Re: DRAFT: May CA Communication

On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: On 5/2/14, 11:17 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 10:05 AM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: In regards to action #5, I think we need to add another option to allow CAs to specify if they have

Re: EKUs covered in the Mozilla CA Program

On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 11:45 AM, David Keeler dkee...@mozilla.com wrote: On 05/13/2014 06:48 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: I think the biggest question probably is id-kp-clientAuth. From a quick scan of the NSS certdb code, it seems that setting this EKU in a CA cert would allow it to issue

Re: New wiki page on certificate revocation plans

On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 2:02 AM, Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote: On 04/08/14 18:16, Erwann Abalea wrote: OCSP is painful and costly to optimize, x509labs shows great availability and good performance for most CA/location combination, but this is in contradiction with real user

Re: Audits of CA conformance to the BRs

On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 11:16 AM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: 2) BR point-in-time audits may not be sufficient. https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:CertificatePolicyV2.1#Time_Frames_for_included_CAs_to_comply_with_the_new_policy Any Certificate Authority being considered for root

Re: Wildcard cert, no intermediate

On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 1:55 PM, fhw...@gmail.com wrote: I've encountered a wildcard end-entity certificate on a live server that chains directly to the root cert. There is no intermediate certificate and the root is in the Mozilla trust store. I assume this is a frowned upon practice that

Re: Allow Redaction of issues detailed in BR Audit statements?

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 11:35 AM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: I am running into a problem with BR audit statements that list details about issues that have been found. https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:CertificatePolicyV2.1#Baseline_Requirements ...The first BR audit for each CA and

Re: Allow Redaction of issues detailed in BR Audit statements?

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 1:24 PM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: BR 9.5 – 1024-bit certs with validity beyond 2013 (in order to support legacy customer apps) BR 13.2.6 - OCSP giving status “good” for

Re: Organization info in certs not being properly recognized byFirefox

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:58 AM, John Nagle na...@sitetruth.com wrote: On 27/10/14 08:16, Ryan Sleevi wrote: snip If you're trusting certificates to assert information about either the identity of the entity behind the key or that the CA has done due diligence, well, you're using certificates

Re: [Cryptography] New free TLS CA coming

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 11:27 PM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Mark Atwood m...@mark.atwood.name writes: So Mozilla et al have been giving CAcert the runaround for over 4 years now, and then suddenly they create a more centralized less audited Let's Encrypt shows up, and it's

Removed roots

There are currently spreadsheets for roots that are included in the Mozilla trust store and roots have applied to be in the trust store. Is there any tracking of roots that were removed? How about any time one of the trust bits or EV policy IDs are removed? (I'm not sure that the later has ever

Re: Second Discussion of KIR S.A. Root Inclusion Request

On Mon, Feb 9, 2015 at 4:19 PM, Ryan Sleevi ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com wrote: Section 3.2.2 describes a means for validating domain ownership that is not described within Section 11.1.1 of the BR 1.2.3. In particular, it uses the WHOIS information (described in 11.1.1 p3) in conjunction

Re: Certificate Profiles

[mailto:dev-security-policy- bounces+steve.roylance=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Peter Bowen Sent: 15 March 2015 00:59 To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Certificate Profiles I've been trying to figure out what is required, forbidden, and optional for X.509

Re: Removed roots

On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 4:04 PM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: On 2/7/15 3:02 PM, Peter Bowen wrote: There are currently spreadsheets for roots that are included in the Mozilla trust store and roots have applied to be in the trust store. Is there any tracking of roots that were

Re: Propose Removal of E-Guven root

On Thu, Mar 19, 2015 at 4:39 PM, David Keeler dkee...@mozilla.com wrote: On 03/19/2015 01:01 PM, Peter Bowen wrote: Given this ratio, I find it very hard to believe that they would be able to receive an audit report without qualifications that Mozilla would deem unacceptable. Maybe I'm

Require separation between Issuing CAs and Policy CAs

Today the Mozilla CA policy and the CAB Forum categorize CAs as either Root CAs or Intermediate CAs. However the reality is that the line is not always clear between the two and this leads to uncertainty of what requirements apply in various circumstances. For example, the Baseline Requirements

Re: 答复: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

Anyin, It seems that the mailing list strips attachments. I copied the ones you attached to this message a shared location. They are at: https://pzb-public-files.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/B1.pdf https://pzb-public-files.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/B2.pdf Thanks, Peter On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at

