Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[John F. Sowa]

Jon,
I have no desire to rehash our earlier debates about the
following issue:
JAS> Accordingly, what I *have *suggested
previously is that semeiotic is sufficiently robust to prompt the
plausible hypothesis of God as the real and independent object that
determines the entire universe as a sign.  I know that you disagree with
this, but we have
debated it sufficiently in the past and need not
rehash those arguments.
I admit that some readers may consider that
analysis as "plausible".   But others would strongly disagree. 
It's safe to conclude that the point is controversial.
People like
Dan, Michael, Edwina, and many other subscribers to Peirce-L find the
noncontroversial aspects of Peirce's semeiotic to be valuable for their
work. I usually agree with them.
There is nothing wrong with
discussing the controversial applications to theology.  But it's important
to say that one can use Peirce's theories without accepting those
hypotheses.
John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, John, Edwina, Auke, Daniel, List,

Jon wrote:

JAS: I *have *suggested previously [. . .] that semeiotic is sufficiently
robust to prompt the plausible hypothesis of God as the real and
independent object that determines the entire universe as a sign.  I know
that you disagree with this, but we have debated it sufficiently in the
past and need not rehash those arguments.


It is likely that there will continue to be considerable disagreement here
regarding this matter, and so I support your suggestion that we "need not
rehash those arguments" on peirce-l.

Nevertheless there are those, including me, who agree that there is
sufficient reason to hold that Peirce himself considered semeiotic to be
"sufficiently robust to prompt the plausible hypothesis of God as the real
and independent object that determines the entire universe as a sign." For
the record, I consider your paper, "A Neglected Additament: Peirce on
Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God"
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187, as constituting a major
contribution to that "plausible hypothesis."

There is now a scholarly literature supporting that view, albeit a
small one relative to certain other Peircean topics, and spread out in book
chapters, journal articles, papers, etc. There are also, of course and
importantly, Peirce's own discussions of the topic which you have
explicated rather fully here and especially in your paper *op. cit. supra*.

Best,

Gary


"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*








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On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 9:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, Edwina, Daniel, List:
>
> Indeed, and I have never suggested any such thing, either; after all, it
> would wrongly imply that metaphysics comes *before *semeiotic in a proper
> classification of the sciences.  Peirce unambiguously has it the other way
> around--"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of
> logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of
> being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896).  Accordingly, what I *have *suggested
> previously is that semeiotic is sufficiently robust to prompt the plausible
> hypothesis of God as the real and independent object that determines the
> entire universe as a sign.  I know that you disagree with this, but we have
> debated it sufficiently in the past and need not rehash those arguments.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 10:03 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> John - thanks for your comment. I think that's an important point.
>>
>> " Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for
>> analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has
>> suggested that theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently
>> robust to be used as a foundation for developing semeiotic."
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Fri 17/04/20 10:50 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
>>
>> Auke and Jon AS,
>>
>> I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would also like to comment on
>> the following point:
>>
>> AvB> God or the  conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in
>> semiotics. My interest is systematical not biographical.
>>
>> A biographical analysis can be useful for clarifying what Peirce meant in
>> his voluminous writings.  That is an important task for Peirce scholars.
>> Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for analyzing
>> theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has suggested that
>> theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently robust to be used as
>> a foundation for developing semeiotic.
>>
>> John
>>
>>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, Edwina, Daniel, List:

Indeed, and I have never suggested any such thing, either; after all, it
would wrongly imply that metaphysics comes *before *semeiotic in a proper
classification of the sciences.  Peirce unambiguously has it the other way
around--"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of
logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of
being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896).  Accordingly, what I *have *suggested
previously is that semeiotic is sufficiently robust to prompt the plausible
hypothesis of God as the real and independent object that determines the
entire universe as a sign.  I know that you disagree with this, but we have
debated it sufficiently in the past and need not rehash those arguments.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 10:03 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John - thanks for your comment. I think that's an important point.
>
> " Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for analyzing
> theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has suggested that
> theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently robust to be used as
> a foundation for developing semeiotic."
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 17/04/20 10:50 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> Auke and Jon AS,
>
> I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would also like to comment on
> the following point:
>
> AvB> God or the  conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in
> semiotics. My interest is systematical not biographical.
>
> A biographical analysis can be useful for clarifying what Peirce meant in
> his voluminous writings.  That is an important task for Peirce scholars.
> Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for analyzing
> theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has suggested that
> theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently robust to be used as
> a foundation for developing semeiotic.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'.


