Dover Case Questions
Steve Jamar writes: Maybe they teach science differently now than when I went to school and when my boys (now ages 19 and 22) went to school, but science was inherently taught as conditional and subject to testing and change. There are things that are known facts, but there is a lot that is still unexplained -- the true nature of light, for example, and why gravity is such a weak force compared to the others, and a whole host of things in biology and geology. [snip] If the point is to teach the limits of our understanding, that can be and in my experience was and is taught. There are lots of questions still to which the answer is we don't know. There is an important difference between fallibility, contingency, and modesty _within_ scientific inquiry and modesty _about_ the scientific enterprise itself. All good scientists accept the former. Many, but far from all, accept the latter. Some scientists and philosophers -- folks like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett most vocally lately -- argue that the conclusions of science, such as evolution, shred any possible basis for belief in God. Would it be constitutional for this sort of Dawkins/Dennett claim to be one of the propositions officially taught as a part of a science curriculum? I assume not. Would it be constitutional to tell students that there are no truths that are unamentable, in principle, to scientific study and verification? I assume not. (I'm not saying that these sorts of thing couldn't be discussed in public school classrooms.) All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advise students that the methodological naturalism built into scientific inquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of intelligent design theory as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken for an official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks like Dawkins and Dennett. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Steve Jamar writes: Maybe they teach science differently now than when I went to school and when my boys (now ages 19 and 22) went to school, but science was inherently taught as conditional and subject to testing and change. There are things that are known facts, but there is a lot that is still unexplained -- the true nature of light, for example, and why gravity is such a weak force compared to the others, and a whole host of things in biology and geology. [snip] If the point is to teach the limits of our understanding, that can be and in my experience was and is taught. There are lots of questions still to which the answer is we don't know. There is an important difference between fallibility, contingency, and modesty _within_ scientific inquiry and modesty _about_ the scientific enterprise itself. All good scientists accept the former. Many, but far from all, accept the latter. Some scientists and philosophers -- folks like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett most vocally lately -- argue that the conclusions of science, such as evolution, shred any possible basis for belief in God. Would it be constitutional for this sort of Dawkins/Dennett claim to be one of the propositions officially taught as a part of a science curriculum? I assume not. Would it be constitutional to tell students that there are no truths that are unamentable, in principle, to scientific study and verification? I assume not. (I'm not saying that these sorts of thing couldn't be discussed in public school classrooms.) All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advise students that the methodological naturalism built into scientific inquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of intelligent design theory as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken for an official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks like Dawkins and Dennett. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
On Dec 22, 2005, at 9:05 AM, Perry Dane wrote: Some scientists and philosophers -- folks like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett most vocally lately -- argue that the conclusions of science, such as evolution, shred any possible basis for belief in God. Would it be constitutional for this sort of Dawkins/Dennett claim to be one of the propositions officially taught as a part of a science curriculum? I assume not. Would it be constitutional to tell students that there are no truths that are unamentable, in principle, to scientific study and verification? I assume not. (I'm not saying that these sorts of thing couldn't be discussed in public school classrooms.) All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advise students that the methodological naturalism built into scientific inquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of "intelligent design theory" as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken for an official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks like Dawkins and Dennett. Wow! Your science teachers and students must be well ahead of the pack to understand the philosophy of science and concepts like methodological naturalism.But the problem with your disclaimer is that methodological naturalism isn't religion and so no disclaimer is appropriate. Indeed, it would be, within the current context, just another undermining of the science teaching and learning that is happening. And we don't need any more of that.I seriously doubt that HS science books make the entirely legitimate religious/philosophical argument that the conclusions of science point to the non-existence of god. I'll bet they avoid such stuff with great vigor.In my experience with HS students, they do not need to be told that science is not everything!Steve -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"In these words I can sum up everything I've learned about life: It goes on."Robert Frost ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
In a message dated 12/22/2005 9:06:14 AM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Some scientists and philosophers -- folks like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett most vocally lately -- argue that the conclusions of science, such as evolution, shred any possible basis for belief in God. "God" or "a god"? I can't see how it can be the latter. That is, it's unclear how the conclusions of evolutionary theory can "shred any possible basis for belief" in a god. Make such a belief highly unlikely? Maybe. But impossible (logically? empirically?)? I think it unlikely that statements of unqualified "impossibility" are useful here. BobbyRobert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Perry Dane wrote: Some scientists and philosophers -- folks like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett most vocally lately -- argue that the conclusions of science, such as evolution, shred any possible basis for belief in God. Would it be constitutional for this sort of Dawkins/Dennett claim to be one of the propositions officially taught as a part of a science curriculum? I assume not. I believe it would be. An official government endorsement of atheism would be no less an establishment, in my view, than endorsement of Christianity or theism itself. I also believe that Dawkins and Dennett are wrong and that they should do a much better job of distinguishing between what science says and the theological or philosophical inferences that one draws from science. Scientific theories are often used to inform our non-scientific opinions, and that is well and good, but they can often do so in contradictory ways. For example, big bang cosmology. William Lane Craig argues that big bang cosmology supports Christian theism; Quentin Smith argues that big bang cosmology