Re: Re: Re: reform and rev
on 1/22/02 06:44 AM, Michael Perelman at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > The Paris Commune caused a flurry of interest in Marx -- especially by > mainstream economists. > > On Mon, Jan 21, 2002 at 10:13:37AM -0800, Rakesh Bhandari wrote: >>> >>> >>> CB: The difference between Marx and others is the Russian, Chinese >>> and other socialist revolutions. We are studying Marx because of >>> the Bolsheviks and the Russian Rev. >> >> Please Charles speak for yourself. >> >> For one thing, I do not think Marx developed a theory of the transfer >> of value in and through the world market that gives expression to >> revolutionary aspirations of national revolts in which peasants, >> petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat have been engaged. The Cuban >> revolution was not waged against a pure advanced capitalism by a pure >> proletariat of the sorts imagined by Marx in his theoretical work. >> This has erroneously led some Marxists to dismiss outright such >> revolutions (say the Cuban and Sandinista revolutions) as nationalist >> reaction and to ridicule first world supporters of them as "third >> worldists", but to combat this view one has to in fact go beyond >> Marx's theory of a pure capitalism (no trade, only two classes, etc) >> to show that without protection in the real world market weaker >> national capitals are as a result of the tranfer of value in >> circulation subject to devaluation and endemic crisis, which in turn >> lead to financial/debt crises. Some orthodox Marxists would dismiss >> this kind of theory of dependency because it is "circulationist", but >> it is in fact a development of Marx's theory of production price in >> the third volume of Capital. >> >> The reason why so many Marxists have difficulty in understanding the >> progressive thrust of many third world revolutions has been that they >> only study Marx, and do not beyond him. Two people who have tried to >> go beyond Marx here are Guglielmo Carchedi and Enrique Dussel from >> whose latest book (edited by the way by Fred Moseley) I draw in the >> above. >> >> Second, it is patently absurd to say that Marx was not studied before >> the revolutions that you mention and imply that people would have >> ceased studying Marx if not for those revolutions. >> >> Rakesh >> >> Towards An Unknown Marx: A Commentary on the Manuscripts of 1861-63 >> (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics, Volume 34) by Fred >> Moseley, Yolanda Angulo (Translator), Enrique D. Dussel >> MIYACHI TATSUO Psychiatric Department Komaki municipal hospital JAPAN arguments about relationship between reform and revolution are prosperous. But I think previous revolutions we experienced was political, not social. In other words, for Marx(Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian") It is entirely false that social need produces political understanding. Indeed, it is nearer the truth to say that political understanding is produced by social well-being. Political understanding is something spiritual, that is given to him that hath, to the man who is already sitting on velvet. Our "Prussian" should take note of what M. Michael Chevalier, a French economist, has to say on the subject: In 1789, when the bourgeoisie rose in rebellion the only thing lacking to its freedom was the right to participate in the government of the country. Emancipation meant the removal of the control of public affairs, the high civic, military, and religious functions from the hands of the privileged classes who had a monopoly of these functions. Wealthy and enlightened, self-sufficient and able to manage their own affairs, they wished to evade the clutches of arbitrary rule. We have already demonstrated to our "Prussian" how inadequate political understanding is to the task of discovering the source of social need. One last word on his view of the matter. The more developed and the more comprehensive is the political understanding of a nation, the more the proletariat will squander its energies -- at least in the initial stages of the movement -- in senseless, futile uprisings that will be drowned in blood. Because it thinks in political terms, it regards the will as the cause of all evils and force and the overthrow of a particular form of the state as the universal remedy. Proof: the first outbreaks of the French proletariat. [8] The workers in Lyons imagined their goals were entirely political, they saw themselves purely as soldiers of the republic, while in reality they were the soldiers of socialism. Thus their political understanding obscured the roots of their social misery, it falsified their insight into their real goal, their political understanding deceived their social instincts. But if the "Prussian" expects understanding to be the result of misery, why does he identify "suppression in blood" with "suppression in incomprehension"? If misery is a means whereby to produce understanding, then a bloody slaughter must be a very
Re: RE: Re: RE: reform and rev