Understood, but by contrast I read "eventual interpretant" and "normal
interpretant" as two *tentative *terms (with *tentative *definitions) for
the *same *concept, which were eventually superseded by "final
interpretant."  While the names vary over time, Peirce consistently
maintains that there are *exactly three* interpretants, since this is
required by his categorial analysis as Robert's podium diagram helpfully
illustrates.

AvB:  I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical interpretant'
(aspectual) and 'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for
disambiguation pusposes.


Again, I do not read Peirce as defining two *different *"dynamical
interpretants," but rather working out in his Logic Notebook some candidate
ideas for defining *the *dynamical interpretant.  In this case, a dynamical
interpretant as "the determination of a field of consciousness" is a *logical
*interpretant producing a *further sign* in the interpreter such that the
sign itself is a *usual*, while a dynamical interpretant as "the commanded
act in the mere doing of it" is an *energetic *interpretant producing an
*effort* in the interpreter such that the sign itself is a *percussive*.

AvB (in another thread):  Semiotics must be developed by a study of signs
and sign processes, not by speculations on particular concepts of god, not
even Peirce's.


I agree, and my point was not to say anything one way or the other about
theism--only that Peirce considers the entire universe to be a *sign*,
specifically an argument; and as such, like *every *sign, it necessarily
has a final interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 3:11 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alen,
>
> This comment probably does not come as a surprise.
>
> CSP:  The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that
> it destines, in view of the other general truths of the universe,
> conditionally upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all
> the real difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual
> Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c. 1906)
>
> CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the true
> Interpretand, which the sign *ought *to produce. Its *true value*. Take,
> for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the
> modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony ought
> logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906)
>
> I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
> already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged by the
> truth value: is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought to
> produce. It is an understanding of the import of this sign. It is
> restricted to the interpretation prosesses goals at hand.
>
> The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it destines,
> in view of other general truths of the universe. It is the sum and
> substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will make, it must
> be a habit. It is what the normal interpretant of my former alinea might
> mean in other processes too. This difference can be looked at as a
> difference between an involved dicent aspect (of the normal i) of the sign
> and a rheme aspect (involved in eventual i,), the latter enabling its to
> involvement in other processes. The lines of identity that connect the
> processes (involved index element of legisigns and immediate interpretants
> that of themself act as a sign alike guaranty the possibility of this to
> actually happen).
>
> On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is able to
> make the finest and clearest distinctions between closely related gestures.
> He is not the butcher that only knows to make minced meat. He looks at each
> joint from all relevant (semiotically) perspectives and describes what you
> find if you cut from those perspectives.
>
> Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical
> interpretant'.  I found  passage's in Logical notebooks:
>
> The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a field of
> representation
> exterior to the sign. This eld is an interpreter's consciousness which
> determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8, 1905).
>
> The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a
> given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2, 1906).
>
> I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:
>
> The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the command
> is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that conduct
> involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and
> recognizes
> this correctly, 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, John, List:

I do not agree with a linear view of Peirce, either, and strongly concur
that one must take his entire vast corpus into account.  What I have said
is that I generally assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that his later writings reflect his *more considered* views--rarely (if
ever) *contradicting* his earlier writings, but typically seeking to
*clarify* them after further contemplation and refinement.

Peirce considered his inkstand to be an extension of his mind (CP 7.366,
1902), and I interpret many of his manuscripts accordingly--as
documentation of his ongoing thought process, not finished products that
always merit equal weight with whatever came subsequently or actually
appeared in print during his lifetime.  I can very much relate to such a
method myself; as the variously attributed saying goes, "I write to find
out what I think," both on the List and elsewhere.  My posts this week
express opinions that have evolved considerably from those that I held two
or three years ago, but the latter would still provide insight into how I
arrived at my current positions.

