Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary R, Gary F, list, From my cherry-picking readings in the orchard of Peirce, I gathered the impression that Every phenomenon has three aspects he called (081314-1) Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. If this impression of mine is true, why can't phaneron itself have these three aspects, so that there may be (i) phaneron AS IS (i.e., quality), (ii) phaneron AS ENCOUNTERED/EXPERIENCED (i.e., actuality), and (iii) phaneron AS CONCEPTUALIZED/ABSTRACTED/THEORIZED (i.e. lawfulness) ? With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Gary F, list, I'm not at all convinced of the following. GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a snippet at EP2:368]. However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what is admittedly the firstness that is the single feeling . . . of that moment of the phaneron with the firstnesses of the individual qualities within the phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the qualities 'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly *what each is *in the phaneron. And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy' but also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second being a wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities and characters appearing within the phaneron). So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes: [T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red, then is a Priman (EP2. 267). Peirce immediately continues: [Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling. Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling (EP2.267) [Note the plural: *qualities* of feeling]. So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological experience, we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity, but also 'red' as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round', etc. The the attempt to sublate these different qualities into the phaneron seems to me extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you concluded your post: GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis. Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Gary, John, list, GR: Although I agree that Firstness (rather, any given First as quality or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality, I'm not so certain that we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural. Doesn't it happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness, the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of them? GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the
RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary,
GR: I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our phenomenological
experience those several qualities are felt as distinct.
GF: I would agree with that. They are felt as distinct when the analysis is
not under conscious control, as the percept itself is not.
Phaneroscopically, though, the distinctness of each quality is its
Secondness to the others; and at the same time, the distinctive quality of
our experience (which is surely due to the biological nature of our
embodiment) is determined both by the Secondness of our various senses to
one another, and by the Secondness of the sensed object (the apple in this
case) to the nervous system. Our recognition of the apple as such, and our
recognition of any of its qualities as such, constitute the Thirdness of the
phenomenon. So, like every conceivable phenomenon, it involves all three
elements.
Defining a first is even harder than defining Firstness. When we give
examples, such as redness, we are inclined to draw them from sensory
experience. But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron,
not the elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of human
experience only. I can well believe that the only way to do this
scientifically (i.e. communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectifying
the phenomenon as an icon. Is there any way to formulate this that avoids
the limitations and ambiguities of language?
Id like to hear what André has to say about this, but I imagine hes pretty
busy now with more urgent matters!
gary f.
} End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take. Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till
thousendsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! [Finnegans Wake, final page] {
http://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{
gnoxics
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 12-Aug-14 11:01 PM
Gary F, list,
I'm not at all convinced of the following.
GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirces, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon reflection
as the phenomenon is objectified, and not until then do they appear
separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how
anything can appear to any kind of mind, considers experience more
holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
snippet at EP2:368].
However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what is
admittedly the firstness that is the single feeling . . . of that moment of
the phaneron with the firstnesses of the individual qualities within the
phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the qualities
'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly what each is
in the phaneron.
And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de
Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy' but
also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second being a
wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities and
characters appearing within the phaneron).
So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes:
[T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can
easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to
our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red, then
is a Priman (EP2. 267).
Peirce immediately continues:
[Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling.
Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling
(EP2.267) [Note the plural: qualities of feeling].
So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological
science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological experience,
we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity, but also 'red'
as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round', etc. The the
attempt to sublate these different qualities into the phaneron seems to me
extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you concluded your post:
GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only
one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a
proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.
Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our
phenomenological experience those several qualities are felt as distinct.
Best,
Gary R.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary, all,
Gary F. wrote:
But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron, not the
elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of *human* experience
only. I can well believe that the only way to do this scientifically (i.e.
communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectifying the phenomenon as an
icon. Is there any way to formulate this that avoids the limitations and
ambiguities of language?
One might ask the same of phaneroscopy: is there any way to 'do' this
science which avoids the limitations and ambiguities of language? My answer
is, probably not, at least not if one is doing *science* and not, say,
merely meditating or some such thing (this holds for the 3rd
phenomenological science I'd posit as well, that is, category theory, what
Peirce called trichotomic, and which considers genuine trichotomic
relations wherever they occur, and, just as with iconoscopy, not
necessarily as merely elements of experience or just elements of human
experience).
So what exactly are the elements of the phaneron once one's stated the
obvious, that is, the three universal categories? (And even that statement
requires language, as is clear from Peirce's own phenomenological studies.)
This was Joe Ransdell's problem with phaneroscopy as I recall--he didn't
think it had much work to do, and that which it did have to do had been
pretty much done by Peirce already. I didn't agree with him on this, but I
don't think one can make much progress in Peircean phenomenology as a
science until one considers not only phaneroscopy, but also iconoscopy and,
I'd hold, trichotomic category theory. And, again, for all three putative
phenomenological sciences, there seems to be no way to avoid language.
But, I'd agree with you that Andre sounding in on this would be most
helpful.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 8:21 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Gary,
GR: I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological
experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct.
GF: I would agree with that. They are *felt* as distinct when the
analysis is not under conscious control, as the percept itself is not.
Phaneroscopically, though, the distinctness of each quality is its
Secondness to the others; and at the same time, the distinctive quality of
*our
experience* (which is surely due to the biological nature of our
embodiment) is determined both by the Secondness of our various senses to
one another, and by the Secondness of the sensed object (the apple in this
case) to the nervous system. Our recognition of the apple as such, *and*
our recognition of any of its qualities as such, constitute the Thirdness
of the phenomenon. So, like every conceivable phenomenon, it involves all
three elements.
Defining a first is even harder than defining Firstness. When we give
examples, such as redness, we are inclined to draw them from *sensory*
experience. But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron,
not the elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of *human*
experience only. I can well believe that the only way to do this
scientifically (i.e. communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectifying
the phenomenon as an icon. Is there any way to formulate this that avoids
the limitations and ambiguities of language?
I'd like to hear what André has to say about this, but I imagine he's
pretty busy now with more urgent matters!
gary f.
} End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take. Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till
thousendsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! [Finnegans Wake, final page] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
*From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* 12-Aug-14 11:01 PM
Gary F, list,
I'm not at all convinced of the following.
GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon
reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out
how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more
holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
snippet at EP2:368].