Re: 答复: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 10:10 AM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: All, I appreciate your thoughtful and constructive feedback on this situation. The suggestions regarding the CNNIC root certificates that I've interpreted from this discussion are as follows. These are listed in no

Re: ç­”å¤ : Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:20 PM, Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote: On 25/03/15 17:45, Ryan Sleevi wrote: That is, in a hypothetical world where E1 is pursued (for any CA), the CA can simply backdate the certificate. They'd be non-compliant with the Baseline Requirements, presumably, but

Re: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 2:22 PM, jjo...@mozilla.com wrote: On Monday, March 30, 2015 at 8:34:47 AM UTC-7, Richard Barnes wrote: As a compromise, however, I would be willing to add the CNNIC intermediates to the Mozilla root list (F). [...] Rather, we should plan to remove them after a fixed

Re: address prefixes allowed for domain control validation

On Sun, Mar 22, 2015 at 4:18 PM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: admin@domain administrator@domain webmaster@domain hostmaster@domain postmaster@domain What do you all think? (Note this is also in Baseline Requirements section 11.1.1) It is hard to know

RE: TurkTrust Root Renewal Request

Steve, Unless Peter is a member of the forum, the public list is a black hole, as only members can post. The alternative, the questions list, is not publicly readable, so is also a bad choice for open discussion. Therefore, while this thread is not the appropriate place, this forum is probably

Re: How to become a trusted root CA for SSL Certificates

On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 7:25 AM, Framarti francescomartin...@gmail.com wrote: i'm working for a company that is issuing trusted SSL OV certificates as a subsidiary CA. I was thinking about becoming a trusted root CA in order to get rid of the fees per each issued certificate to be given to

Re: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 6:24 PM, Peter Kurrasch fhw...@gmail.com wrote: ‎Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of the Superfish debacle is that sites that have EV certs would get the green bar treatment on other devices but not on the Lenovo devices where Superfish was

Re: address prefixes allowed for domain control validation

On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 9:41 AM, Robin Alden ro...@comodo.com wrote: I wonder if the current publicity will lead all webmail providers to do a review, and then we won't see any further problems... That would be nice! Pertaining to Peter Bowen's suggestion that some CAs who use email

Re: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 3:47 PM, Richard Barnes rbar...@mozilla.com wrote: It has been discovered that an intermediate CA under the CNNIC root has mis-issued certificates for some Google domains. Full details can be found in blog posts by Google [0] and Mozilla [1]. We would like to discuss

Re: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 5:50 PM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.com wrote: Peter, Did you read the blog posts? 1) https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/23/revoking-trust-in-one-cnnic-intermediate-certificate/ 2)

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

On Sun, May 17, 2015 at 5:48 PM, Ryan Sleevi ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com wrote: On Sun, May 17, 2015 3:28 pm, Peter Bowen wrote: What if Mozilla puts a simple rule in place? All CAs must either: - Have a WebTrust for BR and ETSI TS 102 042 assessment conducted by a assessor who meets

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

On Sun, May 17, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Ryan Sleevi ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com wrote: On Sun, May 17, 2015 6:06 pm, Peter Bowen wrote: I was assuming this discussion was based on the concept that Government CAs did not need to meet all the audit criteria. Otherwise why are we having

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 8:25 AM, Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote: The topic of name-constraining government CAs, probably to the TLD(s) of their territory(ies), has come up numerous times. I'd like to try and hash out, once and for all, whether we think this is actually a good idea, so

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote: Are https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc751157.aspx and http://aka.ms/auditreqs the MSFT components (previously?) under NDA? The published requirements are not under NDA. Microsoft released a draft version under NDA

Publicly disclosed and audited policy

The Mozilla CA Certificate policy says that all certificates which are capable of being used to issue new certificates must either be technically constrained or be publicly disclosed and audited. For certificates in the latter category, there are several requirements. I'm hoping to get clarity

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

On Sun, May 31, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Ryan Sleevi ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com wrote: On Sat, May 30, 2015 2:47 pm, Brian Smith wrote: IIRC, in the past, we've seen CAs that lapse in compliance with Mozilla's CA policies and that have claimed they cannot do the work to become compliant again

Re: Letter from US House of Representatives

Thinking about this from a technical perspective, rather than a political one, this seems very similar to a user deciding to add additional certificates to their trust store. I think the primary differences are the need to add a set of certificates and possibly automatically update the list. If

