Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

James, Robert, List:

Thank you for the reference.  Unfortunately, I do not read French; is any
of the content from the book available in English, other than the 76 Sign
definitions quoted from Peirce?

I agree that he clearly believed that Sign taxonomies are to be derived by
applying the "rule of determination" to a series of trichotomies for any
number of correlates and relations, resulting in only 10 classes (rather
than 27) for three divisions, 28 classes (rather than 729) for six
divisions, and 66 classes (rather than 59,049) for ten divisions.  This is
why I acknowledge that my current proposal is not *Peirce's *Speculative
Grammar, but I still maintain that it is a *Peircean *Speculative Grammar;
for one thing, I retain five trichotomies that result in only 21 classes
(rather than 243).  As another alternative, Francesco Bellucci suggests at
the end of his recent book that Peirce may have ultimately leaned toward a
hierarchical (rather than linear) arrangement of the trichotomies, but does
not attempt to work out the details of how that might look.

As for the quote that you like, I find it helpful to situate it in its
original context.

CSP:  *What is a sign?* This is a question of no ordinary difficulty, to
which the answer must be sought by a well-considered method ... We all have
a ragged-outlined notion of what we call a sign. We wish to replace that by
a well-defined concept, which may exclude some things ordinarily called
signs, and will almost certainly include some things not ordinarily so
called. So that our new concept may have the highest utility for the
science of logic, which is the purpose of the investigation, the terms of
the definition must be strictly relevant to logic. As far as this condition
will allow, it is to express that which is most essential in the vulgar
notion of a sign or representamen ... Now it is rather desirable that our
sought concept should have a somewhat greater breadth than is strictly
necessary for our purpose, on the principle that the surroundings of
anything whatever aid to a comprehension of the surrounded object, and
certainly in case of doubt we should prefer to include what may be needless
rather than exclude anything needed. A too wide concept can do no harm
whatever, provided that a careful division of it be made.
 Let it be repeated that all the terms of the division must be strictly
relevant to logic, and that consequently all accidents of experience,
however universal, must be excluded. The result of this rule will
necessarily be that the new concept of a "sign" will be defined exclusively
by the forms of its logical relationships; and the utmost pains must be
taken to understand those relations in a purely formal, or, as we may say,
in a purely mathematical way. (EP 2:388-389; 1906)


Peirce went on to discuss at considerable length that a Sign is "a medium
of communication" and "a determination of a quasi-mind" (EP 2:389-392, cf.
EP 2:544n22)--functions that I associate respectively with a Replica
(embodiment) and an Instance (occurrence) of a Sign.  That is one reason
why my initial point of departure is treating *every *Sign in itself as a
Type that governs its Tokens--enduring Replicas (*possible *Signs) with
significant characters (Tones), and individual Instances (*actual *Signs)
that they facilitate--rather than *dividing *Signs into a trichotomy such
as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type or
Potisign/Actisign/Famisign.  Eliminating the two Object trichotomies
follows from this, since every Type is a Collective and a Copulative, every
Instance is a Concretive, there are no true Abstractives, and every Replica
of a Rheme is either a Designative or a Descriptive.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 8:27 AM, James Crombie  wrote:

> List,
>
> Just a reminder, for those of you who read French, of the existence of the
> following book by Robert Marty:
>
> *L'Algèbre des signes: Essai de sémiotique scientifique d'après C.S.
> Peirce.*
>
> John Benjamins, 1990 – giving a mathematical approach to Peirce’s theory
> of signs. Apparently Amazon has one copy left “with more on the way”:
>
> https://www.amazon.com/LAlg%C3%A8bre-signes-s%C3%A9miotique-scientifique-
> Foundations/dp/9027232962/ref=sr_1_1?s=books=UTF8=
> 1538140635=1-1=Robert+Marty+alg%C3%A8bre&
> dpID=41Wh2gVYRDL=_SY291_BO1,204,203,200_QL40_=srch
>
> Disclaimer: I have no financial ties to Amazon – but I have worked with
> Robert!!
>
> James Crombie
>
> Philosophie/Sciences humaines
>
> Université Sainte-Anne, Canada
>
>
>
> *De :* marty.rob...@neuf.fr 
> *Envoyé :* 28 septembre 2018 10:08
> *À :* Jon Alan Schmidt ; List <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Objet

RE: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[James Crombie]

List,
Just a reminder, for those of you who read French, of the existence of the 
following book by Robert Marty:
L'Algèbre des signes: Essai de sémiotique scientifique d'après C.S. Peirce.
John Benjamins, 1990 – giving a mathematical approach to Peirce’s theory of 
signs. Apparently Amazon has one copy left “with more on the way”:
https://www.amazon.com/LAlg%C3%A8bre-signes-s%C3%A9miotique-scientifique-Foundations/dp/9027232962/ref=sr_1_1?s=books=UTF8=1538140635=1-1=Robert+Marty+alg%C3%A8bre=41Wh2gVYRDL=_SY291_BO1,204,203,200_QL40_=srch
Disclaimer: I have no financial ties to Amazon – but I have worked with Robert!!
James Crombie
Philosophie/Sciences humaines
Université Sainte-Anne, Canada

De : marty.rob...@neuf.fr 
Envoyé : 28 septembre 2018 10:08
À : Jon Alan Schmidt ; List 
Objet : Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification

J‌on Alan, list,

To come back to the classification of the signs, I would like to point out that 
whatever the terms used to designate the components of the sign, whatever their 
number, we will ultimately obtain a sequence of indexed letters: one or two 
objects of first, following the sign and interpretants (1 at least then 3 up to 
7). Consequently, it is of little importance that definitions and Byzantine 
discussions can be made about them (they have lasted for decades and are 
recurrent). Consequently, it is of little importance that Byzantine definitions 
and discussions can be made about them (they have lasted for decades and are 
recurrent). Whatever the number of objects and interpretations selected there 
will be according to successive determinations and categorial assignments. That 
these are "modes of being" or "mode of apprehension" or "nature" or "purpose", 
they will be numbers 3 or 2 or 1 with the rules of logical presupposition that 
we know. Moreover, we can be absolutely certain that this was in the mind of 
Peirce, otherwise he could never have mentioned the 28 classes for the 6 
trichotomies or the 66 classes for the 10. There is no other ways to get them. 
I think that we cannot go beyond if we want to produce a scientific knowledge 
and which only the actual use for the concrete understanding of the meanings 
and the communication in social life has to allow the scientific community to 
choose.

That's why I like this quote : "The result of this rule will necessarily be 
that the new concept of a "sign" will be defined exclusively by the forms of 
its logical relationships; and the utmost pains must be taken to understant 
those relations in a purely formal, or, as we may say, in a purely mathematical 
way."
C.S. PEIRCE, MS 283 (v.1905)

Best regards,

Robert Marty

De : "Jon Alan Schmidt"
A : peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Envoyé: jeudi 27 septembre 2018 20:46
Objet : ***SPAM*** Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification

Mats, Jeff, List:

Thank you for this clarification.  I am sure that we would all welcome and 
benefit from more frequent participation in our List discussions by scholars 
such as yourself, Francesco, and Robert.

Peirce's comment about Immediate vs. Real Objects makes sense, because every 
Sign must at least purport to represent something in order to be a Sign at all. 
 The non-Reality of the Dynamic (or General?) Objects of some Signs would be 
known in the ultimate opinion, presumably as part of their Final Interpretants. 
 Such terms as "unicorn" and "phoenix" have Essential Breadth and Depth in 
accordance with their definitions, but no Substantial Breadth or Depth since 
there are no Real Objects that they denote or concrete Forms that they signify; 
just whatever is attributed to them by their fictional representations.

As for the Interpretants, although Peirce did seem to equate Immediate and 
Emotional in the second quote, he also said that "a piece of concerted music" 
only has an Emotional Interpretant.  He wrote more about the same example at 
roughly the same time, in two different drafts of "Pragmatism."

CSP:  The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by 
it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence 
that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of 
truth in this is frequently very slight. This "emotional interpretant," as I 
call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some 
cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, 
the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is 
intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist 
merely in a series of feelings. (CP 5.475; 1907)

CSP:  It is easy to see that there are three kinds of interpretants of signs. 
Our categories suggest this; and we have only to r

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[marty . robert]

J‌on Alan, list,

To come back to the classification of the signs, I would like to point out that 
whatever the terms used to designate the components of the sign, whatever their 
number, we will ultimately obtain a sequence of indexed letters: one or two 
objects of first, following the sign and interpretants (1 at least then 3 up to 
7). Consequently, it is of little importance that definitions and Byzantine 
discussions can be made about them (they have lasted for decades and are 
recurrent). Consequently, it is of little importance that Byzantine definitions 
and discussions can be made about them (they have lasted for decades and are 
recurrent). Whatever the number of objects and interpretations selected there 
will be according to successive determinations and categorial assignments. That 
these are "modes of being" or "mode of apprehension" or "nature" or "purpose", 
they will be numbers 3 or 2 or 1 with the rules of logical presupposition that 
we know. Moreover, we can be absolutely certain that this was in the mind of 
Peirce, otherwise he could never have mentioned the 28 classes for the 6 
trichotomies or the 66 classes for the 10. There is no other ways to get them. 
I think that we cannot go beyond if we want to produce a scientific knowledge 
and which only the actual use for the concrete understanding of the meanings 
and the communication in social life has to allow the scientific community to 
choose.

That's why I like this quote : "The result of this rule will necessarily be 
that the new concept of a "sign" will be defined exclusively by the forms of 
its logical relationships; and the utmost pains must be taken to understant 
those relations in a purely formal, or, as we may say, in a purely mathematical 
way."
C.S. PEIRCE, MS 283 (v.1905)

Best regards,

Robert Marty

De : "Jon 
Alan Schmidt"
A : peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Envoyé: jeudi 27 septembre 2018 20:46
Objet : ***SPAM*** Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification




Mats, Jeff, List:


Thank you for this clarification. I am sure that we would all 
welcome and benefit from more frequent participation in our List discussions by 
scholars such as yourself, Francesco, and Robert.



Peirce's comment about Immediate vs. Real Objects makes sense, because 
every Sign must at least purport to represent something in order to be 
a Sign at all. The non-Reality of the Dynamic (or General?) Objects of 
some Signs would be known in the ultimate opinion, presumably as part of their 
Final Interpretants. Such terms as "unicorn" and "phoenix" have Essential 
Breadth and Depth in accordance with their definitions, but no Substantial 
Breadth or Depth since there are no Real Objects that they denote or concrete Formsthat they signify; 
just whatever is attributed to them by their fictional representations.