However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what
is admittedly the firstness that is the single feeling . . . of that
moment of the phaneron with the firstnesses of the individual qualities
within the phaneron--certainly the
RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John, you wrote, I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this is the point I have been trying to make. I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false). I would say that there is no experience of firsts, but Firstness is an element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not a ground of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really speak of firsts in the plural because Firstness does not admit of discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness. gary f. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
To the extent that I understand Firsts as originating in feelings (derived I infer from some effort to sense what is coming up in one's consciousness, having willed to seek to plumb it, it seems to me that a First begins with that feeling and that it is then named with one or more terms. For example, Loose Ends or Unfinished Business. Naming (using words to describe signs or feelings) is our editing of reality. We determine what a first is by such a process of feeling and naming. I am referring to the actual experience I have when I engage in intentional, conscious thinking. I wonder if John thinks what I am describing is the experience of a first. To continue the exercise i have mentioned, the experience might more generally be called the past or what is not now. It is exactly what I went through yesterday on returning home from a weekend filled with things that left me quite overloaded (loose ends, the past, etc. Or so I felt. The result of my cogitations was a few actions and expressions I doubt I would have had the presence of mind to do if I had not allowed the process to move through an ethical index and culminate as they did. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: John, you wrote, I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this is the point I have been trying to make. I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false). I would say that there is no experience of firsts, but Firstness is an element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not a ground of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really speak of firsts in the plural because Firstness does not admit of discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness. gary f. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary, John, list, GR: Although I agree that Firstness (rather, any given First as quality or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality, I'm not so certain that we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural. Doesn't it happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness, the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of them? GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear separately. Empiricists generally look at such a simultaneous experience as consisting of sensations bundled together by the mind into a Gestalt, but I think Peirce saw it the other way round, as a whole phenomenon, which strictly speaking has no parts, although it can be analyzed afterwards into separate sensations. I suppose the psychologist, if he's trying to figure out how the brain does perception, has to take the multitude of sensations as primary; but the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything can appear to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. EP2:368: [[ Contemplate anything by itself,-anything whatever that can be so contemplated. Attend to the whole and drop the parts out of attention altogether. One can approximate nearly enough to the accomplishment of that to see that the result of its perfect accomplishment would be that one would have in his consciousness at the moment nothing but a quality of feeling. This quality of feeling would in itself, as so contemplated, have no parts. It would be unlike any other such quality of feeling. In itself, it would not even resemble any other; for resemblance has its being only in comparison. It would be a pure priman. Since this is true of whatever we contemplate, however complex may be the object, it follows that there is nothing else in immediate consciousness. ]] On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis. gary f. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary F, list, I'm not at all convinced of the following. GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a snippet at EP2:368]. However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what is admittedly the firstness that is the single feeling . . . of that moment of the phaneron with the firstnesses of the individual qualities within the phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the qualities 'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly *what each is *in the phaneron. And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy' but also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second being a wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities and characters appearing within the phaneron). So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes: [T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red, then is a Priman (EP2. 267). Peirce immediately continues: [Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling. Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling (EP2.267) [Note the plural: *qualities* of feeling]. So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological experience, we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity, but also 'red' as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round', etc. The the attempt to sublate these different qualities into the phaneron seems to me extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you concluded your post: GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis. Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Gary, John, list, GR: Although I agree that Firstness (rather, any given First as quality or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality, I'm not so certain that we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural. Doesn't it happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness, the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of them? GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear separately. Empiricists generally look at such a simultaneous experience as consisting of sensations bundled together by the mind into a Gestalt, but I think Peirce saw it the other way round, as a whole phenomenon, which strictly speaking has no parts, although it can be analyzed afterwards into separate sensations. I suppose the psychologist, if he's trying to figure out how the brain does perception, has to take the multitude of sensations as primary; but the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. EP2:368: [[ Contemplate anything by
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Response to Claudio (nice post in my opinion) and Gary R. At 05:52 PM 2014-08-10, Gary Richmond wrote: Forwarded at the request of Claudio Guerri. GR -- Forwarded message -- From: Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar Date: Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 9:25 AM Subject: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for To: Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com Mensaje original Asunto: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Fecha: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 15:17:22 -0300 De: Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com A: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Gary, John, List, Firstness is really a complex aspect of the sign... but the more important and difficult aspect for knowledge... Symbols grow and so, First is last... but not least... and Firstness is essential to all Design disciplines, because related to Form: conception of form (Math, Geometry...), concrete representation of form (graphic languages...), aesthetic strategy of form (Renaissance, Cubism...). I think that some good should come out of considering a concrete sign instead of an abstract approach to what can be considered First (examples are not easy to give, Peirce not excluded from that difficulty). Everything can be considered a sign, and all signs have to be considered in its triadic aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling and a Qualisign: redness... But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not exist without the experienced brute force of lots of red objects, so Secondness is also present. Verbal language is tricky... 'is' and 'are' should not be used for subsigns or aspects of a sign. The Gioconda IS not an Icon, but a complete SIGN, from which I can legally emphasize the iconic aspect in a sentence without naming specifically the other two logically necessary aspects. In this sense, Louis Althusser is very helpful by stating: some aspect can be dominant. The sign Architecture is an 'easy' example... Somewhere in the old e-mails in the List there should be a complete Semiotic Nonagon of the 'sign Architecture'. Resuming: The three aspects of Architecture are: Design (1ness), Construction (2ness) and Habitability (3ness). At his time, Vitruvius considered also three aspects, but naming the three values or 3ness's of the three aspects (in his own order): Firmitas (Dicisign), Utilitas (Argument) and Venustas (Rhema). In the case of architecture, I would not say that Design is a 'feeling'... it should be (normally) something very concrete, even if only the 'possibility' of being constructed and inhabited. By deepening in the 3 aspects of Design (always simplifying), we have: Geometry, Graphic Languages and Gestalt Theory (for the Qualisign); plans/drawings, models and texts (for the Iconic aspect); and an aesthetic value of that proposal (for Rhema). And I would not dare to say that even Geometry can be considered a 'feeling', except in a very metaphoric way... In this example, Geometry is not considered as a sign in itself, but as a 1ness of 1ness of 1ness of Architecture, and, since it is considered in the context of Architecture it is also related unavoidably to Projective Geometry (2ness, the different graphic languages: Perspective, Monge System and TSD) and to Gestalt Theory (3ness). Though, Geometry IS not something concrete and stable but is an aspect of itself, depending on the context in which it appears. So, given any sign or aspect of a sign all three Categories will be there necessarily, in a way or an other, explicitly or not, by cognitive consciousness or not... The troglodyte that killed the neighbor to get his 'better' cave (the equivalent to a better building today) had no IDEA, was not conscious about DESIGN to decide to kill his neighbor, but, according to Peirce's proposal, he had to have SOME idea about 'forms' of caves (design, 1ness), some idea of the of materiality of caves (construction, 2ness) and some idea of the usability (3ness) of that space, called 'cave'. It seems to me that it is not completely correct, or say, misleading, to say that those direct 'feels' are not thoughts, that they are unanalyzed experiences of qualities or are ineffable, because to say so, we have to imply all knowledge of concrete materialized experiences and use all our symbolic knowledge of speech to say that, in THIS case, this is ineffable... but actually meaning: after having reviewed all what I know, I can not recognize the immediate object nor its symbolic meaning. As far as I can think, there can not be a pure 1ness, nor a pure 2ness nor a pure 3ness, but there is always SOME presence of the three categories... perhaps with an emphasis on one aspect. This is my understanding. I think it is very difficult, If not impossible, to concentrate on firstness alone (see below, response
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John,
You wrote:
I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of
firsts as unclassified feels. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among
other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as ineffable.
I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as
real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them
directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to
them, but* I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact
I think that this is required if all thought is via signs (emphasis added).*
Your last sentences are, I think, key towards resolving this issue. My
point would be that those direct 'feels' are *not* thoughts, that they are
unanalyzed experiences of qualities. The analysis--should it happen at
all--happens after the fact.
An example: I remember once being in an apple orchard on one of the autumn
days when the wind briskly moves stratocumulus clouds across the sky,
creating all sorts of rapidly changing shadows on the earth. Upon
reflection I analyzed the colors of the apples as I'd experienced them as
bright red, dark red, cherry red, almost purple, almost black, etc., the
last 'color' experience ('almost black') being the most remarkable for me.
Indeed, in the totality of my phaneron I recall that I wasn't even
experiencing 'colors' as such so that my sense of them was just what it
was, and that experience could only be (inadequately and partially)
analyzed *after the fact* as experience of firsts as qualities, at times
changing so very rapidly and melding into other hues so subtly that I
couldn't have analyzed them--couldn't have found descriptive adjectives to
name the colors--had I tried (the only reason that I had tried at all was
that the 'black'-red apple sensation shocked me into a moment of analysis).
At such moments of pure experience nothing is being represented at all. I
wouldn't and couldn't think of all those hues as having color-names as they
were experienced and, in some cases, even upon reflection I couldn't (that
color between 'almost purple' and 'almost black' doesn't have a name for
me).