Re: Clarify that a ccTLD is not acceptable in permittedSubtrees

On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 12:21 AM, Adriano Santoni wrote: > The issue I raised is not whether ccTLD are allowed in the BRs (they > apparently are, to date) or what kind of entity could be allowed a ccTLD in > their SubCA certificate's permittedSubtrees. > > My point

Re: Clarify that a ccTLD is not acceptable in permittedSubtrees

On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 3:11 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > "Presence on the ICANN section of the list" gets closer, but this > doesn't solve the brand-TLD problem. > > Ideally, we would know which TLDs were public-registration and which > were not; ICANN has made noises about

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Remove Code Signing Trust Bit

> On Oct 8, 2015, at 6:27 AM, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > > ‎I will cop to being confused about the Linux situation--I thought some issue > had been identified for one of the distros. > > 1. Impacts to specific products: I had hoped that by now we'd be able to > point to

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 2:22 AM, Rob Stradling wrote: > I would also like to get clarification on if/when the underscore character > may be used in each of the name types. Your report seems to flag > underscores as always prohibited (I think), but I expect that some CAs

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Rob Stradling wrote: > On 17/11/15 17:54, Kurt Roeckx wrote: >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 05:40:28PM +, Rob Stradling wrote: >>> >>> >>> Great. I tried importing the list into postgres but I couldn't persuade >>> it >>> to accept

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

er 17, 2015 2:12 PM > To: Jeremy Rowley > Cc: Richard Wang; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Peter Bowen; > Peter Gutmann > Subject: Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates > > On 17/11/15 18:27, Jeremy Rowley wrote: >> Encoding an IP Address in a dNSName i

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

d, please check it, thanks. > > The attached certificate is No. 6653, please check its EKU, thanks. > > > Best Regards, > > Richard > > > -Original Message- > From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com] > Sent: Wednesday, November 18, 2015 12:33 AM > To:

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com> wrote: > On Wed, November 18, 2015 8:56 am, Peter Bowen wrote: >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 2:22 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com> >> wrote: >> > I would also

Re: Remove Roots used for only Email and CodeSigning?

On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 11:04 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > On Tue, Sep 08, 2015 at 10:58:39AM -0700, Kathleen Wilson wrote: >> 28. Remove Code Signing trust bits. As of Firefox 38, add-ons are signed >> using Mozilla's own roots. There doesn't appear to be anyone else using the >>

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Remove Code Signing Trust Bit

On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 3:54 PM, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > It seems to me that the benefits of this proposed change are minimal while > the negative impacts to embedded systems ‎are significant. Perhaps I've > missed something? > > It should be understood that code signing is

Re: Major SSL Root issue...

Sebastien, I apologize, but I don’t follow the issue. What flaw are you reporting? Can you describe in detail the problem? Also, if you think that this is not a publicly known issue, please see https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/#For_Developers

Re: Firefox security too strict (HSTS?)?

> On Sep 17, 2015, at 8:29 PM, AnilG wrote: > > On Friday, 18 September 2015 12:29:46 UTC+10, Peter Gutmann wrote: >> base. If you look at Mozilla's own figures at >> https://input.mozilla.org/en-US/, they have a 90% dissatisfaction rating from > > To make my point

Re: Name issues in public certificates

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 9:35 AM, Matthias Hunstock <no-s...@ple4se.org> wrote: > Am 17.11.2015 um 09:04 schrieb Peter Bowen: > >> There are a couple of rules that may create false positives, so please >> don't assume every certificate on the sheet is problematic. > > I

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Timeline for Disclosing SubCAs

On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 11:17 AM, Kathleen Wilson <kwil...@mozilla.com> wrote: > On 12/3/15 11:04 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: >> >> On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 10:31 AM, Kathleen Wilson <kwil...@mozilla.com> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 23/11/15 15:57, Pe

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Timeline for Disclosing SubCAs

On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 10:31 AM, Kathleen Wilson <kwil...@mozilla.com> wrote: >> On 23/11/15 15:57, Peter Bowen wrote: >>> >>> I realize that Mozilla carved out allowance for not disclosing, but >>> the CA/Browser Forum did not adopt this, instead only ex

Re: Name issues in public certificates

On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 6:07 AM, Matthias Hunstock <no-s...@ple4se.org> wrote: > Am 09.12.2015 um 18:46 schrieb Peter Bowen: > >> Do you have an example where you think IPv6 addresses are not being >> handled correctly? > > Serial 19D70E1B381579 in your document

Re: Nation State MITM CA's ?