As for the Interpretants, although Peirce did seem to equate Immediate and 
Emotional in the second quote, he also said that "a piece of concerted music" 
only has an Emotional Interpretant. Hewrote more about the 
same example at roughly the same time, in two different drafts of 
"Pragmatism."






CSP: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling 
produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as 
evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the 
foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight. This "emotional 
interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of 
recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that 
the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a 
sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but 
these usually consist merely in a series of feelings. (CP 5.475; 1907)







CSP: It is easy to see that there are three kinds of interpretants 
of signs. Our categories suggest this; and we have only to run over in our 
minds a sufficient variety of remembered signs, with a slight examination of 
each, to gain ample confirmation of the division. Namely, the interpretant may 
be a feeling. Thus, an air for a guitar, if considered as meant to convey the 
genuine or feigned musical emotions of its composer, can only fulfill this 
function by exciting responsive feelings in the listener. (EP 2:430; 1907)






I suggest that the mere "feeling of recognition" associated 
withany Replica of a Sign pertains to its Immediate 
Interpretant, its possible signification within the Sign System to 
which it belongs and with which the Interpreter must be acquainted; while the 
"series of feelings" beyond this that a musical performance "produces" 
as its "proper significate effect" is its Dynamic Interpretant, its 
actual signification to someone in a particular Instance

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

terpretants. I cannot recall another passage where Peirce would put
> matters in exactly these terms. It is of course always difficult to say how
> much weight one should place on a single letter; but in recent discussions
> concerning semiotic matters, much has also been made of provisional remarks
> and classifications found in Peirce’s notebooks.
>
>
>
> All best,
>
> Mats
>
>
>
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> *Sent:* 26 September 2018 20:13
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign
> classification
>
> List,
>
> Mats Bergman has written a review of Franceco's monograph.  Here is a link
> in case you are interested:  https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/peir
> ces-speculative-grammar-logic-as-semiotics/
>
> Towards the end of the review, Bergman makes the following points:
>
> The final developments of speculative grammar (discussed in chapter eight)
> constitute a colossal challenge for the interpreter. Peirce's semiotic
> grows rapidly, but these changes emerge mainly in unfinished manuscripts,
> experimental notebook entries, and fragmentary correspondence. Many
> scholars have become captivated by this potentially fertile but problematic
> phase -- and especially by the 66-class system that Peirce envisioned. In
> these notoriously perilous terrains, Bellucci adopts a cautious stance,
> stating that he is "not concerned with finishing what Peirce left
> unfinished" (p. 352). This seems like a sensible approach, but it is not
> always easy to sustain. As he documents minute changes in ideas and
> terminology, Bellucci faces the challenges involved in trying to put
> together a puzzle with many mismatched and missing pieces, and he ends up
> streamlining certain aspects of Peirce's semiotic. To some extent, this is
> inevitable; but there are instances where I believe that Bellucci does not
> sufficiently consider contradictory evidence. For example, he confidently
> asserts that only propositions and proposition-like signs have so-called
> "immediate objects" (p. 294) -- that is, objects that are in some sense
> internal to the representation afforded by the sign, in distinction from
> the "dynamical" aspect of the object. This contention is backed up by
> Peirce's tentative suggestion that signs can be classified as vague,
> singular, and general according to the mode of the immediate object -- a
> partition that bears more than passing resemblance to the traditional
> division of propositions according to quantity. However, the existence of
> such a lineage does not suffice to prove that Peirce would hold that terms
> or "rhemas" lack immediate objects. Whatever analytical merits Bellucci's
> reconstruction may possess, it is dubious from a strictly exegetical point
> of view. When Peirce directly addresses the matter at hand -- e.g. in a
> 1907 letter to Giovanni Vailati -- his position is that all signs
> necessarily have immediate objects, while some lack real dynamical objects.
>
> I'm not able to find the 1907 letter of Vailati online or in
> other sources. If anyone has a link or a copy they would be willing to
> share, I'd appreciate it.
>
> For my part, I find the question of how we might interpret what Peirce
> says about the immediate object to be of interest because of the light it
> might help to shed on the division between possibles, existents and
> necessitants that is guiding the classification of signs in the later works.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>

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RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[MB]

Jeff & list,

 

I happened to stumble across this when I checked the Peirce-list, which I do
intermittently although I do not generally participate in the discussions.
The “letter to Giovanni Vailati” was an embarrassing slip on my part, which
has not been corrected although I have requested the NDPR to do so. The 1907
letter (MS L327) was addressed to Giovanni Papini, not Giovanni Vailati. 

 

In the letter, Peirce states that just “as all signs necessarily have
Immediate Objects, but not all have Real Objects, so every sign has an
emotional interpretant; but a piece of concerted music, for example, has no
other”. He also asserts that “logicians distinguish the Immediate Object of
a sign from its Real Object. I look for an analogous distinction as to the
Interpretant; but I find there are not two, but three Interpretants; namely,
1st, the immediate, or as I call it, the emotional interpretant, involving
(at least) in every case a sense of comprehending the sign, as something
familiar in some sense; 2nd, the Existential Interpretant, or the actual
events which the sign, as sign, may bring about, by however indirect a
process; and 3rd, the Logical Interpretant, which is imperfectly represented
in the definition of the sign.” This is of interest because of the claim
that “emotional interpretant” and “immediate interpretant” are practically
synonyms as well as the evident limitation to three interpretants. I cannot
recall another passage where Peirce would put matters in exactly these
terms. It is of course always difficult to say how much weight one should
place on a single letter; but in recent discussions concerning semiotic
matters, much has also been made of provisional remarks and classifications
found in Peirce’s notebooks. 

 

All best,

Mats

 

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 26 September 2018 20:13
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign
classification

 

List,

 

Mats Bergman has written a review of Franceco's monograph.  Here is a link
in case you are interested:
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/peirces-speculative-grammar-logic-as-semiotics/

 

Towards the end of the review, Bergman makes the following points:  

 

The final developments of speculative grammar (discussed in chapter eight)
constitute a colossal challenge for the interpreter. Peirce's semiotic grows
rapidly, but these changes emerge mainly in unfinished manuscripts,
experimental notebook entries, and fragmentary correspondence. Many scholars
have become captivated by this potentially fertile but problematic phase --
and especially by the 66-class system that Peirce envisioned. In these
notoriously perilous terrains, Bellucci adopts a cautious stance, stating
that he is "not concerned with finishing what Peirce left unfinished" (p.
352). This seems like a sensible approach, but it is not always easy to
sustain. As he documents minute changes in ideas and terminology, Bellucci
faces the challenges involved in trying to put together a puzzle with many
mismatched and missing pieces, and he ends up streamlining certain aspects
of Peirce's semiotic. To some extent, this is inevitable; but there are
instances where I believe that Bellucci does not sufficiently consider
contradictory evidence. For example, he confidently asserts that only
propositions and proposition-like signs have so-called "immediate objects"
(p. 294) -- that is, objects that are in some sense internal to the
representation afforded by the sign, in distinction from the "dynamical"
aspect of the object. This contention is backed up by Peirce's tentative
suggestion that signs can be classified as vague, singular, and general
according to the mode of the immediate object -- a partition that bears more
than passing resemblance to the traditional division of propositions
according to quantity. However, the existence of such a lineage does not
suffice to prove that Peirce would hold that terms or "rhemas" lack
immediate objects. Whatever analytical merits Bellucci's reconstruction may
possess, it is dubious from a strictly exegetical point of view. When Peirce
directly addresses the matter at hand -- e.g. in a 1907 letter to Giovanni
Vailati -- his position is that all signs necessarily have immediate
objects, while some lack real dynamical objects.

 

I'm not able to find the 1907 letter of Vailati online or in other sources.
If anyone has a link or a copy they would be willing to share, I'd
appreciate it.

 

For my part, I find the question of how we might interpret what Peirce says
about the immediate object to be of interest because of the light it might
help to shed on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants
that is guiding the classification of signs in the later works.

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

 

  _  

From: Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com&g

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

List,


Mats Bergman has written a review of Franceco's monograph.  Here is a link in 
case you are interested:  
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/peirces-speculative-grammar-logic-as-semiotics/


Towards the end of the review, Bergman makes the following points:


The final developments of speculative grammar (discussed in chapter eight) 
constitute a colossal challenge for the interpreter. Peirce's semiotic grows 
rapidly, but these changes emerge mainly in unfinished manuscripts, 
experimental notebook entries, and fragmentary correspondence. Many scholars 
have become captivated by this potentially fertile but problematic phase -- and 
especially by the 66-class system that Peirce envisioned. In these notoriously 
perilous terrains, Bellucci adopts a cautious stance, stating that he is "not 
concerned with finishing what Peirce left unfinished" (p. 352). This seems like 
a sensible approach, but it is not always easy to sustain. As he documents 
minute changes in ideas and terminology, Bellucci faces the challenges involved 
in trying to put together a puzzle with many mismatched and missing pieces, and 
he ends up streamlining certain aspects of Peirce's semiotic. To some extent, 
this is inevitable; but there are instances where I believe that Bellucci does 
not sufficiently consider contradictory evidence. For example, he confidently 
asserts that only propositions and proposition-like signs have so-called 
"immediate objects" (p. 294) -- that is, objects that are in some sense 
internal to the representation afforded by the sign, in distinction from the 
"dynamical" aspect of the object. This contention is backed up by Peirce's 
tentative suggestion that signs can be classified as vague, singular, and 
general according to the mode of the immediate object -- a partition that bears 
more than passing resemblance to the traditional division of propositions 
according to quantity. However, the existence of such a lineage does not 
suffice to prove that Peirce would hold that terms or "rhemas" lack immediate 
objects. Whatever analytical merits Bellucci's reconstruction may possess, it 
is dubious from a strictly exegetical point of view. When Peirce directly 
addresses the matter at hand -- e.g. in a 1907 letter to Giovanni Vailati -- 
his position is that all signs necessarily have immediate objects, while some 
lack real dynamical objects.


I'm not able to find the 1907 letter of Vailati online or in other sources. If 
anyone has a link or a copy they would be willing to share, I'd appreciate it.