So, all thought is via signs, but the experience of a quality is not a
thought. So, I do not see why you say that you don't think we ever
experience them (qualities, firsts) directly. Isn't my example one of the
direct experience of qualities before analysis?
Best,
Gary R.
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 12:03 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Edwina,
I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of
firsts as unclassified feels. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among
other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as ineffable.
I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as
real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them
directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to
them, but I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I
think that this is required if all thought is via signs.
I agree that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a
short exchange privately that I am content with.
John
*From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
*Sent:* August 3, 2014 10:00 PM
*To:* Stephen C. Rose; John Collier
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since
you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is
confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and
Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure
feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move
into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of
differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that
direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from
the heat.
No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you
outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some
semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for
a sign.
Edwina
- Original Message -
*From:* Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
*To:* John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
*Cc:* Peirce List Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu
*Sent:* Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may
seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own
accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what
exists at every stage
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
I agree with Gary R's sense of this but would stress that it is precisely
in the context of a perceived sign that creative analysis can and perhaps
should appear. This is the premise of 'triadic philosophy' and the only way
I can see to arrive at measurable results - which I would see as the aim of
pragmaticism.
*@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose*
On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 10:19 AM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
wrote:
John,
You wrote:
I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of
firsts as unclassified feels. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among
other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as ineffable.
I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as
real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them
directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to
them, but* I think some version of representationalism is correct. In
fact I think that this is required if all thought is via signs (emphasis
added).*
Your last sentences are, I think, key towards resolving this issue. My
point would be that those direct 'feels' are *not* thoughts, that they
are unanalyzed experiences of qualities. The analysis--should it happen at
all--happens after the fact.
An example: I remember once being in an apple orchard on one of the autumn
days when the wind briskly moves stratocumulus clouds across the sky,
creating all sorts of rapidly changing shadows on the earth. Upon
reflection I analyzed the colors of the apples as I'd experienced them as
bright red, dark red, cherry red, almost purple, almost black, etc., the
last 'color' experience ('almost black') being the most remarkable for me.
Indeed, in the totality of my phaneron I recall that I wasn't even
experiencing 'colors' as such so that my sense of them was just what it
was, and that experience could only be (inadequately and partially)
analyzed *after the fact* as experience of firsts as qualities, at times
changing so very rapidly and melding into other hues so subtly that I
couldn't have analyzed them--couldn't have found descriptive adjectives to
name the colors--had I tried (the only reason that I had tried at all was
that the 'black'-red apple sensation shocked me into a moment of analysis).
At such moments of pure experience nothing is being represented at all. I
wouldn't and couldn't think of all those hues as having color-names as they
were experienced and, in some cases, even upon reflection I couldn't (that
color between 'almost purple' and 'almost black' doesn't have a name for
me).
So, all thought is via signs, but the experience of a quality is not a
thought. So, I do not see why you say that you don't think we ever
experience them (qualities, firsts) directly. Isn't my example one of the
direct experience of qualities before analysis?
Best,
Gary R.
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 718%20482-5690*
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 12:03 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Edwina,
I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of
firsts as unclassified feels. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among
other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as ineffable.
I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as
real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them
directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to
them, but I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I
think that this is required if all thought is via signs.
I agree that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a
short exchange privately that I am content with.
John
*From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
*Sent:* August 3, 2014 10:00 PM
*To:* Stephen C. Rose; John Collier
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and
since you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is
confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and
Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure
feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move
into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of
differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that
direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from
the heat.
No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you
outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some
semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for
a sign.
Edwina
- Original Message
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John, list, I agree that no phenomenon can be a pure first, but for the reason that firstness, secondness and thirdness are elements of every phenomenon (or as Peirce put it, of the phaneron). However I disagree with your belief that we infer the existence of firsts from a theory of signs. On the contrary, since a sign is a kind of phenomenon, a theory of signs has to be grounded in phaneroscopy, in order to account for the possibility of semiosis. Peirce himself did not fully realize this until 1902, but his subsequent definitions of sign all involve the three elements of the phaneron, either explicitly or implicitly. On this point I disagree not only with you but also with Joe Ransdell, and I gave my reasons in the Ransdell issue of Transactions, so I won't elaborate on them here. The fact that Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are extremely abstract concepts does not imply that we infer them from a theory of signs, and does not preclude them being elements of direct experience, as Peirce said that they were. And this makes a big difference in the way we read Peirce's logic and semiotic, which does indeed apply to dumb animals as well as to words. gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 3-Aug-14 1:40 PM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Stephen, It seems to me if you are aware of something as distinct from something else, irrespective of if you put a word to it, then it is not a pure first. If you are not aware of it as distinct from something else, I question whether you can be aware of it. In other words, I question whether there are an bare firsts. I believe we infer the existence of firsts from a theory of signs. In other words, we get at them through abstraction, not direct experience. I don't think think this has any consequences for Peirce's view that all thought is in signs, but it does put some limits to how far we can go with phaneroscopy. In any case, what I was saying has nothing to do with words per se, and would also apply to the dumb animals. John At 12:38 AM 2014-08-01, Stephen C. Rose wrote: It is the penumbra of everything within the mind that you experience prior to putting a word to it that attests to the independent existence of uninterpreted phenomena. I think it is for this reason that the writing of words is always a sort of slaying of what was there. This is a temporal event. It proceeds I think from the conscious sense of there being more than one can name and its editing down to one or more terms that is seen to be the named sign. This is my experience of how signs may evolve within consciousness. @stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary F wrote: . . . firstness, secondness and thirdness are (6231-1) elements of every phenomenon as Peirce put it, . . . . This is also how I understood firstness, secondness, and thirdness based on my brief readings of Peirce's originals and secondary sources. In other words, I believe Peirce said somewhere that Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are the (6231-2) different aspects of a phenomenon that the human mind prescind for the convenience of thought. With all the best. Sung John, list, I agree that no phenomenon can be a pure first, but for the reason that firstness, secondness and thirdness are elements of every phenomenon (or as Peirce put it, of the phaneron). However I disagree with your belief that we infer the existence of firsts from a theory of signs. On the contrary, since a sign is a kind of phenomenon, a theory of signs has to be grounded in phaneroscopy, in order to account for the possibility of semiosis. Peirce himself did not fully realize this until 1902, but his subsequent definitions of sign all involve the three elements of the phaneron, either explicitly or implicitly. On this point I disagree not only with you but also with Joe Ransdell, and I gave my reasons in the Ransdell issue of Transactions, so I won't elaborate on them here. The fact that Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are extremely abstract concepts does not imply that we infer them from a theory of signs, and does not preclude them being elements of direct experience, as Peirce said that they were. And this makes a big difference in the way we read Peirce's logic and semiotic, which does indeed apply to dumb animals as well as to words. gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 3-Aug-14 1:40 PM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Stephen, It seems to me if you are aware of something as distinct from something else, irrespective of if you put a word to it, then it is not a pure first. If you are not aware of it as distinct from something else, I question whether you can be aware of it. In other words,%2 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina, I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of firsts as unclassified “feels”. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as “ineffable”. I don’t see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as real from our experience, but I don’t think we ever experience them directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to them, but I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I think that this is required if all thought is via signs. I agree that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a short exchange privately that I am content with. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: August 3, 2014 10:00 PM To: Stephen C. Rose; John Collier Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from the heat. No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for a sign. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stephen C. Rosemailto:stever...@gmail.com To: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Cc: Peirce Listmailto:Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through some sort of index to some form of expression or action. I certainly made no assumptions of the sort you note. I find that reaction surprising. Sorry! @stephencrosehttps://twitter.com/stephencrose On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 2:09 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248tel:%2B27%20%2831%29%20260%203248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031tel:%2B27%20%2831%29%20260%203031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John wrote: I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real;(6231-1) I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. Let me expose my ignorance. Is this what is known as constructive realism? With all the bet. Sung At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
