Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Gary Richmond]

 might
>> mean by that, but I have no confidence in my guess, as apparently I
>> guessed wrong about what your previous post referred to. As far as I
>> can tell, you’re also guessing wrong about my meaning (and inferring
>> my “tone” from your guess). You seem to have more confidence in
>> your own guesses than I have in mine. In order to carry a conversation
>> like this forward, we have to keep on guessing and revising our
>> guesses; but sometimes one doubts whether it is worth the effort.
>>
>> During my teaching career, I used to tell my students (and show them
>> when possible) that the greatest barrier to genuine communication
>> between people with a common language is the assumption that you
>> really know what the other person is talking about. If I’d been a
>> Peircean then, I would have said that the barrier is the difference
>> between the immediate object of the sign heard by the interpreter and
>> the dynamic object of the sign uttered by the utterer. Your post has
>> raised my consciousness of that barrier — which makes it very
>> difficult to respond appropriately. So all I’m doing here is
>> applying one of the main insights I get from Peircean semiotics
>> (explained in more detail in Chapter 2 of my book _Turning Signs_) to
>> the concrete example of the exchange between you and me. If you
>> ‘take it personally’ or find its “tone” offensive, that’s
>> unfortunate but beyond my control.
>>
>> Believe it or not, I too was sincere in wishing you a Happy New Year!
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>> } The Path is fundamentally without words. We use words to reveal the
>> Path. [_Blue Cliff Record_ 25] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
>> Sent: 31-Dec-17 16:46
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca
>> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>>
>> Gary f,
>>
>> Sorry for inexact expressions. I should have made a distinction
>> between just interpreting a quote and going beyond it. Paraphrasing is
>> customarily marked with expressions like "as XXX says elsewhere...".
>>
>> If I had problems with understanding where you were paraphrasing
>> Peirce, and where you were stating your own inferences,  I was just
>> one reader amongst many. Why the tone?
>>
>> My point has been that words and ideas are not in any kind of identity
>> relation. And that the relation between signs and meanings is a tricky
>> question, not a simple one.
>>
>> If you disagree, why can't we just agree to disagree?
>>
>> Surely you are well aware that Peirce did not mean something like a
>> college chemistry lab with laboratory and seminary philosophy.
>>
>> He does offer many very detailed precepts for thought experiments as
>> well as practical everyday experimentations he conducted himself, many
>> of them for many years, even decades.
>>
>> Most of these I have conducted myself. Following his descriptions as
>> accurately as I can. Very often Peirce points out that everyone should
>> do so. In order to find out oneself. Instead of only following the
>> method of authority. - Which is OK, if and after
>>
>> I really meant to thank youn and wish you a happy new year.
>>
>> Best wishes anyway, Kirsti
>>
>> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 31.12.2017 22:29:
>>
>> Kirsti, you quoted my post in yours and commented that you “cannot
>>>
>>
>>
>> understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in
>>>
>>
>> what follows.”
>>>
>>
>>
>>>
>> It’s quite simple: The part enclosed in quotation marks is a
>>>
>> direct
>>
>> quote of Peirce’s exact words, and the rest is my own words. This
>>>
>> is
>>
>> what I always do in my posts, whenever I am commenting on something
>>>
>>
>> Peirce (or anyone) wrote; I “try to keep quotes and
>>>
>> interpretations so
>>
>> marked that any reader can tell which is which” (quoting you, in
>>>
>> that
>>
>> case). In my post, I included the link to my blog so that anyone who
>>>
>>
>>
>> wanted the exact source citation could find it there. I don’t see
>>>
>> the
>>
>> problem with that.
>>>
>>
>>
>>>
>> I also don’t see how your claim — that Peirce’s own choice of
>>>
>&

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

 because the methods were effective.  Also they seemed to be 
inducing happiness around. Students glowed with pride and 
self-confidence.


And I am not ecpecting you or anyone else to believe just by reading 
what I wrote.  I am encouriging trying out what I say.  Whoever has the 
opportunity to teach.


Gary f. , perhaps you have met the utterly strict and demanding part 
without the lenient atmosphere absolutely needed.  The list is not a 
class. Not together in the same room, at the same time.


Teaching is a kind of laboratory work.   Practical work, with practical 
aims.  Not so different with teaching oneself.  Experimenting on 
oneself.


If one can firmly and with good grounds come to the conclusion that this 
(whatever it is) is  true about me, then that (whatever) is proven 
possible.


If something is not true with oneself, it does not follow that it could 
not be true of others. (Implication is not equivalence).


If something (with oneself ) has been proven possible, then the next 
question to (logically) follow is about its generality & conditions for 
that.  (This is about probabilities. And not just about beans in a bag, 
even though CSP used that kind of example)


Then, and finally, arises the question of  what always is and must be.  
This is what CSP deals with in his phenomenology


This much, for now.

Best, Kirsti


g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 1.1.2018 16:09:

Kirsti,

We seem to have a language problem here. I don’t understand your
distinction between “just interpreting a quote and going beyond
it,” or between “paraphrasing Peirce” and stating my own
inferences. To me, studying Peirce (or any philosopher) means
_recreating_ his or her thought process. That entails _both_
interpreting quotes _and_ “going beyond them,” _both_ paraphrasing
the writer _and_ making inferences about the object(s) of the signs
uttered by the writer. In a situation like this at least, an
interpretant is usually another sign with the same object as the
original sign. Of course, the perennial problem with reading words is
that we are forced to use symbols in place of the indices that would
direct our attention to the object. In other words, we have to _guess_
what the object is, and then make inferences about it which we hope
are parallel or analogous to the inferences made by the original
writer. And hope that when we guess wrong, we will find out sooner or
later that this is the case, and recognize the need to guess again.

For instance, when Peirce writes about the difference between
“laboratory” thinkers and “seminary” thinkers, my guess is
that he is referring to the difference between experientially testable
hypotheses and theories that are not testable in that way (and
probably follow the method of authority instead). Maybe your guess is
different — I can’t tell, from what you’ve written. Likewise I
can’t tell what you have in mind when you write “I was just one
reader amongst many. Why the tone?” I could guess what you might
mean by that, but I have no confidence in my guess, as apparently I
guessed wrong about what your previous post referred to. As far as I
can tell, you’re also guessing wrong about my meaning (and inferring
my “tone” from your guess). You seem to have more confidence in
your own guesses than I have in mine. In order to carry a conversation
like this forward, we have to keep on guessing and revising our
guesses; but sometimes one doubts whether it is worth the effort.

During my teaching career, I used to tell my students (and show them
when possible) that the greatest barrier to genuine communication
between people with a common language is the assumption that you
really know what the other person is talking about. If I’d been a
Peircean then, I would have said that the barrier is the difference
between the immediate object of the sign heard by the interpreter and
the dynamic object of the sign uttered by the utterer. Your post has
raised my consciousness of that barrier — which makes it very
difficult to respond appropriately. So all I’m doing here is
applying one of the main insights I get from Peircean semiotics
(explained in more detail in Chapter 2 of my book _Turning Signs_) to
the concrete example of the exchange between you and me. If you
‘take it personally’ or find its “tone” offensive, that’s
unfortunate but beyond my control.

Believe it or not, I too was sincere in wishing you a Happy New Year!

Gary f.

} The Path is fundamentally without words. We use words to reveal the
Path. [_Blue Cliff Record_ 25] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 31-Dec-17 16:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f,

Sorry for inexact expressions. I should have made a distinction
between just interpreting a quote and going beyond it. Paraphrasing is
customarily marked with expressions like "as XXX

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Kirsti,

 

We seem to have a language problem here. I don’t understand your distinction 
between “just interpreting a quote and going beyond it,” or between 
“paraphrasing Peirce” and stating my own inferences. To me, studying Peirce (or 
any philosopher) means recreating his or her thought process. That entails both 
interpreting quotes and “going beyond them,” both paraphrasing the writer and 
making inferences about the object(s) of the signs uttered by the writer. In a 
situation like this at least, an interpretant is usually another sign with the 
same object as the original sign. Of course, the perennial problem with reading 
words is that we are forced to use symbols in place of the indices that would 
direct our attention to the object. In other words, we have to guess what the 
object is, and then make inferences about it which we hope are parallel or 
analogous to the inferences made by the original writer. And hope that when we 
guess wrong, we will find out sooner or later that this is the case, and 
recognize the need to guess again.

 

For instance, when Peirce writes about the difference between “laboratory” 
thinkers and “seminary” thinkers, my guess is that he is referring to the 
difference between experientially testable hypotheses and theories that are not 
testable in that way (and probably follow the method of authority instead). 
Maybe your guess is different — I can’t tell, from what you’ve written. 
Likewise I can’t tell what you have in mind when you write “I was just one 
reader amongst many. Why the tone?” I could guess what you might mean by that, 
but I have no confidence in my guess, as apparently I guessed wrong about what 
your previous post referred to. As far as I can tell, you’re also guessing 
wrong about my meaning (and inferring my “tone” from your guess). You seem to 
have more confidence in your own guesses than I have in mine. In order to carry 
a conversation like this forward, we have to keep on guessing and revising our 
guesses; but sometimes one doubts whether it is worth the effort.