For my part, I find the question of how we might interpret what Peirce says 
about the immediate object to be of interest because of the light it might help 
to shed on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants that is 
guiding the classification of signs in the later works.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2018 10:56 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification

Jeff, Robert, Jon S, Francesco, List,

Jeff,

This is very helpful, perhaps especially this quotation:

In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional 
interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, 
too, pertain to all signs without exception. The real object and energetic 
interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things. But to our 
surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not correspond with any 
kind of object. This defect of correspondence between object and interpretant 
must be rooted in the essential difference there is between the nature of an 
object and that of an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes 
while the latter succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a 
relatively future tense (Boldface added GR).

I currently happen to be rereading a short article on the perennially disputed 
topic of the relationship of the 1906 interpretant trichotomy and that of 1909  
by Brendan Lalor ( Semiotica 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997) available here: 
http://thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-interpretants/

Abstract. After characterizing the role of the interpretant in semiosis, I 
consider two passages in which Peirce makes a threefold division of 
interpretants, one from 1906, one from 1909. Then I suggest that Thomas Short 
and others are wrong in holding that in the two passages, Peirce put forward 
two completely separate trichotomies. Instead, I argue that the 1906 trichotomy 
is in fact a special case of that put forward by Peirce in the 1909 passage, 
not a separate trichotomy. I then explain more specifically how we ought to 
conceive the relationship between these two classifications.

As we know, Peirce's 1906 trichotomy is into the emo

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Jeff, List:

I am familiar with the debate between Lalor and Short, and have always
found the latter more persuasive.  For one thing, I find it misleading to
imply that Peirce employed Emotional/Energetic/Logical earlier (not 1906
but 1907, in "Pragmatism") and Immediate/Dynamic/Final later (1909).
Already in 1904, in the same letter to Lady Welby in which he first
introduced the whole notion of two Objects and three Interpretants, he
labeled the latter as Immediate/Dynamic/Signified--"its interpretant as
represented or meant to be understood, its interpretant as it is produced,
and its interpretant in itself" (CP 8.333).

Peirce's initial division of Signs according to the Immediate Interpretant
was into "1st, those which are interpretable in thoughts or other signs of
the same kind in infinite series, 2nd, those which are interpretable in
actual experiences, 3rd, those which are interpretable in qualities of
feelings or appearances" (CP 8.339).  Although reversing the usual
sequence, these seem to align quite clearly with what he later called the
Logical, Energetic, and Emotional Interpretants, respectively.  Then in
1906 ("Prologomena"), he characterized the (Dynamic) Interpretant as "that
which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by
determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign" (CP
4.536).  By 1908, this division had become Sympathetic/Percussive/Usual,
while the one for the Immediate Interpretant was ("with great hesitation")
Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative (EP 2:489-490).

Presumably that is why David Savan and others associated
Emotional/Energetic/Logical with *only* (or at least *primarily*) the
Dynamic Interpretant, which is how I lean myself.  Another reason is the
fact that Peirce referred to each member of that 1907 trichotomy as the
"proper significate effect of a sign" (CP 5.475) and "something which the
sign in its significant function essentially determines in its interpreter"
(EP 2:409); i.e., the Sign's *actual* effect, which is precisely the *Dynamic
*Interpretant.  I therefore suggest that all Instances of Signs produce *at
least* Feelings as their Dynamic Interpretants, while some (Indices and
Symbols) *also* produce Exertions, and some of those (Symbols) *also *produce
*other *Instances of Signs.  Each of these kinds of outcomes is amenable to
the self-controlled cultivation of Interpretative Habits, and thus
corresponds to a Normative Science--Esthetics, Ethics, and Logic as
Semeiotic, respectively.

This brings up something that has bothered me for quite some time, and
probably contributed to my thought process in developing an alternative
framework.  The three Universes for each trichotomy in Peirce's 1908
taxonomy are Possible/Existent/Necessitant, but those labels seem to apply
to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final Interpretants *themselves* as how the Sign
may/does/would affect an interpreting Quasi-mind, rather than how Signs are
divided according to them.  Transferring the same principle to the Object
results in exactly what I am proposing.

   - The *Immediate *Object and *Immediate *Interpretant are the
*possible *denotation
   and signification of any *Replica* of the Sign within a particular Sign
   System.
   - The *Dynamic *Object and *Dynamic *Interpretant are the *actual
*denotation
   and signification of an individual *Instance* of the Sign that occurs at
   a single place and time.
   - The *General *Object and *Final *Interpretant are the *necessary
*denotation
   and signification of the Sign *itself *in the ultimate opinion.

Perhaps I should replace "General Object" with "Final Object" to make the
parallelism complete.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jeff, Robert, Jon S, Francesco, List,
>
> Jeff,
>
> This is very helpful, perhaps especially this quotation:
>
> *In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional
> interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective";
> both, too, pertain to all signs without exception.* The real object and
> energetic interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things.
> But to our surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not
> correspond with any kind of object. This defect of correspondence between
> object and interpretant must be rooted in the essential difference there is
> between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant; which
> difference is that former antecedes while the latter succeeds. The logical
> interpretant must, therefore, be in a relatively future tense (Boldface
> added GR).
>
>
> I currently happen to be rereading a short article on the perennially
> disputed topic of the relationship of the 1906 interpretant trichotomy and
> that of 1909  by Brendan Lalor ( *Semiotica* 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997)
> 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

If a sign is amorphous as I feel most are, in other words without a
definite and clear and discernable objective, then it is hit or miss
whether a clear connection or influence can be discerned. It seems to me
that mystery lies at the heart of the semiotic process because of the
nature of our minds. We guess at words and go from there but the words may
have no real connection to whatever the sign may have been. In this sense I
have always assumed that there was a process in firstness by which signs
morphed into words or explicit images or formulae and became the basis for
consideration via a triadic encounter with index and then symbol.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Francesco, Jon S., Robert, List,
>
>
> The list Robert has compiled contains an entry that bears on the question
> of how we might understand the character of the immediate object. The entry
> the 40th in the list, and it is from *MS 318, Pragmatism (1907).*
>
>
> I am now prepared to risk an attempt at defining a sign, --since in
> scientific inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds:  nothing
> hazard, nothing gain. I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever
> mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since
> it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and
> determining the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to
> cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation
> of this "sign".
>
>
> The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the
> sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Moreover,
> the sign being defined in terms of these correlative correlates, it is
> confidently to be expected that object and interpretant should precisely
> correspond, each to the other. In point of fact, we do find that the
> immediate object and emotional interpretant correspond, both being
> apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, too, pertain to all signs without
> exception. The real object and energetic interpretant also correspond, both
> being real facts or things. But to our surprise, we find that the logical
> interpretant does not correspond with any kind of object. This defect of
> correspondence between object and interpretant must be rooted in the
> essential difference there is between the nature of an object and that of
> an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes while the latter
> succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a relatively
> future tense.
>
> The relevant passage is the one where he says of the immediate object and
> the emotional interpretant that "both, too, pertain to all signs without
> exception." This seems to suggest that any sign that involves the
> apprehension of an object does so in virtue of its having a relation to
> an immediate object. While some external signs may not, at some point in
> time, be apprehended by an interpreter, all are capable of being so
> apprehended. This suggests that all signs have an immediate object--at
> least as a possible sort of thing--even if the object is not actually
> apprehended at some given time. When the sign of any type is interpreted *in
> **actu*, it will come to be apprehended in this way--and the immediate
> object appears to be essential for the interpretation of every sign.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> ----------
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Monday, September 24, 2018 11:13:58 AM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign
> classification
>
> Robert, List:
>
> How can our understanding of the different correlates be "superfluous" to
> the classification of Signs accordingly?  For one thing, the
> internal/external distinction helps explain why there are additional
> trichotomies for the (external) relations between the Sign and the Dynamic
> Object/Interpretant, but not the (internal) relations between the Sign and
> the Immediate Object/Interpretant.  Again, why did Peirce divide Signs
> according to the Mode of *Presentation *of the *internal *correlates vs.
> the Mode of *Being * of the *external* correlates, if he did not consider 
> *both
> *of these distinctions to be noteworthy and perhaps connected?
>
> I have come across your "76 Definitions" in the past, but have not
> reviewed it recently.  I agree that many of the editorial choices for CP
> were unfortunate, and wish that the Peirce Edition Project 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Francesco, Jon S., Robert, List,


The list Robert has compiled contains an entry that bears on the question of 
how we might understand the character of the immediate object. The entry the 
40th in the list, and it is from MS 318, Pragmatism (1907).


I am now prepared to risk an attempt at defining a sign, --since in scientific 
inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds:  nothing hazard, nothing 
gain. I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by 
the object relatively to the interpretant, and determining the interpretant in 
reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign".


The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; 
the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Moreover, the sign 
being defined in terms of these correlative correlates, it is confidently to be 
expected that object and interpretant should precisely correspond, each to the 
other. In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional 
interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, 
too, pertain to all signs without exception. The real object and energetic 
interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things. But to our 
surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not correspond with any 
kind of object. This defect of correspondence between object and interpretant 
must be rooted in the essential difference there is between the nature of an 
object and that of an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes 
while the latter succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a 
relatively future tense.


The relevant passage is the one where he says of the immediate object and the 
emotional interpretant that "both, too, pertain to all signs without 
exception." This seems to suggest that any sign that involves the apprehension 
of an object does so in virtue of its having a relation to an immediate object. 
While some external signs may not, at some point in time, be apprehended by an 
interpreter, all are capable of being so apprehended. This suggests that all 
signs have an immediate object--at least as a possible sort of thing--even if 
the object is not actually apprehended at some given time. When the sign of any 
type is interpreted in actu, it will come to be apprehended in this way--and 
the immediate object appears to be essential for the interpretation of every 
sign.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2018 11:13:58 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification

Robert, List:

How can our understanding of the different correlates be "superfluous" to the 
classification of Signs accordingly?  For one thing, the internal/external 
distinction helps explain why there are additional trichotomies for the 
(external) relations between the Sign and the Dynamic Object/Interpretant, but 
not the (internal) relations between the Sign and the Immediate 
Object/Interpretant.  Again, why did Peirce divide Signs according to the Mode 
of Presentation of the internal correlates vs. the Mode of Being of the 
external correlates, if he did not consider both of these distinctions to be 
noteworthy and perhaps connected?