supports atheism. So is big bang cosmology theistic or atheistic? Neither, of course. Big bang cosmology is a discrete theory that explains a specific set of data and that is all it does. The arguments of Craig and Smith are philosophical arguments that draw opposing inferences from that explanation, neither of which is intrinsic to the theory itself. Schools should certainly teach the theory because it is incredibly well supported (i.e. it's true, within the boundaries of reasonable doubt), but they should not take a position on the theological or anti-theological inferences that others draw from those theories. Teach the science, leave the philosophy out. Would it be constitutional to tell students that there are no truths that are unamentable, in principle, to scientific study and verification? I assume not. (I'm not saying that these sorts of thing couldn't be discussed in public school classrooms.) All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advise students that the methodological naturalism built into scientific inquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of intelligent design theory as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken for an official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks like Dawkins and Dennett. I think it would not only be constitutional, I think it is necessary. We do a lousy job of teaching how science operates, by and large, and I think we absolutely ought to teach science beginning there. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
There is only a difference between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism if we are open to the possibility that there may be other methods of inquiry (besides naturalism) that could potentially lead to truth. Take Dane's disclaimer -- that science because it is a constrained discourse, it cannot claim, within its own four corners, to give us a full picture of Truth. If this is indeed inappropriate (does Professor Jamar mean unconstitutional?), then we really have crossed over into ontological naturalism. Chris From: Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Dover Case Questions Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2005 09:31:10 -0500 On Dec 22, 2005, at 9:05 AM, Perry Dane wrote: Some scientists and philosophers -- folks like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett most vocally lately -- argue that the conclusions of science, such as evolution, shred any possible basis for belief in God. Would it be constitutional for this sort of Dawkins/Dennett claim to be one of the propositions officially taught as a part of a science curriculum? I assume not. Would it be constitutional to tell students that there are no truths that are unamentable, in principle, to scientific study and verification? I assume not. (I'm not saying that these sorts of thing couldn't be discussed in public school classrooms.) All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advise students that the methodological naturalism built into scientific inquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of intelligent design theory as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken for an official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks like Dawkins and Dennett. Wow! Your science teachers and students must be well ahead of the pack to understand the philosophy of science and concepts like methodological naturalism. But the problem with your disclaimer is that methodological naturalism isn't religion and so no disclaimer is appropriate. Indeed, it would be, within the current context, just another undermining of the science teaching and learning that is happening. And we don't need any more of that. I seriously doubt that HS science books make the entirely legitimate religious/philosophical argument that the conclusions of science point to the non-existence of god. I'll bet they avoid such stuff with great vigor. In my experience with HS students, they do not need to be told that science is not everything! Steve -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/ In these words I can sum up everything I've learned about life: It goes on. Robert Frost ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
On Dec 22, 2005, at 10:03 AM, Christopher C. Lund wrote:Take Dane's disclaimer -- that science "because it is a constrained discourse, it cannot claim, within its own four corners, to give us a full picture of Truth." If this is indeed inappropriate (does Professor Jamar mean unconstitutional?), then we really have crossed over into ontological naturalism.ChrisNo. I meant inappropriate for the reason stated. And no, saying that such a disclaimer is inappropriate does not push us over to ontological naturalism. It just says it is inappropriate to require such a disclaimer for science. It is also inappropriate to require one for any other subject.2 + 2 = 4 is true. But neither it, nor all of the math yet invented, is the whole truth of existence. The map is never the thing itself. The finger pointing to the moon is not the moon. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"It is by education I learn to do by choice, what other men do by the constraint of fear."Aristotle ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case Questions
Title: Dover Case Questions Perry Dane writes: All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advisestudents that the methodological naturalism built into scientificinquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of "intelligentdesign theory" as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken foran official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks likeDawkins and Dennett. Perry Thisshould definitely be part of the science curriculum -- because it is true, because it is part of explaining the meaning and boundaries of science and the scientific method, and because it addresses a very widespread misunderstanding that fuels resistance to central parts of the science curriculum. If this simple point could ever be established in the public mind, it would defuse the whole controversy. That degree of success is of course quite unlikely, but the point is important and needs to be emphasized at every opportunity. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 512-471-6988 (fax) ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case Questions
Title: Dover Case Questions Marc and I do not disagree on the reality. I am inclined tothink that the points he makes show that the boundary between science and religion cannot be established in the public mind; he appears to think that even if the point were established, the fight would go on. I don't think that anything turns on this difference in characterization. