Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A, John C, List,

Jon wrote:

I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the
universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to
serve as a sign relation in one measure or another.


I would tend strongly to agree.

JA: In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are
present from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons
and indices so much as icons and indices devolve from their geI suspect you
are right, Jon.

Jon S and I have argued for this approach (3ns as ur-Continuity present in
the earliest cosmos, i.e., pre-Big Bang so to speak) as Peirce considers it
in the final lecture of 1898 RLT in the famous 'Blackboard' metaphor.

John C, who wrote that he suspects Jon S is correct in this matter of
triadic relations being 'there' from the get-go, added:

JC: I think this means that you would disagree with Terry Deacon’s
approach, which starts with icons and has the rest evolve.


I'm not sure I read Deacon exactly that way. While I found problems with
his first book, *The Symbolic Species*, and discussed some of these
problems (including this 'starting with icons') with him after a talk he
gave at ICCS U. of Alabama, Huntsville, a number of years ago, I don't see
his repeating those same errors in *Incomplete Nature*. However, I'm away
from my desk and do not have the book with me at the moment.

However, what I think you may be pointing to, John, is suggested by this
comment by Deacon (reproduced in a review of the book by Robert Logan--all
quotations below are from this long review and precis.
See: file:///C:/Users/Gary/Downloads/information-03-00290%20(1).pdf)

The core hypothesis of this book is that all teleodynamic phenomena
necessarily depend upon, and emerge from, simpler morphodynamic and
homeodynamic [i.e., thermodynamic] processes (p. 487).

What Logan calls Deacon's 'triality' (as opposed to 'duality') takes the
following form of levels built upon levels:


RL: Each level of interaction gives rise to a different set of properties
or behaviors of matter and hence I suggest that if Deacon is right (and I
believe he is) then we are possibly dealing with property “triality” not
property duality, with three distinct property domains of matter, namely,

(1)  the thermodynamic dissipation of order as exemplified by an ideal gas;
(2)  inanimate, non-self-maintaining self-organization (or morphodynamics)
as exemplified by crystal formation and Bénard cells; (3)  self-organizing
and self-maintaining systems as exemplified by all living teleodynamic
organisms.


But with Deacon's concerns in this book we are very far from "the get go"
at this point in the evolution of the cosmos, nor is he dealing directly
with semiosis, icons, indices, symbols and the rest. While even Peirce
(this in reference to (2) above) for example, saw even crystal formation as
a triadic process.

Still, I will want to re-read parts of *Incomplete Nature *to see if Deacon
writes specifically of an iconic basis for all that follow. So thanks for
the hint, John.

Perhas, as does Logan, what I admire most about Deacon's book is its
emphasis on the need for a return to values in science. As Logan writes:

As Deacon points out despite all the achievements of science to understand
our physical universe science has

"at the same time conceived the realm of value as radically alienated from
this seeming complete understanding of the fabric of existence …. The
removal of any approach to value from a scientific perspective is the
ultimate expression of having accepted the presumed necessity of that
elective surgery" (p. 544).


Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:36 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> I suspect you are right, Jon. I think this means that you would disagree
> with Terry Deacon’s approach, which starts with icons and has the rest
> evolve. Perhaps the origin of the first third *is* the beginning. Nothing
> is outside of that. That would be a bit like some gnostic views.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 19 April 2017 7:00 PM
> *To:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
> interaction
>
>
>
> Gary, all ...
>
>
>
> I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of
> the universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential
> to serve as a sign relation in one measure or another.
>
>
>
> In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are
> present from the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Jon Awbrey]

Or Dylan Thomas ...

| In the beginning was the three-pointed star,
| One smile of light across the empty face;
| One bough of bone across the rooting air,
| The substance forked that marrowed the first sun;
| And, burning ciphers on the round of space,
| Heaven and hell mixed as they spun.
|
| Dylan Thomas, “In The Beginning”, Verse 1
|
http://web.archive.org/web/20110612002235/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04290.html

Regards,

Jon

On 4/19/2017 10:36 PM, John Collier wrote:

I suspect you are right, Jon. I think this means that you would disagree with 
Terry Deacon’s approach, which starts with icons and has the rest evolve. 
Perhaps the origin of the first third is the beginning. Nothing is outside of 
that. That would be a bit like some gnostic views.

Best,
John

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 April 2017 7:00 PM
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and 
interaction

Gary, all ...

I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the 
universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to serve 
as a sign relation in one measure or another.