I have come across your "76 Definitions" in the past, but have not reviewed it 
recently.  I agree that many of the editorial choices for CP were unfortunate, 
and wish that the Peirce Edition Project had made much better progress to date 
at publishing the Writings in chronological order.  As for your animation, it 
reflects the notion of infinite semiosis, although it only proceeds forward 
rather than also reaching backward.  My understanding of Peirce's late view is 
that he came to recognize the termination of semiosis upon the production of a 
feeling or effort as the Dynamic Interpretant, rather than another Sign, or a 
habit or habit-change as the ultimate Logical Interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 5:51 AM, 
mailto:marty.rob...@neuf.fr>> wrote:
‌
Would you agree that these internal vs. external distinctions (which I readily 
admit) are superfluous with regard to the classification of signs? It is a 
necessary condition to continue the debate, it seems to me ...
In addition, do you know my thesaurus

‌http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsource

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

How can our understanding of the different correlates be "superfluous" to
the classification of Signs accordingly?  For one thing, the
internal/external distinction helps explain why there are additional
trichotomies for the (external) relations between the Sign and the Dynamic
Object/Interpretant, but not the (internal) relations between the Sign and
the Immediate Object/Interpretant.  Again, why did Peirce divide Signs
according to the Mode of *Presentation *of the *internal *correlates vs.
the Mode of *Being *of the *external* correlates, if he did not consider *both
*of these distinctions to be noteworthy and perhaps connected?

I have come across your "76 Definitions" in the past, but have not reviewed
it recently.  I agree that many of the editorial choices for CP were
unfortunate, and wish that the Peirce Edition Project had made much better
progress to date at publishing the Writings in chronological order.  As for
your animation, it reflects the notion of infinite semiosis, although it
only proceeds forward rather than also reaching backward.  My understanding
of Peirce's late view is that he came to recognize the *termination *of
semiosis upon the production of a *feeling *or *effort *as the Dynamic
Interpretant, rather than another Sign, or a *habit *or *habit-change* as
the ultimate Logical Interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 5:51 AM,  wrote:

> ‌
> Would you agree that these internal vs. external distinctions (which I
> readily admit) are superfluous with regard to the classification of signs?
> It is a necessary condition to continue the debate, it seems to me ...
> In addition, do you know my thesaurus
>
> ‌http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM  ?
> 
>
> Having made this work (which seemed to me absolutely necessary to avoid
> the bias of the arbitrary choices made by the editors of the CP , with in
> addition an anarchic chronological dispersion of the items) I am engaged me
> in a kind of linear regression by the method of the least squares,  a good
> metaphor for me to describe one "method of the least gaps with the thinking
> of the master". I made an animated gif which expresses my choices
> globally ... it dynamically represents semiosis with successive triads ad
> infinitum ; it can be complicated by introducing the 2 objects and the 3
> interpretants :
>
>  http://semiotiquedure.online/images/sch038.gif
>
>
>
> *do you think it is compatible with your own choices? Best Regards, Robert
> Marty*
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[marty . robert]

‌‌


Would you agree that these internal vs. 
external distinctions (which I readily admit) are superfluous with regard to 
the classification of signs? It is a necessary condition to continue the 
debate, it seems to me ...

In addition, do you know my thesaurus 

‌http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM;>http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM;
 ?

Having made this work (which seemed to me absolutely necessary to avoid the 
bias of the arbitrary choices made by the editors of the CP , with in addition 
an anarchic chronological dispersion of the items) I am engaged me in a kind of 
linear regression by the method of the least squares, a good metaphor for 
me to describe one "method of the least gaps with the thinking of the 
master".I made an animated gif

which expresses my choices globally ... 
it dynamically represents semiosis with successive triads ad infinitum ; it can 
be complicated by introducing the 2 objects and the 3 
interpretants:

http://semiotiquedure.online/images/sch038.gif

do you think it 
is compatible with your own choices?

Best Regards,
Robert Marty

De : "Jon 
Alan Schmidt"
A : peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Envoyé: dimanche 23 septembre 2018 22:36
Objet : ***SPAM*** Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification






Robert, List:


All of the trichotomies are divisions into the Universes of 
Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants. I only distinguish "Mode of 
Presentation" from "Mode of Being" because Peirce clearly did so.








CSP: The ten respects according to which the chief divisions of 
signs are determined are as follows: first, according to the Mode of 
Apprehension of the Sign itself; second, according to the Mode of Presentation 
of the Immediate Object; third, according to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical 
Object, fourth, according to the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object, 
fifth, according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant, 
sixth, according to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Interpretant, seventh, 
according to the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant, eighth, 
according to the Nature of the Normal Interpretant, ninth, according to the 
Relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant, tenth, according to the 
Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal 
Interpretant ...

A Sign is necessarily in itself present to the Mind of its Interpreter. 
Now there are three entirely different ways in which Objects are present to 
minds ... (CP 8.344-346, EP 2:482-483; 1908)








The Sign itself is divided according to its "Mode of Apprehension" or 
"Modes of possible Presentation"; and the Immediate Object and Interpretant, 
which are internal to the Sign, are both divided according to their 
"Mode of Presentation"; while the Dynamic Object and Interpretant, which are 
external to the Sign, are divided according to their "Mode of 
Being." If a "Mode of Presentation" is no different from a "Mode of 
Being," why did Peirce use two different terms? And why was he consistent 
about applying one to the internal correlates and the other to the 
external correlates? Surely this is not coincidental.



On the other hand, as we recently discussed on the List, Peirce's 
architectonic requires that within the Normative Science of Logic as 
Semeiotic,"Mode of Being" must be 
understoodPhaneroscopically, rather 
thanMetaphysically. In other words, both "Mode of 
Presentation" and "Mode of Being" must have something to do with how the 
correlatesappearto the mind, not with how they really 
are, since Normative Science does not yet address the Reality of 
any phenomena. At most, we are performing a kind of hypostatic 
abstraction when we use metaphysical terminology to discuss logical 
concepts.












CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; 
still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to 
express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind 
ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as 
"humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in 
the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)












Regards,







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt; 
target="_blank">www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt; 
target="_blank">twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







On Sun, Sep 23, 2018 at 2:04 PM, marty.robert mailto:marty.rob...@neuf.fr; 
target="_blank">marty.rob...@neuf.fr wrote:

J‌on Alan, 
list

Just a question before a general critic ... You distinguish "mode of 
presentation" and "mode 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

All of the trichotomies are divisions into the *Universes *of Possibles,
Existents, and Necessitants.  I only distinguish "Mode of Presentation"
from "Mode of Being" because *Peirce *clearly did so.

CSP:  The ten respects according to which the chief divisions of signs are
determined are as follows: first, according to the Mode of Apprehension of
the Sign itself; second, according to the Mode of Presentation of the
Immediate Object; third, according to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical
Object, fourth, according to the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical
Object, fifth, according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate
Interpretant, sixth, according to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical
Interpretant, seventh, according to the Relation of the Sign to the
Dynamical Interpretant, eighth, according to the Nature of the Normal
Interpretant, ninth, according to the Relation of the Sign to the Normal
Interpretant, tenth, according to the Triadic Relation of the Sign to the
Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant ...
A Sign is necessarily in itself present to the Mind of its Interpreter. Now
there are three entirely different ways in which Objects are present to
minds ... (CP 8.344-346, EP 2:482-483; 1908)


The Sign itself is divided according to its "Mode of Apprehension" or
"Modes of possible Presentation"; and the Immediate Object and
Interpretant, which are *internal *to the Sign, are both divided according
to their "Mode of Presentation"; while the Dynamic Object and Interpretant,
which are *external *to the Sign, are divided according to their "Mode of
Being."  If a "Mode of Presentation" is no different from a "Mode of
Being," why did Peirce use two different terms?  And why was he consistent
about applying one to the *internal *correlates and the other to the *external
*correlates?  Surely this is not coincidental.

On the other hand, as we recently discussed on the List, Peirce's
architectonic requires that within the Normative Science of Logic as
Semeiotic, "Mode of Being" must be understood *Phaneroscopically*, rather
than *Metaphysically*.  In other words, both "Mode of Presentation" and
"Mode of Being" must have something to do with how the correlates *appear* to
the mind, not with how they *really are*, since Normative Science does not
yet address the *Reality *of any phenomena.  At most, we are performing a
kind of hypostatic abstraction when we use metaphysical terminology to
discuss logical concepts.

CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still
less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to
express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind
ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such
as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were
substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Sep 23, 2018 at 2:04 PM, marty.robert  wrote:

> J‌on Alan, list
>
> Just a question before a general critic ... You distinguish "mode of
> presentation" and "mode of being "... "mode of presentation" appears only 3
> times in the totality of the CP, in 8.344 only ... I am confident that you
> have read 8.345 :
> *"**345. The ten divisions appear to me to be all Trichotomies; but it is
> possible that some of them are not properly so. Of these Ten Trichotomies,
> I have a clear apprehension of some, (which I mark {d} for {délos}), an
> unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others (which I mark {a} for
> {adélos}), and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others
> (which I mark {m} for {metrios}, {s} for {schedon}, almost clear, {ch} for
> {chalepös} hardly better than {a})."*
> and you read also : "
>
>
> *Peirce: CP 8.347 : Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of
> possible Presentation, are divisible (Σ) into : A. Potisigns, or Objects
> which are signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be
> positively possible; as, for example, the seventh ray that passes through
> the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's hexagram. B.
> Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hic et nunc; suchs any
> single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of
> a single page of a single copy of a book. There may be repetition of the
> whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other
> occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten
> thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy. C. Famisigns, familiar signs,
> which must be General, as General signs must be familiar or composed of
> Familiar signs. (I speak of signs which are "general," not in the sense of
> signifying Generals, but as being themselves general; just as Charlemagne
> is general, in that it occurs many times 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[marty.robert]

J‌on Alan, 
list

Just a question before a general critic ... You distinguish "mode of 
presentation" and "mode of being "... "mode of presentation" appears only 3 
times in the totality of the CP, in 8.344 only ... I am confident that you have 
read 8.345 :
"345. 
The ten divisions appear to me to be all Trichotomies; but it is possible that 
some of them are not properly so. Of these Ten Trichotomies, I havea 
clear apprehension of some, (which I mark {d} for {délos}), an unsatisfactory 
and doubtful notion of others (which I mark {a} for {adélos}), and a tolerable 
butnot thoroughly tried conception of others (which I mark {m} for 
{metrios}, {s} for {schedon}, almost clear, {ch} for {chalepös} hardly better 
than {a})."
and you read also : "Peirce: CP 8.347 :Consequently, Signs, in 
respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible 
(Σ) into :
A. Potisigns, or Objects which are signs so far as they are 
merely possible, but felt to be positively possible; as, for example, the 
seventh ray that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of 
Pascal's hexagram.
B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hic et 
nunc; suchs any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single 
paragraph of asingle page of a single copy of a book. There may be 
repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But 
that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition 
of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy.
C. Famisigns, familiar signs, which must be General, as 
General signs must be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (I speak of signs 
which are "general," not in the sense of signifying Generals, but as being 
themselves general; just as Charlemagne is general, in that it occurs many 
times with one and the same denotation.)"

