Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, List

John quoted Jon, then wrote:

Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
> then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
> is sound.

JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would
never state or accept any such claim.


Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a deductive
syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic about it
whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling ("anti-Peircean" and
"dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming.

Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:


Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.


   - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is a
  basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
  - The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence
  that Peirce claimed this, GR]
  - The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
  [this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed
  "necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object
Peirce (and
  Jon) call God, GR].

John wrote:

JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings
taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different
topics.


GR:  Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics: Here's
one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's Semeiotic
Argumentation for the Reality of God merely follows Peirce's strong
suggestion as offered in A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God  (and
elsewhere) in the context of certain basic semeiotic principles.

John wrote:

JS: As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a fossilized
version of language.  That is its greatest strength and its greatest
weakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.


GR: Who has denied this? What in Jon's argumentation denies this? And whose
thinking is fossilized here? Jon offers a way to think further about what
Peirce adumbrated in "A Neglected Argument." Personally, I am very
interested in efforts to help bridge the chasm between religion and
science, and it seems to me that Jon's efforts tend toward that
desideratum.

JS: Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and using
the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept any
reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,
valid, and sound -- not even his own.


We should all feel free to use Peirce's advanced logic in whatever ways
seems productive to each inquirer. Peirce himself reasoned "in ordinary
language"--thousands and thousands of pages of this discursive reasoning
ought demonstrate that point. Meanwhile, and again, a deductive syllogism
is sound as long as the premises are asserted to be true, and there is
nothing "anti-Peircean" about that (just consider the myriad deductive
syllogisms Peirce offers in his work).

JS: Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabled
him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a way
that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost
anybody else.  I have never read any commentary about anything
Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the
original quotations by Peirce.


GR: And yet you have written discursively extensively about Peirce's
thought, sometimes offering supporting quotes, often not, occasionally
offering EGs. I do not see any Peirce scholars "translating each statement
by Peirce to an EG," etc., you included.

JS:  Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.
Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are his
preferred system.  If you want to make any claim that resembles
the one at the top of this note, you must translate each statement
by Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and apply
the EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.


GR: That may be *your* ideal, and even were it Peirce's, again, you
yourself do not do that, and it is impossible for anyone to do so on an
email list.

JS: If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help.  But if you
refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.


GR: I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and hubristic
comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your "help" that  he
has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my opinion, below any
serious scholar's dignity.

Again, you ought to stop this intellectual assault. "Blocking the way of
inquiry is the worst possible sin." John Sowa
.
Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List


I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has an 
object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the claim 
that the object must be separate from the sign, I am supposing, is that the 
object determines the sign. As a matter of principle, an object cannot be the 
kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is not separate from the 
sign.


This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case of the actual 
objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects and signs stand in 
the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation is classified as a 
dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For this type of sign, the 
object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical sinsign, as patient, if the 
two are identical. Diversity is requisite for the relation to hold.


If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of a 
sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this question 
about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our attention on the 
following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from 1910:  "But in order 
that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, 
called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its 
Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make 
an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign."


Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted:


SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS



The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, 
or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "fast," which is a Sign, is not 
imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or 
pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when 
it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means 
"rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it 
refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must 
"represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the 
condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, 
since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a 
Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a 
character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the 
very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the 
crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On 
a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all 
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that 
represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A 
sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," 
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not 
regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of 
objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and 
often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the 
sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, 
there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or 
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the 
Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the 
Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a 
Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together 
with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding 
in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, 
containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and 
according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. 
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a 
Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of 
emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic 
might say that the "species" of the Object emanating from it found its matter 
in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn 
away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of 
such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the 
"ratio," or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, 
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) [CP 2.230]


Consider the three examples Peirce offers to illustrate this point about a sign 
that is part of a sign:


a)   "Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[John F Sowa]

On 5/20/2019 4:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
is sound.


That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would
never state or accept any such claim.

First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings
taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different
topics.  The meanings of words, even for Peirce, shift subtly
from one context to another.

As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a fossilized
version of language.  That is its greatest strength and its greatest
weakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.

Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and using
the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept any
reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,
valid, and sound -- not even his own.

Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabled
him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a way
that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost
anybody else.  I have never read any commentary about anything
Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the
original quotations by Peirce.

Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.
Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are his
preferred system.  If you want to make any claim that resembles
the one at the top of this note, you must translate each statement
by Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and apply
the EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.

If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help.  But if you
refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

While I understand what you are asking and why, I think that it is an
inaccurate and unfair characterization of my List participation over the
years.  I have stated repeatedly that the issue for me is one of
*terminological
ethics*--in accordance with Peirce's own well-documented standards, we
should not use words that he coined in ways that clearly deviate from
*his *usage,
especially when doing so results in a different *conceptual *scheme from
anything that he actually outlined.  The goal is never to *close *the
discussion--I take very seriously Peirce's maxim, "Do not block the way of
inquiry," and share the desire that you and others have expressed to apply
his thought more broadly--but hopefully to *clarify *it; i.e., make
*our *ideas,
*Peirce's *ideas, and the *differences *between them clear.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 3:20 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> Just a brief comment. You wrote:
>
>   "He never claimed to have worked out all of the ramifications of his
> own thought during his lifetime; on the contrary, he said more than once
> that he was counting on future generations to continue the work that he
> had started, especially in Semeiotic."
>
> My question then, is why do you so instantly rebuff other's postings and
> arguments about semiosic processes by declaring that their comments are
> 'not made by or found in Peirce'? That is, you don't discuss the
> functionality of their arguments; you just close the discussion by your
> rebuttal that the very notion wasn't 'made by or found in Peirce'.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

1.  Please reread what you quoted from CP 5.484 very carefully.  It states
that *semeiosis *is "an action or influence" that involves *three
*subjects, one of
which is a *Sign*.  Hence the word "Sign" does not denote the *action*, but
one of the three *subjects *involved in that action; i.e., it does not
denote the *triad *or *triadic relation*, but one of its three *correlates*,
as I have been saying all along.