 

During my teaching career, I used to tell my students (and show them when 
possible) that the greatest barrier to genuine communication between people 
with a common language is the assumption that you really know what the other 
person is talking about. If I’d been a Peircean then, I would have said that 
the barrier is the difference between the immediate object of the sign heard by 
the interpreter and the dynamic object of the sign uttered by the utterer. Your 
post has raised my consciousness of that barrier — which makes it very 
difficult to respond appropriately. So all I’m doing here is applying one of 
the main insights I get from Peircean semiotics (explained in more detail in 
Chapter 2 of my book Turning Signs) to the concrete example of the exchange 
between you and me. If you ‘take it personally’ or find its “tone” offensive, 
that’s unfortunate but beyond my control.

 

Believe it or not, I too was sincere in wishing you a Happy New Year!

 

Gary f.

 

} The Path is fundamentally without words. We use words to reveal the Path. 
[Blue Cliff Record 25] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 31-Dec-17 16:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Gary f,

 

Sorry for inexact expressions. I should have made a distinction between just 
interpreting a quote and going beyond it. Paraphrasing is customarily marked 
with expressions like "as XXX says elsewhere...".

 

If I had problems with understanding where you were paraphrasing Peirce, and 
where you were stating your own inferences,  I was just one reader amongst 
many. Why the tone?

 

My point has been that words and ideas are not in any kind of identity 
relation. And that the relation between signs and meanings is a tricky 
question, not a simple one.

 

If you disagree, why can't we just agree to disagree?

 

Surely you are well aware that Peirce did not mean something like a college 
chemistry lab with laboratory and seminary philosophy.

 

He does offer many very detailed precepts for thought experiments as well as 
practical everyday experimentations he conducted himself, many of them for many 
years, even decades.

 

Most of these I have conducted myself. Following his descriptions as accurately 
as I can. Very often Peirce points out that everyone should do so. In order to 
find out oneself. Instead of only following the method of authority. - Which is 
OK, if and after

 

I really meant to thank youn and wish you a happy new year.

 

Best wishes anyway, Kirsti

 

 

 

 

 <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 31.12.2017 22:29:

> Kirsti, you quoted my post in yours and commented that you “cannot 

> understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Gary f,

Sorry for inexact expressions. I should have made a distinction between 
just interpreting a quote and going beyond it. Paraphrasing is 
customarily marked with expressions like "as XXX says elsewhere...".


If I had problems with understanding where you were paraphrasing Peirce, 
and where you were stating your own inferences,  I was just one reader 
amongst many. Why the tone?


My point has been that words and ideas are not in any kind of identity 
relation. And that the relation between signs and meanings is a tricky 
question, not a simple one.


If you disagree, why can't we just agree to disagree?

Surely you are well aware that Peirce did not mean something like a 
college chemistry lab with laboratory and seminary philosophy.


He does offer many very detailed precepts for thought experiments as 
well as practical everyday experimentations he conducted himself, many 
of them for many years, even decades.


Most of these I have conducted myself. Following his descriptions as 
accurately as I can. Very often Peirce points out that everyone should 
do so. In order to find out oneself. Instead of only following the 
method of authority. - Which is OK, if and after


I really meant to thank youn and wish you a happy new year.

Best wishes anyway, Kirsti




g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 31.12.2017 22:29:

Kirsti, you quoted my post in yours and commented that you “cannot
understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in
what follows.”

It’s quite simple: The part enclosed in quotation marks is a direct
quote of Peirce’s exact words, and the rest is my own words. This is
what I always do in my posts, whenever I am commenting on something
Peirce (or anyone) wrote; I “try to keep quotes and interpretations
so marked that any reader can tell which is which” (quoting you, in
that case). In my post, I included the link to my blog so that anyone
who wanted the exact source citation could find it there. I don’t
see the problem with that.

I also don’t see how your claim — that Peirce’s own choice of
term, such as “phaneron,” is “inconsistent with his deeper
views” — can be tested in any laboratory, as you appear to
suggest. I don’t know any way of comprehending Peirce’s “deeper
views” about matters except to study what he wrote about them, on
the DEFAULT assumption that he meant exactly what he wrote, and “it
is quite indifferent whether it be regarded as having to do with
thought or with language, the wrapping of thought, since thought, like
an onion, is composed of nothing but wrappings” (Peirce, EP2:460).
Perhaps you do have a better way of gaining insight into Peirce’s
deeper thoughts, but if so, I think it’s up to you to demonstrate it
rather than ask the rest of us to take it on faith.

And Happy New Year to you too!

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 31-Dec-17 10:25
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f, list

My source on Eucleides was Grattan-Guinness (The Fontana history of
the mathematical sciences) and my thirty years old notes on the topic.
(& Liddell and Scott, of course.)

It is important to keep in mind that no such divisions (or

classifications) between sciences that are taken for granted today did
not exist in ancient times. - Still, Eucleides was studied by
mathematicians for centuries. It was taken for granted. Up till
non-Euclidean math. Even the Bible came much, much later.

Meaning is context-dependent, that much we all agree. We have signs
from old times, no dispute on that. But do we have meanings?

I have problems with the following:

GARY f.: My


answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought,



implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to,



http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1] [1]: “upon a

continuous line


there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only

room


for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a point

on the


line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has

a


beginning and end, then it has those two points



(discontinuities) already.


I cannot understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo
them in what follows.

Peirce took up in several contexts his point of marking any points and
thus breaking continuity. He took care to set down rules for (logical)
acceptability for doing so.

In order to understand his meaning three triads are needed.
Possibility, virtuality and actuality makes one of them. (But only one
of them.)

CSP wrote on Ethics of Terminology. - Did he follow these ethical
rules?

- I'd say YES and NO. To the despair of his readers he chanced his
terminology over the decaces very, very often. But it was HIS to
change, in order to accommondate with renewed understanding of his
whole conceptual system, his new findings along the way in making it
move...

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Kirsti, you quoted my post in yours and commented that you “cannot understand 
the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in what follows.”

 

It’s quite simple: The part enclosed in quotation marks is a direct quote of 
Peirce’s exact words, and the rest is my own words. This is what I always do in 
my posts, whenever I am commenting on something Peirce (or anyone) wrote; I 
“try to keep quotes and interpretations so marked that any reader can tell 
which is which” (quoting you, in that case). In my post, I included the link to 
my blog so that anyone who wanted the exact source citation could find it 
there. I don’t see the problem with that.

 

I also don’t see how your claim — that Peirce’s own choice of term, such as 
“phaneron,” is “inconsistent with his deeper views” — can be tested in any 
laboratory, as you appear to suggest. I don’t know any way of comprehending 
Peirce’s “deeper views” about matters except to study what he wrote about them, 
on the default assumption that he meant exactly what he wrote, and “it is quite 
indifferent whether it be regarded as having to do with thought or with 
language, the wrapping of thought, since thought, like an onion, is composed of 
nothing but wrappings” (Peirce, EP2:460). Perhaps you do have a better way of 
gaining insight into Peirce’s deeper thoughts, but if so, I think it’s up to 
you to demonstrate it rather than ask the rest of us to take it on faith.

 

And Happy New Year to you too!

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 31-Dec-17 10:25
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Gary f, list

 

My source on Eucleides was Grattan-Guinness (The Fontana history of the 
mathematical sciences) and my thirty years old notes on the topic. (& Liddell 
and Scott, of course.)

 

It is important to keep in mind that no such divisions (or

classifications) between sciences that are taken for granted today did not 
exist in ancient times. - Still, Eucleides was studied by mathematicians for 
centuries. It was taken for granted. Up till non-Euclidean math. Even the Bible 
came much, much later.

 

Meaning is context-dependent, that much we all agree. We have signs from old 
times, no dispute on that. But do we have meanings?

 

I have problems with the following:

 

GARY f.: My

> answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought, 

> implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to, 

>  <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/> 
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]: “upon a continuous line 

> there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only room 

> for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a point on the 

> line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has a 

> beginning and end, then it has those two points

> (discontinuities) already.

 

I cannot understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in 
what follows.

 

Peirce took up in several contexts his point of marking any points and thus 
breaking continuity. He took care to set down rules for (logical) acceptability 
for doing so.

 

In order to understand his meaning three triads are needed. Possibility, 
virtuality and actuality makes one of them. (But only one of them.)

 

CSP wrote on Ethics of Terminology. - Did he follow these ethical rules? 

- I'd say YES and NO. To the despair of his readers he chanced his terminology 
over the decaces very, very often. But it was HIS to change, in order to 
accommondate with renewed understanding of his whole conceptual system, his new 
findings along the way in making it move...

 

I firmly believe he had a reason every time for those changes. BUT he also 
experimented with words he took into a kind of test driving for his concepts. 
Such as "phaneron". An experiment doomed to fail.

 

Why do I believe so? - I have never read him explicitly saying so. But the term 
(etymology etc) did get the idea twisted in such ways which were inconsistent 
with his deeper views. - So when I read those texts by him using "phaneron", I 
took note of the year and looked forward to see him stop using it.

 

It not a job for me to search whether he did or not. It is job for seminary 
minded philosophers. Not for the laboratory minded ones.

 

I wish to take up Ethics of Interpretation in a similar spirit. In order to 
make our ideas more clear, it may be good to try to keep quotes and 
interpretations so marked that any reader can tell which is which.

 

It is an impossible task, I know. Just as impossible to any human being as is 
Christian ethics. But a very good guideline to keep in mind & to follow as best 
one can.

 

The links in any post may get read or not. - It takes too much time to read all 
those offered.

 

What cannot be included in

Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Helmut,

I find your thinking very much to the point.  I also find it very good 
to be frank. And I think Peirce wasas frank as he could, too. Which did 
not make him very agreeable to the establishments of his times.