If a mode of presentation is not a mode of being how come that A, B, C are 
clearly categorial divisions according modes of being ? We have an usual 
trichotomy ... How come ?

Regards,

Robert Marty
Professeur Honoraire, PhD Mathematics, PhD Humanities, Free Thinker
De : "Jon 
Alan Schmidt"
A : peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Envoyé: samedi 22 septembre 2018 23:42
Objet : ***SPAM*** Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification





Robert, List:


Thanks for your comments, and for joining the List discussion.






RM:Od-Oi-S--Ii--Id-If






I disagree. The Destinate Interpretant is what the Sign is 
destined to signify at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite 
community; i.e., the Final Interpretant. The Explicit 
Interpretant is what a Replica of the Sign explicitly signifies within 
a particular Sign System; i.e., the Immediate Interpretant. 
Hence the logical order of determination is 
Od--Oi--S--If--Id--Ii.








RM:Where is the immediate object?








The Immediate Object is what a Replica of the Sign could denote 
within a particular Sign System to someone who knew only its definitions; i.e., 
possessing no Collateral Experience.










RM:Nevertheless, according to the relationships between the 
classes of hexadic signs I can answer that if the mode of being of Od is 
Thirdness (is the case of "freedom") then the mode of being of Oi is Thirdness 
or Secondness or Firstness.










This is indeed Peirce's late taxonomy, except that he divided Signs 
according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object, not its 
Mode of Being. In any case, I have proposed for consideration a 
different framework in which all Signs are Types, and therefore all 
Signs have General Objects.



As a Type, the Sign itself is in a genuine triadic 
relation with the General Object and Final Interpretant--what it 
necessarily would denote and signify to a Quasi-mind in the state of 
Substantial Knowledge; i.e., complete omniscience and 
thusinfallible Interpretative Habits. Each Instance 
of the Sign (single occurrence) is in a degenerate triadic 
relation with an individual Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant--what it 
actually does denote and signify to a Quasi-mind in the state of 
Informed Knowledge; i.e., finite Collateral Experience and 
thusfallible Interpretative Habits. Each Replica 
of the Sign (enduring embodiment) is in a doubly degenerate 
triadic relation with an Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant--what it 
possibly could denote and signify to a Quasi-mind in the state of 
Essential Knowledge; i.e., mere Sign System Acquaintance and 
thusminimal Interpretative Habits.



Regards,







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt; 
target="_blank">www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt; 
target="_blank">twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 9:59 AM, mailto:ma

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Thanks for your comments, and for joining the List discussion.

RM:  Od->Oi->S-->Ii-->Id->If


I disagree.  The Destinate Interpretant is what the Sign is *destined *to
signify at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e.,
the *Final
*Interpretant.  The Explicit Interpretant is what a Replica of the
Sign *explicitly
*signifies within a particular Sign System; i.e., the *Immediate
*Interpretant.
Hence the logical order of determination is Od-->Oi-->S-->If-->Id-->Ii.

RM:  Where is the immediate object?


The Immediate Object is what a Replica of the Sign *could *denote within a
particular Sign System to someone who knew only its definitions; i.e.,
possessing no Collateral Experience.

RM:  Nevertheless, according to the relationships between the classes of
hexadic signs I can answer that if the mode of being of Od is Thirdness (is
the case of "freedom") then the mode of being of Oi is Thirdness or
Secondness or Firstness.


This is indeed Peirce's late taxonomy, except that he divided Signs
according to the Mode of *Presentation *of the Immediate Object, not its
Mode of *Being*.  In any case, I have proposed for consideration a *different
*framework in which all Signs are Types, and therefore all Signs have
General Objects.

As a Type, the Sign *itself *is in a *genuine *triadic relation with the
General Object and Final Interpretant--what it *necessarily would* denote
and signify to a Quasi-mind in the state of *Substantial *Knowledge; i.e.,
complete omniscience and thus *infallible *Interpretative Habits.
Each *Instance
*of the Sign (single occurrence) is in a *degenerate *triadic relation with
an individual Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant--what it *actually
does* denote and signify to a Quasi-mind in the state of *Informed *Knowledge;
i.e., finite Collateral Experience and thus *fallible *Interpretative
Habits.  Each *Replica *of the Sign (enduring embodiment) is in a *doubly
degenerate* triadic relation with an Immediate Object and Immediate
Interpretant--what it *possibly could* denote and signify to a Quasi-mind
in the state of *Essential *Knowledge; i.e., mere Sign System Acquaintance
and thus *minimal *Interpretative Habits.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 9:59 AM,  wrote:

> Jon Alan, list
>
> JAS : " How might we restate this in accordance with Peirce's later
> terminology of multiple Objects and Interpretants? "
>
> RM : It is not only a new terminology but mostly another extended
> definition of the sign with 6 constituents (that I named hexadic sign). The
> definition by Peirce is included here :
>
> *"It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it
> is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
> Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since
> the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines
> the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant which
> determines the Effective Interpretant which determines
> the Explicit Interpretant the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729
> classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield 28
> classes ..." (Letter to Lady Welby, December 23, 1908) You obtains the
> correspondant lattice (typing 6 in the box) at this URL :  *
> http://patrick-benazet.chez-alice.fr/lattices/
>
> My transcription *: *Od->Oi->S-->Ii-->Id->If  (I dont
> debate here on the denominations, If is the classical final interpretant) ,
> the arrow are logical presuppositions (according to the Frege's criterion
> implicitly verified by the first sentence of the quote)
>
> JAS : "According to the quote, you write a *Replica*, which is
> interpreted as a *Sign *of "an instance of that concept," which is its
> *Object*.  More specifically, I suggest (tentatively) that this is the
> individual *Dynamic *Object--the instance of the concept that you, as the
> Utterer, have in mind upon writing the Replica--while the concept itself,
> as the collection or continuum of all such instances, is the *General*
>  Object."
>
> RM : Where is the immediate object ? Remember : *"**In point of fact, we
> do find that the immediate object and emotional interpretant correspond,
> both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, too, pertain to all
> signs without exception. The real object and energetic interpretant also
> correspond, both being real facts or things. But to our surprise, we find
> that the logical interpretant does not correspond with any kind of object.
> This defect of correspondance between object and interpretant must be
> rooted in the essential difference there is between the nature of an object
> and that of an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes
> while the latter succeeds. The logical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[John F Sowa]

On 9/22/2018 10:59 AM, marty.rob...@neuf.fr wrote:

/It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible,
it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but 
a Necessitant./  


Thank you for that reminder (EP 2.481).  In an earlier note on
another topic, I discussed Peirce's three universes:  possibilities,
actualities, and necessities.  That note would have been clearer if
I had remembered to cite EP 2.481, but I forgot.

Although it's slightly off-topic for this note, I'll present a
revised explanation of an issue that is central to Peirce's thought:

 1. Pure mathematics is the theory of all possibilities.  Every
possibility is a pattern that can be represented by a diagram.

 2. Since a necessitant can only be determined by a necessitant,
Every mathematical theorem must begin with a statement that is
necessarily true.

 3. In Peirce's existential graphs, truth is represented by a
blank Sheet of Assertion.  Every theorem of pure mathematics
begins with the same two steps:  (1) By the rule of double
negation, draw a nest of two ovals around a blank area on SA.
(2) by the rule of inserting anything into a negative area,
insert the hypothesis (a possibility represented by a diagram)
into the outer oval (the if-area).

 4. By the EG rules of inference, iterate the hypothesis or parts
of it, as needed, into the inner oval (the then-area). Continue
with other EG rules until the inner oval contains the conclusion.

This shows that every necessitant is a theorem of pure mathematics
that has been derived from another necessitant (a blank SA).  But
the content of that necessitant includes hypothetical diagrams.

Therefore, pure mathematics is the theory of all possibilities
and necessities.  All other sciences (including common sense)
apply diagrams of pure mathematics (pure possibilities) to the
observed patterns (actualities) in their subject matter.

For many practical applications, no pure mathematician had ever
thought about the kinds of diagrams that occur in that subject.
Therefore, scientists and engineers in every field are often
required to do the work of mathematicians in discovering novel
kinds of patterns.

Albert Einstein, for example, had an excellent visual imagination,
which enabled him to invent his famous Gedanken experiments.  But
some say that his first wife Mileva was a better mathematician,
and she helped him with the details of the theories.  Minkowski
later reinterpreted Einstein's diagrams as abstract 4-D patterns,
which Einstein applied for the general theory of relativity.

In summary, observed patterns of actualities are often the
inspiration.  Then imagination elaborates the actual patterns
into a series of abstract possibilities.  Pure mathematics
proves theorems about them, and applied mathematics uses those
theorems to explain the actualities and make plans for the future.

For anyone who would like a quick review of Peirce's rules and
proofs in existential graphs, see slides 31 to 41 of
http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[marty . robert]

Jon Alan, list

JAS : "How might we restate this in accordance 
with Peirce's later terminology of multiple Objects and Interpretants? "

RM : It is not only a new terminology but mostly another extended definition of 
the sign with 6 constituents (that I named hexadic sign). The definition by 
Peirce is included here :

"It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it is 
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. 
Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since 
theDynamoid Objectdetermines 
theImmediate Object, which determines 
theSignitself, which determines 
theDestinate Interpretantwhich determines 
theEffective Interpretant which determines 
theExplicitInterpretantthe 
six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if 
they were independent, only yield 28 classes ..." (Letter to Lady Welby, 
December 23, 1908) You obtains the correspondant lattice (typing 6 in the box) 
at this URL :http://patrick-benazet.chez-alice.fr/lattices/;>http://patrick-benazet.chez-alice.fr/lattices/

My 
transcription:Od-Oi-S--Ii--Id-If(I
 dont debate here on the denominations, If is the classical final interpretant) 
, the arrow are logical presuppositions (according to the Frege's criterion 
implicitly verified by the first sentence of the quote)

JAS : "According to the quote, you write aReplica, which is interpreted as aSignof "an instance 
of that concept," which is itsObject. More 
specifically, I suggest (tentatively) that this is the 
individualDynamicObject--the 
instance of the concept that you, as the Utterer, have in mind upon writing the 
Replica--while the concept itself, as the collection or continuum of all such 
instances, is theGeneralObject."