2.  Please stop calling my view "reductionism" and pretending that I
invented it myself.  I am *directly quoting *Peirce when I say that "if any
signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one
sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).  Denying what Peirce explicitly called a
"theorem" of the "science of semeiotics" is straightforwardly *disagreeing
with him*, and he also went on to state *explicitly *the implication that
"the body of all thought is a sign" (singular).

ET:  Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in
its own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
conclusion ...


If each of my premisses is *true*, and the form of my argumentation is
*valid*--which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below--then the
conclusion *must *also be true; i.e., my argumentation is *sound*.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:32 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> 1] I disagree with your assertion that Peirce never said that the triad is
> a sign. See.. "by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an action or
> influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as
> a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not
> being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs...'semeiosis' in
> Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember
> rightly, meant the action of any kind of sign; and my definition on
> anything that so acts the title of a 'sign' 5.484. I read that to mean
> that the title of 'sign' refers to the semiosic tri-relative action'. My
> emphasis on the words of 'action' and 'act'. Therefore - I continue to use
> the term of Sign to refer to this tri-relative action.
>
> 2] My reading of 'the entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not
> composed exclusively of signs'  is that the universe is a continuous
> semiosic process - of that triad. You, on the other hand, seem to
> understand this to mean a reductionism which declares that All signs are
> connected and therefore, are ONE sign' - whereas I understand Peircean
> semiosis to be a continuous process but not a material reductionism of its
> material results.
>
> It's almost like saying that 'The forest is perfused with trees;
> therefore, the forest is a tree'.
>
> Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in its
> own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
> conclusion -especially if we differ on the meaning of the terms [Sign].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 20/05/19 11:28 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
> true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
>
>
> No, and why not?  Because the conclusion does not follow necessarily from
> the premisses; the form of the argumentation is invalid.  The same is
> true of the other examples below.  Now consider a different one--all dogs
> are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then state that Rover is
> an animal?  Yes, because the conclusion does follow necessarily from the
> premisses; the form of the argumentation is valid.  My Semeiotic
> Argumentation has exactly the same form as the second case, not the first
> case or any of the others below; therefore, it is valid, such that the
> conclusion does follow necessarily from the premisses.
>
>- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all dogs
>are animals, and
>- The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore,
>- The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself =
>Rover is an animal.
>
> So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be
> obviously implied--for any valid deductive argumentation, the conclusion
> is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the
> conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of  that premiss;
> e.g., if the entire Universe is not a Sign, or if Rover is not a dog.
> However, anyone who affirms all of the premisses is rationally required
>  to affirm the conclusion, as well.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list
>>
>> The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.
>>
>> JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any d

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Just a brief comment. You wrote:

  "He never claimed to have worked out all of the ramifications of
his own thought during his lifetime; on the contrary, he said more
than once that he was  counting on future generations to continue the
work that he had started, especially in Semeiotic."

My question then, is why do you so instantly rebuff other's postings
and arguments about semiosic processes by declaring that their
comments are 'not made by or found in Peirce'? That is, you don't
discuss the functionality of their arguments; you just close the
discussion by your rebuttal that the very notion wasn't 'made by or
found in Peirce'.

Edwina
 On Mon 20/05/19  3:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 JFS:  But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature of the
creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary or
contingent. 
 I have not claimed otherwise, except to quote Peirce himself as
stating explicitly that God is Ens necessarium ("A Neglected
Argument") and possesses the attribute of Infinite Benignity
(manuscript drafts). 
 JFS:  You quoted Peirce, but you claim that the argument is
unavoidable.
 No, I do not.  For the third time, what I have said is that my
Semeiotic Argumentation provides what seems to me to be the
unavoidable answer to the question, "If the entire Universe is a
Sign, then what is its Object?"
  JFS:  The absence of any hint in any of his MSS raises a serious
doubt that Peirce would approve the reasoning that led to that
argument.
 As Peirce himself surely would have recognized, this is an argument
from silence, which is not logically valid.  He never claimed to have
worked out all of the ramifications of his own thought during his
lifetime; on the contrary, he said more than once that he was 
counting on future generations to continue the work that he had
started, especially in Semeiotic.
 JFS:  Ideally, that would require a translation of each premise and
every step of the reasoning to existential graphs and an application
of the EG rules of inference.
 I thought that it was obvious that the form of my Semeiotic
Argumentation is  identical to Peirce's simple example of reasoning
with EGs in his letter to Mr. Kehler (NEM 3:168-169; 1911 June 22),
where S = the entire Universe, M = a Sign, and P = determined by an
Object other than itself.
 JFS:  1. The claim that the object of every sign must be in a
different universe of discourse than the physical sign of that object
...I'll accept the point that the object of a sign must be different
from the sign itself.
 I have never made the first claim, only the second--that the Object
of every Sign is external to, independent of, and unaffected by the
Sign itself, as Peirce himself explicitly stated.
 JFS:  2. The claim the Creator (God, Satan, or some demiurge) cannot
be in the same universe as the creation.  3. The claim that Peirce's
three universes (Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity) are
insufficient as a home for the Creator.
 The relevant claim is rather that the Creator of the three Universes
of Experience and "every content of them without exception" cannot be
within any or all of those Universes; i.e., God is "not immanent in"
them, as Peirce explicitly stated.
  JFS:  I forgot to mention that I had uploaded some of Peirce's
definitions to http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/ [1]  See sign1.jpg and
sign2.jpg .
 Thank you for the link; I agree that all of those 1890s definitions
apply only to Sinsigns/Tokens, presumably because Peirce did not
recognize the reality of Qualisigns/Tones and Legisigns/Types until
1903. 
 JFS:  CSP, Century Dictionary for 'universe'--1. The totality of all
existing things; all that is in dynamical connection with general
experience taken collectively--embracing (a} the Creator and
creation; or (b) psychical and material objects, but excluding the
Creator; or (c) material objects only.
 When I refer to "the entire Universe" in my Semeiotic Argumentation,
I mean all three Universes of Experience taken together; i.e., what
Peirce  himself called "the entire universe--not merely the universe
of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to
refer to as 'the truth'" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).  That means
sense (b) above plus the first Universe of Ideas/Possibles, assuming
that we can take "material objects" to be the constituents of the
second Universe of Actuality/Existents and "psychical objects" to be
the constituents of the third Universe of Signs/Necessitants. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] 
 On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:56 AM John F Sowa  wrote:
 Jon,
 > Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything el