I readily admit to focusing a lot on terminology, as Peirce himself did,
since in some ways it is a specific object of study for semeiotic as a
distinct science.  However, I also acknowledge as he did the importance of
applying the results in *other* sciences--including not only metaphysics as
the third branch of philosophy, which I have discussed extensively, but
also the special sciences such as biology and sociology, which are *not *areas
in which I have much personal interest or expertise.  Nevertheless, if one
does not correctly *apprehend *Peirce's views on phenomenology, normative
sciences (including logic as semeiotic), and metaphysics, then one
obviously will not be able to *apply *them properly in the special sciences.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 9:59 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS - as usual, you and I, each in our personal opinions of Peirce, have
> great differences.
>
> I don't agree with a linear view of Peirce [early->late]; I think one has
> to take his whole works into consideration, for even if he was saying
> things in a different fashion, using different terms,  and working his
> analysis out in more detail - I think that Peirce was very consistent in
> his basic approach.
>
> Your focus seems to be on terminology;; on terms having a
> specific meaning, which you understand as increasingly clarified and
> 'accurate' as Peirce grows older;   and you tend to refrain from
> examining the functions of these terms in the real world. My focus is the
> pragmatic use of Peircean semiosis to explain the biological and societal
> realms.
>
> I gave my outline of the function of the Final Interpretant in enabling
> the adaptive capacity of habits. As for 'ultimate truth' - this is an
> entirely different function than an 'adaptive capacity of habits' -
> and refers to the scientific method of examining and analyzing objective
> reality. Nothing to do with the nature of habits, with adaptation, with
> generalization etc.
>
> So- we'll have to continue, each in our personal way, to disagree.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Language: A Semiotic Introduction to the Study of Speech

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, Edwina, Michael, List:

I seem to recall being scolded more than once on-List for allegedly putting
words in Peirce's mouth.  In this case, he never used the term "objectified
idealism," but he did use "objective idealism" and explicitly endorsed it
as "the one intelligible theory of the universe" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293,
1891).  It strikes me as a bit presumptuous to suggest, 129 years later,
that "he ought to have said" something different from what he actually did
say.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 10:21 AM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Michael,
>
> I agree with the following point, and I suspect that Peirce and Schelling
> would also agree.
>
> ET> I also like your [Michael's] use of 'objectified idealism' rather than
> 'objective idealism'. Exactly right.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Daniel L. Everett]

Indeed. Peirce was very much opposed to many earlier philosophers because they 
had been theologically trained and reasoned from theology rather than logic.

Dan

> On Apr 17, 2020, at 10:50 AM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Auke and Jon AS,
> 
> I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would also like to comment on the 
> following point:
> 
> AvB> God or the  conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in 
> semiotics. My interest is systematical not biographical.
> 
> A biographical analysis can be useful for clarifying what Peirce meant in his 
> voluminous writings.  That is an important task for Peirce scholars.   Many 
> theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for analyzing 
> theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has suggested that 
> theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently robust to be used as a 
> foundation for developing semeiotic.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> -
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Categories

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Peirce's Categories • 14
At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/04/16/peirces-categories-%e2%80%a2-14/

Continuing with the discussion of Robert Marty's “Podium Diagram” ...

Re: Peirce List ( 
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/thrd1.html#00020 )
Re: Robert Marty ( 
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00047.html )

RM: What do you think of the presuppositions between the levels?  Do they make 
sense to you?

At this point I have mostly questions, which would take further research to answer, not to mention unpacking many books 
still in boxes from our move a year and a half ago, none of which I'm at liberty to do right now.  So, just off the cuff ...


“Presupposition” is one of those words I tend to avoid, as it has too many uses at odds with each other.  There are at 
least the architectonic, causal, and logical meanings.  It it were only a matter of logic, I would say “P presupposes Q” 
means “P ⇒ Q”.  But usually people have something more pragmatic or rhetorical in mind than pure logic would require, 
something like enthymeme.