RM : Where is the immediate object ? Remember :"In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional 
interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, 
too, pertain to all signs without exception. The real object and energetic 
interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things. But to our 
surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not correspond with any 
kind of object. This defect of correspondance between object and interpretant 
must be rooted in the essential difference there is between the nature of an 
object and that of an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes 
while the latter succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a 
relatively future tense.(MS 318-f)

Nevertheless, according to the relationships between the classes of hexadic 
signs I can answer that if the mode of being of Od is Thirdness (is the case of 
"freedom") then the mode of being of Oi is Thirdness or Secondness or 
Firstness. Consequently there is possibility of instances in the first case and 
the modes of beings of the possibles classes of signs are
33XY-ZT with the values of X,Y,Z,T 
being 3 or 2 or 1 and X=Y=Z=T ( see the lattice for an exhaustive 
list. ). No problem for continue with instances wich concerns only the pair 
relationned 33 (the General Objet as Peircean commens connected with 
the particular concept of "freedom" of the Utterer) and we have the following 
categorial possibilities of représentation of this pair : 22, 
2---1, 11 that is to say two Secondnesses connected (two concretes 
représentations, e.g statue of Liberty and one graphism) ; or one Secondness 
connected with one Firstness (e.g statue of Liberty and one feeling of freedom) 
or finally two Firstnesses connected (two feelings of freedom).

JAS 
:"If we project the word "freedom" on a wall where 100 different people 
read it, there is only one Replicainitially, but 100 
Instances, resultingsubsequentlyin 
100additionalReplicas 
as the Dynamic Interpretants in the people's minds."

RM :For me,no matter replicas ; we have 100 
pairs of various instances which are choosen among the three possibilities 
above ; but the commens is allways the same in the time of analysis ... it can 
evolve ... in a future tense...
In fact, given the relative permanence of 
the commens we have two variabilities: categorical variability according to the 
modes of being of the instances and variabilities according to the persons that 
can in the long run affect the commens.

Best regards,

Robert Marty

De : "Jon 
Alan Schmidt"
A : peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Envoyé: jeudi 20 septembre 2018 23:06
Objet : ***SPAM*** Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification






Robert, List:


My apologies to all for the accidental post when I first started drafting 
this reply. I was doing some reformatting and clicked on the "Send" 
button by mistake.



I agree that Peirce used "replica" only for Legisigns in his 1903 
taxonomy, such that his cla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

My apologies to all for the accidental post when I first started drafting
this reply.  I was doing some reformatting and clicked on the "Send" button
by mistake.

I agree that Peirce used "replica" only for Legisigns in his 1903 taxonomy,
such that his classification at that time included Sinsigns that were
*not *Replicas
of Legisigns.  However, I remain unable to identify any clear-cut cases of
such Sinsigns.  Nevertheless, the quote from CP 2.261 merits careful
consideration.

CSP:  A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [e.g., a common noun] is a sign
connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way
that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to
certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general
concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an
instance of that concept.


How might we restate this in accordance with Peirce's later terminology of
multiple Objects and Interpretants?  Perhaps it will be more
straightforward to analyze your example instead.

RM:  When I write the word "freedom", I write one instance of the concept
...


According to the quote, you write a *Replica*, which is interpreted as a *Sign
*of "an instance of that concept," which is its *Object*.  More
specifically, I suggest (tentatively) that this is the individual
*Dynamic *Object--the
instance of the concept that you, as the Utterer, have in mind upon writing
the Replica--while the concept itself, as the collection or continuum of
all such instances, is the *General* Object.

RM:  ... which produces the idea of freedom in the mind of every one which
know english and perceive the graphism.


I suggest (more confidently) that this is the Immediate Interpretant, and
that anything of which "freedom" could be correctly predicated by someone
possessing only knowledge of written English and its definitions--i.e.,
Sign System Acquaintance, but no Collateral Experience--is a constituent of
the Immediate Object.  The Dynamic Interpretant is the *actual *idea ("a
general concept") that the event of *reading* the word "freedom"--an *Instance
*of the Sign--produces in the mind of any *one *person, in accordance with
his/her (fallible) Interpretative Habits ("certain habits or dispositions
of that mind").

RM:  Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I always considered
this an obvious fact.


It is *not *obvious to me that the two terms are equivalent.  I would say
instead that the Replica is the enduring arrangement of ink on a page or
pixels on a screen, while the Instance is the occurrence that determines a
single interpreting Quasi-mind to a single Dynamic Interpretant.  If we
project the word "freedom" on a wall where 100 different people read it,
there is only one Replica *initially*, but 100 Instances, resulting
*subsequently
*in 100 *additional *Replicas as the Dynamic Interpretants in the people's
minds.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 12:10 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
> Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently
> didn’t send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains
> some important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you,
> Robert!
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* marty.rob...@neuf.fr 
>
> *Sent:* 20-Sep-18 09:28
>
> G‌ary, list, with your indulgence for my very bad English,
>
> In the dated text 1903 (CP 2.254 - 2.263) Peirce uses exactly 15 times the
> term "replica" , 9 times in the only one 2.261. The first appearance is in
> 2.258, the iconic legisign ; consequently all 15 "replicas" appear
> exclusively in the classes which are legisigns or symbols ; but all the
> symbols are necessarily legisigns and we can say that replicas are
> consubstantially related with the legisigns .
>
> The nature of the relationship is specifed immediately in 2.258 : "* Being a 
> Legisign, its mode of being is that of governing single **Replicas**, each of 
> which will be an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar kind"*. As a result we have 
> that the mode of being of the *replicas* is to be governed by the legisigns ; 
> and we must remember that they are sinsigns "*of a peculiar kind"* which 
> means that all the sinsigns are not replicas. This is very important ; I 
> explain the reasons further.
>
> Previously I examine the others appearances. Within 2.259 and 2.260 it's 
> exactly the same with again t*he "peculiar kind"*. Examining 2.261(the 
> rhematic symbol) with its 9 appearances, we have the guess of the riddle in 
> the first sentence: *"A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [**e.g., **a common 
> noun] is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas 
> in such a way that its **Replica** calls up an image in the mind which image, 
> owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 12:10 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
> Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently
> didn’t send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains
> some important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you,
> Robert!
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* marty.rob...@neuf.fr 
>
> *Sent:* 20-Sep-18 09:28
>
> G‌ary, list, with your indulgence for my very bad English,
>
> In the dated text 1903 (CP 2.254 - 2.263) Peirce uses exactly 15 times the 
> term "replica" , 9 times in the only one 2.261. The first appearance is in 
> 2.258, the iconic legisign ; consequently all 15 "replicas" appear 
> exclusively in the classes which are legisigns or symbols ; but all the 
> symbols are necessarily legisigns and we can say that replicas are 
> consubstantially related with the legisigns .
>
> The nature of the relationship is specifed immediately in 2.258 : "* Being a 
> Legisign, its mode of being is that of governing single **Replicas**, each of 
> which will be an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar kind"*. As a result we have 
> that the mode of being of the *replicas* is to be governed by the legisigns ; 
> and we must remember that they are sinsigns "*of a peculiar kind"* which 
> means that all the sinsigns are not replicas. This is very important ; I 
> explain the reasons further.
>
> Previously I examine the others appearances. Within 2.259 and 2.260 it's 
> exactly the same with again t*he "peculiar kind"*. Examining 2.261(the 
> rhematic symbol) with its 9 appearances, we have the guess of the riddle in 
> the first sentence: *"A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [**e.g., **a common 
> noun] is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas 
> in such a way that its **Replica** calls up an image in the mind which image, 
> owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a 
> general concept, and the **Replica** is interpreted as a Sign of an Object 
> that is an instance of that concept." C*learly since a symbol is necessarily 
> a legisign the relationship is again the same BUT here Peirce says that these 
> replica (eg a common noun) is an instance of a concept. When I write the word 
> "freedom", I write one instance of the concept which produces the idea of 
> freedom in the mind of every one which know english and perceive the 
> graphism. It's the same that to say that the word "freedom" written anywhere 
> of any way is a member of the extension of the concept, himself regarded as 
> an intension. Frege says that the noun written "fall"  under the concept; 
> Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I always considered this an 
> obvious fact.
>
> Continuing with 2.261 there is nothing new except that Peirce "cascades" the 
> assertions concerning the classes of signs described previously. And he 
> specify everytime *"peculiar kind*", thus showing that all the set of the 
> sinsigns is cut out in instances of various kinds according to the legisigns 
> which governs them.
>
> 2.262 and 2.263 only consolidate my conclusions.
>
> There is a simple manner of considerer this question by using the lattice of 
> the classes of signs ; it's one true diagrammatisation of the Peirce's text. 
> I develop this point of view in an article to appear.
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

It was brought to my attention off-List that I inadvertently sent my last
post in this thread to Gary F., rather than to the List as intended.  Since
his comments below are interspersed with mine, I will not bother to repeat
the latter.

GF: The date of the note is of no importance. What I said was that Peirce *did
not use the term “replica” after 1904 *in a semiotic context. You have not
cited an example to refute that observation, nor have you cited an instance
of Peirce ever using the term “Sign-Replica.”



I did not attribute any importance to the date of the note, I did not deny
your observation, and I did not claim that Peirce ever used the term
"Sign-Replica."  I simply pointed out that Peirce *did *use "Replica" quite
extensively *up until* 1904.  I have been advocating "Sign-Replica" as a
substitute for "Sign" whenever we are referring to the *embodiment *of a
Sign within a particular Sign System, rather than the Type *itself*, which
can have many such embodiments in many different Sign Systems.  However, I
would not be averse to simply using "Replica" for that purpose, if that is
less objectionable.