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Marc SternSent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 10:24 AMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: RE: Dover Case Questions I think Perry is right that the schools can, and should teach something along the lines he is suggesting- though I fit is not part of the high stakes test ,no one will pay attention,- but I cannot agree with Doug that such a statement if established in the public mind would defuse the whole controversy I think experience has shown that moderate middle ground solutions do not defuse controversy; they seem to encourage true believers of right ort left to try harder to achieve total victory. Look at the recent discussion on this list over whether the Equal Access Act is unconstitutional for not providing enough access for religious speakers from outside the school or the controversy over teaching the Bible; there now is a constitutional text available, and school boards, such as that of Odessa Texas seem willing to insist on an unconstitutional sectarian text Marc Stern From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Douglas LaycockSent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 11:12 AMTo: religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduSubject: RE: Dover Case Questions Perry Dane writes: All that some of us are arguing, then, is that it would be constitutional simply to advisestudents that the methodological naturalism built into scientificinquiry (and which properly excludes the teaching of "intelligentdesign theory" as a subject _within_ science) should not be taken foran official commitment to the ontological naturalism of folks likeDawkins and Dennett. Perry Thisshould definitely be part of the science curriculum -- because it is true, because it is part of explaining the meaning and boundaries of science and the scientific method, and because it addresses a very widespread misunderstanding that fuels resistance to central parts of the science curriculum. If this simple point could ever be established in the public mind, it would defuse the whole controversy. That degree of success is of course quite unlikely, but the point is important and needs to be emphasized at every opportunity. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 512-471-6988 (fax) ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
The Dover case has me so confused that I cant see what its implications are beyond its narrow facts. A couple of questions came to mind as I read it. Maybe someone can help me sort them out. 1. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs said last night on one of the news shows that all this (ID) would be fine if relegated to a class on comparative religion or philosophy. Why should the ostensible subject matter or title of a class make any difference? The case wasnt about policing the content of science classes but rather the establishment clause. It seems like it ought not matter which door the establishment effort enters. What am I missing here? 2. If, as the Dover court says, the Constitution forbids teaching creationism as science, then wouldnt the principal version of the now-regnant big bang theory be constitutionally prohibited as well? Its now generally accepted that the age of the observable cosmos is 12-20 billion years and thus that the universe was created (in an act of exnihilation) in a big bang. This theorys predecessor, the steady state theory, held that the cosmos had always existed and that the steady state of the universe was maintained by the continuous creation (coming into existence out of nothing) of hydrogen nuclei. Both of these theories employ the idea of creation in precisely the same sense ! as in the Dover case: the coming into existence of something (life, hydrogen nuclei, the cosmos, whatever) ab initio, ex nihilo. Its true that many modern physicists have claimed that things can come into existence from nothing by natural processes, but they do so after leaving science and inadvertently turning philosopher, thus failing to understand the difference between creation and natural generation. Surely, we cant legally distinguish the creationism of the ID proponents from the creationism of the big bang proponents solely on the basis that the former acknowledge that creation implies a creator and the latter doesnt. That would make the distinction entirely conventional, it seems.So it can't just be that it's the level of controversy within science either. Might there be "good" creationis! m and "bad" creationism now? Ive also been puzzled why some ID people havent picked up the big bang as supporting the notion that scientists themselves view creationism as a proper object of science (wrongly, I think) and as accepting the idea that the cosmos was created. One of the most interesting factors in the Dover case was the way the plaintiffs expert witness relied on Aquinas. Aquinas drew a sharp distinction between creation and natural generation (motion and change), and defended the idea that, since we cant know whether the cosmos had a beginning or end, we should keep a completely open mind on the subject philosophically and scientifically. I dont think that Aquinas would have had much difficulty accepting the idea of evolution. It looks like the plaintiff's "expert" theologian ignor! ed the stronger arguments for the plaintiffs' position in Aquinas and contented himself with disparaging the defendants' position. Maybe that was just a tactical decision. Davis Nelson ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
On Dec 21, 2005, at 11:03 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:The Dover case has me so confused that I can’t see what its implications are beyond its narrow facts. A couple of questions came to mind as I read it. Maybe someone can help me sort them out. 1. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs said last night on one of the news shows that “all this” (ID) would be fine if relegated to a class on “comparative religion” or philosophy. Why should the ostensible subject matter or title of a class make any difference? The case wasn’t about policing the content of science classes but rather the establishment clause. It seems like it ought not matter which door the establishment effort enters. What am I missing here?That schools can teach about religious beliefs in suitable classes (World Ideologies, Comparative Religion, Belief Systems, Impact of Beliefs on Society, etc.). The problem is that the requirement to teach a religious belief in a science class is clearly favoring or tending to establish religion. Teaching science is not. Teaching about religions is not. Teaching English is not. Etc. The same problem would arise if the school mandated teaching only one religion or mandated teaching English using only the Bible as the only source of literature. 2. If, as the Dover court says, “the Constitution forbids teaching creationism as science”, then wouldn’t the principal version of the now-regnant “big bang” theory be constitutionally prohibited as well? It’s now generally accepted that the age of the observable cosmos is 12-20 billion years and thus that the universe was “created” (in an act of exnihilation) in a big bang. This theory’s predecessor, the steady state theory, held that the cosmos had always existed and that the “steady state” of the universe was maintained by the continuous “creation” (coming into existence out of nothing) of hydrogen nuclei. Both of these theories employ the idea of “creation” in precisely the same sense ! as in the Dover case: the coming into existence of something (life, hydrogen nuclei, the cosmos, whatever) ab initio, ex nihilo. It’s true that many modern physicists have claimed that things can come into existence from nothing by natural processes, but they do so after leaving science and inadvertently turning philosopher, thus failing to understand the difference between creation and natural generation. Surely, we can’t legally distinguish the creationism of the ID proponents from the creationism of the big bang proponents solely on the basis that the former acknowledge that creation implies a creator and the latter doesn’t. That would make the distinction entirely conventional, it seems. So it can't just be that it's the level of controversy within science either. Might there be "good" creationis! m and "bad" creationism now?The big bang theory does not say there was a god that made the bang. It just says that something happened at a point before time that started things off. And we really don't know what it was (though the current brane theories give us some clues -- though they tend to have the same ultimate problem -- how were the brane's created?).The ID creation theory is that there was a creator. That is not the same thing at all. And we can indeed distinguish the two on that basis. I’ve also been puzzled why some ID people haven’t picked up the big bang as supporting the notion that scientists themselves view creationism as a proper object of science (wrongly, I think) and as accepting the idea that the cosmos was created. One of the most interesting factors in the Dover case was the way the plaintiffs’ expert witness relied on Aquinas. Aquinas drew a sharp distinction between creation and natural generation (motion and change), and defended the idea that, since we can’t know whether the cosmos had a beginning or end, we should keep a completely open mind on the subject philosophically and scientifically. I don’t think that Aquinas would have had much difficulty accepting the idea of evolution. It looks like the plaintiff's "expert" theologian ignor! ed the stronger arguments for the plaintiffs' position in Aquinas and contented himself with disparaging the defendants' position. Maybe that was just a tactical decision. Davis Nelson___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008