It's also common for people to confound the implication order “P ⇒ Q” with the causal order “P causes Q”, whereas it's 
more like the reverse of that.  In more complex settings we usually have the architectonic sense in mind, and that is 
what I sensed in the case of the normative sciences.  Viewed with regard to their bases, logic is a special case of 
ethics and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, but with regard to their level of oversight, aesthetics must submit 
to ethical control and ethics must submit to logical control.


Early on, Peirce used “involution” with the meaning it has in arithmetic or number theory, namely, “exponentiation”, 
where x^y means taking x to the power of y.  See the following passage and commentary.


* Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives • The Sign of Involution
  
https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Part_2#Selection_12

As far as the boolean or propositional analogue goes, x^y for x, y in {0, 1 means the same thing as x ⇐ y, as one can 
tell by comparing the following two operation tables.


Exponentiation and Converse Implication
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/exponentiation-and-converse-implication.png

I haven't looked into whether Peirce uses “involution” or “involvement” with 
that sense in his later writings.

Resources
=

* Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives
  https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Overview

* Precursors Of Category Theory
  https://oeis.org/wiki/Precursors_Of_Category_Theory

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The secret life of plants

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John - thank you so very much for this post. I agree with your
comments about plants - and as you say- from bacteria up. Peirce
would even include chemical processes.

Edwina
 On Fri 17/04/20 12:09 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
In some theories of ontology, the focus on scientific principles
tends to omit or downgrade the importance of goals, intentions, and
feelings.  Such issues are often deprecated as "anthropomorphic". 
Other systems, which emphasize neuroscience, downgrade any kind of
memory or reasoning that is not based on neurons.  Even the field of
biosemiotics puts more emphasis on animals with brains than
single-celled protozoa, which have no neurons.  The semiotics of
plants was usually ignored.

But in recent years, biologists have discovered the complex methods
of communication, memory, and learning by plants.  For a review of
those methods, see "The secret life of plants:  How they memorize,
communicate, problem solve, and socialize":
https://getpocket.com/explore/item/the-secret-life-of-plants-how-they-memorise-communicate-problem-solve-and-socialise?utm_source=pocket-newtab

These developments show the importance of broadening the foundations
of ontology to include phytosemiotics as well as zoosemiotics.  Those
issues are fundamental to every aspect of life from bacteria on up. 
They cannot be dismissed as "unscientific".

John 

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[PEIRCE-L] The secret life of plants

[John F. Sowa]

In some theories of ontology, the focus on scientific principles tends
to omit or downgrade the importance of goals, intentions, and feelings. 
Such issues are often deprecated as "anthropomorphic".  Other
systems, which emphasize neuroscience, downgrade any kind of memory or
reasoning that is not based on neurons.  Even the field of biosemiotics
puts more emphasis on animals with brains than single-celled protozoa,
which have no neurons.  The semiotics of plants was usually
ignored.
But in recent years, biologists have discovered the complex
methods of communication, memory, and learning by plants.  For a review of
those methods, see "The secret life of plants:  How they memorize,
communicate, problem solve, and socialize":
https://getpocket.com/explore/item/the-secret-life-of-plants-how-they-memorise-communicate-problem-solve-and-socialise?utm_source=pocket-newtab
These
developments show the importance of broadening the foundations of ontology
to include phytosemiotics as well as zoosemiotics.  Those issues are
fundamental to every aspect of life from bacteria on up.  They cannot be
dismissed as "unscientific".
John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John - thanks for your comment. I think that's an important point.

" Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for
analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has
suggested that theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently
robust to be used as a foundation for developing semeiotic."

Edwina
 On Fri 17/04/20 10:50 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
Auke and Jon AS,

I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would also like to comment
on the following point:

AvB> God or the  conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in
semiotics. My interest is systematical not biographical.

A biographical analysis can be useful for clarifying what Peirce
meant in his voluminous writings.  That is an important task for
Peirce scholars.   Many theologians have considered Peirce's
semeiotic useful for analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody,
not even Peirce, has suggested that theology or any theological
hypothesis is sufficiently robust to be used as a foundation for
developing semeiotic.