By now, there is no agreement on any overview, not about this topic or 
much else.


You wrote on EG's:
HELMUT: " Is it so, that the EGs are about all that can be expressed 
with the

term "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that
would be existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about
composition (parts), is that so?"


I think you are right.

Let's see what is (logically) involved in what you write,
 CSP wrote: what is involved, can be evolved. Which is what I now 
attempt to do.


Existential Graphs are about existence.  – But about what kind of 
existence?  This question I'll leave on hold.
Existential Graphs  consist of three parts, alfa, beta and gamma graphs. 
 The three first Greek alphabets.  – Is it to be taken as a division (a 
classification) into three, a trichotomy?  - Yes.


Which part of the division is to be taken up first? – Well, Peirce gave 
many options for that issue.  One of them was that its best to take up 
first the one which is easiest to understand  AND to make understood.


Then there is the option to take up first what became historically (or 
evolutionarily) first.  The order of precedence, in a general sense.


The third option is offered by logical if – then relations.  One should, 
of course, add the third part (? ) [This choice of word is to be left on 
hold, because it involves a word the question is aimed to solve.  CSP 
typically writes "Let's provisionally accept this or that",  then later 
he comes back to what has been provisionally accepted with a new 
understanding, often with a new wording, just as well.] The third is of 
course a chain of  IF (if – then) THEN …. etc. relations.


This is sometimes called contextuality, sometimes inbeddedness, 
sometimes by some other name.  The logical idea remains the same.  [but 
a lot of muddle is brought up by so called exact  (verbal) definitions]. 
 It is good to keep in mind that all logic is about ideas, even though 
some ideas persist  out of 'natural causes'.  For example pushing a door 
open. [An example CSP used a lot, but which has lost  much of its 
argumentative power with automatic doors.]


With developing  Existential Graphs to the (almost) perfect state, CSP, 
according to my general understanding of his work as a whole, took the 
easiest part first.  [Do not expect any Peirce sholar to agree with 
this.  With this I stand alone.  But CSP did express that he did not 
wish to be followed by a pack of sheep, but by people who took on to 
experiment on what he had written on.  So I have done. ]


The existents  in EG's are made visible on the sheet of assertion. They 
follow each other in a certain logical order.  But the sheet has a recto 
and verso.  [CSP did change his wordings, but not the basic ideas] .  On 
the sheet there may be presented negations. But there also always is the 
other side.


When you or anyone else writes down,  or draws up [note the English ups 
and dows, in Finnish there is no such division] a sign aimed at 
communicating an idea to others, the sign becomes an existent being.  It 
is there. Not any more only virtually, but also actually.


This is the point where all becomes difficult and confusing.  Divisions 
into three and classifications do not work any more.


John F Sowa has offered many examples on Greek etymology and how the 
nouns originate in verbs.  Greek was a very verbal language.  So is 
Finnish even today.


 in 1990's I designed an experiment for myself. I made a rule on not  
ever using the verb "is" (the Finnish counterpart, of course).  For a 
year or so it was very cumbersome to stop every time that word happened 
to come out "from my pen", wrote CSP.  I could also use the "search" 
command.   With this experiment I learned a lot.
I believe that by it I got rid of the last remnants of nominalistic ways 
of thought.  (Which is not the same as a philosophical standpoint, it 
has to do with cultural issues, not individual issues, or opinions or 
whatever.) The experiment lasted about three years.  By then my habits 
of  thought had been changed, so there were no more any need for such 
restrictions.


 A verb, any verb presents a logical connective.  Modern formal logic is 
all about IS or IS NOT.  Peirce brought in existential quantifier, which 
came along with his theory of probability etc.


Which came along with his ideas of firstness as spontaneity etc.

Existential Graphs present all they present from the standpoint of 
Secondness only.  But the standpoint of Secondness allows three 
perspectives.  If a dialogue with others is wished for at the CSP's 
times (or ours), then best start with the second perspective available 
from the standpoint of Secondness.


By now the Lowell lectures are approaching the point wher

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

ore, he applies the distinction in
his both his logical (i.e., 2nd level of clarity) and in his pragmatic
(i.e., 3rd level) definitions and explanations of how the correlates
are related to one another in both degenerate and genuinely dyadic and
triadic relations. Having said that, he is being remarkable careful
about when and how the distinctions should be applied.

It is possible that Peirce is mistaken in applying the distinction
between part and whole the way he does to semiotic relations and
relationships but, for my part, I don't see anything that stands out
as a clear error on his part. As such, my aim is to follow his lead in
the proper use of these terms--at least when I'm trying to interpret
his texts.

Yours,

Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354
-

FROM: Helmut Raulien 
 SENT: Friday, December 22, 2017 10:36:32 AM
 TO: jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com
 CC: Peirce List; John F Sowa
 SUBJECT: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Jerry, John, List,
you wrote:
"

If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",

 > I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
 > that question? What would you do with the answer?”
Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!
".
I dont understand this. If anybody asks, if relations have parts, why
can this not be an intrinsically motivated question? Why does the CSP
spirit suggest, that this question must be extrinsically motivated, so
that the asker does not just want to know the answer, because he/she
finds it interesting, but has obscure motives, and wants to use the
answer for something weird, something other than just gaining
knowledge? Ok, you can always ask: Why do you want to gain knowledge?
That is always a good question, I admit. But: If the knowledge gainer
shares this knowledge, then I think it is clear to see, that she/he
just wants to commit to the scientific progress, and is not Dr. No, or
Frankenstein.

I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts,
but there are also composed relations, that consist of other
relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term
"parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to
be discussed, or is already, and I might have missed it).

Best,
Helmut

22. Dezember 2017 um 17:55 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 

List, John:

 Comments inserted within text:

 > On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
 >
 > On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 >> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and
predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these
“parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice
of whether it has one “subject” or several.
 >
 > But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
 >
 > A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether
 > you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example,
 > consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
 >
 > If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
 > and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
 > But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
 >
 Well stated!
 But, this is traditional mathematical usage because of the role of
well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly
display of numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a
one-dimensional geometric line.

 The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations
that depend on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology). This is
essential to the emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral
centers. The alignment of the parts of the chiral molecule are in
space. This proven by well-defined emanations necessary for the
patterns of x-ray diffraction of the sinsign.

 In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the
symbols where A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for
guanosine, the three symbols,

 A > G

 makes no logical sense.

 In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the
symbol system under inquiry.

 (A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and
syntax which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

 > That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
 > relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
 > relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
 > is only one of many ways of "having”.

 A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given
molecular formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of
tartaric acid.
 >
 > One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
 > infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that
 > greater-

Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Helmut,


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 22.12.2017 18:14:

Kirsti,
is the term "part" already defined?


No, it is not. You hit the point with "virtual".

Best, Kirsti

-
I think, if it is defined

geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a
function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts,
then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But,
because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions
cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But
any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum
problem (line consisting or not of points).
Best,
Helmut

 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Helmut,

 I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
 did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which,
of
 course, are deeply related. But how?

 To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
 connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.

 Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
 laboratory, but one needs though experiments.

 I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
 question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
 question, is such an experiment.

 Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
 logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.

 EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
 Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
 logical thinking.

 Comments?

 Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
 > Gary, Kirsti, List,
 > I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
 > geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
 > part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
 > meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
 > metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
 > point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a
functional
 > part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
 > part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
 > spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are
not
 > geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
 > they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
 > g...@gnusystems.ca
 > wrote:
 >
 > Kirsti, list,
 >
 > Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
 > points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from
last
 > month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1] [1]. By the
way,
 > according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον
for
 > _point_ before Euclid.
 >
 > Gary f.
 >
 > -Original Message-
 > From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
 > Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
 >
 > Listers,
 >
 > Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used
for
 > geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined
it
 > as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
 > instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans &
later
 > Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.
 >
 > Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
 > List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
 > posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a
 > message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
 > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
 > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] [2] .
 >
 > Links:
 > --
 > [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]
 > [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2]

 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .



Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/
[2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

John, list,

Now, with John, we are talking!

This was the last post I (quite hastily) read before leaving the 
e-world. - And I left with a happy tone.


Best, Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.12.2017 17:38:

On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and 
predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these 
“parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of 
whether it has one “subject” or several.


But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.

A sign is a triadic relation.  But it's not clear whether
you can or should say that a relation has parts.  For example,
consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.

If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.

That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
relationships.  And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
is only one of many ways of "having".

One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
infinite set of pairs.  But that does not imply that
greater-than has infinitely many parts.

The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
(several statements with multiple symbols).  But those
axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
describe any relation, including the sign relation.

If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
I would say "What do you mean?  Why are you asking
that question?  What would you do with the answer?"

John



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

at point in the next
lecture.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 22-Dec-17 01:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Kirsti and Gary F,

K


Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has




no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the



earlier STIGME .


GF


By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word

σημεῖον


for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the

Liddell


and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word

for sign and


root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical



point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with

στιγμή


(stigma).


I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique,
and Heath's translation and commentary on Euclid.

The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something; for
example, as a sign of ownership.  From that, the word 'stigma'

(ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed
instrument.  The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's
plumage; then it came to mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant.

Aristotle explicitly said that a  point was a marker on a line, not a
part of the line.  Heath said that Euclid generally followed
Aristotle.  But in vol. 1, p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was probably
"considered more suitable than 'stigme' (a puncture) which might claim
to have more reality than a point."

In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer
to a mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others.

K


Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?


The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark.