GF: True, the two words are not synonyms in the strictest sense of the
word. But a “replica is a sinsign” and a sinsign is a sign in this
classification, which means that the *replica is a sign*. This is not the
case in your systematization, because all signs are Types, and a Replica is
not a Type, is it?



Again, I am proposing that a Replica is an enduring *embodiment *of a Sign
(Type) within a particular Sign System, like the multiple appearances of
"the" on a printed page of written English.  I believe that this is
consistent with Peirce's usage of "Replica" through 1904.



GF:  Peirce said that there is only one word “the” in the English language,
only one *Type*, regardless of whether Tokens of it are spoken or printed.
A language is one Sign System, regardless of the variety of media used to
utter the signs.



I strongly disagree.  Peirce explicitly affirmed at least twice that a
translation from one language into another is a *different* Replica of the
*same* Sign.



CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)



CSP:  Giving to the word *sign* the full scope that reasonably belongs to
it for logical purposes, a whole book is a sign; and a translation of it is
a replica of the same sign. (EP 2:303; 1904)



There is only one word (as a Type), *independent *of any particular
language or other Sign System, that corresponds to "the" (as a Replica) in
written English.  "Der" or "die" or "das" in written German, and "el" or
"la" in written Spanish, are Replicas of the *same* Sign; besides the
different spelling, the gender aspect pertains strictly to those different
Sign Systems, not to the Sign itself as a Type.


Likewise, spoken English (or German or Spanish) is a different Sign System
from written English (or German or Spanish), even though translating
between them is much more direct than doing so between different
languages.  That is why an e-mail exchange does not necessarily communicate
the same message as a phone conversation using identical words, and a
face-to-face discussion can convey something else again.  An even stronger
proof is the fact that someone can be--and many people throughout history
have been--fluent in hearing/speaking their native language, yet completely
incapable of reading/writing it.



GF:  The footprint I saw in the mud just now is not a replica of any other
sign or a Token of any Type.



Again, I strongly disagree.  My first Peirce quote above continues as
follows.



CSP:  It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a
physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is
only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen
which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not
be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. This
repetitory character of the representamen involves as a consequence that it
is essential to a representamen that it should contribute to the
determination of another representamen distinct from itself. For in what
sense would it be true that a representamen was repeated if it were not
capable of determining some different representamen? (CP 5.138, EP 2:203;
1903)



The simple fact that you *interpreted* what you saw in the mud to *be* a
footprint entails that an *Instance *of a Sign occurred at that
moment--i.e., a Token of a Type--because it determined *another* Instance
of a Sign, your subsequent thought, as its Dynamic Interpretant.  Such
an Instance
of a Sign is not *itself* a Sign, any more than an instance of a law of
nature is 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[gnox]

List,

Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently didn’t 
send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains some 
important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you, Robert!

Gary f.

 

From: marty.rob...@neuf.fr   mailto:marty.rob...@neuf.fr> > 
Sent: 20-Sep-18 09:28



G‌ary, list, with your indulgence for my very bad English,
  

In the dated text 1903 (CP 2.254 - 2.263) Peirce uses exactly 15 times the term 
"replica" , 9 times in the only one 2.261. The first appearance is in 2.258, 
the iconic legisign ; consequently all 15 "replicas" appear exclusively in the 
classes which are legisigns or symbols ; but all the symbols are necessarily 
legisigns and we can say that replicas are consubstantially related with the 
legisigns .
The nature of the relationship is specifed immediately in 2.258 : " Being a 
Legisign, its mode of being is that of governing single Replicas, each of which 
will be an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar kind". As a result we have that the 
mode of being of the replicas is to be governed by the legisigns ; and we must 
remember that they are sinsigns "of a peculiar kind" which means that all the 
sinsigns are not replicas. This is very important ; I explain the reasons 
further.
Previously I examine the others appearances. Within 2.259 and 2.260 it's 
exactly the same with again the "peculiar kind". Examining 2.261(the rhematic 
symbol) with its 9 appearances, we have the guess of the riddle in the first 
sentence: "A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [e.g., a common noun] is a sign 
connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that 
its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits 
or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the 
Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that 
concept." Clearly since a symbol is necessarily a legisign the relationship is 
again the same BUT here Peirce says that these replica (eg a common noun) is an 
instance of a concept. When I write the word "freedom", I write one instance of 
the concept which produces the idea of freedom in the mind of every one which 
know english and perceive the graphism. It's the same that to say that the word 
"freedom" written anywhere of any way is a member of the extension of the 
concept, himself regarded as an intension. Frege says that the noun written 
"fall"  under the concept; Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I 
always considered this an obvious fact.
Continuing with 2.261 there is nothing new except that Peirce "cascades" the 
assertions concerning the classes of signs described previously. And he specify 
everytime "peculiar kind", thus showing that all the set of the sinsigns is cut 
out in instances of various kinds according to the legisigns which governs 
them. 
2.262 and 2.263 only consolidate my conclusions.
There is a simple manner of considerer this question by using the lattice of 
the classes of signs ; it's one true diagrammatisation of the Peirce's text. I 
develop this point of view in an article to appear.

  

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[gnox]

Jon, a few brief responses inserted:

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 19-Sep-18 13:07



Gary F., List:

I was not previously aware of Peirce's marginal note about "Replica," so thank 
you for bringing it to my attention; the CP editors dated it "c. 1910," not 
1904.  He used "Replica" quite extensively before that--including in "New 
Elements"--for each enduring embodiment of a Sign within a particular Sign 
System, such as each appearance of "the" on a printed page of English text.

GF: The date of the note is of no importance. What I said was that Peirce did 
not use the term “replica” after 1904 in a semiotic context. You have not cited 
an example to refute that observation, nor have you cited an instance of Peirce 
ever using the term “Sign-Replica.”

  I am proposing to retain it for this purpose, mainly to differentiate it from 
an "Instance" of a Sign as he defined that term in 1906, which is an occurrence 
at exactly one time and place.  As long as a book is closed and sitting on the 
shelf, it contains many Replicas of "the," but an Instance of that Sign only 
happens each time someone actually reads one of them.  Also, for the record, 
Peirce definitely did not use "replica" as a synonym for "sinsign" in 1903.

CSP:  Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which 
may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from 
fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and 
the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a replica. The 
replica is a sinsign. Thus, every legisign requires sinsigns. But these are not 
ordinary sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as 
significant. Nor would the replica be significant if it were not for the law 
which renders it so. (CP 2.246, EP 2:291; 1903)

GF: True, the two words are not synonyms in the strictest sense of the word. 
But a “replica is a sinsign” and a sinsign is a sign in this classification, 
which means that the replica is a sign. This is not the case in your 
systematization, because all signs are Types, and a Replica is not a Type, is 
it?

In this scheme, every Replica was a Sinsign, but not an ordinary one, such that 
not every Sinsign was a Replica; and a Replica was only significant because it 
was rendered so by the Legisign that it embodied.  I acknowledge that my 
current approach is different--I am proposing that all Signs are what Peirce 
called Legisigns in 1903 (Types in 1906 and later), because as he wrote 
elsewhere, a Sign only exists in Replicas; in itself, it is an Entelechy (3ns), 
not a Matter (2ns).  We can (and Peirce often did) call the Replicas "Signs" in 
the same way that we can talk about "the" both as one word and as 15 to 25 
different words on a page.  However, for the sake of clarity--especially within 
technical discussions of Speculative Grammar--I continue to advocate reserving 
"Sign" for the former, calling the latter "Replicas," and using "Instance" for 
each individual event of semiosis that produces a Dynamic Interpretant.

GF:  But it makes less sense to speak of written, printed or pronounced 
instances of the word “the” as “replicas”, because they differ radically in 
perceptible form ...

I have addressed this before.  Replicas of the same Sign within the same Sign 
System will resemble each other; it is precisely their significant characters 
(Tones) that make them recognizable as Replicas of Signs at all.  However, 
Replicas of the same Sign in different Sign Systems--e.g., written/printed 
English vs. spoken English, not to mention other languages--may indeed "differ 
radically."

GF: Sorry, this rationalization of your usage does not address the issue. 
Peirce said that there is only one word “the” in the English language, only one 
Type, regardless of whether Tokens of it are spoken or printed. A language is 
one Sign System, regardless of the variety of media used to utter the signs. 

Again, none of this amounts to an exegetical claim about Peirce's writings; 
rather, it is a systematic proposal for understanding Signs and their relations 
today.  I would be glad to consider any purported cases of "existing things or 
events which turn out to be significant," but allegedly cannot be analyzed as 
Replicas/Instances of general Signs.  I have already explained in other threads 
why I do not view ripples on a lake, weathercocks, thermometers, barometers, 
etc. as counterexamples.

GF: Yes, I’ve seen those explanations, which mainly demonstrates your skill at 
rationalizing. The footprint I saw in the mud just now is not a replica of any 
other sign or a Token of any Type. The fact that we have a general concept of 
“footprint” does not constitute an analysis of that sign in the mud, or indeed 
of any genuine index. I just don’t see how such repurposing of Peirce’s terms 
contributes anything but confusion to the understanding of signs today.

Gary f.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[gnox]

Jon, list,

I agree with you (and Gary R) that “sign-vehicle” is an unfortunate choice of 
term, for the reasons you’ve given. But similar reasons apply to your term 
“Sign-Replica,” another term that Peirce himself never used (with or without 
the hyphen), as far as I can tell. He did use the term “Graph-replica” to 
distinguish between a graph that visibly existed on paper and the imagined 
diagram that it “replicated”; but he stopped using the term “replica” in 
reference to EGs in 1904, for reasons given in a marginal note to CP 4.395: “I 
abandon this inappropriate term, replica, Mr. Kempe having already (‘Memoir on 
the Theory of Mathematical Form’ [Philosophical Transactions, Royal Society 
(1886)], §170) given it another meaning. I now call it an instance.”

Peirce also stopped using the term “replica” in reference to signs generally, 
and I doubt that you can find an instance of it in his semiotics after 1904. In 
the 1903 classification, he was using it as a synonym for “sinsign.” Since 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign is a trichotomy of signs — as is tone/token/type — a 
sinsign, or token, or replica, is a kind of sign. So is a legisign, or Type; in 
which case it makes no sense to say that all Signs are Types; which is probably 
why Peirce never said that, not even in “Kaina Stoicheia.” Likewise the term 
“Sign-Replica” makes no sense because a replica is a sign in the only 
classification system where Peirce actually used the word “replica,” that of 
1903. And besides that, many of the examples Peirce gave of sinsigns at that 
time do not actually replicate anything; they are simply existing things or 
actual events which are determined by objects to determine interpretants. (The 
fact that you have to use a symbol in order to name or denote these things is 
irrelevant to their functioning as signs.)