In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are present 
from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons and indices 
so much as icons and indices devolve from their generic precursors in the 
triadic matrix.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 19, 2017, at 6:22 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jon, List,

Nice post, and rereading it, quite helpful. However, I don't think that a 
consideration of sets and subsets fully does the trick. Or rather, it may for 
mathematics, but it does not do so sufficiently for semiotics, at least in my 
opinion.

So the notion of 'constraints' has got to be fleshed out much further for 
semiotics. I earlier commented on the richness and originality of Terrence 
Deacon's Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. For Deacon 
constraints are seen in relation to what is absent, much like the hub of a 
wheel is a hole which yet allows for its functioning (as a student of the Tao, 
I know that this is no news to you!).

More importantly for one of the key ideas of his book is that those constraints 
which bring about emergent processes are in their nature more complex than the 
constituents of a process because the complexity of such absential constraints 
is tied to their not being physical things: take away the spokes and the tire 
and the hub just disappears.

Gary Furhman has done some interesting work as well in consideration of the 
organizing power of constraints in his book, Turning Signs 
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm, a work which I've highly recommended in 
the past and have been recently re-reading parts of, esp. it's penultimate 
Chapter 18, which Gary referred to recently in another thread. (I should note 
that for both authors discussions of constraint include but go beyond semeiotic 
science, although perhaps not beyond semiosis itself.)

In the light of thinking about constraints, I especially liked this comment in your 
message as to the complexity added in consideration of what you termed "mutual 
constraints":

JA: There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.

I think that this is quite true, and that much more could be said regardomg it. 
Fuhrman, referring to an earlier book by Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The 
Co-evolution of Language and the Brain, gives an example of such mutual 
constraints in this sniippet.

As Deacon (1997) points out, languages have adapted to human use. ‘The brain 
has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the 
adapting’ (122) in  Fuhrman, Turning Signs, Chapter 13.

Best,

Gary R



--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[John Collier]

I suspect you are right, Jon. I think this means that you would disagree with 
Terry Deacon’s approach, which starts with icons and has the rest evolve. 
Perhaps the origin of the first third is the beginning. Nothing is outside of 
that. That would be a bit like some gnostic views.

Best,
John

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 April 2017 7:00 PM
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and 
interaction

Gary, all ...

I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the 
universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to serve 
as a sign relation in one measure or another.


In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are present 
from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons and indices 
so much as icons and indices devolve from their generic precursors in the 
triadic matrix.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 19, 2017, at 6:22 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jon, List,

Nice post, and rereading it, quite hlepfull. However, I don't think that a 
consideration of sets and subsets fully does the trick. Or rather, it may for 
mathematics, but it does not do so sufficiently for semiotics, at least in my 
opinion.

So the notion of 'constraints' has got to be fleshed out much further for 
semiotics. I earlier commented on the richness and originality of Terrence 
Deacon's Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. For Deacon 
constraints are seen in relation to what is absent, much like the hub of a 
wheel is a hole which yet allows for its functioning (as a student of the Tao, 
I know that this is no news to you!).

More importantly for one of the key ideas of his book is that those constraints 
which bring about emergent processes are in their nature more complex than the 
constituents of a process because the complexity of such absential constraints 
is tied to their not being physical things: take away the spokes and the tire 
and the hub just disappears.

Gary Furhman has done some interesting work as well in consideration of the 
organizing power of constraints in his book, Turning Signs 
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm, a work which I've highly recommended in 
the past and have been recently re-reading parts of, esp. it's penultimate 
Chapter 18, which Gary referred to recently in another thread. (I should note 
that for both authors discussions of constraint include but go beyond semeiotic 
science, although perhaps not beyond semiosis itself.)

In the light of thinking about constraints, I especially liked this comment in 
your message as to the complexity added in consideration of what you termed 
"mutual constraints":

JA: There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.

I think that this is quite true, and that much more could be said regardomg it. 
Fuhrman, referring to an earlier book by Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The 
Co-evolution of Language and the Brain, gives an example of such mutual 
constraints in this sniippet.

As Deacon (1997) points out, languages have adapted to human use. ‘The brain 
has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the 
adapting’ (122) in  Fuhrman, Turning Signs, Chapter 13.

Best,

Gary R



[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:
Gary,

Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint:

• The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M.

Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint:

• The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z.

So any way we choose to define a triadic relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint.

In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form:

• L ⊆ O × S × I

where:
O is the set of all objects under discussion,
S is the set of all signs under discussion, and
I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion.

The concepts of constraint, definition, determination,
lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis
in the idea that one set is a subset of another set.

Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask:

• What bearings do these types of global constraints
  have on various local settings we might select?

And conversely:

• To what extent do various typ

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, all ...

I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the 
universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to serve 
as a sign relation in one measure or another. 