John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[John F. Sowa]

Auke and Jon AS,
I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would
also like to comment on the following point:
AvB> God or the 
conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in semiotics. My interest
is systematical not biographical.
A biographical analysis can be
useful for clarifying what Peirce meant in his voluminous writings.  That
is an important task for Peirce scholars.   Many theologians have
considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for analyzing theological arguments. 
But nobody, not even Peirce, has suggested that theology or any
theological hypothesis is sufficiently robust to be used as a foundation
for developing semeiotic.
John

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Categories

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

I've put lightly revised and better formatted editions of my last two posts,
stemming from the discussion of Robert Marty's "podium" diagram, on my blog,
including them under an earlier series on Peirce's Categories.

Cf: Peirce's Categories • 13
At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/04/15/peirces-categories-%e2%80%a2-13/

Re: Peirce List ( 
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/thrd1.html#00020 )
Re: Robert Marty ( 
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00020.html )

All,

With a few choice exceptions I have always found Peirce’s earlier writings on categories, relations, and semiotics to be 
more clear, exact, and fruitful in practice than his last attempts to explain himself without the requisite logical and 
mathematical supports.


Still, I like Robert Marty’s “podium” picture of the universal categories
( https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474 ), comprehend it all or not,
and I found myself once using a similar picture to explain the relationships
among the big 3 normative sciences of aesthetics, ethics, and logic.  I called
this “The Pragmatic Cosmos”, using “cosmos” in the sense of a global order.
It looks like most of this stuff has fallen off the live web but here's
a few links I found.

* The Pragmatic Cosmos (Oct 2003)
  
http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010215/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html

* Inquiry Oriented Systems (Feb 2004)
  
http://web.archive.org/web/20070222005725/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd4.html#05337
• 1. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154925/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05337.html
… 8. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155036/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05344.html

* The Pragmatic Cosmos (Mar 2012)
  https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00924.html

I'll copy and format pieces of this to my blog as I get time.

Resources
=

* Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives
  https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Overview

* Precursors Of Category Theory
  https://oeis.org/wiki/Precursors_Of_Category_Theory

Regards,

Jon

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

I decided to insert our technical semiotic discussion in your exchange with 
Edwina. I noticed by the way that in 1. I at the end write normal where 
representative is ment.

You asked:

Just to be clear, are you suggesting a direct correspondence between the 
alpha/beta/gamma EGs and the 1903/hexadic/decadic sign taxonomies, or just a 
loose analogy? 

--

 

I am not suggesting a direct relation with EG. I am noticing that it is possible

1. to look at the sign

2. to look at the interpretational proces on the occasion a sign offers itself

3. to look at the interaction between two signs

As in logic (not just EG) it is possible to distinghuis propositional, first 
order predicate calculus and modal logic.

I take over alpha, beta and gamma because they are not prescriptive, but follow 
an order from less to increasing detail in the analyses and from first in the 
order of knowledge to later in that order. 

But with EG fruitful links can be established by a semiotician: the sheet of 
semiosis, the index and the line of identity, tinctures to distinguish 
different lines of identity, their universes of discourse and some more 
possibilities.


You wrote:

I am not aware of any solid arguments for treating the normal and final 
interpretants as different.  The various definitions that I just quoted in my 
last post seem to indicate that the two terms were virtually synonymous in 
Peirce's usage.  As for scale, he stated that the entire universe is a sign, 
specifically an argument--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's 
purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 
1903).

Maybe, this is the reason why you don't see the difference between normal and 
final interpretant.

Semiotics must be developed by a study of signs and sign processes, not by 
speculations on particular concepts of god, not even Peirce's. God or the 
conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in semiotics. My interest is 
systematical not biographical.