On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 2:34 PM, David E. Ross <nobody@nowhere.invalid> wrote: > On 1/7/2016 12:29 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: >> On 1/7/16 11:15 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: >>> >>> >>> Until such time that the provide this, I don't see how they are any >&g

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 5:43 PM, Brian Smith <br...@briansmith.org> wrote: > Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> 2) For commonName attributes in subject DNs, clarify that they can only >> contain: >> >> - IPv4 address in dotted-decimal notat

Re: [FORGED] Name issues in public certificates

On Fri, Nov 20, 2015 at 9:28 AM, wrote: > Yes, thanks. I had CommonName field in mind and that is limited to 64 > characters but SubjectAltName is completely different when it comes to max > length (even though they both hold a FQDN). I had missed that limitation

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Timeline for Disclosing SubCAs

On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > Topic to discuss [1]: > “(D3) Make the timeline clear about when the audit statements and disclosure > has to happen for new audited/disclosed subCAs. > > Section 10 of the Inclusion Policy says: >

Re: Name issues in public certificates

On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 4:26 PM, Brian Smith <br...@briansmith.org> wrote: > Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Robin Alden <ro...@comodo.com> wrote: >> Given that it doesn't, but that that the BRs say "MUST be either a >>

Re: Name issues in public certificates

On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 11:57 AM, Robin Alden wrote: > Peter said.. >> While I realize that it is not clear cut in many contexts, RFC 5280 is >> rather clear cut. The authors clearly wanted to avoid stumbling and >> being eaten by a grue, so they wrote: >> >>When the

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Timeline for Disclosing SubCAs

On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > Topic to discuss [1]: > “(D3) Make the timeline clear about when the audit statements and disclosure > has to happen for new audited/disclosed subCAs. > > What further clarification needs to be added to Mozilla’s CA

Re: Should we block Blue Coat's 'test' intermediate CA?

On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 9:59 AM, Nick Lamb wrote: > That said, so far as I understand the Mozilla requirement is actually that > such intermediates be disclosed _and audited_. The present disclosure from > Symantec asserts that this intermediate is covered by the same

Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

I think there are two things getting conflated here: 1) Disclosure of revoked unexpired CA certificates signed by a trusted CA 2) Disclosure of CA certificates signed by CAs that are the subject of #1 Imagine the following heirarchy: Univercert Root CA (in trust store) --(CA Cert A)-->

Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 8:21 AM, Ben Wilson wrote: >> It seems to me that requiring the registration of these subordinate CAs >> bloats the Salesforce database unnecessarily. > > We've historically

Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

On Sat, Jun 25, 2016 at 3:50 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: > On 25 June 2016 at 00:56, Rob Stradling wrote: >> On 24/06/16 14:38, Rob Stradling wrote: >>> >>> I've just updated https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures. >>> >>> There's now a separate grouping for

Policy revision proposal - transitive disclosure exception

The Mozilla CA Certificate policy says, in part: "8. All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates, and which directly or transitively chain to a certificate included in Mozilla’s CA Certificate Program, MUST be operated in accordance with Mozilla’s CA Certificate

Re: New requirement: certlint testing

On Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 6:55 AM, Erwann Abalea wrote: > Le lundi 8 février 2016 21:43:19 UTC+1, Kathleen Wilson a écrit : >> On 2/8/16 12:22 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: >> >> One topic currently under discussion in Bug #1201423 is regarding root >> certificates with serial number

Re: New requirement: certlint testing

On Mon, Feb 8, 2016 at 2:46 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > > Note that I think there are still some things with the certlint tests that > need to be ironed out, before filing bugs for every reported error. I am unaware of anything that is flagged as Fatal or Error on non-CA

More SHA-1 certs

These are all in the last week Sub-CA under SHECA (which has applied to be in the Mozilla program) https://crt.sh/?id=12367776=cablint Sub-CA under DigiCert https://crt.sh/?id=12460684=cablint Sub-CA under Symantec https://crt.sh/?id=12456194=cablint https://crt.sh/?id=12434313=cablint

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

Peter, I obviously do not represent ComSign, but several of the items in your list are not really specific to the CPS and instead are more comments on the Mozilla policies. On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 4:24 PM, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > * There is a BR from CABF that covers code