Re: Dover Case Questions
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2. If, as the Dover court says, the Constitution forbids teaching creationism as science, then wouldnt the principal version of the now-regnant big bang theory be constitutionally prohibited as well? Its now generally accepted that the age of the observable cosmos is 12-20 billion years and thus that the universe was created (in an act of exnihilation) in a big bang. This theorys predecessor, the steady state theory, held that the cosmos had always existed and that the steady state of the universe was maintained by the continuous creation (coming into existence out of nothing) of hydrogen nuclei. Both of these theories employ the idea of creation in precisely the same sense ! as in the Dover case: the coming into existence of something (life, hydrogen nuclei, the cosmos, whatever) ab initio, ex nihilo. Its true that many modern physicists have claimed that things can come into existence from nothing by natural processes, but they do so after leaving science and inadvertently turning philosopher, thus failing to understand the difference between creation and natural generation. Surely, we cant legally distinguish the creationism of the ID proponents from the creationism of the big bang proponents solely on the basis that the former acknowledge that creation implies a creator and the latter doesnt. That would make the distinction entirely conventional, it seems.So it can't just be that it's the level of controversy within science either. Might there be "good" creationis! m and "bad" creationism now? I think you misunderstand big bang cosmology. Big bang cosmology has nothing to do with creation ex nihilo, but only to do with the state of the universe at a given point in the past. Science can only go back so far (to the beginning of Planck time). There is clearly a difference between claiming that the current space-time continuum was the result of a singular expansion event (which is what big bang cosmology says) and claiming that all of existence was "created" by a supernatural being. These are not "creation" in the same sense at all, as one deals solely with natural phenomena that can be observed and tested, while the other deals with supernatural phenomena. Whatever opinions one might have about whether big bang cosmology may support or inform one or another theological or philosophical view, those opinions are not a part of the science itself. The word "created" does not just mean "had a beginning", as you seem to imply here, it means "resulting from a willful act". Big bang cosmology may indicate that the universe, at least in its current form had a beginning but it does not mean that it was the result of a willful act - and that is the clear distinction between the two types of arguments you are conflating. Ive also been puzzled why some ID people havent picked up the big bang as supporting the notion that scientists themselves view creationism as a proper object of science (wrongly, I think) and as accepting the idea that the cosmos was created. Oh, they have. Michael Behe mentioned the big bang so many times during his testimony that as the second day of his cross examination began, Judge Jones asked the plaintiffs' attorney how long he expected that cross-ex to last. He replied that it would be proportional to the number of times the big bang is mentioned. The judge said, "So we could be here all day." The attorney replied, "It may be a while." The problem with the analogy, in addition to what I stated above, is the differences in how big bang advocates and ID advocates behaved after proposing their ideas. Behe's argument was that the big bang was initially rejected by some because it had religious implications and Id is also rejected because it has religious implications. But big bang advocates like George Gamow didn't start a PR campaign to get his ideas into science classrooms and rant and rave about the "hidebound reactionaries of the Steady State orthodoxy" or the "Stalinist tactics of the Steady State Priesthood". They went to work developing a coherent model, proposing testable hypotheses and devising ways to test them, and when those tests validated their ideas, the big bang was accepted. Contrast that with the ID movement, which has never published a single piece of research that supports ID or developed a coherent model from which one might derive testable hypotheses, but has instead carried on an enormous political and public relations campaign to gain access to public school science classrooms. The analogy is clearly incomplete. One of the most interesting factors in the Dover case was the way the plaintiffs expert witness relied on Aquinas. Aquinas drew a sharp distinction between creation and natural generation (motion and change), and defended the idea that, since we cant know whether the cosmos had a beginning or end, we should keep a completely open mind on the subject philosophically and scientifically. I dont think that Aquinas
Re: Dover Case Questions
Where the class happens to fall in the course catalog, in one sense, does seem completely irrelevant. But the reason why we have this fight is because whether ID is taught as science or something else will determine whether it is taught as true. If it's taught outside of science class, it will likely be taught from a purely descriptive point of view: this is how ID movement historically developed, it had these progenitors, it was motivated by these concerns, etc. But if it is taught as science, however, then it will be taught as true (or at least as a strong candidate for being true). That's why Dover wanted this in the science curriculum, and why Dr. Mirecki (no friend of ID) wanted it taught in a religious-studies class. Whether it's being taught in science or religious-studies class, I think, is just a proxy for whether it's being taught descriptively or as true. I would assume that nothing of substance would change if Dover moved the discussion of ID into a religion class, but then there tried to teach ID as true -- but do others disagree? Chris On Dec 21, 2005, at 11:03 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The Dover case has me so confused that I cant see what its implications are beyond its narrow facts. A couple of questions came to mind as I read it. Maybe someone can help me sort them out. 1. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs said last night on one of the news shows that all this (ID) would be fine if relegated to a class on comparative religion or philosophy. Why should the ostensible subject matter or title of a class make any difference? The case wasnt about policing the content of science classes but rather the establishment clause. It seems like it ought not matter which door the establishment effort enters. What am I missing here? ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case Questions