Best,

Auke


> Op 17 april 2020 om 3:38 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  ..  with the bones, i.e. the technical terms and 
> their arrangement YOU did a good job in sorting things out.
> > 
> > > 
> Thank you, I sincerely appreciate it.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  I do not know whether you recognized that as we 
> have an alpha, beta and gamma part of EG, we also have an alpha, beta and 
> gamma part of semiotics, i.e. the calssifications that yield 
> 10/propositional, 28/quantification and 66/modality.
> > 
> > > 
> Just to be clear, are you suggesting a direct correspondence between the 
> alpha/beta/gamma EGs and the 1903/hexadic/decadic sign taxonomies, or just a 
> loose analogy?  I am more inclined to see the 1903 and hexadic schemes as 
> almost entirely different--again, they have only one trichotomy in common, 
> the division according to the nature of the sign itself--and the decadic 
> approach as an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to combine and integrate the 
> other two.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  But, that only with the small classification it is 
> possible to correlate the sign aspects with the interpretant aspects 
> (emotional interpretant - qualisign, etc) ...
> > 
> > > 
> I disagree, although my current view is that the correlation is different 
> from anything that Peirce explicitly advocated.  The immediate interpretant 
> as a possibility pertains to a type, the dynamical interpretant as an 
> actuality pertains to a token with its tones, and the final interpretant as a 
> conditional necessity pertains to the sign itself.  All three are divisible 
> into emotional (feeling), energetic (exertion), and logical (further sign) 
> interpretants.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  ... and that this correlation is needed to come to 
> terms with interpretaional processes: it makes no sence to make distinctions 
> with regard to the sign if those distinctions do not play a role in the 
> proces of interpretation.
> > 
> > > 
> I agree, which is why I now try to focus more on analyzing the process of 
> semeiosis than on the classifying signs.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  But, since you take normal and final interpretant 
> as the very same, you generalize over grand scale sequences and there our 
> ways depart.
> > 
> > > 
> I am not aware of any solid arguments for treating the normal and final 
> interpretants as different.  The various definitions that I just quoted in my 
> last post seem to indicate that the two terms were virtually synonymous in 
> Peirce's usage.  As for scale, he stated that the entire universe is a sign, 
> specifically an argument--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's 
> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 
> 2:193, 1903).
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  Did you read Hulswit's "A semiotic account of 
> causation"?
> > 
> > > 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Auke - thanks for your clear differentiation of two quite different
semiosic processes - regardless of their terms/names.

That is, as I see it, there IS such a thing as 'Truth' and there IS
such a thing as natural evolution. Both are semiosic actions and both
have different functions and yet both are a type of 'end' action. 

A] With regard to Truth - I consider that this refers to a specific
object/event where a final Interpretant about its singular identity
can eventually be made. This would be, as in the example, the verdict
of the jury. Or, the verdict of a number of scientists about the
'true' identity of a biological specimen. This sets up a closed 'end'
action.

B]  But this is very different from the 'final interpretant/eventual
interpretant which refers to the continuous act of the Universe in 
generalizing from all the existent and emerging differences and
developing a new habit/law. There is no ultimate truth, no final 'end
action'  in this process. Instead, there is a continuous growth of
diversity and networked complexity.

I suspect, but I may be quite wrong, that JAS considers that the
Universe is itself engaged in truth-seeking and is involved in a
search-action for some ultimate final truth. My view is that Peirce
uses both processes; the specific truth event and the generalized
open evolutionary process. 

Edwina
 On Fri 17/04/20  4:11 AM , a.bree...@chello.nl sent:
Jon Alen,

This comment probably does not come as a surprise.CSP:  The Eventual
Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that it destines,
in view of the other general truths of the universe, conditionally
upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all the real
difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual
Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c.
1906) CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the
true Interpretand, which the sign ought to produce. Its true value.
Take, for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is
the modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony
ought logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906)
I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged by
the truth value: is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought
to produce. It is an understanding of the import of this sign. It is
restricted to the interpretation prosesses goals at hand.  

The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it
destines, in view of other general truths of the universe. It is the
sum and substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will
make, it must be a habit. It is what the normal interpretant of my
former alinea might mean in other processes too. This difference can
be looked at as a difference between an involved dicent aspect (of
the normal i) of the sign and a rheme aspect (involved in eventual
i,), the latter enabling its to involvement in other processes. The
lines of identity that connect the processes (involved index element
of legisigns and immediate interpretants that of themself act as a
sign alike guaranty the possibility of this to actually happen).  