I’m inclined to think that Peirce’s use of “replica” in the 1903 classification 
of signs was already a mistake. It is misleading because for all ordinary 
purposes, a replica is a copy of something, usually of an existing thing. This 
is not necessarily the case with sinsigns, or with tokens as defined by Peirce 
in 1906: “A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to 
that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at 
any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as 
occurring just when and where it does.” Peirce does not say here, or anywhere 
that I know of, that a Token of a Type is a “replica” of that type, because 
that would be misleading: the relationship between a Token and the Type that it 
‘betokens’ is not the same as the relation between a replica and what it 
replicates, because the latter two are ordinarily in the same mode of being. It 
makes sense to speak of a “replica” of a graph which has been imagined but not 
scribed, because both graph and replica are essentially visual. But it makes 
less sense to speak of written, printed or pronounced instances of the word 
“the” as “replicas”, because they differ radically in perceptible form — which 
is probably why Peirce didn’t use that term for them after 1904, not even when 
he was using the word as his paradigmatic illustration of the Type-Token 
distinction.

For your “systematic” revision of Peircean terminology you could, I suppose, 
follow Peirce’s example and replace “replica” with “instance.” But that would 
be a band-aid solution to the deeper problem, which is your claim (or proposal) 
that all Signs are Types. For Peirce, an existing instance of a word is a sign 
(albeit a fragmentary and incomplete one), and calling it a “sign-instance” or 
“sign-replica” as if it were only an instance of a Sign is at best redundant. 
As for existing things or events which turn out to be significant, calling them 
“sign-replicas” is deeply misleading — more deeply than the notion of a 
“sign-vehicle.”

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 18-Sep-18 21:07
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

 

Gary R., List:

 

I agree with your comments about Atkins's unfortunate take on the trichotomy 
according to the Sign itself.  It certainly does not pertain to "the 
Sign-Vehicle," since this is a term that Peirce himself never used.  The 
closest that he came was when he wrote in an unidentified fragment, "A sign 
stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a 
vehicle conveying into the mind something from without" (CP 1.339).  On the 
other hand, he clearly distinguished a Sign from a vehicle when discussing the 
"somewhat imperfect example" of a mosquito transmitting a disease.

 

CSP:   ... the active medium is in some measure of the nature of a vehicle, 
which differs from a medium of communication in acting upon the transported 
object and determining it to a changed location, where, without further 
interposition of the vehicle, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I agree with your comments about Atkins's unfortunate take on the
trichotomy according to the Sign itself.  It certainly does not pertain to
"the Sign-Vehicle," since this is a term that Peirce himself never used.
The closest that he came was when he wrote in an unidentified fragment, "A
sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it produces, or modifies.
Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without" (CP
1.339).  On the other hand, he clearly *distinguished *a Sign from a
vehicle when discussing the "somewhat imperfect example" of a mosquito
transmitting a disease.

CSP:   ... the active medium is in some measure of the nature of a *vehicle*,
which differs from a medium of communication in acting upon the transported
object and determining it to a changed location, where, without further
interposition of the vehicle, it acts upon, or is acted upon by, the object
to which it is conveyed. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it
fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the
definition of a medium of communication. (EP 2:391; 1906)


At about the same time, Peirce also wrote, "One selfsame thought may be
carried upon the vehicle of English, German, Greek, or Gaelic; in diagrams,
or in equations, or in graphs: all these are but so many skins of the
onion, its inessential accidents" (CP 4.6; 1906).  Here it seems to be a
Sign-*Replica*, rather than the Sign *itself*, that serves as a "vehicle."

As I have said before, I find it noteworthy that Peirce's late taxonomy
sometimes characterized this division as being according to the Mode of
Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign, rather than its Mode of
Being--although this difference becomes less significant if we understand
"mode of being" in a phenomenological rather than metaphysical/ontological
sense.  There is certainly a parallel between Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign,
Tone/Token/Type, and Potisign/Actisign/Famisign; but to treat them as
strictly equivalent is only one plausible interpretation, by no means
definitive.

I find Atkins's list of all ten 1908 trichotomies misleading in that he
overlooks Peirce's own comments at EP 2:489 to the effect that he switched
#5 to #7 (note the repetition of "Imperative"), such that #5 became ("with
great hesitation") Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative.  I have previously
suggested that these correspond to the number of lines of identity
(zero/one/multiple) needed to represent the Sign in an Existential Graph.
I have also offered my own proposal and supporting rationale for ordering
all ten trichotomies to produce 66 Sign classes (3, 2, 1, 4, 8, 6, 5, 9, 7,
10).

Finally, Peirce's remark at EP 2:483, as quoted by Atkins, potentially
provides mild warrant for the somewhat innovative framework that I posted
yesterday.  He went on to characterize both Potisign/Actisign/Famisign and
Descriptive/Designative/Copulant as "tolerable but not thoroughly tried
conception[s]," although the latter was closer to being one of which he
"had a clear apprehension," if only he had been "satisfied with the
distinction between Descriptives and Denominatives."  Unfortunately, he did
not signal his level of confidence in any of the others.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 3:08 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> For those who may not be familiar with the trichotomic terminology of
> Peirce's last classification of signs or who wish to refresh their
> memories, I've copied a portion of Albert Atkins 2010 article, "Peirce's
> Theory of Signs" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as perhaps
> an aid to better following several of the threaded discussions which employ
> that late terminology.
>
> Yet even Atkins brief comments are themselves not uncontroversial. For
> example, take trichotomy 1. Atkins writes:
>
> In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the
> Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a
> Famisign.
>
> (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with
> terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns,
> Sinsigns and Legisigns).
>
> I'm rather certain that not all semioticians would agree that
> "Sign-Vehicle" is an accurate expression for "the Sign itself" in the
> context of Peirce's semeiotics. But more to the point of current list
> discussions, it remains a question whether the trichotomy
> Poti-/Acti-/Famisign is equivalent to Quali-/Sin-/Legisign, that the former
> is just a terminological experiment. Is there a subtle change suggested by
> the new terminology, or is it just Peirce's suggestion for an improved
> terminology?
>
> Here are Atkins remarks and the 10 trichotomies of the Final
> Classification.
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
> The Final Classification
>
> 

[PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Gary Richmond]

List,

For those who may not be familiar with the trichotomic terminology of
Peirce's last classification of signs or who wish to refresh their
memories, I've copied a portion of Albert Atkins 2010 article, "Peirce's
Theory of Signs" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as perhaps an
aid to better following several of the threaded discussions which employ
that late terminology.

Yet even Atkins brief comments are themselves not uncontroversial. For
example, take trichotomy 1. Atkins writes:

In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the Sign-Vehicle),
a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a Famisign.

(By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with
terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns,
Sinsigns and Legisigns).

I'm rather certain that not all semioticians would agree that
"Sign-Vehicle" is an accurate expression for "the Sign itself" in the
context of Peirce's semeiotics. But more to the point of current list
discussions, it remains a question whether the trichotomy
Poti-/Acti-/Famisign is equivalent to Quali-/Sin-/Legisign, that the former
is just a terminological experiment. Is there a subtle change suggested by
the new terminology, or is it just Peirce's suggestion for an improved
terminology?

Here are Atkins remarks and the 10 trichotomies of the Final Classification.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
The Final Classification

Just as the Early and Interim Accounts include a corresponding
classification of sign types, Peirce's final account holds similar
typological ambitions. Peirce states explicitly that there are sixty-six
classes of sign in his final typology. (See EP2. 481). Strictly speaking,
the six elements that we have detailed yield only twenty eight sign types,
but we are interested in Peirce's very final typology. He believes that we
can obtain these sixty-six classes, rather in the manner of the 1903
typology, by identifying ten elements of signs and signification, each of
which has three qualifying classes, and then working out their permissible
combinations. These ten elements include the six sign elements identified
above, plus four other elements that focus on the relation between signs,
objects and interpretants. The ten elements and their respective sign
types, taken from Peirce's 1908 letters to Lady Welby (EP2 483–491), then,
are as follows:

   1. In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the
   Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a
   Famisign.

   (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with
   terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns,
   Sinsigns and Legisigns).

   2. In respect of the Immediate Object, a sign may be either i)
   Descriptive (ii) Designative or (iii) a Copulant.
   3. In respect of the Dynamic Object, a sign may be either (i)
   Abstractive (ii) Concretive or (iii) Collective.
   4. In respect of relation between the Sign and the Dynamic Object, a
   sign may be either, (i) an Icon (ii) an Index or (iii) a Symbol.
   5. In respect of the Immediate Interpretant, a sign may be either (i)
   Ejaculative, (ii) Imperative or (iii) Significative.
   6. In respect of the Dynamic Interpretant, a sign may be either (i)
   Sympathetic (ii) Shocking or (iii) Usual.
   7. In respect of the relationship between the Sign and Dynamic
   Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Suggestive (ii) Imperative or (iii)
   Indicative.
   8. In respect of the Final Interpretant, a sign may be either, (i)
   Gratiffic (ii) Action Producing or iii) Self-Control Producing.
   9. In respect of the relation between the Sign and the Final
   Interpretant, a sign may be either a (i) Seme (ii) Pheme or (iii) a Delome.
   [earlier, rheme, dicisign, argument GR]
   10. In respect of the relation between the Sign, Dynamic Object and
   Final Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) an Assurance of Instinct (ii)
   an Assurance of Experienceor (iii) an Assurance of Form.

The reason that Peirce believes these ten elements will yield sixty-six
classes is clear enough, the same combinatorial considerations given for
the interim typology (outlined above in 3.4) apply here. However, the
precise manner and order in which these elements interact will determine
what the sixty-six classes of signs will look like in the final typology.
Unfortunately, these ten divisions and their classes represent a baffling
array of under-explained terminology, and there is little to indicate
precisely how we should set about the task of combining them. Even though
we may be confident on the number of signs in the final typology, other
details are sketchy and underdeveloped, and there still exists no fully
satisfactory account of the sixty-six classes. *As Nathan Houser points
out, “a sound and detailed extension of Peirce's analysis of signs to his
full set of ten divisions and sixty-six classes is perhaps the