> > >The argument that deficits cause high interest rates is also >theoretically and empirically questionable. More often the causation >goes the other way--high interest rates mean higher interest payments on >the public debt which cet par mean larger deficits. Mat, good point indeed. > >The impact on poorer nations is a greater concern, not necessarily from >deficits, but in general. The argument can be made that a weak U.S. >economy also has a negative impact on poorer nations, but the more >important point I think is to focus on what kinds of policies those >nations can use themselves to increase the living standards of its >citizens and also to protect itself from vulnerability to global >economic changes and econ developments in nations like the U.S. but wasn't eisner right that if the US is going to finance public and private debt with inflows of capital, then it has to keep its markets open? > >>do you support deficit financing by the US govt to create jobs at all >>times? can it ever be counter productive in effect both on a national >>and global scale? > >I think my answer here is that of course it *can* be counter-productive, >but that it *needn't* be counter-productive if designed right and >accompanied by complementary policies. OK so there are no conditions under which a hypothetical Keynesian program would not work? But you say otherwise below. > But I think these are certainly >important issues to be carefully considered. What would an argument be >that public job creation would necessarily be counter-productive (in >other words, no matter how designed, etc) under certain conditions (and >what are those conditions)? the program in itself could be effective without the stimulus being effective in broader macro economic terms, no? > >I think your statement below about short-term band-aids potentially >exacerbating long term problems is pretty accurate, but it is also the >case that Shaikh at least believes that fiscal and monetary policies can >have some effect, but there are limits. And I'll have to read Shaikh to find out what he thinks they are! > >>>There will be some >>>division of labor--some will concentrate only on one or the other. >Some >>>will do both. Both projects are important. >>> >>>I can't think of anyone on this list that believes Keynesian demand >>>management can eliminate the contradictions of capitalism. I don't >>>believe traditional Keynesian demand management can even achieve true >>>full employment! > >>Again the reasoning behind your conclusion matters. > >Because, traditional Keynesian demand management 1) only looks at >aggregate proportionality and balance and not intersectoral >disproportionalities and imbalances; your work on Adolph Lowe and the difficulties of the traverse? You were very kind to send me a whole set of papers on lowe and pasinetti, and i did read most of them, and learn quite a bit. >2) does not recognize the >functionality of unemployment (and excess capacity generally) in >capitalism; as foley says in understanding capitalism, a Kaleckian wage squeeze argument as to why full employment policy is not possible under capitalism does not seem to go far enough because it suggests that with wage control capitalism could achieve full employment. For example, I think this is the implication of Doug's and Robt Pollin's acceptance of only the Kaleckian limit to full employment capitalism. it would seem that a so called orthodox Marxian would want to reveal deeper obstacles to full employment capitalism. Rakesh
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>Rakesh Bhandari wrote: > >>(2) what happens if in running deficits, the US sucks up global >>capital, raises interest rates, and visits catastrophe on poorer >>nations? is this possible? > >You're assuming that deficits drive up interest rates. There's no >simple relation between deficits and interest rates. If deficits >rise because of a weak economy - either passively, because of lower >revenues, or actively, as a policy choice - then government credit >demand could be offset by weaker private credit demand. > >And you're also assuming that the U.S. doesn't use the borrowed >money to buy imports from poorer countries. Considering that every >item of clothing I'm wearing was made in a poorer country, and that >the computer I'm typing on was assembled in Mexico - not to mention >what we know from the trade stats - that seems wrong. Demand from >the U.S. has stimulated the economies of Latin America and East and >South Asia more than any interest effect. > >Doug Doug, this is a helpful answer for it implies the conditions that would be needed for US govt deficit policy not to visit harm outside. 1. if govt credit demand more than compensates for weakness in private credit demand, there could be upward pressure on global interest rates. 2 if the US borrows capital from abroad, it has to keep its markets open. But aside from the abstract possibilities, I am interested in what actually happened with the early Reagan deficits. The Fed did not accomodate, right? Interest rates were high, which helped the US finance govt deficits as a result of regressive tax relief and increased military budgets. And these high interest rates did create havoc in poorer countries, no? But of course the IMF was not able to rein the US in, so the burdens of adjustment were put disproportionately on the poorer countries on which the contradictions of capitalism were biting hard? Rakesh
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G'day Running Dog >And Carrol, it is Tienamen. I may be off on my spelling but, > I'm closer, I betcha! Cf. "The Tienamen Papers, " edited by Andrew > Nathan. > Michael "Running Dog" Pugliese, Woof, Woof! It was always rendered Tianenman here at the time. I still remember those poor young folk singing The Internationale to absolutely no effect: Beijing and Washington both treating them as counter-revolutionary aspiring cappos - and neither allowing for the possibility that their call for democracy might be for something represented by neither ... a lot of dying in vain, alas. Cheers, Rob.