I agree with John; pure Firstness is totally unanalyzed experience. The triadic sign in a mode of Firstness (all three Relations in Firstness) has no 'mind' Relation in itself. Therefore we are not aware of it, as itself, because awareness requires a separation from that experience and the self. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com Cc: Peirce List Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:09 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from the heat. No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for a sign. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stephen C. Rose To: John Collier Cc: Peirce List Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through some sort of index to some form of expression or action. I certainly made no assumptions of the sort you note. I find that reaction surprising. Sorry! @stephencrose On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 2:09 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Aug 3, 2014, at 2:09 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. John, was your consideration of the possibilities along the same lines as mine, described below? When I read Dewey's critique of the reflex arc in psychology and his explanation that it would be better thought of as a circuit, (described below), I thought of an electrical circuit where no electrons move until the circuit is complete. So likewise, no part of the reflex arc has independence from the other parts. Then I considered that maybe it's more like the coupled wave system of an acoustic guitar. In a guitar, the first half-cycle of the string first vibration is independent of the reaction of the soundboard, and the first half-cycle of the soundboard is independent of the reaction of the air in the inside chamber. After the first half-cycle of the string the reaction of the soundboard affects the string's vibration. (The affect of the air chamber on the string is visually apparent when comparing the string's vibration during a wolf-tone, whose cause is from a standing air pressure wave in the guitar body, to the vibration during a good tone.) I tend to think our thinking is more like an electrical circuit, and that Peirce agreed but sometimes threw sops to Cerberus when describing firsts and seconds. * * * * * * * * * * * * Here's a description of Dewey's reflex circuit, which I copied from a post of mine from last year: Which reminds me of Dewey's criticism of the reflex arc, in The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology (1896), where he described the cyclical view of communication among sender and receiver -- as a circuit, a continual reconstitution, rather than information jerked through one-way-valves, from sensation to idea to action. For those who haven't read it, here's a very short description of Dewey's idea: The reflex arc is sensation-followed-by-idea-followed-by-movement. Dewey saw the understanding of these parts as too isolated. Better would be this: The act, e.g. of looking, and sensation are coordinated; Looking/sensation and idea are coordinated; Looking/sensation/idea and movement are coordinated. The knowledge comes from the coordination of all the parts, not the output after a one-way flow through the parts. http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htm Matt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
The sort of thinking I am talking about is conscious and not in any way an effort to replicate explicit notions of CSP. When this form of thinking is engaged in by me it is as I describe it. The first stage is an effort to create a description of what might be called a sign, a preverbal feeling. So it differs from a first which is only that, The second is an index of values that confronts whatever the sign may be. The third is an aesthetic or action stage in which the goal is to achieve some relationship to the ideals of truth and beauty. This general description is accurate but hardly prescriptive. There are times for example when the time I have given myself to do this is able to encompass only the describing of a sign. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 3:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from the heat. No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for a sign. Edwina - Original Message - *From:* Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com *To:* John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za *Cc:* Peirce List Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu *Sent:* Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through some sort of index to some form of expression or action. I certainly made no assumptions of the sort you note. I find that reaction surprising. Sorry! *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 2:09 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: Written words are representamens and spoken(073114-7) (and understood) words are signs. No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. In both cases if you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - similar to frozen and liquid water. One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the word remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic object. The spoken word functions as a dynamic object. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 2:37 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Yes. That is what I am saying, and I too distinguish between material process of semiotics and semiotics in general. My working hypothesis is that Physics of words/signs is necessary but (073114-2) not sufficient for their semiosis. or that No equilibrium structures can carry out semiosis (073114-3) unless and until transformed into dissipative structures by being activated by input of free energy. For example, words on a piece of paper must be lit before they can convey information. Right, but again that is an ontological assumption of the underlying substrate for semiotic process. Those who adopt a more idealist rather than materialist ontology will simply not agree with that. And indeed Peirce, in both his early and mature phases, would disagree with that conception. (Again, noting that one can simply mine Peircean semiotics without taking all his thought) Thus my point about knowledge of a system and whether that system can be conceived of semiotically. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina wrote (073114-1): Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1) original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my views on signs that differ from yours. There are several things that seem wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as childish, because: (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she studied Peirce as much a as you have. This cannot be true because There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to (073114-2) the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born or independently of Peirces work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913). (2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as reliable as Peirces original writings. This may be true in some cases but not always. (3) The science of signs is larger than Peircean semiotics, because The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly (073114-3) evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural and human sciences and communication engineering. For these reasons I am inclined to believe that Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth (073114-4) about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries. So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the following admonition to you from me: Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to (073114-5) discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be able to discuss energy. Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) (and understood) words are signs. No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that make semiosis possible. In other words, you may be conflating nodes and edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes ! Likewise, you cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens. If you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein semiosis takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, by definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory). The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am July 31, 2014. See Equation (073114-4) therein. In both cases if you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm. I think Ben has a much more realistic understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic issues involved here. In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - similar to frozen and liquid water. See above. One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the word remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic object. The spoken word functions as a dynamic object. See above. Edwina With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: Written words are representamens and spoken(073114-7) (and understood) words are signs. No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. In both cases if you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has nothing to do