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature of the
creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary or
contingent.


I have not claimed otherwise, except to quote Peirce himself as stating
explicitly that God is *Ens necessarium* ("A Neglected Argument") and
possesses the attribute of Infinite Benignity (manuscript drafts).

JFS:  You quoted Peirce, but you claim that the argument is unavoidable.


No, I do not.  For the third time, what I have said is that my Semeiotic
Argumentation provides what *seems to me* to be the unavoidable *answer *to
the question, "If the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object?"

JFS:  The absence of any hint in any of his MSS raises a serious doubt that
Peirce would approve the reasoning that led to that argument.


As Peirce himself surely would have recognized, this is an argument from
silence, which is not logically valid.  He never claimed to have
worked out *all
*of the ramifications of his own thought during his lifetime; on the
contrary, he said more than once that he was *counting *on future
generations to *continue *the work that he had started, especially in
Semeiotic.

JFS:  Ideally, that would require a translation of each premise and every
step of the reasoning to existential graphs and an application of the EG
rules of inference.


I thought that it was obvious that the *form *of my Semeiotic Argumentation
is *identical *to Peirce's simple example of reasoning with EGs in his
letter to Mr. Kehler (NEM 3:168-169; 1911 June 22), where S = the entire
Universe, M = a Sign, and P = determined by an Object other than itself.

JFS:  1. The claim that the object of every sign must be in a different
universe of discourse than the physical sign of that object ...
I'll accept the point that the object of a sign must be different from the
sign itself.


I have never made the first claim, only the second--that the Object of
every Sign is *external *to, *independent *of, and *unaffected *by the Sign
*itself*, as Peirce himself *explicitly *stated.

JFS:  2. The claim the Creator (God, Satan, or some demiurge) cannot be in
the same universe as the creation.
 3. The claim that Peirce's three universes (Possibility, Actuality, and
Necessity) are insufficient as a home for the Creator.


The relevant claim is rather that the Creator of the three Universes of
Experience and "every content of them without exception" cannot be *within *any
or all of those Universes; i.e., God is "*not *immanent in" them, as Peirce
explicitly stated.

JFS:  I forgot to mention that I had uploaded some of Peirce's definitions
to http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/  See sign1.jpg and sign2.jpg .


Thank you for the link; I agree that all of those 1890s definitions apply
only to Sinsigns/Tokens, presumably because Peirce did not recognize the
reality of Qualisigns/Tones and Legisigns/Types until 1903.

JFS:  CSP, Century Dictionary for 'universe'--1. The totality of all
existing things; all that is in dynamical connection with general
experience taken collectively--embracing (a} the Creator and creation; or
(b) psychical and material objects, but excluding the Creator; or (c)
material objects only.


When I refer to "the entire Universe" in my Semeiotic Argumentation, I mean
all three Universes of Experience taken together; i.e., what Peirce *himself
*called "the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all
that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the
universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth'" (CP
5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).  That means sense (b) above plus the first
Universe of Ideas/Possibles, assuming that we can take "material objects"
to be the constituents of the second Universe of Actuality/Existents and
"psychical objects" to be the constituents of the third Universe of
Signs/Necessitants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:56 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> > Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything else) is that
> > Object [of the semeiotic proof], but thereby accepts the burden
> > of making a case for it based on the attributes that such an Object
> > must have.  I suspect that it would amount to nothing more than
> > equating the proper names "Satan" and "God."
>
> That's true.  But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature
> of the creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary
> or contingent.  In the Timaeus, Plato attributes the creation to a
> demiurge (craftsman) who seems to be distinct from the supreme God.
> To explain the origin of evil, the Gnostics later claimed that the
> demiurge was flawed, imperfect, or even malevolent.
>
> The Neoplatonists, following Plotinus, identified the creator with
> the omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God (which they called The 

Re: Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Thanks. For me love is more what you reject and affirm. Reject hurt harm
and fear and you are poised to live decently. Affirm DIY -- recognizing the
necessary difference among spirits-material persons as they engage in their
playing out of freedom. I see everyone this way. Everything anyone does is
a form of love. Some just happen to be hurt, harm and fear.

Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
 Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83



On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 12:56 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Stephen, list,
>
> I did not find your post offensive. I think it is a valuable thesis, that
> the concept of God is sometimes too much complexified. The same, I
> sometimes guess, applies to the concepts of money and sexuality: What
> "God", "money", and "sex" have in common is ontologically, that it is good
> for one to have it, and deontologically, that it should be shared. I guess
> it might be a bad move in reality (history) and theory, to both construct
> complexes as reaction products of these three topics, and also to give
> either of them a surplus meaning, including the other two. Examples:
> Calvinism, I think, did a divination of money. Neoliberalism, social
> darwinism, and marxism too, by naturalizing economy. Baghwan/Oshoism and
> pietism built complexes between sex and religion, either by
> overliberalizing or overlimitating sexuality. In the western cultures, I
> think, money is divinated, and sexuality is economized.
> I think it is good sometimes to attempt a deconstruction of these
> complexes, to see whether they are justified or malconstructions.
> I guess, that deconstruction of complex collusions might put the emphasis
> back to the natural commonities well-being and sharing, and that acceptance
> of these commonities for values is love: Let God be God, economy economy,
> and sex sex. Have it and share it. Love is not merely sexual, but also
> material and religious. This was just expressing a vague sketch based on
> impression.
>
> Helmut
>
> 20. Mai 2019 um 02:33 Uhr
> "Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
> wrote:
> I said the two words you cite and they were repeated but I assume I am the
> one addressed. I am deeply sorry where offense has been taken. I regard
> every human being as beyond judgment and judging others as a futile and
> uncalled for activity.
>
> . Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
>  Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83
> 
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:53 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> Again I read, "Enough already."
>>
>> Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree
>> with someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so
>> and give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.
>>
>> If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread.
>> No one's going to miss you.
>>
>> If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has
>> to say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even
>> before reading them. No one will know or care.
>>
>> The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is
>> simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance
>> reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on
>> the person harshly treated.
>>
>> As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
>>
>>
>> [Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . .
>> be both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in
>> their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. *When
>> in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it *[emphasis in the
>> original]*.*
>>
>>
>> While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see
>> them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over *their
>> own *recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might
>> have shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another
>> forum member. If the answer is that they do* not* believe that they did,
>> then that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer
>> is that they must admit *to themselves* that they indeed did express
>> some intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want
>> to see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in
>> perpetuity on the Internet as an expression of their character. If not,
>> they should simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an
>> inappropriate manner in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade
>> ago, "Peirce-L is a salon, not a saloon."
>>
>> I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward
>> conduct on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will
>> claim that I'm "scolding" folk 

Aw: Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Helmut Raulien]

Stephen, list,

 

I did not find your post offensive. I think it is a valuable thesis, that the concept of God is sometimes too much complexified. The same, I sometimes guess, applies to the concepts of money and sexuality: What "God", "money", and "sex" have in common is ontologically, that it is good for one to have it, and deontologically, that it should be shared. I guess it might be a bad move in reality (history) and theory, to both construct complexes as reaction products of these three topics, and also to give either of them a surplus meaning, including the other two. Examples:

Calvinism, I think, did a divination of money. Neoliberalism, social darwinism, and marxism too, by naturalizing economy. Baghwan/Oshoism and pietism built complexes between sex and religion, either by overliberalizing or overlimitating sexuality. In the western cultures, I think, money is divinated, and sexuality is economized.

I think it is good sometimes to attempt a deconstruction of these complexes, to see whether they are justified or malconstructions.

I guess, that deconstruction of complex collusions might put the emphasis back to the natural commonities well-being and sharing, and that acceptance of these commonities for values is love: Let God be God, economy economy, and sex sex. Have it and share it. Love is not merely sexual, but also material and religious. This was just expressing a vague sketch based on impression.

 

Helmut

 

20. Mai 2019 um 02:33 Uhr
"Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
wrote:



I said the two words you cite and they were repeated but I assume I am the one addressed. I am deeply sorry where offense has been taken. I regard every human being as beyond judgment and judging others as a futile and uncalled for activity. 

 











. Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK  Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83 











 


On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:53 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:









List,

 

Again I read, "Enough already." 

 

Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree with someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so and give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.

 

If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread. No one's going to miss you.

 

If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has to say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even before reading them. No one will know or care.

 

The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on the person harshly treated.

 

As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM

 










[Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . . be both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. When in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it [emphasis in the original].










 

While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over their own recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might have shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another forum member. If the answer is that they do not believe that they did, then that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer is that they must admit to themselves that they indeed did express some intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want to see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in perpetuity on the Internet as an _expression_ of their character. If not, they should simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an inappropriate manner in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade ago, "Peirce-L is a salon, not a saloon."

 

I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward conduct on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will claim that I'm "scolding" folk here. Nonsense. Scold yourself if the uncomfortable shoe fits. Everyone should feel safe and free to express any Peirce-related thoughts that they have in the Peirce e-forum. That is all I'm saying.

 

So, in a word, enough of blocking the way of inquiry; enough of intolerance. 

 

Sincerely,

 

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)

 














 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York


 


















 


On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 3:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

Gary F,

Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never sta

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

1] I disagree with your assertion that Peirce never said that the
triad is a sign. See.. "by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an
action or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions
between pairs...'semeiosis' in Greek of the Roman period, as early as
Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of any kind of
sign; and my definition on anything that so acts the title of a
'sign' 5.484. I read that to mean that the title of 'sign' refers to
the semiosic tri-relative action'. My emphasis on the words of
'action' and 'act'. Therefore - I continue to use the term of Sign to
refer to this tri-relative action.

2] My reading of 'the entire universe is perfused with signs, if it
is not composed exclusively of signs'  is that the universe is a
continuous semiosic process - of that triad. You, on the other hand,
seem to understand this to mean a reductionism which declares that
All signs are connected and therefore, are ONE sign' - whereas I
understand Peircean semiosis to be a continuous process but not a
material reductionism of its material results. 

It's almost like saying that 'The forest is perfused with trees;
therefore, the forest is a tree'. 

Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in
its own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
conclusion -especially if we differ on the meaning of the terms
[Sign].

Edwina
 On Mon 20/05/19 11:28 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises
are true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
 No, and why not?  Because the conclusion does not follow necessarily
from the premisses; the form of the argumentation is invalid.  The
same is true of the other examples below.  Now consider a different
one--all dogs are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then
state that Rover is an animal?  Yes, because the conclusion  does
follow necessarily from the premisses; the form of the argumentation
is valid.  My Semeiotic Argumentation has exactly the same form as
the second case, not the first case or any of the others below;
therefore, it is valid, such that the conclusion does follow
necessarily from the premisses.
*Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all
dogs are animals, and
*The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore, 
*The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
= Rover is an animal.

So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be
obviously implied--for any valid deductive argumentation, the
conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is
false, then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the
basis of  that premiss; e.g., if the entire Universe is not a Sign,
or if Rover is not a dog.  However, anyone who affirms all of the
premisses is rationally required  to affirm the conclusion, as well.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.

JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms  all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well."

For example, 

All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?

How about:

 The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both
premises are true. So, YOU are the bank robber.

All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises
are true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?

All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true].
Therefore no woman is a rational animal.
 And so on... 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. Mor

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Thank you for further clarifying your objection.  Initially it was that God
is completely separated from His creation, and thus absent from the
Universes of Experience.  When I disputed this, it was that our
acquaintance with God must be entirely mediated by Signs.  Since I pointed
out that we are in the same situation with respect to anyone who lived or
anything that happened before we were born, you noted that those people and
events *existed*, but God *did not* and *does not*--as Peirce himself
explicitly affirmed, which is why he specifically argued for the *Reality *of
God instead.

Please do not misinterpret this as an accusation of moving the goalposts; I
am simply explaining the progression of my own understanding of your
position during the course of our exchange so far.  Am I correct that the
*non-existence* of God is what you find problematic for our ability to
acquire knowledge of Him?  If so, then one possible response from me would
be to invoke the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation; however, I will
respect your preference not to delve any further into theology at this
point.  Instead, I will stick to relevant Peircean concepts and texts.

In thinking about all of this over the last couple of days, I noticed the
same thing that you did about the first sentence of "A Neglected Argument"
(CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)--Peirce considered "God" to be "*the *definable
proper name" (emphasis in original), implying that it is the *only *such
case; and he then specified what it *signifies*, not what it *denotes*.  In
other words, the *Immediate Interpretant* of "God" (so capitalized) is "*Ens
necessarium*, in my [Peirce's] belief Really creator of all three Universes
of Experience"; and my current understanding of Speculative Grammar is that
the *Immediate Object* of "God" is whatever it *possibly could* denote in
English accordingly.

What you seem to be questioning is how we can *know* that "God" *actually
does* denote something as its *Dynamic Object*--i.e., how it can serve as a
*subject* of a Proposition that we are able to evaluate as either true or
false, which would require previous Collateral Experience or current
Collateral Observation in order to be understood at all.  According to
Peirce, if God is *Real* then He has "Properties, i.e. characters sufficing
to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453, EP
2:434; 1908).  However, he already expressed dissatisfaction with that
particular formulation in his Logic Notebook the month *before* it appeared
in print.

CSP:  As to the Real, I have decided within the last few days that my
definition in The Hibbert Journal was not advisable, since it gives rise to
a multitude of perplexing problems of little or no meaning.  It is better
to say that that which truly possesses an attribute independently of the
latter being attributed to the former by any single finite mind or single
group of such minds is, in so far, *Real*, thus avoiding those insoluble &
nonsensical problems. (R 339:476[322r]; 1908 Sep 9)


It is thus *possessing* characters independently of them being *attributed*
to it, rather than the *sufficiency* of those characters to *identify* it,
that makes something *Real*.  In other words, whether or not we are able to
*identify* God by His attributes has no bearing on His Reality; only that
He *possesses* those attributes regardless of what anyone thinks about
them.  As I have noted previously, this is a *verbal* definition of
Reality, at the *second* grade of clarity; the *pragmaticistic* definition,
at the *third* grade of clarity, is "the state of things which [would] be
believed in that ultimate opinion" (CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343; 1905) after
infinite inquiry by an infinite community.

Consequently, if anything is *Real*--even it does not now, never has, and
never will *exist*--then it must be *knowable*; and presumably you will
agree that we *do* have knowledge of *some* non-existent Realities.  Again,
how is that possible?  And why would God be any different?  Are you perhaps
suggesting that *entia rationis* are the *only *non-existent Realities that
are knowable?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 11:55 AM  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R,
>
> Jon, you wrote, “I am hoping that Gary F. will explain why he finds it
> problematic that our acquaintance with God is entirely mediated by Signs,
> even though that is just as true of our acquaintance with Peirce or just
> about anything else.”
>
> I will try to keep this concise, because it’s really nothing but an
> attempt to explain what “collateral experience” means in this context.
>
> The evidence for Peirce’s having lived in Lowell and Milford, published a
> number of papers in various journals, having written the hundreds of

[PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

You are misunderstanding what I mean by reducing the Sign to its
parts. You are ignoring that the sign/representamen and the DO and IO
AND the II and DI are all integrated components of a semiosic process.
By focusing only on the 'components' or parts almost as separate
'bits'  - you have reduced the process to a mechanical action and are
ignoring the transformative interactional dynamics of the full
semiosic process - which includes ALL these 'bits' - not as parts but
as transformative agents.

I disagree that the term 'necessitant' refers only to Thirdness. I
used it to refer to a necessary component of the semiosic process,
the Representamen,  - and the Representamen is most often in a mode
of Thirdness, by the way [see the 10 classes]. 