RE: Re: Re: reform and rev
"China and Independent Working Class Politics, " by Paul Hampton, in the newest issue of Workers Liberty, Vol. 2, #1, (http://www.workersliberty.org ) has a good bibliography (besides being a good look/analysis of the contemporary PRC). WL, is the journal of the Alliance for Workers Liberty, one of the constituent orgs of the Socialist Alliances in the UK. BTW, other pieces in this issue are of interest to the thread that erupts now and then on catatrophism. Copies for $8 at Borders or your local lefty bookstore. And Carrol, it is Tienamen. I may be off on my spelling but, I'm closer, I betcha! Cf. "The Tienamen Papers, " edited by Andrew Nathan. Michael "Running Dog" Pugliese, Woof, Woof! >--- Original Message --- >From: Greg Schofield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Date: 1/18/02 7:30:01 PM > >--- Message Received --- >From: Carrol Cox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 19:54:53 -0600 >Subject: [PEN-L:21620] Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: reform and rev > >Carrol I like your thinking here but you probably will not like my addition to it. > >Carrol: >"If I had to guess, I would say that the bulk of the support for the >revolution was not socialist but that aspect of it expressed in Mao's >first speech on Tenyan (w?) Square: China has stood up. There was a >socialist streak there, and I still regard Mao as a major Marxist >thinker that we can learn from if we abstract correctly, but the >essential drive was Chinese patriotism." > >Not only the nature of the support but also the whole nature of what was in fact historically possible. > > >I rate the Chinese revolution a great success, but not for the socialism that it achieved, but for the very situation that China now finds itself (oddly enough). > >My superficial understanding of the history of China does not give this important place a lot of choice in what needed to be done. No Chinese revolution would have been inconcievable, China would have developed into warring states, mass never-ending famine, and the people into virtual slaves of capital and the most reactionary landlords. > >Whatever troubles now beset it, China has stood up and a significant proportion of humankind have a better basis for a real future then they would have had under any other imagined circumstances. > >In this both the "mistakes" of the past (recent and further back) at least take place within a country with a significant working class and a modern infrastructure which however ill developed is at least present. > >The proletarianisation of China (still with a large peasant population) despite all that has happened is a mark of its historical success as a revolution. > >The socialist road of China could never have been and in my understand is not presently anything other then state-capitalism taking on a rather impossible task and achieving much of it. The character of the state, derived from Chinese history has also developed because of this. > >At this point of time the very process of China standing up has exhausted the possiblities of its birth. The problems it is now faced with exceed the ability of this country to continue down the path which got it to this point in the first place. Where is the future of China, well to put no gloss on this questioin at all, it is in its integration with world capitalism where new contradictions will arise and a new struggles emerge. > >At least China now is able to participate in this as a viable state, this would have been denied them if history had not taken the course it did. The Chinese revolution was a necessity, but if the good things about are not to be washed away altogether it is up to us outside China to wrought those changes that can produce a better world. > >China's CP, state and society in general, does not have at this moment the resources to do otherwise than it is, its position is peculiar and derives from the particular role the state has played in the past and is quite incapable of playing any longer. > >If the state and all that this presently entails collapses China will be a mess, however the state in order to maintain itself is also caught up in the contradictions of capital (from which it never was free), meanwhile the working class finds itself in struggle against the state and capital and is all too aware of the peculiar position China is in at the moment. > >If international state to state relations could become more "civilisied" the Chinese state would have more room for development, if the world economy could be forced to encounter the world working class as an emerging power, the workers of China would find more room to move. > >It is not that China is socialist that is the question, but how China typifies the condition of
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G'day Christian, > Michael wrote: > > > Also, interest rates are a very, very weak determinant of > investment. > > Are you speaking generally? If so, do you know of any good empirical > stuff that supports this? > Reckon pen-l has hit a very rich vein of late - gratitude to all. Anyway, if memory serves, the cable buy-up/roll-out frenzy of the late eighties was all done amidst seemingly sobering interest rate numbers. LJ Davis's *The Billionaire Shell Game* makes something of this as he traces Malone et al's predatory path to the crunch of the early 90s (not that all those chooks have come to a rest even now). A romping read, too, btw. Cheers, Rob.