Euclid used it for just one particular kind.  For that use in
geometry, the thing it refers to has no parts.

K


the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their

commentaries.

I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words:

'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point.

John

Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

John, list,

I have been out of reach for more than a week. A heap of mails in this 
thread.  My responses may seem to many as ancient history. For that 
reason I'll leave the comment responded below. And I'll try to be 
concice.


No arguments on words and reference, however detailed, can possibly give 
next to nothing towards making clear the crucial issue on the nature of 
rel. betw. sign and meaning. (CSP of cource presupposed as the context).


Analytical (nominalistic) philosophy made the mistake of taking words 
and reference as all there is to sings and meaning.


Do you agree?

Best, Kirsti


John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.12.2017 08:00:

Kirsti and Gary F,

K

Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which
has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of
the earlier STIGME .


GF

By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον
for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the Liddell
and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word for sign
and root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical
point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with
στιγμή (stigma).


I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique,
and Heath's translation and commentary on Euclid.

The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something;
for example, as a sign of ownership.  From that, the word 'stigma'
(ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed
instrument.  The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's
plumage; then it came to mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant.

Aristotle explicitly said that a  point was a marker on a line,
not a part of the line.  Heath said that Euclid generally followed
Aristotle.  But in vol. 1, p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was
probably "considered more suitable than 'stigme' (a puncture)
which might claim to have more reality than a point."

In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer
to a mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others.

K

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?


The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark.
Euclid used it for just one particular kind.  For that use in
geometry, the thing it refers to has no parts.

K
the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their 
commentaries.


I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words:
'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point.

John



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Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary,

I am feeling quite dull at the moment about all this, I have lost tracks, what remains is the idea, that the meaning of the term "is" might be something that can be symbolized with EGs, though by negations only, but why not, and that EGs (or at least their non-textual symbols like cuts and lines) are merely about existence, identity, classification, that would be what "is" is about, but not about composition (mereology, being a part of). So I think, that the part-whole-topic is something else, that is worth of further elaboration. So let us elaborate it. I can only throw in my theory (of which I however am not so sure about ), that there may be three kinds of composition: Composition from traits or qualities (1ns), spatial (domains) composition (2ns), functional composition (a function, like a sign, consisting of subfunctions, 3ns). But that is just one of those ideas or guesses, mines are based on stating the difference between classification and composition. But this statement mightbe opposed by e.g. saying: You can replace "A is a class of B" by "A is a part of the concept of B".  This is all very difficult.

Best,

Helmut

 

 23. Dezember 2017 um 21:08 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 



Helmut, Gary f. Jeff, list,

 

I have found at least some of the parts/whole, classification/composition discussion not quite to the point of Peirce'comments in this section of Lowell 3. Gary f's formulation today was, however, helpful for me in sorting at least some of this out. 

 



Gf: I don’t see a clear case here of Peirce referring to a part of a relation. . .



 



Generalizing from this [Jeff's] sample, then, I think we can say that Peirce speaks often enough of parts of a sign, but does not speak of parts of a relation. If that’s the case, I think it gives another reason why we should not say that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a sign relation is triadic — and its correlates should not be regarded as parts.




 


I tend to strongly agree with his conclusion.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

 

 


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 11:53 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 
 

Supplement:

Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a part of the concept of". This is all very complicated.

Is it so, tat the EGs are about all that can be expressed with the term "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that would be existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about composition (parts), is that so?


 



Kirsti,

is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of points).

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
course, are deeply related. But how?

To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.

Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.

I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
question, is such an experiment.

Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.

EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
logical thinking.

Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> Gary, Kirsti, List,
> I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> spatial border, and t

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, Gary f. Jeff, list,

I have found at least some of the parts/whole, classification/composition
discussion not quite to the point of Peirce'comments in this section of
Lowell 3. Gary f's formulation today was, however, helpful for me in
sorting at least some of this out.

Gf: I don’t see a clear case here of Peirce referring to a *part of a
relation*. . .



Generalizing from this [Jeff's] sample, then, I think we can say that
Peirce speaks often enough of *parts of a sign*, but does not speak of *parts
of a relation*. If that’s the case, I think it gives another reason why we
should not say that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a *sign
relation* is triadic — and its *correlates* should not be regarded as
* parts*.


I tend to strongly agree with his conclusion.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 11:53 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement:
> Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this
> whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and
> composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on
> the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a part of the
> concept of". This is all very complicated.
> Is it so, tat the EGs are about all that can be expressed with the term
> "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that would be
> existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about composition
> (parts), is that so?
>
> Kirsti,
> is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined
> geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function
> that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it
> has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot
> take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these
> parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see
> the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of
> points).
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
>  kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Helmut,
>
> I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
> did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
> course, are deeply related. But how?
>
> To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
> connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.
>
> Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
> laboratory, but one needs though experiments.
>
> I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
> question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
> question, is such an experiment.
>
> Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
> logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.
>
> EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
> Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
> logical thinking.
>
> Comments?
>
> Kirsti
>
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> > Gary, Kirsti, List,
> > I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> > geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> > part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> > meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> > metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> > point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> > part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> > part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> > spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
> > geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
> > they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
> > g...@gnusystems.ca
> > wrote:
> >
> > Kirsti, list,
> >
> > Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
> > points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
> > month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
> > according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
> > _point_ before Euclid.
> >
> > Gary f.
> >
> > -Original Message-
> > From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
> > Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
> >
> > Listers,
> >
> > Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
> > geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
> > as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
> > instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
> > Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.
> >
> > Does a 

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement:

Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a part of the concept of". This is all very complicated.

Is it so, tat the EGs are about all that can be expressed with the term "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that would be existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about composition (parts), is that so?
 




Kirsti,

is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of points).

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
course, are deeply related. But how?

To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.

Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.

I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
question, is such an experiment.

Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.

EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
logical thinking.

Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> Gary, Kirsti, List,
> I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
> geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
> they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> wrote:
>
> Kirsti, list,
>
> Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
> points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
> month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
> according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
> _point_ before Euclid.
>
> Gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
> Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
>
> Listers,
>
> Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
> geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
> as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
> instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
> Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.
>
> Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a
> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .
>
> Links:
> --
> [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/
> [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm


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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

Interesting little anthology you've put together here, and it certainly
shows Peirce referring to parts of signs (also parts of objects and of
interpretants), and parts of an illative transformation. However I don't see
a clear case here of Peirce referring to a part of a relation. The closest
he comes is the one you put last, where he speaks of a part of a "spike" of
a relation, which is still not a part of a relation.

 

Generalizing from this sample, then, I think we can say that Peirce speaks
often enough of parts of a sign, but does not speak of parts of a relation.
If that's the case, I think it gives another reason why we should not say
that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a sign relation is triadic -
and its correlates should not be regarded as parts.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 22-Dec-17 13:33
To: jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce List ; John F Sowa 
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,

 

I take John to be asking a good question about whether or how the part/whole
distinction might or might not apply to the account of relations and
relationships as it is applied in the normative science of semiotics. Given
the context of our discussion, we can ask similar questions about how the
distinction should be applied in the formal logic of the EG.

 

In asking "what practical  difference would it make," I take John to be
asking the very same kind of thing that Peirce asked in his account of
relations and relationships when he moves from the first (i.e., familiarity)
and second (logical) grades of clarity, to a third pragmatic grade of
clarity (see The Logic of Relatives starting at CP 3.456 and also 6.318
below).

 

Starting with the texts, I see that Peirce applies the distinction in a
number of places to the account of relations and relationships.  Here are
several relevant passages (note:  words both underlined and in bold are my
emphasis):

 

1.  CP 2.316. Let us now proceed to compare the conclusions from the
abstract

definition of a Dicisign with the facts about propositions. The first
conclusion is that every proposition contains a Subject and a Predicate, the
former representing (or being) an Index of the Primary Object, or Correlate
of the relation represented, the latter representing (or being) an Icon of
the Dicisign in some respect. Before inquiring whether every proposition has
such parts, let us see whether the descriptions given of them are accurate,
when there are such parts. The proposition "Cain kills Abel" has two
subjects "Cain" and "Abel" and relates as much to the real Objects of one of
these as to that of the other. But it may be regarded as primarily relating
to the Dyad composed of Cain, as first, and of Abel, as second member. This
Pair is a single individual object having this relation to Cain and to Abel,
that its existence consists in the existence of Cain and in the existence of
Abel and in nothing more. The Pair, though its existence thus depends on
Cain's existence and on Abel's, is, nevertheless, just as truly existent as
they severally are. The Dyad is not precisely the Pair. The Dyad is a mental
Diagram consisting of two images of two objects, one existentially connected
with one member of the pair, the other with the other; the one having
attached to it, as representing it, a Symbol whose meaning is "First," and
the other a Symbol whose meaning is "Second." Thus, this diagram, the Dyad,
represents Indices of Cain and Abel, respectively; and thus the subject
conforms to our conclusion.  

 

2. CP 4.173 A part of a collection called its whole is a collection such
that whatever is u of the part is u of the whole, but something that is u of
the whole is not u of the part. (174) It is convenient to use this locution;
namely, instead of saying A is in the relation, r, to B, we may say A is an
r to B, or of B; or, if we wish to reverse the order of mentioning A and B,
we may say B is r'd by A. If a relation, r , is such that nothing is r to
two different things, and nothing is r'd by two different things, so that
some things in the universe are perhaps r to nothing while all the rest are
r, each to its own distinct correlate, and there are some things perhaps to
which nothing is r, but all the rest have each a single thing that is r to
it, then I call r a one-to-one relation. If there be a one-to-one relation,
r, such that every unit of one collection is r to a unit of a second
collection, while every unit of the second collection is r'd by a unit of
the first collection, those two collections are commonly said to be in a
one-to-one correspondence with one another. . . . 