I also disagree that the DO and DI are 'external to the Sign' - for
this ignores that they wouldn't even function as that DO and DI
without the interactions with the basic triad.

I disagree with your outline of the triad - because I don't see how
a complex interaction can be singular. That is, the semiosis process
is complex. The Representamen can be in a mode of 3ns, and its
relation  to the DO can be in a mode of 2ns, and its relation to the
II and DI can be in a mode of 1ns [this is a rhematic indexical
legisign].  If we do not acknowledge the complexity of the three
relations here; that of the R in itself; that of the R-O and that of
the R-I - then, we miss the basic dynamic nature of semiosis.

Edwina
 On Mon 20/05/19 11:26 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1.  I am not the one "reducing the Sign to its parts," since I
consistently maintain that the Object and Interpretant are external
to the Sign, not parts of the Sign.
 2.  "Necessitant" is a technical term in Peirce's semeiotic, and
hence we are ethically bound to use it only as he did, as the name
for a constituent of the third Universe. 
 3.  Again, the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant (as well as
the Final Interpretant) are external to the Sign.  Each is one
correlate of a triadic relation with the Sign, but the Sign is not
itself that relation.
 4.  Peirce never--not once--analyzed the Sign as "an irreducible
triadic set of relations" (plural).  On the contrary, he always
analyzed it as one correlate of an irreducible triadic relation
(singular) in which the other two correlates are its Object and its
Interpretant.  This is not merely a  terminological distinction, but
a conceptual one.
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 7:17 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

1] I think you are missing my point, which is that the triad, which
I refer to as a Sign, is a functional whole; it is irreducible in
this functionality. To intellectually reduce it to its parts totally
misses its function - which is what semiosis is all about, its
function.

Whether you refer to the interactional parts of the triad as
'correlates' or 'relations [8.335], is frankly irrelevant, since the
focus of the triad is its functionality as that set-of-interactions. 

2] And diverting from my meaning of 'all representamens are
necessitants', which I used to refer to the fact that the triad MUST
include a mediating Representamen in order to function as a semiosic
process.to instead focus on the meaning of 'necessitant' to refer
only to the categorical mode of Thirdness - ignores what I was saying
about semiosis.

3] The Dynamic Object is external to the Sign only before it becomes
attached to the semiosic process - which brings the data from that DO
'into' the mediating actions of the triad where it becomes
transformed as the Immediate Object. The same with the Dynamic
Interpretant - which is 'external' to the triad but only in a sense
that understands that its very identity is the result of the
mediating actions of semiosis. Therefore, neither the DO nor the DI
can be understood as fully separate from the semiosis function. 

4] We will have to continue to disagree with regard to the ten
classes of Signs, which I clearly see as his analysis of the Sign as
an irreducible triadic set of relations. 

Edwina 

On Sun 19/05/19 10:47 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Jeff, Edwina, List:
 JD:  As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they
are the first correlate of a further triadic relation.
 I think that consist is the wrong word here, because it implies that
some Signs are  nothing but triadic relations.  However, I acknowledge
that some Signs clearly involve relations, and some of those relations
are triadic.  For example, Symbols involve Indices and Icons that are
connected in some way, Propositions involve Semes married by
continuous predicates, and Arguments involve Propositions married by
leading principles; not to mention that the Universe as a Sign
obviously

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[John F Sowa]

Jon,


Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything else) is that
Object [of the semeiotic proof], but thereby accepts the burden
of making a case for it based on the attributes that such an Object
must have.  I suspect that it would amount to nothing more than
equating the proper names "Satan" and "God."


That's true.  But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature
of the creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary
or contingent.  In the Timaeus, Plato attributes the creation to a
demiurge (craftsman) who seems to be distinct from the supreme God.
To explain the origin of evil, the Gnostics later claimed that the
demiurge was flawed, imperfect, or even malevolent.

The Neoplatonists, following Plotinus, identified the creator with
the omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God (which they called The One
-- to Hen).  The Neoplatonists had a strong influence on both
Christianity and Islam.  ('Al Lah' is Arabic for 'The One'.)
Nothing in the semeiotic argument depends on any of these issues.


I have consistently referred to my Semeiotic Argumentation...
What I have said is that Peirce affirmed each of its premisses,
and I have provided ample evidence from his explicit statements
to support that claim. 


You quoted Peirce, but you claim that the argument is unavoidable.
Peirce was the world expert in logic and semeiotic.  He also had
a high regard for Thomas Aquinas, who is generally regarded as one
of the most profound theologians who ever lived.   If there was
any "unavoidable" argument that linked those topics, Peirce would
certainly have noticed it.

The absence of any hint in any of his MSS raises a serious doubt
that Peirce would approve the reasoning that led to that argument.
Such a strong claim requires a methodeutic for exact thinking:
"What is needed above all, for metaphysics, is thorough and mature
thinking; and the particular requisite to success in the critic of
arguments is exact and diagrammatic thinking."  (CP 3.406)

Ideally, that would require a translation of each premise and every
step of the reasoning to existential graphs and an application of
the EG rules of inference.  But the critical step, which is necessary
for EGs, predicate calculus, or clear thinking in any language, is
the selection of a set of predicates.  The next step is to restate
each of Peirce's statements in terms of the names of those predicates
and no words other than the six basic words of first-order logic:
and, or, not, if-then, some, every.  Instead of pronouns, use letters
(AKA selectives in EGs or variables in predicate calculus).

If you perform this translation, that would make every step of
reasoning so clear that any logician could translate the argument
to his or her favorite version of logic.  In fact, you would even
have a publishable paper.