In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are present 
from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons and indices 
so much as icons and indices devolve from their generic precursors in the 
triadic matrix.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Apr 19, 2017, at 6:22 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon, List,
> 
> Nice post, and rereading it, quite hlepfull. However, I don't think that a 
> consideration of sets and subsets fully does the trick. Or rather, it may for 
> mathematics, but it does not do so sufficiently for semiotics, at least in my 
> opinion.
> 
> So the notion of 'constraints' has got to be fleshed out much further for 
> semiotics. I earlier commented on the richness and originality of Terrence 
> Deacon's Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. For Deacon 
> constraints are seen in relation to what is absent, much like the hub of a 
> wheel is a hole which yet allows for its functioning (as a student of the 
> Tao, I know that this is no news to you!).
> 
> More importantly for one of the key ideas of his book is that those 
> constraints which bring about emergent processes are in their nature more 
> complex than the constituents of a process because the complexity of such 
> absential constraints is tied to their not being physical things: take away 
> the spokes and the tire and the hub just disappears.
> 
> Gary Furhman has done some interesting work as well in consideration of the 
> organizing power of constraints in his book, Turning Signs 
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm, a work which I've highly recommended in 
> the past and have been recently re-reading parts of, esp. it's penultimate 
> Chapter 18, which Gary referred to recently in another thread. (I should note 
> that for both authors discussions of constraint include but go beyond 
> semeiotic science, although perhaps not beyond semiosis itself.)
> 
> In the light of thinking about constraints, I especially liked this comment 
> in your message as to the complexity added in consideration of what you 
> termed "mutual constraints":
> 
> JA: There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
> they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
> So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
> signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
> that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.
> 
> I think that this is quite true, and that much more could be said regardomg 
> it. Fuhrman, referring to an earlier book by Deacon, The Symbolic Species: 
> The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain, gives an example of such mutual 
> constraints in this sniippet.
> 
> As Deacon (1997) points out, languages have adapted to human use. ‘The brain 
> has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the 
> adapting’ (122) in  Fuhrman, Turning Signs, Chapter 13.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690
> 
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> Gary,
>> 
>> Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint:
>> 
>> • The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M.
>> 
>> Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint:
>> 
>> • The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z.
>> 
>> So any way we choose to define a triadic relation
>> we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint.
>> 
>> In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation
>> we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form:
>> 
>> • L ⊆ O × S × I
>> 
>> where:
>> O is the set of all objects under discussion,
>> S is the set of all signs under discussion, and
>> I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion.
>> 
>> The concepts of constraint, definition, determination,
>> lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis
>> in the idea that one set is a subset of another set.
>> 
>> Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask:
>> 
>> • What bearings do these types of global constraints
>>   have on various local settings we might select?
>> 
>> And conversely:
>> 
>> • To what extent do various types of local constraints combine
>>   to constrain or determine various types of global constraint?
>> 
>> There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
>> they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
>> So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
>> signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
>> that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Nice post, and rereading it, quite hlepfull. However, I don't think that a
consideration of sets and subsets fully does the trick. Or rather, it may
for mathematics, but it does not do so sufficiently for semiotics, at least
in my opinion.

So the notion of 'constraints' has got to be fleshed out much further for
semiotics. I earlier commented on the richness and originality of Terrence
Deacon's *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter.* For Deacon
constraints are seen in relation to what is absent, much like the hub of a
wheel is a hole which yet allows for its functioning (as a student of the
Tao, I know that this is no news to you!).

More importantly for one of the key ideas of his book is that those
constraints which bring about emergent processes are in their nature more
complex than the constituents of a process because the complexity of such
absential constraints is tied to their not being physical things: take away
the spokes and the tire and the hub just disappears.

Gary Furhman has done some interesting work as well in consideration of the
organizing power of constraints in his book, *Turning
Signs http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm
*, a work which I've highly
recommended in the past and have been recently re-reading parts of, esp.
it's penultimate Chapter 18, which Gary referred to recently in another
thread. (I should note that for both authors discussions of *constraint*
include but go beyond semeiotic science, although perhaps not beyond
semiosis itself.)

In the light of thinking about constraints, I especially liked this comment
in your message as to the complexity added in consideration of what you
termed "mutual constraints":

JA: There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.


I think that this is quite true, and that much more could be said regardomg
it. Fuhrman, referring to an earlier book by Deacon, *The Symbolic Species:
The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain*, gives an example of such
mutual constraints in this sniippet.

As *Deacon* (1997) points out, languages have adapted to human use. ‘The
brain has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most
of the adapting’ (122) in  Fuhrman, *Turning Signs*, Chapter 13.


Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint:
>
> • The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M.
>
> Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint:
>
> • The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z.
>
> So any way we choose to define a triadic relation
> we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint.
>
> In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation
> we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form:
>
> • L ⊆ O × S × I
>
> where:
> O is the set of all objects under discussion,
> S is the set of all signs under discussion, and
> I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion.
>
> The concepts of constraint, definition, determination,
> lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis
> in the idea that one set is a subset of another set.
>
> Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask:
>
> • What bearings do these types of global constraints
>   have on various local settings we might select?
>
> And conversely:
>
> • To what extent do various types of local constraints combine
>   to constrain or determine various types of global constraint?
>
> There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
> they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
> So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
> signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
> that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.
>
> Time for Tacos!
>
> Jon
>
> On 4/19/2017 3:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> Jon A, List,
>>
>> I'd written: "... it would seem that what may very well be needed,
>> then, is our unpacking the "triadic forms of constraint, determination,
>> and interaction that are not captured by S-R chains."
>>
>> I read through your links on 'determination' and, while interesting in
>> their own right, I didn't find anything that helped in this matter of
>> getting a better grasp of specifically "*triadic forms* of constraint,
>> determination, and interaction. . ."
>>
>> As  to what Peirce means by 'Object' in the context of semiosis, while I
>> think that his positing two Objects, the Immediate and the Dynamic, 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary,

Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint:

• The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M.

Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint:

• The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z.

So any way we choose to define a triadic relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint.

In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form:

• L ⊆ O × S × I

where:
O is the set of all objects under discussion,
S is the set of all signs under discussion, and
I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion.

The concepts of constraint, definition, determination,
lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis
in the idea that one set is a subset of another set.

Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask:

• What bearings do these types of global constraints
  have on various local settings we might select?

And conversely:

• To what extent do various types of local constraints combine
  to constrain or determine various types of global constraint?

There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.

Time for Tacos!

Jon

On 4/19/2017 3:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon A, List,

I'd written: "... it would seem that what may very well be needed,
then, is our unpacking the "triadic forms of constraint, determination,
and interaction that are not captured by S-R chains."

I read through your links on 'determination' and, while interesting in
their own right, I didn't find anything that helped in this matter of
getting a better grasp of specifically "*triadic forms* of constraint,
determination, and interaction. . ."

As  to what Peirce means by 'Object' in the context of semiosis, while I
think that his positing two Objects, the Immediate and the Dynamic, add a
necessary complexity to the notion of Object, that many, perhaps most
Peircean semioticians are clear enough on this, thus, for example,allowing
Dynamic Objects to be members of any of the three Universes of Experience..
However, how these Objects function in relation to the various forms of the
three Interpretants he also offers late in his career has probably not been
sufficiently clarified.

Best,

Gary Rr

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Gary, all ...

I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
resolved before any kind of communication could occur.

I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
Greek “pragma”.

At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
on the subject of determination, just in case.

Regards,

Jon

On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Jon A, List,

Jon A wrote:

People will continue to be confused about determination

so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.




I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
which does not capture triadic 'determination'.

So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
not captured by S-R chains."

Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that
certain
'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A, List,

I'd written: ". .it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is
our unpacking the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains."

I read through your links on 'determination' and, while interesting in
their own right, I didn't find anything that helped in this matter of
getting a better grasp of specifically "*triadic forms* of constraint,
determination, and interaction. . ."

As  to what Peirce means by 'Object' in the context of semiosis, while I
think that his positing two Objects, the Immediate and the Dynamic, add a
necessary complexity to the notion of Object, that many, perhaps most
Peircean semioticians are clear enough on this, thus, for example,allowing
Dynamic Objects to be members of any of the three Universes of Experience..
However, how these Objects function in relation to the various forms of the
three Interpretants he also offers late in his career has probably not been
sufficiently clarified.

Best,

Gary Rr

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Gary, all ...
>
> I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
> these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
> may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
> resolved before any kind of communication could occur.
>
> I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
> as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
> to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
> the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
> Greek “pragma”.
>
> At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
> with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
> on the subject of determination, just in case.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> Jon A, List,
>>
>> Jon A wrote:
>>
>> People will continue to be confused about determination
>>> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
>>> behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
>>> sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
>>> biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
>>> but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
>>> interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
>>> A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
>>> and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
>>> of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
>>> stripes, or pockets.
>>>
>>
>>
>> I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
>> argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
>> understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
>> which does not capture triadic 'determination'.
>>
>> So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
>> the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
>> not captured by S-R chains."
>>
>> Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
>> of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
>> concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
>> around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that
>> certain
>> 'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
>> important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
>> consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
>> some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
>> time, for reasons just noted.)
>>
>> This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
>> scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of
>> this
>> thread.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>> | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
>>> |
>>> | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
>>> |
>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
>>> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
>>>
>>> | The object of reasoning is to find out,
>>> | from the consideration of what we already know,
>>> | something else which we do not know.
>>> |
>>> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
>>>
>>> If the object of an investigation is
>>> to find out something we did not know
>>> then the clues and evidence discovered
>>> are the signs that determine that object.
>>>
>>> We've 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Jon Awbrey]

Three Threads, No Waiting ...