"In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." That is what they say when they are being careful. Some are sloppy, and some deliberately overreach, but that's the claim.Chris Lund might havemeant that putting ID in the biology class or the comparative religion class is a proxy for whether to teach that ID's claim to be science is true. Or he might have simply meant that government can't teach that a religious view is true, nor can it teach that a religious view is false. Where ever you put ID in the curriculum, the government would have to be agnostic about its supernatural claims. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brad M PardeeSent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 12:36 PMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: Dover Case Questions I think Chris reveals something significant here. Among the evolution supporters I have heard (and I'm not presuming that they speak for all evolutionists everywhere), it does not seem to be enough to say that intelligent design is outside the realm of science. They seem to think it's necessary to go further and say that ID is not true. But if the evolutionists who say ID is outside the realm of science because it's untestable really believe that it's untestable, then they have absolutely no basis for saying it's false because, by their own definition, they can't test it. The absolute best that they should be able to say is, "In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." But that's not what they say. They say a) ID is not testable, but b) even though we can't test it, we will still draw conclusions about it and call it false. I'm sorry, but if you can't test it, then you can't draw conclusions about it. After all, aren't responsible scientific conclusions the result of testing? That's why people like me often view the scientific community's test-less rejection of ID as more of an attempt to protect their hallowed turf instead of actually describe what did or didn't happen. Brad Chris wrote on 12/21/2005 12:06:52 PM: Where the class happens to fall in the course catalog, in one sense, does seem completely irrelevant. But the reason why we have this fight is because whether ID is taught as science or something else will determine whether it is taught as true. If it's taught outside of science class, it will likely be taught from a purely descriptive point of view: this is how ID movement historically developed, it had these progenitors, it was motivated by these concerns, etc. But if it is taught as science, however, then it will be taught as true (or at least as a strong candidate for being true). That's why Dover wanted this in the science curriculum, and why Dr. Mirecki (no friend of ID) wanted it taught in a religious-studies class. Whether it's being taught in science or religious-studies class, I think, is just a proxy for whether it's being taught descriptively or as true. I would assume that nothing of substance would change if Dover moved the discussion of ID into a religion class, but then there tried to teach ID as true -- but do others disagree? Chris ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Brad M Pardee wrote: I think Chris reveals something significant here. Among the evolution supporters I have heard (and I'm not presuming that they speak for all evolutionists everywhere), it does not seem to be enough to say that intelligent design is outside the realm of science. They seem to think it's necessary to go further and say that ID is not true. But if the evolutionists who say ID is outside the realm of science because it's untestable really believe that it's untestable, then they have absolutely no basis for saying it's false because, by their own definition, they can't test it. The absolute best that they should be able to say is, "In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." But that's not what they say. They say a) ID is not testable, but b) even though we can't test it, we will still draw conclusions about it and call it false. I'm sorry, but if you can't test it, then you can't draw conclusions about it. After all, aren't responsible scientific conclusions the result of testing? That's why people like me often view the scientific community's test-less rejection of ID as more of an attempt to protect their hallowed turf instead of actually describe what did or didn't happen. I think you're missing critical distinction here. When scientists say that ID is not testable, they primarily mean two things - that supernatural causes are not testable in science, even in principle (which is a true statement) and that ID does not lead to any hypotheses that could either confirm or disconfirm the existence of such a supernatural designer (which is also a true statement). But there are arguments offered to defend ID that are, in fact, falsifiable and some of them have been falsified. Those arguments are not positive statements or hypotheses that are derived from an ID model (no such model exists), but are rather negative arguments against the ability to explain certain things as being produced by evolution. Thus, for example, many of Michael Behe's arguments concerning irreducible complexity may be tested. When he claims that the blood clotting cascade is irreducibly complex - that if you take away any component of the system it would fail to function and therefore cannot have developed through an evolutionary process - this claim can be tested, and it has been tested. And it turns out not to be true - there are animals with perfectly functional blood clotting systems that lack some of the components of the allegedly irreducibly complex system (dolphins, for example, lack factor VII or Hagemann factor yet their blood clots just fine). There is a difference between a negative argument such as this, which can be tested, and a vague model relying on supernatural causation (ID), which cannot. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
something can be true without being the full truth.2+2 = 4. That is true.But it does a poor job of fully describing nature. Or math.SetveOn Dec 21, 2005, at 2:06 PM, Perry Dane wrote: This doesn't strike me as quite right. It seems to me that real science should also not, in the public school setting, be taught as True with a capital T. To do so would be to teach, not science, but scientism, which is something entirely different. In fact, it seems to me that if a student asks a science teacher, "So is all this stuff that you're teaching us actually True," the teacher, qua teacher, should say (at a level suitable to high school students) something like: "Science is a form of methodologically-constrained inquiry built on certain assumptions such as naturalism. That inquiry has proved itself to be incredibly useful, as well as insightful. It is part of what, imperfectly but necessarily, we call secular knowledge. But precisely because it is a constrained discourse, it cannot claim, within its own four corners, to give us a full picture of Truth." -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"The most precious things one gets in life are not those one gets for money."Albert Einstein ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Lofton/Re: Dover Case Questions