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirce’s conception of mind and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not matter. That’s more the issue I’m getting at. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Stephen- I'm not sure what you mean! Peirce was, as he himself said many times, an Aristotelian, in the sense of his understanding that the 'Form', or habits-of-formation, were generals/universals and were embedded within the particular instantiation. That is, he was not Platonic - where the Forms are actually existentially real on their own. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stephen C. Rose To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:20 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Peirce was Aristotelian in this context? Or entirely? I agree with your note but this confuses me. @stephencrose On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Sung - don't divert from the issue by personalizing my criticism. I'm not saying that no-one can understand a sign unless they have read as much Peirce as I have. I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who constantly chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and to inform us of 'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce and you have to use them as he used them. I've said before - that if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. Use your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it isn't. And so what if - in yet another of your numbered admonitions to us - you tell us that other scholars have made 'fundamental contributions to the science of signs'. What does that have to do with your misuse and misunderstanding of Peircean terms? I certainly do assume that secondary sources on Peirce are not equivalent to the original writings of Peirce. Your failure to read Peirce in the original and your attempts to twist and distort his analysis to suit your own outline of the world can't be laid at the feet of either the secondary sources or Peirce. It's your outline. Again, you are the one constantly informing us of the 'meaning' of Peircean semiosis - with outlandish claims, including your bizarre crosstabs table of the categories, your misunderstanding of the categories, your equation of Firstness with a priori, and, now your insistence that the Representamen (and that's a Peircean term) is a 'thing'. No, I'm not confusing nodes and edges; I don't use them and neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them - that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework. That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a representamen'. Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the representamen within Peircean semiosis. You are merging the abstract habit-of-formation (the Representamen in Thirdness) with the thing-in-itself (in Secondness). The abstract habits of formation are real but not singularly existential; they are embedded within a conceptual or material particular existentiality. Pure Aristotle and Peirce was Aristotelian. So, a material thing does not act as a representamen; the habits of formation act as the representamen and transforms the input data from the object into the interpretant. Rather like a syllogism (something which you also don't understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago). This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to divert the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, your complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into diversions and irrelevancies. Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu; Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com; Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 3:01 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Edwina wrote (073114-1): Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1) original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my views on signs that differ from yours. There are several things that seem wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as childish, because: (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she studied Peirce as much a as you have. This cannot be true because There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to (073114-2) the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
'. Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the representamen within Peircean semiosis. You are merging the abstract habit-of-formation (the Representamen in Thirdness) with the thing-in-itself (in Secondness). The abstract habits of formation are real but not singularly existential; they are embedded within a conceptual or material particular existentiality. Pure Aristotle and Peirce was Aristotelian. So, a material thing does not act as a representamen; the habits of formation act as the representamen and transforms the input data from the object into the interpretant. Rather like a syllogism (something which you also don't understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago). This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to divert the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, your complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into diversions and irrelevancies. Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu; Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com; Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 3:01 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Edwina wrote (073114-1): Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1) original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my views on signs that differ from yours. There are several things that seem wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as childish, because: (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she studied Peirce as much a as you have. This cannot be true because There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to (073114-2) the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born or independently of Peirce's work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913). (2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as reliable as Peirce's original writings. This may be true in some cases but not always. (3) The science of signs is larger than Peircean semiotics, because The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly (073114-3) evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural and human sciences and communication engineering. For these reasons I am inclined to believe that Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth (073114-4) about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries. So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the following admonition to you from me: Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to (073114-5) discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be able to discuss energy. Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) (and understood) words are signs. No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that make semiosis possible. In other words, you may be conflating nodes and edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes ! Likewise, you cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens. If you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein semiosis takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, by definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory). The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am July 31, 2014. See Equation (073114-4) therein. In both cases if you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm. I think Ben has a much more realistic understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic issues involved here. In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary f, This topic has come up before, partly because of my scepticism about icons. Joe was helpful to me in working out a resolution I could live with. I suppose that you are familiar with Sellars’ “Myth of the given”. He basically denies the independent existence of uninterpreted phenomena. C.I. Lewis accepted them, but believed they were “ineffable”. His reasons for thinking they existed were entirely theoretical, because being ineffable we could not experience them without interpreting them. Presumably this is because it is psychologically impossible – as soon as we have a feeling we group it with others (a shade of red, a particular tone). Given the way our neural system works, it is pretty hard to see how it could be otherwise. Sellers, though, just thinks there is no need to postulate such things as pure uninterpreted feelings. I think he is right, but still I think we can abstract the experiential aspect of our mental signs, but it isn’t easy. I like to look at the corner of a room and gradually make it go in, then out again, then flat, and circle through those more quickly and get confused so I don’t see it any clear way (a third). Normally we can’t do this. Most of our thoughts come fully interpreted, and the neuropsychology of sensory perception, for example, requires that our experiences are sorted by habits inherited from our evolutionary past in order for us to perceive things. There is an exception, called “blindsight”, which is processed when the visual cortex is damaged and lower brain systems are all that can be relied on. People with blindsight don’t have the usual phenomenal experiences we have, but can still discriminate visual properties to some degree as shown by their behaviour. Presumably there are visual signs that guide their behaviour despite the lack of conscious experience of them. All in all, I am pretty sceptical that uninterpreted icons can be anything more than confused experiences or abstractions, and that habit rules the day for mental experience. John From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: July 31, 2014 11:25 PM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for John, in order to “make sense” (i.e. to convey any information in the Peircean sense), it must function both iconically and indexically, as a dicisign. A legisign has to be habitual, but an index cannot be habitual, because it must designate something here and now: an individual, not a general. This is the germ of the idea that Natural Propositions is about. gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM To: Clark Goble; Søren Brier; Peirce-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Clark, I don’t think something can be a sign unless it is habitual. How could it make any sense otherwise? John From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: July 31, 2014 10:16 PM To: Søren Brier; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dkmailto:sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirce’s conception of mind and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not matter. That’s more the issue I’m getting at. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
It is the penumbra of everything within the mind that you experience prior to putting a word to it that attests to the independent existence of uninterpreted phenomena. I think it is for this reason that the writing of words is always a sort of slaying of what was there. This is a temporal event. It proceeds I think from the conscious sense of there being more than one can name and its editing down to one or more terms that is seen to be the named sign. This is my experience of how signs may evolve within consciousness. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 6:19 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Gary f, This topic has come up before, partly because of my scepticism about icons. Joe was helpful to me in working out a resolution I could live with. I suppose that you are familiar with Sellars' Myth of the given. He basically denies the independent existence of uninterpreted phenomena. C.I. Lewis accepted them, but believed they were ineffable. His reasons for thinking they existed were entirely theoretical, because being ineffable we could not experience them without interpreting them. Presumably this is because it is psychologically impossible - as soon as we have a feeling we group it with others (a shade of red, a particular tone). Given the way our neural system works, it is pretty hard to see how it could be otherwise. Sellers, though, just thinks there is no need to postulate such things as pure uninterpreted feelings. I think he is right, but still I think we can abstract the experiential aspect of our mental signs, but it isn't easy. I like to look at the corner of a room and gradually make it go in, then out again, then flat, and circle through those more quickly and get confused so I don't see it any clear way (a third). Normally we can't do this. Most of our thoughts come fully interpreted, and the neuropsychology of sensory perception, for example, requires that our experiences are sorted by habits inherited from our evolutionary past in order for us to perceive things. There is an exception, called blindsight, which is processed when the visual cortex is damaged and lower brain systems are all that can be relied on. People with blindsight don't have the usual phenomenal experiences we have, but can still discriminate visual properties to some degree as shown by their behaviour. Presumably there are visual signs that guide their behaviour despite the lack of conscious experience of them. All in all, I am pretty sceptical that uninterpreted icons can be anything more than confused experiences or abstractions, and that habit rules the day for mental experience. John *From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] *Sent:* July 31, 2014 11:25 PM *To:* 'Peirce-L' *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for John, in order to make sense (i.e. to convey any information in the Peircean sense), it must function both iconically and indexically, as a dicisign. A legisign has to be habitual, but an index *cannot* be habitual, because it must designate something here and now: an individual, not a general. This is the germ of the idea that *Natural Propositions* is about. gary f. *From:* John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za colli...