On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is
able to make the finest and clearest distinctions between closely
related gestures. He is not the butcher that only knows to make
minced meat. He looks at each joint from all relevant (semiotically)
perspectives and describes what you find if you cut from those
perspectives.
Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical
interpretant'.  I found  passage's in Logical notebooks: 

The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a  field of
representation
 exterior to the sign. This  eld is an interpreter's consciousness
which
 determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8,
1905).

The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a
 given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2,
1906).

I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:

The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the
command
 is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that
conduct
 involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and
recognizes
 this correctly, it is the representative interpretant (MS 339, 253r,
 October 9, 1905).

1. Note that the normal interpretant, is calles here the
representative. not without reason because with normal Peirce looks
at it from a truth functional perspective and with normal from a
representative.

2. More improtant, you will notice the difference between: 

A. 

The dynamical interpretant as 'the determination of a field of
consciousness' (The immediate interpretant/rheme got its index and

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[a . breemen]

Jon Alen,

This comment probably does not come as a surprise.

> CSP:  The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that it 
> destines, in view of the other general truths of the universe, conditionally 
> upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all the real 
> difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual Interpretant must 
> be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c. 1906)
> 

> CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the true Interpretand, 
> which the sign ought to produce. Its true value. Take, for example, a witness 
> in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the modification of the verdict of 
> the jury in which this testimony ought logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 
> 1906)
> 


I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen already 
suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged by the truth value: 
is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought to produce. It is an 
understanding of the import of this sign. It is restricted to the 
interpretation prosesses goals at hand. 

The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it destines, in 
view of other general truths of the universe. It is the sum and substance of 
all the real difference that its acceptance will make, it must be a habit. It 
is what the normal interpretant of my former alinea might mean in other 
processes too. This difference can be looked at as a difference between an 
involved dicent aspect (of the normal i) of the sign and a rheme aspect 
(involved in eventual i,), the latter enabling its to involvement in other 
processes. The lines of identity that connect the processes (involved index 
element of legisigns and immediate interpretants that of themself act as a sign 
alike guaranty the possibility of this to actually happen). 

On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is able to make 
the finest and clearest distinctions between closely related gestures. He is 
not the butcher that only knows to make minced meat. He looks at each joint 
from all relevant (semiotically) perspectives and describes what you find if 
you cut from those perspectives.


Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical 
interpretant'.  I found  passage's in Logical notebooks:

The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a field of representation
exterior to the sign. This eld is an interpreter's consciousness which
determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8, 1905).

The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a
given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2, 1906).

I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:

The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the command
is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that conduct
involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and recognizes
this correctly, it is the representative interpretant (MS 339, 253r,
October 9, 1905).

1. Note that the normal interpretant, is calles here the representative. not 
without reason because with normal Peirce looks at it from a truth functional 
perspective and with normal from a representative.

2. More improtant, you will notice the difference between:

A.

The dynamical interpretant as 'the determination of a field of consciousness' 
(The immediate interpretant/rheme got its index and became propositional for 
this interpreter. But still needed the representative content to enter the  
argument, being put under the general rule of inference (representational 
interpretant) and judged on its truth value (normal i). It indicates a moment 
in a process of interpretation.

and B.

Dynamical interpretant as "The commanded act in the mere doing of it." In this 
case A must be fullfiled for B to happen. In A we are speaking in terms of sign 
aspects about the dynamical interpretant. In B it is a sign type, and it is the 
intended signtype in this argument (process) if communication is succesful. 

I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical interpretant' (aspectual) and 
'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for disambiguation pusposes.


Best regards,


Auke van Breemen

> Op 17 april 2020 om 3:20 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an 
> expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's 
> writings.
> 
> I always include the year of publication or composition whenever I cite 
> them, because I believe that it is very important to pay attention to the 
> development of Peirce's thought over time.  CP 6.57-65 is from "The Doctrine 
> of Necessity Examined," which appeared in The Monist in 1892, so it is highly 
> tenuous (at best) to base the definition of the final interpretant on that 
> passage dating more than a decade before he ever began distinguishing a