 

3. CP 2.311 This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary Object,
the other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisig

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

ow the distinctions should be applied.


It is possible that Peirce is mistaken in applying the distinction between part 
and whole the way he does to semiotic relations and relationships but, for my 
part, I don't see anything that stands out as a clear error on his part. As 
such, my aim is to follow his lead in the proper use of these terms--at least 
when I'm trying to interpret his texts.


Yours,


Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____
From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Friday, December 22, 2017 10:36:32 AM
To: jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com
Cc: Peirce List; John F Sowa
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Jerry, John, List,
you wrote:
"
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”
Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!
".
I dont understand this. If anybody asks, if relations have parts, why can this 
not be an intrinsically motivated question? Why does the CSP spirit suggest, 
that this question must be extrinsically motivated, so that the asker does not 
just want to know the answer, because he/she finds it interesting, but has 
obscure motives, and wants to use the answer for something weird, something 
other than just gaining knowledge? Ok, you can always ask: Why do you want to 
gain knowledge? That is always a good question, I admit. But: If the knowledge 
gainer shares this knowledge, then I think it is clear to see, that she/he just 
wants to commit to the scientific progress, and is not Dr. No, or Frankenstein.

I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but there 
are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are their 
parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, but maybe 
not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, and I might have missed 
it).

Best,
Helmut


22. Dezember 2017 um 17:55 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 

List, John:

Comments inserted within text:

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but 
>> in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat 
>> arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one 
>> “subject” or several.
>
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
>
> A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
>
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
>
Well stated!
But, this is traditional mathematical usage because of the role of 
well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly display of 
numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a one-dimensional geometric line.

The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations that depend 
on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology). This is essential to the 
emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral centers. The alignment of 
the parts of the chiral molecule are in space. This proven by well-defined 
emanations necessary for the patterns of x-ray diffraction of the sinsign.

In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the symbols where 
A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for guanosine, the three 
symbols,

A > G

makes no logical sense.

In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the symbol 
system under inquiry.

(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and syntax 
which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.

A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given molecular 
formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of tartaric acid.
>
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.

Agreed.
>
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols). But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign sys

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, John, List,

you wrote:

"
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

".

I dont understand this. If anybody asks, if relations have parts, why can this not be an intrinsically motivated question? Why does the CSP spirit suggest, that this question must be extrinsically motivated, so that the asker does not just want to know the answer, because he/she finds it interesting, but has obscure motives, and wants to use the answer for something weird, something other than just gaining knowledge? Ok, you can always ask: Why do you want to gain knowledge? That is always a good question, I admit. But: If the knowledge gainer shares this knowledge, then I think it is clear to see, that she/he just wants to commit to the scientific progress, and is not Dr. No, or Frankenstein.

 


I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, and I might have missed it).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 


22. Dezember 2017 um 17:55 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 

List, John:

Comments inserted within text:

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one “subject” or several.
>
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
>
> A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
>
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
>
Well stated!
But, this is traditional mathematical usage because of the role of well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly display of numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a one-dimensional geometric line.

The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations that depend on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology). This is essential to the emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral centers. The alignment of the parts of the chiral molecule are in space. This proven by well-defined emanations necessary for the patterns of x-ray diffraction of the sinsign.

In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the symbols where A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for guanosine, the three symbols,

A > G

makes no logical sense.

In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the symbol system under inquiry.

(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and syntax which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.

A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given molecular formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of tartaric acid.
>
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.

Agreed.
>
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols). But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign system for chemical notation. The composition of the names of the parts (as names of atoms) generates a new name for the molecule that is the "difference that makes a difference” between atoms and molecules. The new name must give an exact accounting of the spatial organization of the parts, as with tartaric acid and virtually all other biochemicals.
>
> In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
> describe any relation, including the sign relation.
Agreed.
>
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

>From my perspective, I would suggest that John assertions are closely tied to the general problem of taxonomy / categorization / classification / order and organization which are intrinsic to the mathematization of natural sorts and kinds, as well as a host of other problems associated with the bare grammati

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:  

Comments inserted within text:

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but 
>> in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat 
>> arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one 
>> “subject” or several.
> 
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
> 
> A sign is a triadic relation.  But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts.  For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
> 
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
> 
Well stated!
But, this is traditional  mathematical usage because of the role of 
well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly display of 
numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a one-dimensional geometric line.

The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations that depend 
on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology).  This is essential to the 
emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral centers. The alignment of 
the parts of the chiral molecule are in space. This proven by well-defined 
emanations necessary for the patterns of x-ray diffraction of the  sinsign. 

In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the symbols where 
A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for guanosine, the three 
symbols, 

A  >  G  

makes no logical sense.

In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the symbol 
system under inquiry. 
 
(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and syntax 
which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships.  And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.

A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given molecular 
formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of tartaric  acid.  
> 
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs.  But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.

Agreed.
> 
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols).  But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign system for chemical 
notation. The composition of the names of the parts (as names of atoms) 
generates a new name for the molecule  that is the "difference that makes a 
difference” between atoms and molecules. The new name must give an exact 
accounting of the spatial organization of the parts, as with tartaric acid and 
virtually all other biochemicals.
> 
> In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
> describe any relation, including the sign relation.
Agreed.
> 
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean?  Why are you asking
> that question?  What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

>From my perspective, I would suggest that John assertions are closely tied to 
>the general problem of  taxonomy / categorization / classification / order and 
>organization which are intrinsic to the mathematization of natural sorts and 
>kinds, as well as a host of other problems associated with the bare 
>grammatical usage of the term “part” in the context of philosophy and public 
>rhetoric.

Cheers

Jerry


> 
> John
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

John, my response inserted [GF:] —

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 22-Dec-17 10:39



On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM,   g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and 

> predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these 

> “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of 

> whether it has one “subject” or several.

 

But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.

 

GF: It gives a conditional answer: IF you consider a proposition to be a sign, 
and you refer to a subject or a predicate as a part of a given proposition, 
then I know what you mean by “part”, and I say that such a “part” is a product 
of an analysis which is not logically necessary.

 

JFS: A sign is a triadic relation.  

GF: No. If we follow Peirce’s terminology strictly, a sign is one correlate of 
a triadic relation. (We’ve been through this before, and predictably some list 
members will object to that terminology, but I consider the issue settled by 
Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations” (EP2:290, CP 2.242), 
not to mention the rest of the Syllabus and the entirety of the Lowell 
Lectures, which are consistent in this respect. We can say that a sign relation 
is triadic, but we can’t say that a sign is a triadic relation — not if we’re 
sticking to Peirce’s terminology, which I think causes less confusion than the 
alternative. 

 

I agree with you in this respect: I would not say that the other correlates of 
the triadic relation (i.e. the object and interpretant) are “parts” of the 
relation. A correlate is not a part. So I would agree with everything you say 
below, but I don’t object to references to signs as having parts. Peirce 
himself does this occasionally, for instance in “New Elements” where he says 
“the common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter, called to mind by 
the words, is a part of the sign” (EP2:310).

 

Gary f.

 

But it's not clear whether you can or should say that a relation has parts.  
For example, consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.

 

If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols, and it expresses a 
relationship between 7 and 2.

But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.

 

That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the relation named 
greater-than can "have" infinitely many relationships.  And as Aristotle 
observed, "have as part"

is only one of many ways of "having".

 

One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an infinite set of pairs. 
 But that does not imply that greater-than has infinitely many parts.

 

The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms (several statements with 
multiple symbols).  But those axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

 

In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to describe any relation, 
including the sign relation.

 

If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?", I would say "What do you mean?  
Why are you asking that question?  What would you do with the answer?"

 

John


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Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Kirsti,

is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of points).

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
course, are deeply related. But how?

To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.

Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.

I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
question, is such an experiment.

Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.

EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
logical thinking.

Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> Gary, Kirsti, List,
> I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
> geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
> they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> wrote:
>
> Kirsti, list,
>
> Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
> points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
> month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
> according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
> _point_ before Euclid.
>
> Gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
> Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
>
> Listers,
>
> Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
> geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
> as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
> instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
> Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.
>
> Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a
> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .
>
> Links:
> --
> [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/
> [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[John F Sowa]

On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, 
but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is 
somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it 
has one “subject” or several.


But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.

A sign is a triadic relation.  But it's not clear whether
you can or should say that a relation has parts.  For example,
consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.

If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.

That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
relationships.  And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
is only one of many ways of "having".

One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
infinite set of pairs.  But that does not imply that
greater-than has infinitely many parts.

The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
(several statements with multiple symbols).  But those
axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
describe any relation, including the sign relation.

If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
I would say "What do you mean?  Why are you asking
that question?  What would you do with the answer?"

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Kirsti, John, list,

 

My source for the usage of SEMEION was Liddell and Scott (which can be searched 
online). As John says, the primary meaning is “mark”. My answer to the question 
of whether a sign has parts was, I thought, implied by the Peirce quote in the 
blog post I linked to, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/: “upon a 
continuous line there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is 
only room for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you mark a point on the 
line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has a beginning 
and end, then it has those two points (discontinuities) already. 