@ukzn.ac.za] *Sent:* 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM *To:* Clark Goble; Søren Brier; Peirce-L *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Clark, I don't think something can be a sign unless it is habitual. How could it make any sense otherwise? John *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com cl...@lextek.com] *Sent:* July 31, 2014 10:16 PM *To:* Søren Brier; Peirce-L *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirce's conception of mind and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not matter. That's more the issue I'm getting at. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 3:32 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Do you deny that DNA is matter ? Does it not represent an organism? Do you deny that “Semiosis is a material process enabled by the action of the(073114-6) irreducible triad of object, representamen and interpretant. Hence, all the components of semiosis possess material bases.” “. . . the habits of formation act as the representamen and (073114-8) transforms the input data from the object into the interpretant.” So, where is the habit encoded or what embodies the habit ? Thin air or a ghost ? Just to second Edwina, these are clearly explained within Peirce. They are at odds with what I guess is your materialistic ontology. So perhaps you’re assuming some form of simple materialism so much you’re having a hard time wrapping your mind around there being different ways of thinking here. It is rather common to assume some space/time substrate with extension as a necessary substrate for any property. So much so that it’s rather common for many from the scientific community to even recognize it as an unestablished assumption. (And one which many scientists have disagreed with) With regards to Peirce he discusses this in many places. I think a good starting point on this might be the SEP in the “Mind and Semeiotic” section. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#mind Allow me to quote the relevant part as I think it would eliminate a lot of confusion at play here. Connected with Peirce's insistence on the ubiquity of mind in the cosmos is the importance he attached to what he called “semeiotic,” the theory of signs in the most general sense. Although a few points concerning this subject were made earlier in this article, some further discussion is in order. What Peircean meant by “semeiotic” is almost totally different from what has come to be called “semiotics,” and which hails not so much from Peirce as from Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles W. Morris. Even though Peircean semeiotic and semiotics are often confused, it is important not to do so. Peircean semeiotic derives ultimately from the theory of signs of Duns Scotus and its later development by John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot). In Peirce's theory the sign relation is a triadic relation that is a special species of the genus: the representing relation. Whenever the representing relation has an instance, we find one thing (the “object”) being represented by (or: in) another thing (the “representamen”) and being represented to (or: in) a third thing (the “interpretant.”) Moreover, the object is represented by the representamen in such a way that the interpretant is thereby “determined” to be also a representamen of the object to yet another interpretant. That is to say, the interpretant stands in the representing relation to the same object represented by the original representamen, and thus the interpretant represents the object (either again or further) to yet another interpretant. Obviously, Peirce's complicated definition entails that we have an infinite sequence of representamens of an object whenever we have any one representamen of it. The sign relation is the special species of the representing relation that obtains whenever the first interpretant (and consequently each member of the whole infinite sequence of interpretants) has a status that is mental, i.e. (roughly) is a cognition of a mind. In any instance of the sign relation an object is signified by a sign to a mind. One of Peirce's central tasks was that of analyzing all possible kinds of signs. For this purpose he introduced various distinction among signs, and discussed various ways of classifying them. One set of distinctions among signs was introduced by Peirce in the early stages of his analysis. The distinctions in this set turn on whether the particular instance of the sign relation is “degenerate” or “non-degenerate.” The notion of “degeneracy” here is the standard mathematical notion, and as applied to sign theory non-degeneracy means simply that the triadic relation cannot be analyzed as a logical conjunction of any combination of dyadic relations and monadic relations. More exactly, a particular instance of the obtaining of the sign relation is degenerate if and only if the fact that a sign s means an object o to an interpretant i can be analyzed into a conjunction of facts of the form P(s) Q(o) R(i) T(s,o) U(o,i) W(i,s) (where not all the conjuncts have to be present). Either an obtaining of the sign relation is non-degenerate, in which case it falls into one class; or it is degenerate in various possible ways (depending on which of the conjuncts are omitted and which retained), in which cases it falls into various other classes. Other distinctions regarding signs were introduced later by Peirce. Some of them will be discussed very briefly in the following section of this article. In addition one should read
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
I'll reply to a few comments; thanks for your input. - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 6:48 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for 1) CLARK: Lots of comments so I’ll just pick a few posts and include my comments in a single post. My sense is that there’s a lot of miscommunication going on because it’s not clear when people are following Peirce and when they aren’t. EDWINA: I fully agree, but my concern is when people, such as Sung, say that they are following Peirce - when he is misrepresenting him. 2) JOHN COLLIER:I suppose that their could be signs that are not manifested, but I would call these possible signs. The possibilities are real, and are most likely thirds. I don't think that a possible x is an x. So I find it a bit odd to talk about signs that manifest[s] as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics”. CLARK: Put an other way the question is, are possible signs signs with a substance of pure possibility rather than material tokens? That’s not the only non-material sign of course. Consider the implication of a law. The laws are generals and not material and what is signified is also a general. The approach of Soren and Sungchul seems to be that this general - general as a sign process still needs a material substrate which is far from clear to me if we adopt a more thoroughgoing ontology than simple materialist ones. EDWINA: I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular. However, following Aristotle, I consider that the general law (Form) is embedded within the particular instantiation, even though, in itself, it is not a material form. So I think Søren is right in saying that sign tokens are subject to thermodynamics, and in particular it takes work for them to appear. They also tend to dissipate, and to overcome that requires work as we.. And so does recognizing them for what they are. I’ve not read your link yet so I’ll hold off commenting on this beyond thinking there’s quite a bit assumed here - at a bare minimum a materialist ontology of some sort. Kelly Parker’s work on the early ontology of Peirce is rather interesting here. Again one need not buy into Peircean ontology here. As I recall you had some troubles with aspects of Peirce’s indices and icons so it might be that’s at play here? 3) On Jul 31, 2014, at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who constantly chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and to inform us of 'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce and you have to use them as he used them. CLARK: I do think it would be helpful for clarity for everyone to be clear when one is using (or mining) Peirce and when one is breaking from Peirceanism. There’s nothing wrong with breaking from Peircean orthodoxy (or debating about what Peirce did or did not mean). I just think for clarity of communication it’s helpful to be clear what we are doing. EDWINA: Exactly. But the problem is, is that Sung considers that HIS view of Peirce - even though he hasn't read him - is the correct view. 4) On Jul 31, 2014, at 2:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I think this is the basic distinction between the Representamen, the habits of formation, which are 'real' but not existentially particular - and the existentially particular unit or token (the Object and Interpretant) - and the relation between the two modes: the habit and the existential. This relationship, the relationship of mediation, is active, and thus, does involve work and exchanges of energy/information. So, I disagree that Peirce did not work on this aspect of semiosis; it's the basis of his semiosis - that constant networking of the Representamen with other Representamens (the action of generalization); the constant networking of the Sign, in its triadic sense, with other Signs. i don't agree with Sung's outline, which is a postmodernist nominalism, because it ignores both that objective reality exists outside of the perception of humans and it ignores a fundamental nature of Peircean semiosis; that the sign exists - in its own interactions; that is, objective reality exists on its own. For example, the word on the page is, as a material unit, a sign. It exists as ink-on-paper. It does not have to be read by a human in order to exist. CLARK: Honestly I can’t even figure out what postmodernism means anymore so I’ll avoid that term. I think it’d lost its sense well into the 80’s when so many disparate movements were put under the same rubric (often with gross misreadings by both proponents and opponents). EDWINA: Yes - I'm aware of the fuzziness of the term