But -- and this is a very big **BUT** -- there are three critical
assumptions, which I have been criticizing in every one of my
notes about this argument:

 1. The claim that the object of every sign must be in a different
universe of discourse than the physical sign of that object.

 2. The claim the Creator (God, Satan, or some demiurge)  cannot
be in the same universe as the creation.

 3. The claim that Peirce's three universes (Possibility, Actuality,
and Necessity) are insufficient as a home for the Creator.

I'll accept the point that the object of a sign must be different
from the sign itself.  But every proposition of any kind and every
step of any argument can be stated on a single sheet of assertion.
I doubt that Peirce would accept assumption #1.

For #2, note that Peirce allowed modal statements on the same SA
as ordinary FOL statements.  That means that a single universe of
discourse may include a mix of statements from more than one of
his three universes.

For #3, any reasoning must be carried out on a single SA.  That
implies a single universe of discourse.  Any reasoning that could
not be stated on an SA would violate the foundations of Peirce's
logic.  If he had ever considered such a violation, there would be
many hints and comments scattered throughout his thousands of MSS.


JFS:  Look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce defined
for the Century Dictionary.  Each one defines 'sign' as a physical
thing.  None of them mentions the word 'percept'.

JAS:  I would be glad to do so, if you would be so kind as to quote
them.


I forgot to mention that I had uploaded some of Peirce's definitions
to http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/  See sign1.jpg and sign2.jpg .

For Peirce's definition of 'universe' in the Century Dictionary, see
defs/universal.jpg.  The same page includes the definition of universe.
In that definition, Peirce included all the senses that were in common
usage in the 19th c.  He distinguished three major senses, with God 
included in 1a, excluded in 1b and 1c:


CSP, Century Dictionary for 'universe'

1. The totality of all existing things; all that is in dynamical
connection w

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?


No, and why not?  Because the conclusion *does not* follow necessarily from
the premisses; the *form *of the argumentation is *invalid*.  The same is
true of the other examples below.  Now consider a different one--all dogs
are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then state that Rover is
an animal?  Yes, because the conclusion *does *follow necessarily from the
premisses; the *form *of the argumentation is *valid*.  My Semeiotic
Argumentation has *exactly the same form *as the second case, not the first
case or any of the others below; therefore, it is *valid*, such that the
conclusion *does *follow necessarily from the premisses.

   - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all dogs are
   animals, and
   - The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore,
   - The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself =
   Rover is an animal.

So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be obviously
implied--for any *valid *deductive argumentation, the conclusion is only as
strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is
false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; e.g., if the
entire Universe is *not *a Sign, or if Rover is *not *a dog.  However, anyone
who affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.
>
> JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any deductive 
> argumentation--the
> conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false,
> then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of
> that premiss; but anyone who affirms all of the premisses is rationally
> required to affirm the conclusion, as well."
>
> For example,
>
> All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are true.
> Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
>
> How about:
>
> The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both premises are
> true. So, YOU are the bank robber.
>
> All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises are
> true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?
>
> All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true]. Therefore no
> woman is a rational animal.
>
> And so on...
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

1.  I am not the one "reducing the Sign to its parts," since I consistently
maintain that the Object and Interpretant are external to the Sign, not
parts of the Sign.

2.  "Necessitant" is a technical term in Peirce's semeiotic, and hence we
are ethically bound to use it only as he did, as the name for a constituent
of the third Universe.

3.  Again, the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant (as well as the
Final Interpretant) are *external to the Sign*.  Each is one correlate of a
triadic relation *with *the Sign, but the Sign is not *itself *that
relation.

4.  Peirce never--*not once*--analyzed the Sign as "an irreducible triadic
set of relations" (plural).  On the contrary, he *always *analyzed it as *one
correlate* of an irreducible triadic relation (singular) in which the other
two correlates are its Object and its Interpretant.  This is not
merely a *terminological
*distinction, but a *conceptual *one.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 7:17 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> 1] I think you are missing my point, which is that the triad, which I
> refer to as a Sign, is a functional whole; it is irreducible in this
> functionality. To intellectually reduce it to its parts totally misses its
> function - which is what semiosis is all about, its function.
>
> Whether you refer to the interactional parts of the triad as 'correlates'
> or 'relations [8.335], is frankly irrelevant, since the focus of the triad
> is its functionality as that set-of-interactions.
>
> 2] And diverting from my meaning of 'all representamens are necessitants',
> which I used to refer to the fact that the triad MUST include a mediating
> Representamen in order to function as a semiosic process.to instead
> focus on the meaning of 'necessitant' to refer only to the categorical mode
> of Thirdness - ignores what I was saying about semiosis.
>
> 3] The Dynamic Object is external to the Sign only before it becomes
> attached to the semiosic process - which brings the data from that DO
> 'into' the mediating actions of the triad where it becomes transformed
> as the Immediate Object. The same with the Dynamic Interpretant - which is
> 'external' to the triad but only in a sense that understands that its very
> identity is the result of the mediating actions of semiosis. Therefore,
> neither the DO nor the DI can be understood as fully separate from the
> semiosis function.
>
> 4] We will have to continue to disagree with regard to the ten classes of
> Signs, which I clearly see as his analysis of the Sign as an
> irreducible triadic set of relations.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 19/05/19 10:47 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jeff, Edwina, List:
>
> JD:  As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they are
> the first correlate of a further triadic relation.
>
>
> I think that consist is the wrong word here, because it implies that some
> Signs are nothing but triadic relations.  However, I acknowledge that some
>  Signs clearly involve relations, and some of those relations are triadic.
> For example, Symbols involve Indices and Icons that are connected in some
> way, Propositions involve Semes married by continuous predicates, and
> Arguments involve Propositions married by leading principles; not to
> mention that the Universe as a Sign obviously involves triadic (and other)
> relations.  However, the point of contention is whether  any Sign is a
> triadic relation--i.e., a triad--rather than always being one correlate
> of a triadic relation.
>
> ET:  ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants' ...
>
>
> No, only Legisigns/Types are Necessitants; Qualisigns/Tones are Possibles,
> and Sinsigns/Tokens are Existents.
>
> ET:  Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
> structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
>
>
> No, the Object and Interpretant are external to the Sign, not parts of
> the Sign.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant are the three correlates of
> the triadic relation of representing or mediating.
>
> ET:  We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
> contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as
> a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in
> his outline of these ten classes. 2.254
>
>
> No, there is nothing whatsoever in that entire passage (NDTR, CP
> 2.233-272, EP 2:289-299; 1903) that "contradicts" my claim; on the
> contrary, it explicitly confirms that a Sign is a Representamen with a
> mental Interpretant--the First Correlate of a triadic relation, not itself
> a triad or triadic relation.
>
> CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
> Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
> Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the
> possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
> triadic relation to the same Objec