 

I was suggesting an analogy to a sign: for instance, you can say that a 
dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the 
analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the 
choice of whether it has one “subject” or several. The more “complete” a sign 
is, the more the element of continuity (or Thirdness) is predominant in it, and 
thus the more room there is in it for possibilities of parts, i.e. the more 
opportunity for analyzing it into “partial signs.” Sorry for being so 
elliptical in my post, but that was my point (if you’ll pardon the expression). 
I have a very unPeircean fondness for conciseness.

 

By the way, the manuscript of Lowell 4 has a very detailed and previously 
unpublished explanation of (hypostatic) abstractions such as “dormitive 
virtue”, so that may be of use for continuing your recent discussion of 
abstraction, when we reach that point in the next lecture.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 22-Dec-17 01:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Kirsti and Gary F,

 

K

> Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has 

> no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the 

> earlier STIGME .

 

GF

> By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον 

> for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the Liddell 

> and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word for sign and 

> root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical 

> point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with στιγμή 

> (stigma).

 

I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique, and Heath's 
translation and commentary on Euclid.

 

The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something; for example, 
as a sign of ownership.  From that, the word 'stigma'

(ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed instrument. 
 The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's plumage; then it came to 
mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant.

 

Aristotle explicitly said that a  point was a marker on a line, not a part of 
the line.  Heath said that Euclid generally followed Aristotle.  But in vol. 1, 
p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was probably "considered more suitable than 
'stigme' (a puncture) which might claim to have more reality than a point."

 

In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer to a 
mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others.

 

K

> Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

 

The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark.

Euclid used it for just one particular kind.  For that use in geometry, the 
thing it refers to has no parts.

 

K

> the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. 

 

I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words:

'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point.

 

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[John F Sowa]

Kirsti and Gary F,

K

Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which
has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of
the earlier STIGME .


GF

By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον
for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the Liddell
and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word for sign
and root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical
point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with
στιγμή (stigma).


I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique,
and Heath's translation and commentary on Euclid.

The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something;
for example, as a sign of ownership.  From that, the word 'stigma'
(ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed 
instrument.  The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's

plumage; then it came to mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant.

Aristotle explicitly said that a  point was a marker on a line,
not a part of the line.  Heath said that Euclid generally followed
Aristotle.  But in vol. 1, p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was
probably "considered more suitable than 'stigme' (a puncture)
which might claim to have more reality than a point."

In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer
to a mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others.

K

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?


The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark.
Euclid used it for just one particular kind.  For that use in
geometry, the thing it refers to has no parts.

K
the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. 


I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words:
'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point.

John

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Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I 
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of 
course, are deeply related. But how?


To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in 
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.


Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a 
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.


I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the 
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the 
question, is such an experiment.


Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our 
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.


EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines. 
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for 
logical thinking.


Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:

Gary, Kirsti, List,
I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
Best,
Helmut

 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 wrote:

Kirsti, list,

Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
_point_ before Euclid.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
 From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
 Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti

 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .

Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/
[2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Gary f., list,

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 21.12.2017 16:39:


"Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
points."


Yes its does. But that does not answer the questions I posed. Perhaps I 
should have added: What do you (listers) think?


Gary f.: " By the way,

according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
_point_ before Euclid."


Interesting. Was in connection with geometry?  Or how does your source 
infer it was used FOR 'point'?


Best,

Kirsti



-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans &
later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti



Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/



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Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Kirsti, List,

I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of", geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Kirsti, list,

 

Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/. By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for point before Euclid.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
 

 

Listers,

 

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

 

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

 

Best, Kirsti

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Kirsti, list,

 

Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points. 
Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last month, 
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/. By the way, according to my sources, 
Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for point before Euclid.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25



 

Listers,

 

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for 
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that 
which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the 
earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius changed it to 
PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

 

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

 

Best, Kirsti

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for 
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as 
that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead 
of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius 
changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.


Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti


g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 18.12.2017 23:07:

List,

Aristotle's remarks at the beginning of _De Caelo_ go like this: "A
magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and
if three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the
three dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible
in three directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say,
the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three,
since beginning and middle and end give the number of an 'all', and
the number they give is the triad." Peirce occasionally called this
triad the "cenopythagorean categories" -- but for him, there is much
more to them than we find in Aristotle's summary of the Pythagorean
notions. Although these elements are so fundamental that "confused
notions" of them go back to the beginning of philosophy, great
patience and effort is required to clarify them as they ought to be
clarified by anyone interested in philosophy.

Peirce's comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate
Peirce's own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on "the
inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions" -- referring I
think to conceptions _in general_, not just the three in question here
-- is remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty)
compels him to say "I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed
a single idea into its constituent elements." In the drafts of this
lecture and elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors,
though he decided not to "inflict" such an account on his audience at
this time. I think we can be sure that if Peirce never managed to
"analyze a single idea into its constituent elements," it wasn't for
lack of effort or skill at logical analysis.

Gary f.

FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
SENT: 17-Dec-17 15:07
TO: 'Peirce-L' 
SUBJECT: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13896
[1]

Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy,
as most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions
of the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you
can.

[CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be
conveyed in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot
sun-shine of hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well
aimed thought; and you must have patience, for long time is required
to ripen the fruit. They are no inventions of mine. Were they so, that
would be sufficient to condemn them. Confused notions of these
elements appear in the first infancy of philosophy, and they have
never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental importance is noticed
in the beginning of Aristotle's _De Caelo,_ where it is said that the
Pythagoreans knew of them.

[522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant
possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a
philosopher,
1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness;
2nd, Inventive originality;
3rd, Generalizing power;
4th, Subtlety;
5th, Critical severity and sense of fact;
6th, Systematic procedure;
7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to
philosophy.

[523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible
intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not
flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its
constituent elements.

[524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever
lived, had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an
inadequate notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case
was, he would not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast
field that he attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient
in that 5th requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He
brought out the three elements much more clearly. But the element of
Secondness, of _hard fact,_ is not accorded its due place in his
system; and in a lesser degree the same is true of Firstness. After
Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that were remarkably fruitful in
all the means for attaining that 5th requisite. Yet Hegel's followers,
instead of going to work to reform their master's system, and to
render his statement of it obsolete, as every true philosopher must
desire that his disciples should do, only proposed, at best, some
superficial changes without replacing at all the rotten ma

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



A human being may well ask the animal:

‘Why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and gaze at
me.’



The animal would like to answer, and say:

‘The reason is I always forget what I was going to say’—

but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent.



It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.  Should I
not have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with
me?



To make them as distinct as it is in their nature to be is, however, no
small task.



*From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189*



With best wishes,

Jerry Rhee

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 12:44 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, list,
>
>
>
> That’s an interesting question — for my part, I don’t see that Peirce's 
> explanations
> of the alpha or beta parts of EG in the Lowell Lectures tell us much about
> what’s necessary “to arrive at conclusions about what is *observable*
> under different kinds of possible tests.” But maybe we’ll learn something
> about that from the gamma graphs. Or John may have something to say about
> this.
>
>
>
> When you say that those elements of experience are universal and necessary
> “with respect to the requirements that cognitive agents must meet in order
> to improve their understanding of the world by testing explanations against
> observations,” that strikes me as a corollary to the proposition that those
> elements are universal and necessary *for cognition*. In *Turning Signs*
> I argue that the inquiry cycle which is finely articulated in scientific
> method is already present in a less articulated form in even the most
> primitive forms of cognition. I take this to be the Peircean view, and I
> also quote Karl Popper, who sees the essence of scientific method as “trial
> and error” (or to use the bigger words, “hypothesis and refutation.” Popper
> says “The method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in
> a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also” (Popper 1968, 68). Any such
> “method” is inconceivable without Thirdness, which necessarily involves
> Secondness, which necessarily involves Firstness.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> *Sent:* 18-Dec-17 20:59
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>
>
>
> Gary F, John S, List,
>
>
>
> The passage cited earlier from the Carnegie application helps to clarify
> what is unique about Peirce's phenomenological account of the elements of
> experience.
>
>
>
> In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or
> about 4000 words, upon a *New List of Categories*. It was the result of
> full two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today
> that in so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly
> accurate, especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an
> unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of
> categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in
> attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which they
> found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the
> conceptions, slightly developing some of them, arranging them, and in
> Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been confused with others. But
> what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of
> whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by examining it to
> form clear conceptions of its radically different classes of elements,
> without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all. This was the most
> difficult task I ever ventured to undertake. [Carnegie application (1902)]
>
>
>
> In what ways does the account of the formal elements of firstness,
> secondness and thirdness "attempt much more" than is provided in the lists
> and tables of categories developed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? My
> understanding is that it attempts much more because it is meant to be an
> account of the *formal* elements in any possible experience that are, in
> some sense, *universal* and *necessary*?
>
>
>
> Let us ask:  in what senses are the elemental relations of what is
> monadic, dyadic or triadic in experience universal and necessary? My
> interpretative hypothesis is that they are not taken to be universal and
> necessary in themselves (i.e., simpliciter). Rather, they are universal and
> necessary elements of experience with respect to the requirements that
> cognitive agents must meet in order to improve their understanding of the
> world by testing explanations against observations.
>
>
>
> As such, the idea is that Peirce is asking a question that Aristo

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

 

That's an interesting question - for my part, I don't see that Peirce's
explanations of the alpha or beta parts of EG in the Lowell Lectures tell us
much about what's necessary "to arrive at conclusions about what is
observable under different kinds of possible tests." But maybe we'll learn
something about that from the gamma graphs. Or John may have something to
say about this.

 

When you say that those elements of experience are universal and necessary
"with respect to the requirements that cognitive agents must meet in order
to improve their understanding of the world by testing explanations against
observations," that strikes me as a corollary to the proposition that those
elements are universal and necessary for cognition. In Turning Signs I argue
that the inquiry cycle which is finely articulated in scientific method is
already present in a less articulated form in even the most primitive forms
of cognition. I take this to be the Peircean view, and I also quote Karl
Popper, who sees the essence of scientific method as "trial and error" (or
to use the bigger words, "hypothesis and refutation." Popper says "The
method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in a more
dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also" (Popper 1968, 68). Any such "method"
is inconceivable without Thirdness, which necessarily involves Secondness,
which necessarily involves Firstness.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 18-Dec-17 20:59
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Gary F, John S, List,

 

The passage cited earlier from the Carnegie application helps to clarify
what is unique about Peirce's phenomenological account of the elements of
experience.

 

In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or
about 4000 words, upon a New List of Categories. It was the result of full
two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today that in
so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly accurate,
especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an
unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of categories
differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in attempting much more
than they. They merely took conceptions which they found at hand, already
worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the conceptions, slightly
developing some of them, arranging them, and in Hegel's case, separating one
or two that had been confused with others. But what I undertook to do was to
go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we find to have been forced
upon our minds, and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its
radically different classes of elements, without relying upon any previous
philosophizing, at all. This was the most difficult task I ever ventured to
undertake. [Carnegie application (1902)]

 

In what ways does the account of the formal elements of firstness,
secondness and thirdness "attempt much more" than is provided in the lists
and tables of categories developed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? My
understanding is that it attempts much more because it is meant to be an
account of the formal elements in any possible experience that are, in some
sense, universal and necessary?

 

Let us ask:  in what senses are the elemental relations of what is monadic,
dyadic or triadic in experience universal and necessary? My interpretative
hypothesis is that they are not taken to be universal and necessary in
themselves (i.e., simpliciter). Rather, they are universal and necessary
elements of experience with respect to the requirements that cognitive
agents must meet in order to improve their understanding of the world by
testing explanations against observations.

 

As such, the idea is that Peirce is asking a question that Aristotle, Kant
and Hegel failed to adequately answer, which is:  what are the formal
elements in experience that are necessary for (a) drawing on observations of
surprising phenomena for the sake of formulating explanatory hypotheses by
abduction, (b) deducing the testable consequences of what might possibly be
observed if a given hypothesis were to be true and (c), inducing from given
observations what explanations tend to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the
data.

 

In abduction and induction, the observations that are actually made supply
us with the premisses of the arguments. In making deductions of the testable
consequences from purported hypotheses, we are asking what we would expect
to observable given an explanation as a supposition. If this interpretative
hypothesis is on the right track, then Peirce is arguing that the formal
elements of firstness, secondness and thirdness that are universally part of
any possible experience are necessary for the purpose of drawing valid
inference

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Dec 18, 2017, at 7:58 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and 
> Hegel in attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which 
> they found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting 
> the conceptions, slightly developing some of them, arranging them, and in 
> Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been confused with others. But 
> what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever 
> we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by examining it to form clear 
> conceptions of its radically different classes of elements, without relying 
> upon any previous philosophizing, at all. . [Carnegie application (1902)]

Jerry R responded: 
"Dear list,

"For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and 
Hegel in attempting much more than they."

It may be incumbent on our part to ask whether Peirce was lying, and why it is 
obviously so."  


Firstly, this extremely broad assertion is puzzling to me.  Its philosophical 
content is obscure if one attempts to compare the earlier categories of 
Aristotle, Kant and Hegel on a term by term basis.  
Since, philosophically, I believe that one only forms categories with a 
specific purpose in mind, is CSP merely asserting that he has a different 
purpose in mind? 

 Can anyone show how CSP’s categories differ in the sense of “attempting much 
more than they?”

The assertion, 
"and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its radically different 
classes of elements, without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all."

appears to place an extreme constraint on the conceptual meaning of the term 
“philosophizing”.
After all, many many philosophers, great and small, have offered concrete lists 
of categories, usually embracing a good bit of metaphysics in the process.

What justifies CSP's extreme constraint, especially is view of the huge role of 
personal philosophy in defining categories?

Cheers
Jerry






-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry Rhee]

rams that are necessary for us to see what follows
> from a given set of premisses.
>
>
> For my part, I think that Peirce's explanations of the EG in the Lowell
> Lectures does help us see what is necessary for (2). In what ways does it
> help us see what is necessary with respect to (1)?
>
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca 
> *Sent:* Monday, December 18, 2017 2:07:06 PM
> *To:* 'Peirce-L'
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> Aristotle’s remarks at the beginning of *De Caelo* go like this: “A
> magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if
> three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three
> dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible in three
> directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and
> all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and
> middle and end give the number of an ‘all’, and the number they give is the
> triad.” Peirce occasionally called this triad the “cenopythagorean
> categories” — but for him, there is much more to them than we find in
> Aristotle’s summary of the Pythagorean notions. Although these elements are
> so fundamental that “confused notions” of them go back to the beginning of
> philosophy, great patience and effort is required to clarify them as they
> ought to be clarified by anyone interested in philosophy.
>
>
>
> Peirce’s comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate
> Peirce’s own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on “the
> inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions” — referring I think
> to conceptions *in general*, not just the three in question here — is
> remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty) compels him
> to say “I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea
> into its constituent elements.” In the drafts of this lecture and
> elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors, though he decided
> not to “inflict” such an account on his audience at this time. I think we
> can be sure that if Peirce never managed to “analyze a single idea into its
> constituent elements,” it wasn’t for lack of effort or skill at logical
> analysis.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* 17-Dec-17 15:07
> *To:* 'Peirce-L' 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>
>
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13896
> 39 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 464-465 (1903) - Lowell Lecture III - 3rd
> Draught) | FromThePage
> <https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13896>
> fromthepage.com
> 39 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts, MS 464-465 (1903) - Lowell Lecture III - 3rd
> Draught) - page overview. 68 Paging in other book should have 2 added to
> each page after 5, and 1 added to 5 thought as a real power, or as anything
> but a fantastic...
>
>
>
> Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as
> most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the
> three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can.
>
>
>
> [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed
> in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of
> hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you
> must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are
> no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn
> them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of
> philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental
> importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's *De Caelo,* where
> it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them.
>
>
>
> [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant
> possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a
> philosopher,
> 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness;
> 2nd, Inventive originality;
> 3rd, Generalizing power;
> 4th, Subtlety;
> 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact;
> 6th, Systematic procedure;
> 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to
> philosophy.
>
>
>
> [52

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, John S, List,


The passage cited earlier from the Carnegie application helps to clarify what 
is unique about Peirce's phenomenological account of the elements of experience.


In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or about 
4000 words, upon a New List of Categories. It was the result of full two years' 
intense and incessant application. It surprises me today that in so short a 
time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly accurate, especially 
when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an unnecessarily difficult 
route I reached my goal. For this list of categories differs from the lists of 
Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in attempting much more than they. They merely took 
conceptions which they found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was 
limited to selecting the conceptions, slightly developing some of them, 
arranging them, and in Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been 
confused with others. But what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, 
in the sense of whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by 
examining it to form clear conceptions of its radically different classes of 
elements, without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all. This was 
the most difficult task I ever ventured to undertake. [Carnegie application 
(1902)]


In what ways does the account of the formal elements of firstness, secondness 
and thirdness "attempt much more" than is provided in the lists and tables of 
categories developed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? My understanding is that it 
attempts much more because it is meant to be an account of the formal elements 
in any possible experience that are, in some sense, universal and necessary?


Let us ask:  in what senses are the elemental relations of what is monadic, 
dyadic or triadic in experience universal and necessary? My interpretative 
hypothesis is that they are not taken to be universal and necessary in 
themselves (i.e., simpliciter). Rather, they are universal and necessary 
elements of experience with respect to the requirements that cognitive agents 
must meet in order to improve their understanding of the world by testing 
explanations against observations.


As such, the idea is that Peirce is asking a question that Aristotle, Kant and 
Hegel failed to adequately answer, which is:  what are the formal elements in 
experience that are necessary for (a) drawing on observations of surprising 
phenomena for the sake of formulating explanatory hypotheses by abduction, (b) 
deducing the testable consequences of what might possibly be observed if a 
given hypothesis were to be true and (c), inducing from given observations what 
explanations tend to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the data.


In abduction and induction, the observations that are actually made supply us 
with the premisses of the arguments. In making deductions of the testable 
consequences from purported hypotheses, we are asking what we would expect to 
observable given an explanation as a supposition. If this interpretative 
hypothesis is on the right track, then Peirce is arguing that the formal 
elements of firstness, secondness and thirdness that are universally part of 
any possible experience are necessary for the purpose of drawing valid 
inferences by abduction or induction from such observations--or for deducing 
the consequences of what could be observed if a given hypothesis were to be 
true.


Let's focus our attention on the last sort of case pertaining to deduction, and 
let's ask:  are these formal elements universally necessary for deducing the 
consequences of what possibly could be observed if a given hypothesis were to 
turn out to be true? If so, in what ways are the formal elements necessary for 
drawing such inferences by deduction?


There are two ways in which the elements are necessary, and I believe that the 
EG help us clarify both of these ways.


1)  In drawing such deductive inferences, we must be able to arrive at 
conclusions about what is observable under different kinds of possible tests.