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Doug Henwood wrote: > > Carrol Cox wrote: > > >"If you don't hit it, it won't fall." Mao. > > > >I rather suspect that capitalism can be depended on periodically to tear > >itself apart -- but it can also be depended on to put itself back > >together > > Yup. As happened in Mao's own country over the last 20 years. What > happened? Why didn't his revo stick? > Historians, after three or four or 20 more failed revolutions and 30 successful ones may be able to look back and make an intelligent guess. Otherwise, I'm afraid your curiosity will go unquenched. If I had to guess, I would say that the bulk of the support for the revolution was not socialist but that aspect of it expressed in Mao's first speech on Tenyan (w?) Square: China has stood up. There was a socialist streak there, and I still regard Mao as a major Marxist thinker that we can learn from if we abstract correctly, but the essential drive was Chinese patriotism. Carrol
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I have to run, but Robert Chirinko and Robert Eisner have done work on this. bye. On Fri, Jan 18, 2002 at 12:56:20PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Michael wrote: > > > Also, interest rates are a very, very weak determinant of investment. > > Are you speaking generally? If so, do you know of any good empirical stuff that >supports this? > > Christian > -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Michael wrote: > Also, interest rates are a very, very weak determinant of investment. Are you speaking generally? If so, do you know of any good empirical stuff that supports this? Christian
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Similar to Brenner in many ways, yes. We both worked on the transition to capitalism about the same time. Several people pointed out the similarity between his New Left Review piece and my own work. When I saw it, my first thought was plagiarism. I asked about it and he explained the pathway that he followed, thoroughly convincingly that we were just working along similar lines. "Devine, James" wrote: > Michael Perelman writes:>In my new book, The Pathology of the U.S. Economy > Revisited, I tried to make the case that this success rested, in part, on > prior conditions: a new capital stock coming out of the Great Depression and > World War II, the destruction of competing economies, and a very favorable > debt structure.< > > Michael, this is very similar to Brenner's analysis. > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine > > -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chico, CA 95929 530-898-5321 fax 530-898-5901
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Also, interest rates are a very, very weak determinant of investment. On Fri, Jan 18, 2002 at 12:02:21PM -0500, Doug Henwood wrote: > Rakesh Bhandari wrote: > > >(2) what happens if in running deficits, the US sucks up global > >capital, raises interest rates, and visits catastrophe on poorer > >nations? is this possible? > > You're assuming that deficits drive up interest rates. There's no > simple relation between deficits and interest rates. If deficits rise > because of a weak economy - either passively, because of lower > revenues, or actively, as a policy choice - then government credit > demand could be offset by weaker private credit demand. > > And you're also assuming that the U.S. doesn't use the borrowed money > to buy imports from poorer countries. Considering that every item of > clothing I'm wearing was made in a poorer country, and that the > computer I'm typing on was assembled in Mexico - not to mention what > we know from the trade stats - that seems wrong. Demand from the U.S. > has stimulated the economies of Latin America and East and South Asia > more than any interest effect. > > Doug > -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Michael Perelman writes:>In my new book, The Pathology of the U.S. Economy Revisited, I tried to make the case that this success rested, in part, on prior conditions: a new capital stock coming out of the Great Depression and World War II, the destruction of competing economies, and a very favorable debt structure.< Michael, this is very similar to Brenner's analysis. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
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> >(2) what happens if in running deficits, the US sucks up global > >capital, raises interest rates, and visits catastrophe on poorer > >nations? is this possible? Doug answers: > You're assuming that deficits drive up interest rates. There's no > simple relation between deficits and interest rates. If deficits rise > because of a weak economy - either passively, because of lower > revenues, or actively, as a policy choice - then government credit > demand could be offset by weaker private credit demand. also, the private sector can run large deficits -- as it has in recent years -- which can have the effect (ceteris paribus) of driving up interest rates and sucking in funds from overseas. JD
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Rakesh Bhandari wrote: >(2) what happens if in running deficits, the US sucks up global >capital, raises interest rates, and visits catastrophe on poorer >nations? is this possible? You're assuming that deficits drive up interest rates. There's no simple relation between deficits and interest rates. If deficits rise because of a weak economy - either passively, because of lower revenues, or actively, as a policy choice - then government credit demand could be offset by weaker private credit demand. And you're also assuming that the U.S. doesn't use the borrowed money to buy imports from poorer countries. Considering that every item of clothing I'm wearing was made in a poorer country, and that the computer I'm typing on was assembled in Mexico - not to mention what we know from the trade stats - that seems wrong. Demand from the U.S. has stimulated the economies of Latin America and East and South Asia more than any interest effect. Doug
