This would seem relevant ...
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010206/ts/voting_systems_dc_1.html
Tuesday February 6 12:23 PM ET Study: Old Voting Systems May Work Best
By Deborah Zabarenko
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Looking back at Florida's election mess,
scientists say the old ways of casting
To pick nits, this is not completely accurate. What is at odds with
non-coercibility is the ability to demonstrate to a third party how
one voted. But there are techniques that allow a voter to verify that
his/her vote was counted correctly without being able to prove this to
others. (Not that
Why unfair? The rules are published and people get to choose when
they vote. Cambridge is the home of Harvard and other institutions of
higher education, so the populace is certainly not all peons. I
believe there have been legal challenges to the system before which
failed.
The system is use
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David Honig wrote:
> From "Ballot Proposal" version 1.3
>
> 10 B DISPLAY
> (5) Election software shall print the selected choices on a fixed
> visible medium (such as paper), and shall require the voter to
> affirm those choices prior to ele
From: Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2001 11:43:19 -0800
To: David Honig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: William Allen Simpson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED],
"John R. Levine" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Refere
At 05:51 PM 2/4/01 -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
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>
>David Honig wrote:
>>
>> If you give people a paper receipt with their votes on it
>> (as WAS's scheme mentions) then their votes can be bought or blackmailed.
>
>I'm unaware of how that interpretation m
William Allen Simpson wrote:
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>
> I'm sorry for the second message, but I could not let the egregious
> error pass uncorrected:
:-) egregious ...
> Ed Gerck wrote:
> > The law does not allow it, and for good reasons as you mention.
> >...
> > > The voting a
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I'm sorry for the second message, but I could not let the egregious
error pass uncorrected:
Ed Gerck wrote:
> The law does not allow it, and for good reasons as you mention.
>...
> > The voting apparatus may keep a serial record of each vote, in order, for
>
ing in the proposed text that calls for a receipt to be given to
any voter, let alone a copy of their votes?
Perhaps there is some confusion in the interoperability requirement
that electronic ballots be stored in a printable US-ASCII format.
Why? Because nobody (other than mathematicians) t
As seems universally the case in security design, there must
be ugly tradeoffs. In particular (and without quoting acres
of prior material), the proposed requirements for verifiability
and non-coercibility are at odds and one must yield to the
other. Paper systems make this tradeoff by, on the
At 1:01 PM -0500 2/4/2001, John Kelsey wrote:
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>
>At 11:02 PM 1/27/01 -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
>
>...
>>"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:
>>> There are a lot of reasons why open source is desirable,
>>> but it does simply the job for an attacker.
>
>>I disag
> The voting apparatus may keep a serial record of each vote, in
> order, for auditing purposes. This is also mentioned in WAS's
> legislative text.
Good lord no. Here in NY, the inspectors write down each voter's name
on a log sheet with the names numbered in order, and write down the
numbers
David Honig wrote:
> >First of all, that's not "privacy", that's "anonymity".
> >
> >We have voter registration precisely so that we know who the voters
> >are! We are not changing voter registration
> >
> > Ed Gerck wrote:
> >>4. Fail-safe privacy in universal verifiability. If the
>
>First of all, that's not "privacy", that's "anonymity".
>
>We have voter registration precisely so that we know who the voters
>are! We are not changing voter registration
>
>4. Fail-safe privacy in universal verifiability. If the
>encrypted ballots are successfully attacked, even
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At 11:02 PM 1/27/01 -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
...
>"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:
>> There are a lot of reasons why open source is desirable,
>> but it does simply the job for an attacker.
>I disagree. Security by obscurity is never desirable.
Right.
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"John R. Levine" wrote:
> The current election system, for all its faults, is the result of two
> centuries of effort by people not all of whom were completely stupid,
> and has a complex and not always set of features to defend against all
> sorts of schemes to
William Allen Simpson wrote:
> And in the same vein, I forwarded Ed Gerck's list of published
> 'requirements' to Lynn. She intends to use them as a perfect example
> of what we DO NOT want!
see below, before you set yourself to re-invent the wheel.
> Ed Gerck wrote:
> > 1. Sixteen requireme
[ likely too far off topic ]
> Hmmm, I have a "voter registration card" and I believe that is
> the case across the USA.
Anything that is itself mechanically _required_ in order to
vote must be provided to the voter gratis else it will be
surely challenged as a poll tax. By just this
>>Hmmm, I have a "voter registration card" and I believe that is the case
>>across the USA.
Here in New York, the county sends you a card when you register, which
all but the most anal then lose. I used to be an election inspector,
and I can report that we never asked for the cards, and I can't
At 05:28 PM 1/25/01 -0600, (Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy wrote:
>On Thu, Jan 25, 2001 at 01:03:49PM -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
>>
>> I've been working with Congresswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
>> electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sens
William Allen Simpson wrote:
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>
> I've been working with Congresswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
> electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sensitive
> information, and encourage widespread implementation in a compe
> Hmmm, I have a "voter registration card" and I believe that is the case
> across the USA.
It is not.
/r$
[True enough. --Perry]
> -Original Message-
> From: William Allen Simpson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Subject: Re: electronic ballots
> [SNIP much]
> >
> > It seems that something like a smartcard would be the best scheme.
>
> Not likely. Voting is very different from banking
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Hash: SHA1
At 05:28 PM 1/25/01 -0600, (Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy wrote:
>First the basics:
>
> 1. An electronic election system need only be as good as the current
> system. While perfection remains the goal, the minimum criteria
> is that it be no worse.
Aft
sswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
> >electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sensitive
> >information, and encourage widespread implementation in a competitive
> >environment. We'd like feedback.
>
> You should list the desirable properties
At 1:03 PM -0500 1/25/2001, William Allen Simpson wrote:
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>
>I've been working with Congresswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
>electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sensitive
>information, and encourage widespread
On Thu, Jan 25, 2001 at 01:03:49PM -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
>
> I've been working with Congresswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
> electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sensitive
> information, and encourage widespread implementation
At 01:03 PM 1/25/01 -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
>-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>
>I've been working with Congresswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
>electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sensitive
>information, and encourage widespread
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Long answer
Matt Crawford wrote:
>
> It looks as if your VERIFIABILITY constraints allow pay-for-vote to
> take place. The voter V can show his audit number to ward-heeler W,
> who can subsequently verify, together with poll-watcher P, that V
> voted for
It looks as if your VERIFIABILITY constraints allow pay-for-vote to
take place. The voter V can show his audit number to ward-heeler W,
who can subsequently verify, together with poll-watcher P, that V
voted for Boss B. The PRIVACY section does not seem strong enough to
prevent this.
Ten years
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I've been working with Congresswoman Lynn Rivers on language for
electronic ballots. My intent is to specify the security sensitive
information, and encourage widespread implementation in a competitive
environment. We'd like feedback.
Unlike l
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