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.

JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well."

For example, 

All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?

How about:

The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both
premises are true. So, YOU are the bank robber.

All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises
are true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?

All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true].
Therefore no woman is a rational animal.
And so on...
 On Sun 19/05/19 11:09 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 For the record, I have consistently referred to my Semeiotic
Argumentation, and have never--not once--attributed it to Peirce. 
What I have said is that Peirce affirmed each of its premisses, and I
have provided ample evidence from his explicit statements to support
that claim.  Moreover, the only time that I used the word "proof" was
in response to  someone else mentioning "logical proof of the reality
of God," and I put quotation marks around it accordingly.
 JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well.
 On the other hand, Peirce himself used the word "proof" without such
quotation marks in a passage that I have quoted a couple of times.
 CSP:  ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to predict
what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though
we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His
Thought, as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
 Gary F,
 Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by
attributing
 arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
 GF
 > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
 > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” —
which
 > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names
because
 > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
 > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
 > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
 > subject is collateral experience of it.
 I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
 as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
 individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
 source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
 The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
 God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
 or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
 catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
 GF
 > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
 > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
 > or provisional we take it to be.
 Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
 and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
 same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
 the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a 
 prerequisite.
 GF
 > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the 
 > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go 
 > any further into theology than I have here.
 I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
 "Enough already."
 John


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

1] I think you are missing my point, which is that the triad, which
I refer to as a Sign, is a functional whole; it is irreducible in
this functionality. To intellectually reduce it to its parts totally
misses its function - which is what semiosis is all about, its
function.

Whether you refer to the interactional parts of the triad as
'correlates' or 'relations [8.335], is frankly irrelevant, since the
focus of the triad is its functionality as that set-of-interactions.

2] And diverting from my meaning of 'all representamens are
necessitants', which I used to refer to the fact that the triad MUST
include a mediating Representamen in order to function as a semiosic
process.to instead focus on the meaning of 'necessitant' to refer
only to the categorical mode of Thirdness - ignores what I was saying
about semiosis.

3] The Dynamic Object is external to the Sign only before it becomes
attached to the semiosic process - which brings the data from that DO
'into' the mediating actions of the triad where it becomes
transformed as the Immediate Object. The same with the Dynamic
Interpretant - which is 'external' to the triad but only in a sense
that understands that its very identity is the result of the
mediating actions of semiosis. Therefore, neither the DO nor the DI
can be understood as fully separate from the semiosis function.

4] We will have to continue to disagree with regard to the ten
classes of Signs, which I clearly see as his analysis of the Sign as
an irreducible triadic set of relations. 

Edwina
 On Sun 19/05/19 10:47 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jeff, Edwina, List:
 JD:  As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they
are the first correlate of a further triadic relation.
 I think that consist is the wrong word here, because it implies that
some Signs are  nothing but triadic relations.  However, I acknowledge
that some Signs clearly involve relations, and some of those relations
are triadic.  For example, Symbols involve Indices and Icons that are
connected in some way, Propositions involve Semes married by
continuous predicates, and Arguments involve Propositions married by
leading principles; not to mention that the Universe as a Sign
obviously involves triadic (and other) relations.  However, the point
of contention is whether  any Sign is a triadic relation--i.e., a
triad--rather than always being one correlate of a triadic relation.
ET:  ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants' ... 
 No, only Legisigns/Types are Necessitants; Qualisigns/Tones are
Possibles, and Sinsigns/Tokens are Existents.
 ET:  Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this
'internal structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'. 
 No, the Object and Interpretant are external to the Sign, not parts
of the Sign.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant are the three
correlates of the triadic relation of representing or mediating.
  ET:  We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs -
where, in contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers
to the triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full
triad of relations in his outline of these ten classes. 2.254
 No, there is nothing whatsoever in that entire passage (NDTR, CP
2.233-272, EP 2:289-299; 1903) that "contradicts" my claim; on the
contrary, it explicitly  confirms that a Sign is a Representamen with
a mental Interpretant--the First Correlate of a triadic relation, not
itself a triad or triadic relation.
 CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its  Interpretant, by which triadic relation
the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of
the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant.A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is
a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have
been much studied. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290-291) 
 Peirce proceeded to use "Sign," rather than "Representamen,"
throughout the entire remainder of the text.  I do not see how he
could have been any clearer, and I stand by my statement that he
never--not once--used "Sign" for a triad.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 7:31 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[3]> wrote:
ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since the
representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
semiosic set of O-R-I.

Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.

We can see the examples