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In my new book, The Pathology of the U.S. Economy Revisited, I tried to make the case that this success rested, in part, on prior conditions: a new capital stock coming out of the Great Depression and World War II, the destruction of competing economies, and a very favorable debt structure. "William S. Lear" wrote: > > James Galbraith and Tom Ferguson have a paper looking wage structure > and government policy that seems to come to a different conclusion: > "The American Wage Structure: 1920-1947", Research in Economic > History, Volume 19, pages 205-257 (Stamford Connecticut, 1999), > Alexander J. Field, ed. They look at unemployment, the exchange rate, > strikes, and other variables and conclude that "policy makers after > World War II managed to avoid the worst macroeconomic mistakes of the > earlier period. Encouraged by the post-war strike wave, the spread of > Keynes' views, the beginning of the Cold War and later the war in > Korea, they maintained high levels of aggregate demand and employment > nearly consistently for 25 years, if rarely attaining 'full > employment'". I think policy has a strong and potentially positive > role to play in quick recovery from and prevention of major > recessions. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chico, CA 95929 530-898-5321 fax 530-898-5901
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Rakesh asks: >Mat, >(1) what happens if govt deficits in the pursuit of full employment >have arresting effects on private investments; could this happen? why >or why not? If you are talking about some kind of "crowding out" then, first, I think that many of the arguments for crowding out are theoretically flawed and not supported by empirical evidence, and second, that crowding out is not necessarily a 'bad' thing. It may be that certain public investments, social services, etc. are more desirable than having a little more private expenditure. >(2) what happens if in running deficits, the US sucks up global >capital, raises interest rates, and visits catastrophe on poorer >nations? is this possible? The argument that deficits cause high interest rates is also theoretically and empirically questionable. More often the causation goes the other way--high interest rates mean higher interest payments on the public debt which cet par mean larger deficits. The impact on poorer nations is a greater concern, not necessarily from deficits, but in general. The argument can be made that a weak U.S. economy also has a negative impact on poorer nations, but the more important point I think is to focus on what kinds of policies those nations can use themselves to increase the living standards of its citizens and also to protect itself from vulnerability to global economic changes and econ developments in nations like the U.S. >do you support deficit financing by the US govt to create jobs at all >times? can it ever be counter productive in effect both on a national >and global scale? I think my answer here is that of course it *can* be counter-productive, but that it *needn't* be counter-productive if designed right and accompanied by complementary policies. But I think these are certainly important issues to be carefully considered. What would an argument be that public job creation would necessarily be counter-productive (in other words, no matter how designed, etc) under certain conditions (and what are those conditions)? >> >>Of course, there can be a problem that we spend all our time supporting >>the safety net instead of throwing over capitalism. But there can >>equally be the problem that we spend all the time thinking about >>throwing over capitalism instead of making sure there is a safety net. >This is not the problem that Mattick and presumably Shaikh are >getting at, right? Right. >>So there needs to be the short term reforms that make a difference >>immediately and the long term solutions as well. >Will the reforms reform? Could the reforms not only not stop but >also exacerbate a retrenchment in private investment that the >Keynesians want to leave in private hands?Will the reforms push >problems elsewhere? What is Shaikh saying here? I think your statement below about short-term band-aids potentially exacerbating long term problems is pretty accurate, but it is also the case that Shaikh at least believes that fiscal and monetary policies can have some effect, but there are limits. >> There will be some >>division of labor--some will concentrate only on one or the other. Some >>will do both. Both projects are important. >> >>I can't think of anyone on this list that believes Keynesian demand >>management can eliminate the contradictions of capitalism. I don't >>believe traditional Keynesian demand management can even achieve true >>full employment! >Again the reasoning behind your conclusion matters. Because, traditional Keynesian demand management 1) only looks at aggregate proportionality and balance and not intersectoral disproportionalities and imbalances; 2) does not recognize the functionality of unemployment (and excess capacity generally) in capitalism; 3) does not recognize or downplays technological and structural unemployment. There are more problems but these are the ones that I would emphasize off the top of my head. gotta run, try to finish later. But Sidney Coontz is one of the people was thinking of. Thanks! These are very important issues you are raising and I find this discussion extremely helpful. Mat