Peirce List -- The Object Of Reasoning Is To Find Out (TOORITFO)
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00260.html
GR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00263.html
EC:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00291.html

Peirce List -- Triadic Forms of Constraint, Determination, Interaction
GR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00263.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00306.html
JBD:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00309.html

Peirce List -- Definition and Determination
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00302.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00303.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00307.html

Because, you know, if you're gonna toss a sop to Cerberus,
You'd better toss three ...

Jeff, List,

There are many places where Peirce uses the word “object”
in the full “pragma”tic sense, so much so that it demands
a very selective attention not to remark on them.  I cited
a couple at the top of this discussion but perhaps the most
critical locution for the sake of pragmatism is stated here:

| Consider what effects that might conceivably
| have practical bearings you conceive the
| objects of your conception to have.  Then,
| your conception of those effects is the
| whole of your conception of the object.
|
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Regards,

Jon

On 4/19/2017 1:40 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

Jon A, List,

Peirce suggests that others have been confused by the way he talks about "objects" in the context of the 
theory of semiotics, and he tries to straighten matters out in a Dec. 14 1908 Letter to Lady Welby. He uses the word 
"object" in the sense of in which "obiectum" (objectum?) "was first made a substantive early 
in the XIIIth century" (Semiotics and Significs, 69).

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2017 10:05 AM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and 
interaction

Gary, all ...

I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
resolved before any kind of communication could occur.

I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
Greek “pragma”.

At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
on the subject of determination, just in case.

Regards,

Jon

On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon A, List,

Jon A wrote:


People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.



I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
which does not capture triadic 'determination'.

So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
not captured by S-R chains."

Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that certain
'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
time, for reasons just noted.)

This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of this
thread.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon A, List,

Peirce suggests that others have been confused by the way he talks about 
"objects" in the context of the theory of semiotics, and he tries to straighten 
matters out in a Dec. 14 1908 Letter to Lady Welby. He uses the word "object" 
in the sense of in which "obiectum" (objectum?) "was first made a substantive 
early in the XIIIth century" (Semiotics and Significs, 69).

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2017 10:05 AM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and 
interaction

Gary, all ...

I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
resolved before any kind of communication could occur.

I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
Greek “pragma”.

At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
on the subject of determination, just in case.

Regards,

Jon

On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
> Jon A, List,
>
> Jon A wrote:
>
>> People will continue to be confused about determination
>> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
>> behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
>> sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
>> biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
>> but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
>> interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
>> A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
>> and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
>> of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
>> stripes, or pockets.
>
>
> I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
> argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
> understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
> which does not capture triadic 'determination'.
>
> So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
> the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
> not captured by S-R chains."
>
> Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
> of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
> concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
> around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that certain
> 'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
> important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
> consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
> some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
> time, for reasons just noted.)
>
> This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
> scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of this
> thread.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
>> |
>> | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
>> |
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
>> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
>>
>> | The object of reasoning is to find out,
>> | from the consideration of what we already know,
>> | something else which we do not know.
>> |
>> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
>>
>> If the object of an investigation is
>> to find out something we did not know
>> then the clues and evidence discovered
>> are the signs that determine that object.
>>
>> We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
>> but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...
>>
>> People will continue to be confused about determination
>> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
>&g

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, all ...

I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
resolved before any kind of communication could occur.

I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
Greek “pragma”.

At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
on the subject of determination, just in case.

Regards,

Jon

On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon A, List,

Jon A wrote:


People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.



I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
which does not capture triadic 'determination'.

So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
not captured by S-R chains."

Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that certain
'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
time, for reasons just noted.)

This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of this
thread.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


| “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
|
| — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
|
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/

| The object of reasoning is to find out,
| from the consideration of what we already know,
| something else which we do not know.
|
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html

If the object of an investigation is
to find out something we did not know
then the clues and evidence discovered
are the signs that determine that object.

We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...

People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.

Regards,

Jon



--

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oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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