Bobby writes: I would argue that Steve's inference from the facts of disease, war, violence, inequity, inequality, stupidity of some design features (knees, elbows, eyes) to the conclusion that no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect (loving) deity exists is a perfectly legitimate inference. That is, the facts of evil and suffering are incompatible with the existence of such a deity, and this incompatibility must be explained away for anyone to recognize these facts but still insist on the deity's existence. I have never been persuaded by any of the numerous attempts to rationalize this incompatibility. But we've been down this road, and I'll say no more about it. Comment: Bobby's view is caused by a lack of faith, not believing the Bible, God's Word, which tells us that, ORIGINALLY, everything made by God was very good. Then, the Fall, Adam/Eve/Serpent -- humans, substituting their own thoughts for God's commands, and, presto!, ALL things are changed by this original sin; lots of bad things happen. God did not make THIS world; WE did. John Lofton, Editor, TheAmericanView.com, Recovering Republican, saved sinner ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
No, urethra design is not beside the point at all. Is there an intelligent design explanation for that design? There is an evolutionary explanation (though not wholly satisfactory to many). How could such a thing have happened, according to "intelligent design theory?" The absence of any possible answer to that question points to the lack of science behind ID. That is the whole issue.Ed Darrell DallasPerry Dane [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Robert Lipkin wrote:I would argue that Steve's inference from the facts of "disease, war,violence, inequity, inequality, stupidity of some design features (knees, elbows,eyes)" to the conclusion that no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect(lovin! g) deity exists is a perfectly legitimate inference. That is, the factsof evil and suffering are incompatible with the existence of such a deity,and this incompatibility must be explained away for anyone to recognize thesefacts but still insist on the deity's existence.To be fair to the intelligent design folks, their argument is not that the design of the universe IS intelligent, in the sense of optimal, or efficient, or morally good, or aesthetically pleasing, but rather that certain facts of the universe point to it having been designed BY AN intelligence.This does not, of course, answer Robert's theological argument, but it does suggest that the usual anti-intelligent-design jokes about the proximity of the prostate gland to the urethra are really beside the point.Perry***Perry DaneProfessor of LawRutg! ers UniversitySchool of Law -- Camden217 North Fifth StreetCamden, NJ 08102[EMAIL PROTECTED]www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/Work: (856) 225-6004Fax: (856) 969-7924Home: (610) 896-5702***___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
A great teacher would indeed tell about the many experiments Darwin ran, and about the specific observations of nature around the world he made that pointed him to discover evolution theory. In a test-driven curriculum that does not test one's understanding of how science really works, there is little time for that. In a curriculum that has been battered for 40 years to get those stories out of the texts because they make evolution too clear for Texas critics of evolution, it's swimming against the stream. Good science education isn't made in the courtroom, and it's not made by school boards that micromanage, either. Ed Darrell DallasSteven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: so! mething can be true without being the full truth.2+2 = 4. That is true.But it does a poor job of fully describing nature. Or math.Setve On Dec 21, 2005, at 2:06 PM, Perry Dane wrote: This doesn't strike me as quite right. It seems to me that real science should also not, in the public school setting, be taught as True with a capital T. To do so would be to teach, not science, but scientism, which is something entirely different.! bsp; In fact, it seems to me that if a student asks a science teacher, "So is all this stuff that you're teaching us actually True," the teacher, qua teacher, should say (at a level suitable to high school students) something like: "Science is a form of methodologically-constrained inquiry built on certain assumptions such as naturalism. That inquiry has proved itself to be incredibly useful, as well as insightful. It is part of what, imperfectly but necessarily, we call secular knowledge. But precisely because it is a constrained discourse, it cannot claim, within its own four corners, to give us a full picture of Truth."-- Prof. Steven D. Jamarvox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"The most precious things one gets in life are not those one gets for money."Albert Einstein___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
As one who over the last few weeks has been made painfully--very painfully--aware of this design, it appears to point to the inescapable reality that there is no necessary correlation between intelligence and benevolence. VanceOn 12/21/05, Ed Darrell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No, urethra design is not beside the point at all. Is there an intelligent design explanation for that design? There is an evolutionary explanation (though not wholly satisfactory to many). How could such a thing have happened, according to intelligent design theory? The absence of any possible answer to that question points to the lack of science behind ID. That is the whole issue.Ed Darrell Dallas Perry Dane [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Robert Lipkin wrote:I would argue that Steve's inference from the facts of disease, war,violence, inequity, inequality, stupidity of some design features (knees, elbows, eyes) to the conclusion that no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect(lovin! g) deity exists is a perfectly legitimate inference. That is, the factsof evil and suffering are incompatible with the existence of such a deity,and this incompatibility must be explained away for anyone to recognize thesefacts but still insist on the deity's existence.To be fair to the intelligent design folks, their argument is not that the design of the universe IS intelligent, in the sense of optimal, or efficient, or morally good, or aesthetically pleasing, but rather that certain facts of the universe point to it having been designed BY AN intelligence.This does not, of course, answer Robert's theological argument, but it does suggest that the usual anti-intelligent-design jokes about the proximity of the prostate gland to the urethra are really beside the point.Perry*** Perry DaneProfessor of LawRutg! ers UniversitySchool of Law -- Camden217 North Fifth StreetCamden, NJ 08102[EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/Work: (856) 225-6004Fax: (856) 969-7924Home: (610) 896-5702 ***___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Vance R. KovenBoston, MA USA[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Ed Darrell writes: No, urethra design is not beside the point at all. Is there an intelligent design explanation for that design? There is an evolutionary explanation (though not wholly satisfactory to many). How could such a thing have happened, according to intelligent design theory? The absence of any possible answer to that question points to the lack of science behind ID. That is the whole issue. I agree that ID is not a scientific theory. I also believe that the Dover decision was correct. That said, though, one needs to be fair here. The claim of intelligent design theory is not that NO features of the biological world can be explained by evolution through natural selection. Nor is it, as I said before, that the biological world is, according to