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:06 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: It is rather common to assume some space/time substrate with extension as a necessary substrate for any property. So much so that it’s rather common for many from the scientific community to even recognize it as an unestablished assumption. (And one which many scientists have disagreed with) Whoops. Typo. That should be, So much so that it’s rather uncommon for many from the scientific community to even recognize it as an unestablished assumption.” That is many in the scientific community have tended to adopt a kind of Cartesian view with mind simply discarded from the system. There are many problems with this (exactly where to place the laws of physics for example) yet it’s constantly surprising to me how many scientists adopt just such a view. (I think Lawrence Krauss moves in that direction for example - although at least he gets the substrate a little more sophisticated than Descartes) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular. However, following Aristotle, I consider that the general law (Form) is embedded within the particular instantiation, even though, in itself, it is not a material form. I’ve not read too many arguments on how Aristotilean Peirce is here. As I recall I was curious a few months back of how to distinguish say Armstrong’s view of universals from Peirce’s view of generals here. That is if the general is a habit to what degree is it tied to the matter. Which is what I think John was getting at. Sadly I just don’t have time to get into that. I’m far from convinced there’s a simple answer in Peirce though. I think there are places where he seems to distinguish qualities from matter. The question ends up being whether generals as generals are just habits or whether they also relate to possibility as possibility. The quote I gave earlier from CP 6.220 touches on that. I forget the exact date of that document but off the top of my head I think it was in the 1870’s. So a debate of the evolution of Peirce’s thought seems quite relevant as well. EDWINA: Yes - I'm aware of the fuzziness of the term postmodernism; a more modern term is 'constructivism', I think; but the point remains - that it views the world through the individual human agent's eyes. Well as a side tangent I’m not sure I’d agree the important figures under the postmodern rubric are constructivists. Many are, of course. Some major figures like Heidegger or Derrida can easily be read in very realist ways. That is they emphasize construction in order to get at the Other of construction. One could argue the so-called theological turn in French theology also is because of this kind of realism. Interesting this gets one to the parallels with Plotinus’ emanation theory. Is the Other the pure One of Plotinus or is the Other the pure privation or Matter of Plotinus. The logic tends to work either way, I think. I don’t want to go down that tangent right now, but I do think some of the issues are quite relevant in Peirce as well. EDWINA: I would consider Sung a nominalist - but not John. A general signifying a general is only one class of sign: the pure Argument, where all three - the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are in a mode of Thirdness. Such a sign is, in my view, both aspatial and atemporal, and thus, purely conceptual. It might be carried by words - but, in itself, it is 'purely mental’. Yes, but a more nominalist reading of Peirce will tend to see such signs as regulatory or ideal limits at best. However clearly you and I tend to agree on how to read Peirce here. grin Really? I'd consider that his more mature era rejected the Hegelian analytic frame, which, after all, essentially ignored Secondness - and was, again my view, most certainly not Platonic. I’m thinking particularly of the Cambridge Lectures where Peirce shocked quite a few at how Hegelian he was. Unexpectedly so given what most knew of his thought. Exactly how Hegelian seems an ongoing debate I’m not qualified to take a position on. I’ll confess that while I’m comfortable with saying a bit about his early ontology, I’m not sure in his mature thought he’s usually talking ontology. So I’m far more loath to say he’s making ontological commitments. If so (and I’m hardly an expert here) it’s not at all clear how to take the significance of his early thought. Kelly Parker attempts to paint there being a fair bit of continuity. I think his assertions outstrip his evidence in many key places though. So I tend to simply be agnostic as to Peirce’s particular ontology in his mature thought. Parker’s view can be found in The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s been long enough since I last read it that I’m loath to summarize any view from it though. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Clark wrote: But there can be signs of mind and not matter. (073114-1) Thats more the issue Im getting at. Can there be any signs of mind independent of matter or unsupported by material mechanisms of some sort ? If so, what would be an example of that ? With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirces conception of mind and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not matter. Thats more the issue Im getting at. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
6.220 is from the Logic of Events, 1898- and that section refers, as John was talking about, to the nature of potentiality. - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 7:27 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular. However, following Aristotle, I consider that the general law (Form) is embedded within the particular instantiation, even though, in itself, it is not a material form. I’ve not read too many arguments on how Aristotilean Peirce is here. As I recall I was curious a few months back of how to distinguish say Armstrong’s view of universals from Peirce’s view of generals here. That is if the general is a habit to what degree is it tied to the matter. Which is what I think John was getting at. Sadly I just don’t have time to get into that. I’m far from convinced there’s a simple answer in Peirce though. I think there are places where he seems to distinguish qualities from matter. The question ends up being whether generals as generals are just habits or whether they also relate to possibility as possibility. The quote I gave earlier from CP 6.220 touches on that. I forget the exact date of that document but off the top of my head I think it was in the 1870’s. So a debate of the evolution of Peirce’s thought seems quite relevant as well. EDWINA: Yes - I'm aware of the fuzziness of the term postmodernism; a more modern term is 'constructivism', I think; but the point remains - that it views the world through the individual human agent's eyes. Well as a side tangent I’m not sure I’d agree the important figures under the postmodern rubric are constructivists. Many are, of course. Some major figures like Heidegger or Derrida can easily be read in very realist ways. That is they emphasize construction in order to get at the Other of construction. One could argue the so-called theological turn in French theology also is because of this kind of realism. Interesting this gets one to the parallels with Plotinus’ emanation theory. Is the Other the pure One of Plotinus or is the Other the pure privation or Matter of Plotinus. The logic tends to work either way, I think. I don’t want to go down that tangent right now, but I do think some of the issues are quite relevant in Peirce as well. EDWINA: I would consider Sung a nominalist - but not John. A general signifying a general is only one class of sign: the pure Argument, where all three - the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are in a mode of Thirdness. Such a sign is, in my view, both aspatial and atemporal, and thus, purely conceptual. It might be carried by words - but, in itself, it is 'purely mental’. Yes, but a more nominalist reading of Peirce will tend to see such signs as regulatory or ideal limits at best. However clearly you and I tend to agree on how to read Peirce here. grin Really? I'd consider that his more mature era rejected the Hegelian analytic frame, which, after all, essentially ignored Secondness - and was, again my view, most certainly not Platonic. I’m thinking particularly of the Cambridge Lectures where Peirce shocked quite a few at how Hegelian he was. Unexpectedly so given what most knew of his thought. Exactly how Hegelian seems an ongoing debate I’m not qualified to take a position on. I’ll confess that while I’m comfortable with saying a bit about his early ontology, I’m not sure in his mature thought he’s usually talking ontology. So I’m far more loath to say he’s making ontological commitments. If so (and I’m hardly an expert here) it’s not at all clear how to take the significance of his early thought. Kelly Parker attempts to paint there being a fair bit of continuity. I think his assertions outstrip his evidence in many key places though. So I tend to simply be agnostic as to Peirce’s particular ontology in his mature thought. Parker’s view can be found in The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s been long enough since I last read it that I’m loath to summarize any view from it though. -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 29, 2014, at 1:44 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990, Intrinsic Information (1990) but I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple confusions and misunderstandings when I have discussed the issues on mailing lists. In particular I argued that dissipative and non-dissipative is a scale dependent distinction. The goal was to ask what the world must be like if we get information from the world, as some philosophers hold. At that time I thought that semiotics was too far from my audience that I didn't mention it, tough I have dome some extensions in later papers. I’ll check those out John before going further. I think there are a lot of hidden assumptions at play which I think need clarified or brought out. My apologies for not having been part of the discussion in past dialogs on this. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John wrote: I should have said as well that my student, Scott Muller, (073014-1) was able to prove that the information content I refer to is unique. He uses group theory following he argument I made that information originates in symmetry breaking. His book is Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information (The Frontiers Collection) http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetry-Foundation- Information-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3540698833 I purchased his book about a month ago but have not had time to read it yet. It seems like the main content of the book would be consistent with my finding that many organizations (from blackbody radiations to enzymic catalysis to cell metbolism to brain fucntions to comsogenesis) can be viewed as having resulted fron random events obeying the Gaussian function (which is symmetric) selected or 'perturbed' by envrionmental inputs to produce long tailed distributions called the Planckian distributions (which can be mathemtically derived from the Gaussian function assuming some reasonable mechanisms). It is for this reason that I have started to refer to Plakcian distributions as asymmetric Gaussian distributions in my manuscript under preparation. It seems as though I should read your student's book and refer to it before completing my manuscript. If you have any other suggestions, please let me know. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net html body At 06:57 PM 2014-07-30, Clark Goble wrote:brbr blockquote type=cite class=cite cite= blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=On Jul 29, 2014, at 1:44 AM, John Collier lt;a href=mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za;colli...@ukzn.ac.za/agt; wrote:brbr I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990,nbsp; ul lia href=http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/intrinfo.pdf;Intrinsic Information/a (1990) /ulbut I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple confusions and misunderstandings when I have discussed the issues on mailing lists. In particular I argued that dissipative and non-dissipative is a scale dependent distinction. The goal was to ask what the world must be like if we get information from the world, as some philosophers hold. At that time I thought that semiotics was too far from my audience that I didn't mention it, tough I have dome some extensions in later papers. /blockquotebr Ill check those out John before going further. I think there are a lot of hidden assumptions at play which I think need clarified or brought out. My apologies for not having been part of the discussion in past dialogs on this. br /blockquoteI should have said as well that my student, Scott Muller, was able to prove that the information content I refer to is unique. He uses group theory following he argument I made that information originates in symmetry breaking. His book is Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information (The Frontiers Collection) a href=http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetry-Foundation-Information-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3540698833; eudora=autourl http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetry-Foundation-Information-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3540698833/a brbr Johnbr /body br body hr Professor John Colliernbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp; colli...@ukzn.ac.zabr Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africabr T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp; F: +27 (31) 260 3031br a href=http://web.ncf.ca/collier; eudora=autourl Http://web.ncf.ca/collierbr /a/body /html - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
One brief last point. I think Peirce’s distinctions between token, type, and tone are rather helpful here and should be kept in mind. Of course the token/type distinction in particular can be blurry but I’m not sure that’s relevant to the discussion at hand. My sense is that the metaphysics/epistemology distinction is also at play. I’d just note that we can talk about a sign process without requiring that anyone be able to know that sign as a sign. That is some unseen entity could signify a particular interpretant without any person being able to know it. That’s why I think semiotics and physics should be kept clearly separated. One might say that because of the structure of some physical phenomena it can’t communicate information due to the physics but that doesn’t mean there aren’t other semiotic analysis at work. To give an example of this consider the group velocity and the phase velocity of a wave. One can go faster than the speed of light while the other can’t. And it’s trivial to show that according to relativity one can’t transmit useful information faster than the speed of light. However we must be careful not to limit semiotical structures just to this information that can be communicated only at the speed of light or slower. Put an other way, we have to be careful not to equivocate over the term “information while moving back and forth between physics and semiotics. Again as I mentioned earlier an excellent example of this are Feynman Diagrams. These diagrams clearly are a type of semiotic analysis of interactions even if the nature of the interactions become problematic when treated materially. Hopefully that clarifies things rather than confuses them. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
At 11:28 PM 2014-07-28, Clark Goble wrote: (Sorry for any repeats - I accidentally sent several emails from the wrong account so they didnt make it to the list) On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. Its just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think theres a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (Im a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if youve clarified this before. Im behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990, Intrinsic Information (1990) but I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple confusions and misunderstandings when I have discussed the issues on mailing lists. In particular I argued that dissipative and non-dissipative is a scale dependent distinction. The goal was to ask what the world must be like if we get information from the world, as some philosophers hold. At that time I thought that semiotics was too far from my audience that I didn't mention it, tough I have dome some extensions in later papers. John Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Dear Clark, Thanks for your response. What you say below is correct if we accept the meanings of dissipative and equilibrium structures as you define them in your mind, and this applies to Benjamin's previous response as well. But the point I was making in my admittedly provocative email was based on the meanings of dissipative and equilibrium structures carefully defined in irreversible thermodynamics by workers such as I. Prigogine (1917-2003) and his school in Brussels and Austin, for which Prigogine was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1977. Anything that disappears in a physical system upon removing energy supply can be identified with dissipative structures, such as the flame of a candle, images on a computer screen, words coming out of the mouth of a person, melodies coming out of a piano, action potential of neurons, the airplane trajectories in the sky, semiosis between persons or between neurons, etc. Conversely, anything that remains unchanged when energy supply is removed would be equilibrium structures, such as an artificial candle or flower, the photograph of a computer screen with images, words written down on a piece of paper (which lasts a much longer time than a spoken word can after it leaves the vocal cord of the speaker), melodies encoded in sheet music, etc. By denying the distinction between equilibrium and dissipative structures in semiotics or philosophical discourse in general, one is denying the fundamental role that energy plays in these disciplines and hence the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms (or underpinnings) supporting such mental activities. It may be useful, therefore, to distinguish between two types of semiotics (or the study of signs) the classical semiotics wherein no energy consideration is necessary, and the neo-semiotics wherein the role of energy dissipation is fundamental, since No energy, no semiosis. (072814-1) which may be viewed as the First Law of Semiotics, in analogy to the First law of Thermodynamics. Coining these two terms, classical vs. neo-semiotics, conceptualizes the dual necessity for semiosis, i.e., the continuity (as expressed in semiotics) and the discontinuity (as expressed in classical vs. neo-), just as the terms, classical physics and new physics conceptualize the continuity of the Newtonian physics and its discontinuity occasioned by the concept of energy quantization, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and Einsteins relativity. Finally, I would like to suggest the following two statements for possible discussions: Peirces semiotics is a major component of the (072814-2) classical semioticswhile biosemiotics is a major component of the neo-semiotics. Just as classical physics and new physics can co-exist (072814-3) in physics so classical semiotics (e.g., the Peirce-L) and neo-semiotics (e.g., biosemiotics) may be able to co-exist in the semiotics of future. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. Its just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think theres a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (Im a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if youve clarified this before. Im behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
(Sorry for any repeats - I accidentally sent several emails from the wrong account so they didn’t make it to the list) On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. It’s just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think there’s a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (I’m a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if you’ve clarified this before. I’m behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 25, 2014, at 8:01 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe into two classes equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them to exist. I think the ES-DS theory of Prigogine can be applied to linguistics and semiotics generally. Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. They are like a hammer, an ES, which cannot move matter until an agent inputs some energy into it by, say, lifting and ramming it down on the head of a nail. But spoken words, being sound waves (which are DSs), can perform work because they possess energy and hence can move matter, for example, causing the ear drum to vibrate. Apologies for not reading this before that last post. I’d just say that according to this definition I don’t think there are any pure ES. The very idea of equilibrium suggests this since it would entail that ES is really multiple DS that create a quasi-permanent patter but whose parts sometimes change. This would be in Peircean terms a habit. On Jul 28, 2014, at 10:47 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Conversely, anything that remains unchanged when energy supply is removed would be equilibrium structures, such as an artificial candle or flower, the photograph of a computer screen with images, words written down on a piece of paper (which lasts a much longer time than a spoken word can after it leaves the vocal cord of the speaker), melodies encoded in sheet music, etc. I’m not trying to be pedantic in what follows because I think it a key issue. We have to qualify this with “when a particular energy supply is removed.” This is key since of course we aren’t dealing with a closed system except in very artificial thought experiments. The implications of this are quite important and demand we consider the thermodynamics far more holistically. This then leads to the points I raised earlier. Whenever we talk about equilibrium we are always really talking about equilibrium in a particular context and period. What you say is fine for that. But when we move from these more artificial chemical examples to the broader examples of writing and speech that context matters and matters a lot. The obvious example is the equilibrium of magnetic tape. In practice we always end up with semi-permanent equilibrium. By denying the distinction between equilibrium and dissipative structures in semiotics or philosophical discourse in general, one is denying the fundamental role that energy plays in these disciplines and hence the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms (or underpinnings) supporting such mental activities. Hopefully I clarified why there is at best a continuum between these two categories. And indeed I’d question whether true equilibrium of the sort you specify is truly possible except as a regulative theoretical concept. (Much like the ideal gas law ends up being an idealization) Semiotically this is very important because contamination is always going on. As in physics and chemistry we can do theoretical or empirical perturbation analysis to see how well a system can withstand “noise” and maintain its equilibrium. However these are often statistical and there usually is a point of external energy where the system starts to break down. This energy can be external or internal (say the very stability of particular chemicals over time) When one moves from physics and chemistry to more broad semiotics this principle becomes quite important since equilibrium is maintained by a kind of replication of the sign system as it undergoes semiotic process. Yet (and this is key for Peirce’s semiotics) there is always a gap between object and interpretant in this process. For Peirce this is best conceived by way of the Epicurean notion of swerve. Peirce uses this by way of analogy I think. (Others might disagree) However regardless of how one takes Peirce’s ontology, I think the notion of this sign gap is a tremendously significant in semiotics. Effectively to deny this gap is to claim the legendary transcendental sign which is key to certain philosophies - especially many Platonic ones. I think a major theme of semiotics in the second half of the 20th century, regardless of jargon, is the denial of such a transcendental sign. Effectively this is the denial, in your terminology, of a pure equilibrium structure. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at
