and
>> in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an
>> assertion.
>>
>> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while
>> truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?
>>
>> I think that you may be correct about TRUTH in all caps (or even one cap,
>> Truth). But Peirce also in some places remarks that Truth corresponds to
>> Reality, and it seems to me that much as we can approach the truth (small
>> 't') of some matters, we do experience the reality (small 'r') of some
>> things (and one should note that in this smaller sense, there is certainly
>> untruth/falsehood and unreality/fantasy, the latter in the sense recently
>> discussed here that the content of a dream isn't real even while the
>> dreaming of it most assuredly is).
>>
>> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth
>> cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot
>> be known.
>>
>> But it seems to me (and I recall Peirce saying that the progress of
>> science, for example, strongly suggests it) that we *can* approach truth
>> (albeit fallibly) in some matters even as we can experience reality (albeit
>> partically)--and both involving, it seems to me in good part, signs.
>>
>> Would you explain what you mean by writing that that although you believe
>> that truth can't be know through signs that "this does not imply that it
>> cannot be known"?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Charles Pyle 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I think the following is at least tangentially related to this
>>> discussion of truth.
>>>
>>> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the
>>> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in
>>> caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and
>>> in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an
>>> assertion.
>>>
>>> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus,
>>> while truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?
>>>
>>> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that
>>> truth cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it
>>> cannot be known.
>>>
>>> On March 2, 2017 at 3:54 PM Clark Goble  wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> CG:  Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have
>>> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone
>>> assuming it’s merely regulative.
>>>
>>> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's
>>>  *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity


Jon S., list,

As far as I can tell, satisficing is just a third way between 
optimization and bare-minimum constraint satisfaction (any feasible 
solution). Same forest of decision-making and trade-offs; different tree.


Herbert Simon: "...decision makers can satisfice either by finding 
optimum solutions for a simplified world, or by finding satisfactory 
solutions for a more realistic world. Neither approach, in general, 
dominates the other, and both have continued to co-exist in the world of 
management science." Even the general statement is of a setting for 
trade-offs.


Best, Ben

On 3/2/2017 4:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


Jon A., List:

It was also Herbert Simon who (rightly, in my view) observed that 
design in general, and engineering in particular, is a matter of 
satisficing rather than optimization--"good enough" rather than "best 
possible."


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 3:40 PM, Jon Awbrey > wrote:


Ben, List,

I think it was Herbert Simon who I first recall lumping
engineering under the heading of the “design sciences”
but I don't know if that usage was original with him.

Coincidentally, again, if you believe in such things,
I've been reviewing a number of old discussions on the
Peirce List in preparation for getting back to my study
of Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives and there are a few
places where the exchanges with Bernard Morand branched
off onto the classification of signs.

Here is the initial exchange:


http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_10



Bernard gives his Table of the “Ten Divisions of Signs” here:


http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives#Discussion_Note_13



Most of you know this is not really my thing — I prefer
to think of these taxonomies or typologies as detailing
the “Aspects or Modes of Sign Functionality” as opposed
to mutually exclusive and exhaustive ontologies of signs.
So I just submit them FWIWTWIMC ...

Regards,

Jon




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

2017-03-02 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, Ben:  

Your recent posts contribute to a rather curious insight into CSP’s beliefs 
about the relationships between mathematics, chemistry and logic of scientific 
hypotheses.

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in Sandra B. Rosenthal's 1994 book _Charles 
> Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism_:
> 
> An Occurrence, which Thought analyzes into Things and Happenings, is 
> necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even imagined in all its 
> infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand[,] is so much of the real Universe 
> as can be represented in a Proposition, and instead of being, like an 
> Occurrence, a slice of the Universe, it is rather to be compared to a 
> chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of Thought; and though it 
> is, or may be Real, yet, in its Real existence it is inseparably combined 
> with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the Fact 
> itself. It is impossible to thread our way through the Logical intricacies of 
> being unless we keep these two things, the Occurrence and the Real Fact, 
> sharply separate in our Thoughts. [Peirce, MS 647 (1910)]
> 
> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can 
> even be imagined.
> 
In MS 647, he compares a fact with "a chemical principle extracted therefrom by 
the power of Thought;”   That is, the notion of a fact is in the  past tense.  
It is completed and has an identity.  It is no longer is question about the 
nature of what happened during the occurrence. Thus the separation from:  "in 
its Real existence it is inseparably combined with an infinite swarm of 
circumstances, which make no part of the Fact itself.”

Now, compare this logical view of a chemical principle with the mathematical 
relation with the realism of matter in the synechism (EP1, 312-333.):

The things of this world, that seem so transitory to philosophers, are not 
continuous. They are composed of discrete atoms, no doubt Boscovichian 
 points (my emphasis). 
The really continuous things, Space, and Time, and Law, are eternal.”

Do you believe that CSP is asseerting that there exist two clear and distinctly 
different notions of mathematical points?
That is, the Boscovichian points of discrete atoms as contrasted with the 
points of ”really continuous things, space, time and Law"?

What would be an alternative hypothesis? That true continuity does not contain 
points?
Would it be necessary for a legi-sign be something other than space and time 
because they would not be points?? 

Any ideas on the ontological status of Boscovichian points from your 
perspective of singularities?

More precisely, what is the meaning of

Synechism …  it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of 
hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined.??

Is it possible that a “regulatory principle of logic” is a continuity in the 
sense of excluding Boscovichian points?

Very confusing, to say the least. 

Cheers

Jerry

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Truth as Regulative or Real : Logical Graphs

2017-03-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Charles, List,

Let's consider Peirce's logical graphs at the alpha level, the abstract forms 
of which can be interpreted for propositional logic. I say “can be interpreted” 
advisedly because the system of graphs themselves form an uninterpreted syntax, 
the formulas of which have no fixed meaning until interpreted. As it happens, 
the forms themselves do not determine their interpretations uniquely. There is 
at minimum a degree of freedom that allows them to be interpreted in two 
different ways, corresponding to what Peirce called his entitative graphs and 
existential graphs.

Bringing this to bear on the empty sheet of assertion we have the following 
facts:

The blank SA is a symbol and wants interpretation to give it a meaning. Under 
the entitative reading (En) it means “false”.  Under the existential reading 
(Ex) it means “true”.  What these mean demands a further, denotative 
interpretation relative to the universe of discourse at hand, “true” denoting 
the whole universe and “false” denoting the empty set.

Regards,

Jon

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 5:36 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
> 
> I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion of 
> truth. 
> 
> 
> 
> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the 
> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in 
> caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and in 
> which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an assertion. 
> 
> 
> 
> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while 
> truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable?
> 
> 
> 
> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth 
> cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot be 
> known.  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.