one or another criterion, well-designed. It is, rather, that there are certain features of the biological world (irreducible complexity and all that) that point to at least those features having been designed by an intelligence. It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Perry Dane wrote: That said, though, one needs to be fair here. The claim of intelligent design theory is not that NO features of the biological world can be explained by evolution through natural selection. Nor is it, as I said before, that the biological world is, according to one or another criterion, well-designed. It is, rather, that there are certain features of the biological world (irreducible complexity and all that) that point to at least those features having been designed by an intelligence. Actually, this depends on which ID advocate you're talking to at the time and that fact points up the lack of a coherent ID model. Some ID proponents, like Nancy Pearcey and Paul Nelson, are young earth creationists. For all practical purposes, they do take the position that there is nothing in the biological world, save perhaps bacterial adaptation for immunity to antibiotics, that can be explained by evolution through natural selection. That's precisely why there can't be an actual ID model for the natural history of life on earth, as there is for evolutionary theory. Does ID mean that all life forms in the earth's history were created simultaneously? Maybe. According to many ID advocates, yes. Does it mean that life on earth evolved through common ancestry but with the designer having to step in every now and then to design some particularly complex bit that can't evolve on its own? That appears to be Behe's position, at least. But those are radically different propositions, and the inclusion of both of them under a sort of mimimalist or bare bones ID assertion that *some* designer did *something* at *some point* is one major reason why ID cannot be considered a scientific theory, because it does not make any positive statements that the evidence might either confirm or refute. At least with the young earthers, they have offered a model from which we can derive testable hypotheses - the world is ~6000 years old, all animals lived on the earth simultaneously, most of them were killed off in a global flood around 4500 years ago, all of the features of the geological world are the result of that flood, and so forth. Those are all statements that lead to risky predictions that the evidence may either confirm or refute (in this case, all of them are of course soundly refuted by the evidence). So frankly, I don't think we can make statements about what intelligent design theory says or doesn't say about evolution or about natural history because there is no theory, just a very vague and minimalist statement and a set of arguments against evolution. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Perry wrote on 12/21/2005 01:54:14 PM: It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Or that an omniscient God who knows more than we do had a reason for creating us this way that is no more apparent to us than it is apparent to a 3 year old why he can't play with a lit candle. Brad___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Ed Brayton writes: Actually, this depends on which ID advocate you're talking to at the time and that fact points up the lack of a coherent ID model. This is fair enough, in a sense. Yes, to be sure, there are different versions of ID, just as there are different versions of most schools of thought. But the fact that a theory has different versions that do not cohere with each other does not mean that the theory, as a general approach, is not coherent. It's also worth adding that, outside the range of what is usually labeled as ID theory, are a whole set of other views, which are self-consciously religious/theological or meta-empirical rather than faux scientific, that posit that an intelligent God in some sense guides or stands behind or sustains or pushes or pulls or is otherwise involved in the process that science, within its own perfectly appropriate naturalistic methodological limitations, describes to us as evolution through random mutation and natural selection. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Brad writes: Perry wrote on 12/21/2005 01:54:14 PM: It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Or that an omniscient God who knows more than we do had a reason for creating us this way that is no more apparent to us than it is apparent to a 3 year old why he can't play with a lit candle. Yes. And that is part of what makes Intelligent Design Theory so theologically and religiously unsatisfactory: For the sake of trying to play in the arena of science, an effort at which it fails, much of the ID movement invokes a designer who is simply an abstract placeholder rather than the One Who Loves, and who evokes love and worship from his or her creation. There is a deeper point lurking here about the very strange terms on which the contemporary culture wars are being fought. But I'll let that pass. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Brad writes: Perry wrote on 12/21/2005 01:54:14 PM: It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Or that an omniscient God who knows more than we do had a reason for creating us this way that is no more apparent to us than it is apparent to a 3 year old why he can't play with a lit candle. Yes. And that is part of what makes Intelligent Design Theory so theologically and religiously unsatisfactory: For the sake of trying to play in the arena of science, an effort at which it fails, much of the ID movement invokes a designer who is simply an abstract placeholder rather than the One Who Loves, and who evokes love and worship from his or her creation. There is a deeper point lurking here about the very strange terms on which the contemporary culture wars are being fought. But I'll let that pass. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case Questions
In a clear effort in futility, I wonder if it would be possible to identify some minimalist consensus on the list on this issue; one that reflects Marks thoughtful recognition of IDs current limitations (see below) as well as Brads concerns about the overreaching of some evolutionists. So suppose someone drafted a statement disclaiming scientific overreaching as in In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. And then added to it a statement building on Marks comment that In its current form, or state of development, ID does not provide a framework for identifying testable hypothesis and as such can not be recognized as science. Is that a statement list members think school boards can constitutionally, and should, as a matter of policy, endorse? Alan Brownstein My sense is that some (or perhaps all) ID proponents think that some features of biological systems were designed but that other features evolved, either independently of design or after implementation of an intelligent design. ID does not, I think, necessarily involve a view that all present features of biological systems were designed. It does not necessarily require that the intelligent designer intervene at every moment or be responsible for every present-day feature. Thus ID and the existence of evolutionary processes are not necessarily incompatible. That's one reason why I think some anti-ID claims are overstated, such as the claim that ID is inconsistent with a scientific understanding of how bacteria evolve immunity to antibiotics, or the claim that examples of poor design falsify ID. On the other hand, the inability to falsify ID by pointing to poor design is one reason why it may be hard to take ID at this point seriously as a scientific theory. ID seems to be underdefined. When ID proponents identify systematically (rather than item by item) which present-day features (or precursors of present-day features) are the result of intelligent design, then it will be possible to consider whether the theory matches the facts. Until then, any example of a poorly operating biological feature can be explained as the result of evolutionary processes, and in a sense ID theory will remain nonfalsifiable, with ID proponents able to cherry-pick examples that support, or seem to support, their view. At least that's my sense of the matter. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:46 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Dover Case Questions In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. That is what they say when they are being careful. Some are sloppy, and some deliberately overreach, but that's the claim.Chris Lund might havemeant that putting ID in the biology class or the comparative religion class is a proxy for whether to teach that ID's claim to be science is true. Or he might have simply meant that government can't teach that a religious view is true, nor can it teach that a religious view is false. Where ever you put ID in the curriculum, the government would have to be agnostic about its supernatural claims. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brad M Pardee Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 12:36 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Dover Case Questions I think Chris reveals something significant here. Among the evolution supporters I have heard (and I'm not presuming that they speak for all evolutionists everywhere), it does not seem to be enough to say that intelligent design is outside the realm of science. They seem to think it's necessary to go further and say that ID is not true. But if the evolutionists who say ID is outside the realm of science because it's untestable really believe that it's untestable, then they have absolutely no basis for saying it's false because, by their own definition, they can't test it. The absolute best that they should be able to say is, In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. But that's
Dover Case Questions
Alan Brownstein writes: So - suppose someone drafted a statement disclaiming scientific overreaching as in 1. In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. And then added to it a statement building on Mark's comment - that 2. In its current form, or state of development, ID does not provide a framework for identifying testable hypothesis - and as such can not be recognized as science. Is that a statement list members think school boards can constitutionally, and should, as a matter of policy, endorse? I do think that it might be salutary and just plain correct to append to all science classes (and for that matter social science classes that proceed from a presumption of methodological naturalism) the sort of disclaimer I suggested earlier. But I worry that attaching such a disclaimer specifically to the teaching of evolution improperly privileges one particular religious point of view over others. The trick is to attend to the legitimate concern that science education would inadvertently promote an ideology of scientism, while also avoiding the official promotion of religion. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Maybe they teach science differently now than when I went to school and when my boys (now ages 19 and 22) went to school, but science was inherently taught as conditional and subject to testing and change. There are things that are known facts, but there is a lot that is still unexplained -- the true nature of light, for example, and why gravity is such a weak force compared to the others, and a whole host of things in biology and geology.Isn't that enough?Why any disclaimer at all?The ID challenge is motivated not by the demonstrable concern that there is anything wrong with the science of evolution as science, but rather by the fear that it conflicts with religious beliefs.If the point is to teach the limits of our understanding, that can be and in my experience was and is taught. There are lots of questions still to which the answer is "we don't know."But the answer the IDers desire is not that we don't know or even that it is unknowable through current scientific methods, but rather that the answer to some of the questions is there is a creator.And that is religious.SteveOn Dec 21, 2005, at 6:59 PM, Alan Brownstein wrote: In a clear effort in futility, I wonder if it would be possible to identify some minimalist consensus on the list on this issue; one that reflects Mark’s thoughtful recognition of ID’s current limitations (see below) as well as Brad’s concerns about the overreaching of some evolutionists. So – suppose someone drafted a statement disclaiming scientific overreaching as in “In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." And then added to it a statement building on Mark’s comment – that In its current form, or state of development, ID does not provide a framework for identifying testable hypothesis – and as such can not be recognized as science. Is that a statement list members think school boards can constitutionally, and should, as a matter of policy, endorse? Alan BrownsteinMy sense is that some (or perhaps all) ID proponents think that some features of biological systems were designed but that other features evolved, either independently of design or after implementation of an intelligent design. ID does not, I think, necessarily involve a view that all present features of biological systems were designed. It does not necessarily require that the intelligent designer intervene at every moment or be responsible for every present-day feature. Thus ID and the existence of evolutionary processes are not necessarily incompatible. That's one reason why I think some anti-ID claims are overstated, such as the claim that ID is inconsistent with a scientific understanding of how bacteria evolve immunity to antibiotics, or the claim that examples of poor design falsify ID. On the other hand, the inability to falsify ID by pointing to poor design is one reason why it may be hard to take ID at this point seriously as a scientific theory. ID seems to be underdefined. When ID proponents identify systematically (rather than item by item) which present-day features (or precursors of present-day features) are the result of intelligent design, then it will be possible to consider whether the theory matches the facts.Until then, any example of a poorly operating biological feature can be explained as the result of evolutionary processes, and in a sense ID theory will remain nonfalsifiable, with ID proponents able to cherry-pick examples that support, or seem to support, their view. At least that's my sense of the matter. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:46 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Dover Case Questions "In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." That is what they say when they are being careful. Some are sloppy, and some deliberately overreach, but that's the claim. Chris Lund might have meant that putting ID in the biology class or the comparative religion class is a proxy for whether to teach that ID's claim to be science is true. Or he might have simply meant that government can't teach that a religious view is true, nor can it teach that a religious view is false. Where ever you put ID in the curriculum, the government would have to be agnostic about its supernatural claims. Douglas LaycockUniversity of Texas Law School727 E. Dean Keeton St.Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL