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michael writes: > > >I believe that the slaughtering of captial values gives capital a lot >more room to maneuver than a Keynesian solution -- which I regard as a >temporary fix -- although I am not convinced that the ultimate problem >is deficit financing. I don't think the ultimate problem is deficit financing either!!! but a shortage of surplus value which explains both the slow down in accumulation and business hostility to the expansion of the state even when state demand can (as you say) relieve excess capacity (inventories, idle plants, idle workers) in the short run. As fears of a slow down become dominant, there is bourgeois fear that the state will have to grow even more and thus exacerbate--via the threat of taxes and capital crowd out--the fear of continued declining private profitability which in turn leads to even more retrenchment of investment. A higher marginal efficiency of capital then requires the state to rein itself it, to create extra opportunities for national capital in the world market, and most of all to suppress labor. For example, Bob Jessop the Marxist state theorist speaks of a transition from the Keynesian welfare to the Schumpeterian workfare state. Which is not to say that even such a lean and mean state will stimulate investment levels consonant with full employment and general prosperity. The business class finds that it cannot do with or without effective demand generated via deficit financing. Unable to solve its own problems, a new class has to assert itself. > > > I think govts have in fact already found that running deficits the >> size that would be needed to achieve full employment would only yield >> retrenchment in private investment; > >Rakesh, I am not sure how you support the above. after the failure of the Reagan deficits, European social democracy and now Japan's aggressive fiscal policy to stimulate strong growth, govts are attempting to encourage private investments by containing the run up of debt and thus to instill confidence in the business sector that the future tax burden and interest costs will be manageable vis a vis their profits. Krugman as a business Keynesian thinks that Bush has been skirting near to the edge of the destruction of that confidence. He's not necessarily wrong. I am certainly not saying that such trimming is working or has worked to generate strong investment and full employment! > Right wingers often >say the same. Does Mattick/Grossman propose that idea? Which idea? Mattick's idea was that state debt consumed capital yet interest and principal were owed, thus making state paper fictitious capital; principal and interest would thus have to come out of the private economy, as Sismondi long ago recognized. Mattick did not disagree that the public consumption of capital could at times and for periods improve production and employment levels. > >Now, we have to make a distinction between deficit spending at the >trough and near full >employment. near the trough, it will encourage investment -- less so >the further you come to full employment. Private investment never brings the economy to any where near full employment; the compensatory expansion of the public sector seemed to do little to generate a strong bout of private accumulation and seemed to have in fact undermined business confidence rather than encouraged investment overall as you are suggesting; however, the attempt to trim expenditures and get budgets in order has also not yielded full employment investment levels either. Mattick's point was not that anti Keynesianism would generate full employment and prosperity! His point was that private economy and mixed economy alike were not immune to the kinds of downturns that Marx predicted--in other words, capitalism had NOT changed and could not be changed via state management. > > >This above statement sounds similar to Robert Barro. With low capacity >utilization, companies don't care much about fixcal prudence. It is of course important what companies think and do as opposed to what Robt Barro thinks and does. rb
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Regarding what Carrol wrote, Russell Jacoby wrote about how the German social democrats embraced crisis theory because it offered the comforting idea that they did not have to do anything -- the economy would fall on its own. On Thu, Jan 17, 2002 at 10:43:58PM -0600, Carrol Cox wrote: > > > Michael Perelman wrote: > > > > Ian, Marx posited that capitalism would work that way for a while, but > > that the contradictions would accumulate and then , but then, it has > > not yet happened, except in the USSR, China ... > > > > "If you don't hit it, it won't fall." Mao. > > I rather suspect that capitalism can be depended on periodically to tear > itself apart -- but it can also be depended on to put itself back > together unless there is a political force that can overthrow it in at > least a few nations substantial enough to defend themselves. Unless we > really do think that History (with the uppercase H) is some sort of > divinity, we can't guarantee the appearance of such a force. We can work > for it and see what happens. > > (Of course it can also destroy the environment irreparably. I don't