2) Drawing such deductions requires that we observe the formal elements in the 
sorts of logical diagrams that are necessary for us to see what follows from a 
given set of premisses.


For my part, I think that Peirce's explanations of the EG in the Lowell 
Lectures does help us see what is necessary for (2). In what ways does it help 
us see what is necessary with respect to (1)?



--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:07:06 PM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

List,

Aristotle’s remarks at the beginning of De Caelo go like this: “A magnitude if 
divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if three a body. Beyond 
th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,


Ἰδέα is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for εἶδος,
class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality that underlies any
group of things classed together in virtue of possessing a common quality.
An ἰδέα is perceptible only by the mind, but the word does not denote the
content of a mental perception, as does the derivative 'idea' in ordinary
English.



Some words shall herein be capitalised when used, not as vernacular, but as
terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought
or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato’s idea of *ἰδέα*, denotes anything whose
Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented,
regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it.


Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 3:07 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> Aristotle’s remarks at the beginning of *De Caelo* go like this: “A
> magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if
> three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three
> dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible in three
> directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and
> all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and
> middle and end give the number of an ‘all’, and the number they give is the
> triad.” Peirce occasionally called this triad the “cenopythagorean
> categories” — but for him, there is much more to them than we find in
> Aristotle’s summary of the Pythagorean notions. Although these elements are
> so fundamental that “confused notions” of them go back to the beginning of
> philosophy, great patience and effort is required to clarify them as they
> ought to be clarified by anyone interested in philosophy.
>
>
>
> Peirce’s comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate
> Peirce’s own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on “the
> inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions” — referring I think
> to conceptions *in general*, not just the three in question here — is
> remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty) compels him
> to say “I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea
> into its constituent elements.” In the drafts of this lecture and
> elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors, though he decided
> not to “inflict” such an account on his audience at this time. I think we
> can be sure that if Peirce never managed to “analyze a single idea into its
> constituent elements,” it wasn’t for lack of effort or skill at logical
> analysis.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* 17-Dec-17 15:07
> *To:* 'Peirce-L' 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>
>
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13896
>
>
>
> Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as
> most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the
> three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can.
>
>
>
> [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed
> in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of
> hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you
> must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are
> no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn
> them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of
> philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental
> importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's *De Caelo,* where
> it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them.
>
>
>
> [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant
> possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a
> philosopher,
> 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness;
> 2nd, Inventive originality;
> 3rd, Generalizing power;
> 4th, Subtlety;
> 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact;
> 6th, Systematic procedure;
> 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to
> philosophy.
>
>
>
> [523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible
> intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter
> myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent
> elements.
>
>
>
> [524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived,
> had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate
> notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would
> not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he
> attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th
> requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He brought out the three
> elements much more clearly. But the e

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Stephen C. Rose]

When I was in my 20s living on North Orchard Street in Lincoln Park in
Chicago I vividly remember entering my building after a day's work  and
stopping. I turned and began to pound the marble-like wall above the row of
mailboxes at eye level. Unbidden came a cry, "There are too many truths!"
It was followed by one or two softer repetitions. It was cold, perhaps this
time of year. I opened the heavy door and walked upstairs. I have no
recollection of telling anyone of this or even writing about it. But since
encountering Peirce late in life -- I am 81 I was in my 20s then -- I
associate my outburst with his notion of the triadic. The nesting within
that is infinite. So to are truths. It remains frustrating but that is
where we live.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 4:07 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> Aristotle’s remarks at the beginning of *De Caelo* go like this: “A
> magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if
> three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three
> dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible in three
> directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and
> all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and
> middle and end give the number of an ‘all’, and the number they give is the
> triad.” Peirce occasionally called this triad the “cenopythagorean
> categories” — but for him, there is much more to them than we find in
> Aristotle’s summary of the Pythagorean notions. Although these elements are
> so fundamental that “confused notions” of them go back to the beginning of
> philosophy, great patience and effort is required to clarify them as they
> ought to be clarified by anyone interested in philosophy.
>
>
>
> Peirce’s comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate
> Peirce’s own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on “the
> inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions” — referring I think
> to conceptions *in general*, not just the three in question here — is
> remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty) compels him
> to say “I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea
> into its constituent elements.” In the drafts of this lecture and
> elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors, though he decided
> not to “inflict” such an account on his audience at this time. I think we
> can be sure that if Peirce never managed to “analyze a single idea into its
> constituent elements,” it wasn’t for lack of effort or skill at logical
> analysis.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* 17-Dec-17 15:07
> *To:* 'Peirce-L' 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>
>
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13896
>
>
>
> Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as
> most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the
> three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can.
>
>
>
> [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed
> in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of
> hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you
> must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are
> no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn
> them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of
> philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental
> importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's *De Caelo,* where
> it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them.
>
>
>
> [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant
> possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a
> philosopher,
> 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness;
> 2nd, Inventive originality;
> 3rd, Generalizing power;
> 4th, Subtlety;
> 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact;
> 6th, Systematic procedure;
> 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to
> philosophy.
>
>
>
> [523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible
> intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter
> myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent
> elements.
>
>
>
> [524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived,
> had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate
> notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would
> not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he
> attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th
> requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He brought out the three
> elements much more clearly. Bu

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

List,

 

Aristotle's remarks at the beginning of De Caelo go like this: "A magnitude
if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if three a body.
Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three dimensions are
all that there are, and that which is divisible in three directions is
divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in
it is determined by the number three, since beginning and middle and end
give the number of an 'all', and the number they give is the triad." Peirce
occasionally called this triad the "cenopythagorean categories" - but for
him, there is much more to them than we find in Aristotle's summary of the
Pythagorean notions. Although these elements are so fundamental that
"confused notions" of them go back to the beginning of philosophy, great
patience and effort is required to clarify them as they ought to be
clarified by anyone interested in philosophy.

 

Peirce's comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate
Peirce's own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on "the inexhaustible
intricacy of the fabric of conceptions" - referring I think to conceptions
in general, not just the three in question here - is remarkable, and his
recognition of that (rather than modesty) compels him to say "I do not
flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent
elements." In the drafts of this lecture and elsewhere, Peirce did give some
account of his labors, though he decided not to "inflict" such an account on
his audience at this time. I think we can be sure that if Peirce never
managed to "analyze a single idea into its constituent elements," it wasn't
for lack of effort or skill at logical analysis. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: 17-Dec-17 15:07
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13896

 

Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as
most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the
three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can. 

 

[CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed in
one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of hard
thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you must
have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are no
inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn them.
Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of
philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental
importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's De Caelo, where it is
said that the Pythagoreans knew of them. 

 

[522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant possessed
in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a philosopher, 
1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness; 
2nd, Inventive originality; 
3rd, Generalizing power; 
4th, Subtlety; 
5th, Critical severity and sense of fact; 
6th, Systematic procedure; 
7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to philosophy. 

 

[523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible
intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter
myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent
elements. 

 

[524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived, had
a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate notion,
too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would not have
attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he attempted to
clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th requisite of critical
severity and sense of fact. He brought out the three elements much more
clearly. But the element of Secondness, of hard fact, is not accorded its
due place in his system; and in a lesser degree the same is true of
Firstness. After Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that were remarkably
fruitful in all the means for attaining that 5th requisite. Yet Hegel's
followers, instead of going to work to reform their master's system, and to
render his statement of it obsolete, as every true philosopher must desire
that his disciples should do, only proposed, at best, some superficial
changes without replacing at all the rotten material with which the system
was built up. 

 

[525] I shall not inflict upon you any account of my own labors. Suffice it
to say that my results have afforded me great aid in the study of logic. 

 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I have been accused of criticizing list culture.

But it can be good to be self-critical when it suits us to be so.



“It rather annoys me to be told that there is anything original in my three
categories; for if they have not, however confusedly, been recognized by
men since men began to think, that *condemns them at once*”



“..for long time is required to ripen the fruit.

*They are no inventions of mine*.

Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn them.”



If Peirce did not invent his Categories, then who?



Best,
Jerry R

On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 2:06 PM,  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13896
>
>
>
> Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as
> most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the
> three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can.
>
>
>
> [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed
> in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of
> hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you
> must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are
> no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn
> them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of
> philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental
> importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's *De Caelo,* where
> it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them.
>
>
>
> [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant
> possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a
> philosopher,
> 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness;
> 2nd, Inventive originality;
> 3rd, Generalizing power;
> 4th, Subtlety;
> 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact;
> 6th, Systematic procedure;
> 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to
> philosophy.
>
>
>
> [523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible
> intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter
> myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent
> elements.
>
>
>
> [524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived,
> had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate
> notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would
> not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he
> attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th
> requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He brought out three
> elements much more clearly. But the element of Secondness, of *hard fact,*
> is not accorded its due place in his system; and in a lesser degree the
> same is true of Firstness. After Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that
> were remarkably fruitful in all the means for attaining that 5th
> requisite. Yet Hegel's followers, instead of going to work to reform their
> master's system, and to render his statement of it obsolete, as every true
> philosopher must desire that his disciples should do, only proposed, at
> best, some superficial changes without replacing at all the rotten material
> with which the system was built up.
>
>
>
> [525] I shall not inflict upon you any account of my own labors. Suffice
> it to say that my results have afforded me great aid in the study of logic.
>
>
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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