see > any guarantee against that either.) > > Carrol > -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Rakesh Bhandari wrote: > I think govts have in fact already found that running deficits the > size that would be needed to achieve full employment would only yield > retrenchment in private investment; Rakesh, I am not sure how you support the above. Right wingers often say the same. Does Mattick/Grossman propose that idea? Now, we have to make a distinction between deficit spending at the trough and near full employment. near the trough, it will encourage investment -- less so the further you come to full employment. ? govts thus find that limiting > deficits and containing the run up in debt are important to > maintaining private investment--that is, fiscal prudence gives > confidence that taxes and interest rates will remain under control > over the projected future and the state will thus not bite into > profits the prospects for which are not strong. This above statement sounds similar to Robert Barro. With low capacity utilization, companies don't care much about fixcal prudence. > The state thus finds itself unable to do much even as the private > economy has been unable to generate full employment and plunges > itself into downturns. This has already made many people expendable; > that is in part why we continue to be haunted by bourgeois dysgenic > fears about the black so called underclass and so called illegal > aliens. > > The limits of the mixed economy have in fact already been reached, > including now in Japan. I don't think that Japan qualifies as a mixed economy, but I cannot speak with certainty. Japan is, in my mind, relatively unique. > I do emphatically agree on the importance of the theory of fictitious > capital as you are developing it here. In particular, I agree that > the way out of recessions ultimately depends upon the slaughter of > capital values, not higher prices and strong consumption in the first > instance. I believe that the slaughtering of captial values gives capital a lot more room to maneuver than a Keynesian solution -- which I regard as a temporary fix -- although I am not convinced that the ultimate problem is deficit financing. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: reform and rev
As Jim D. mentioned, Marx's private predictions were not particularly accurate -- they included a large dollop of hope. Marxists generally study Marx for his method, not for his predictions. Ian Murray wrote: > > Ok, but how are his claims any different from the > predictions of other economists-social forecasters? What is > it about his method of inference etc. that renders his > approach to the futurity of indeterminism and uncertainty > capable of generating more reliable predictions about the > long run? > > Ian -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Re: Re: reform and rev
Michael Perelman wrote: > > Ian, Marx posited that capitalism would work that way for a while, but > that the contradictions would accumulate and then , but then, it has > not yet happened, except in the USSR, China ... > "If you don't hit it, it won't fall." Mao. I rather suspect that capitalism can be depended on periodically to tear itself apart -- but it can also be depended on to put itself back together unless there is a political force that can overthrow it in at least a few nations substantial enough to defend themselves. Unless we really do think that History (with the uppercase H) is some sort of divinity, we can't guarantee the appearance of such a force. We can work for it and see what happens. (Of course it can also destroy the environment irreparably. I don't see any guarantee against that either.) Carrol
Re: Re: Re: Re: reform and rev
- Original Message - From: "Michael Perelman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, January 17, 2002 8:07 PM Subject: [PEN-L:21571] Re: Re: Re: reform and rev Ian, Marx posited that capitalism would work that way for a while, but that the contradictions would accumulate and then , but then, it has not yet happened, except in the USSR, China ... === Ok, but how are his claims any different from the predictions of other economists-social forecasters? What is it about his method of inference etc. that renders his approach to the futurity of indeterminism and uncertainty capable of generating more reliable predictions about the long run? Ian
Re: Re: Re: reform and rev
Ian, Marx posited that capitalism would work that way for a while, but that the contradictions would accumulate and then , but then, it has not yet happened, except in the USSR, China ... On Thu, Jan 17, 2002 at 07:15:22PM -0800, Ian Murray wrote: > > Hate to be a pain in the neck on this but given the > inability to 'see' -let alone predict- the future long run, > what if anything is the basis for the claim that capitalism > can't push it's problems 'out into the future' indefinitely > as long as technological-organizational innovations don't > seriously further harm ecosystems? All the material I've > seen on how workers and citizens consent to the system do > not hint at what it would take to overcome the processes by > which consent is created. A la SocDem. wasn't Przeworski > pretty damn close to the mark concerning electoral > constraints? What forms of organizing of the 'managerial > class', let alone the larger working class of which they > are a subset, would it take to have them withdraw consent > to the system? And why do I keep thinking about Derek De > Solla Price about the future of the knowledge class? > > Ian > -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