Re: OCSP Responders Are An Attack Vector For SHA-1 Collisions

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote: > 1. Use a non-CA OCSP certificate if the relevant clients are known to > support this aspect of the OCSP protocol (I don't know if any OCSP > clients, historic or otherwise, lack this ability). Such an OCSP >

CA ownership (re: Q1 2016 CA communication)

Over the last year or so there seems to be a lot of movement in CA ownership. Would it be worth asking for each root to provide an indication of company/organization ownership? For example, NetLock indicates on their website they were acquired by Docler Holding in 2013. Similarly, TrustWave

Re: A-Trust Root Renewal Request

On Fri, Mar 25, 2016 at 7:33 AM, wrote: > can someone explain to a non security expert, why A-Trust is still not in the > inclusion phase? This bug-report goes over a year now. Is A-Trust not > cooperating promptly and correctly? Is Mozilla working too slow? I really > don't

[no subject]

I'm a little confused about the expected scope of audit reports with respect to non-Root issuers. The Mozilla CA policy says: "The term 'subordinate CA' below refers to any organization or legal entity that is in possession or control of a certificate that is capable of being used to issue new

Re: What is the Mozilla Firefox policy concerning SHA-1 Client authentication certificates?

It does to a certain extent. If I have a certificate that uses a 512-bit RSA key and is signed using RSAwithMD2, will Mozilla even attempt to use that certificate for client authentication? On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Richard Barnes wrote: > For client certificates,

Re: Undisclosed CA certificates

Here is a Google Spreadsheet without the subordinates that have EKU restrictions. I didn't match to SalesForce, so most of these are probably already in there. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/14lO33nW-tTN86Vq_urmI6IAIWRPZgd1KKfzvrLk5TZQ/edit?usp=sharing On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 6:11 PM,

Re: Undisclosed CA certificates

On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 7:36 PM, Richard Barnes <rbar...@mozilla.com> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 8:41 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> As far as I can tell, SalesForce does not have a way to show multiple >> certificates for one CA. So it is

Re: Undisclosed CA certificates

On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 7:17 PM, Matt Palmer <mpal...@hezmatt.org> wrote: > On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 05:12:28PM -0700, Peter Bowen wrote: >> On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 5:03 PM, Matt Palmer <mpal...@hezmatt.org> wrote: >> > Even more fun: what if the seria

Re: SSL Certs for Malicious Websites

[ Disclaimer: This message is my personal view and does not necessarily represent that of my employer. ] On Thu, May 19, 2016 at 9:15 AM, wrote: > This has been a very surprising discussion to me. If most CAs were asked “Do > you think CAs are supposed to investigate

Re: SSL Certs for Malicious Websites

[ Disclaimer: This message is my personal view and does not necessarily represent that of my employer. ] On Fri, May 20, 2016 at 5:41 PM, wrote: > Peter -- the reference to BR 9.6.8(8) is interesting, but is not really > relevant to discussion of the requirements of BR

Re: SSL Certs for Malicious Websites

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 6:06 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com> wrote: > On 16/05/16 01:43, Peter Bowen wrote: > > This discussion should consider what's best for Mozilla's users. Perhaps > that aligns precisely with the minimum requirements in the EVGs, or perhaps >

Re: SSL Certs for Malicious Websites

(Top posting to bring the questions to the top) > 1) What does "Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud" in the definition > of Certificate Problem Report actually mean? > 2) What does "misused" mean in Section 4.9.1.1? I think there are a several of different things that could fall within

Re: SSL Certs for Malicious Websites

On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 7:16 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > I think the bullet as a whole could mean that we reserve the right to > not include CAs who happily issue certs to "www.paypalpayments.com" to > just anyone without any checks or High Risk string list or anything. > Such

Re: Disclosure requirements for "subsequent certificates in a (name-constrained) certification path"

> On May 5, 2016, at 6:50 AM, Richard Barnes <rbar...@mozilla.com> wrote: > > On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 8:32 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> I will disagree. I think the intent is to "prune" the tree > > > Oh, if only it we

Re: Which intermediate certs to add to CA Community in Salesforce

On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > All, > > I added the following to > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:SalesforceCommunity#Which_intermediate_certificate_data_should_CAs_add_to_Salesforce.3F > ~~ > Intermediate certificates are considered to be technically

Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

I think there is confusion over the generic term “Symantec”. There is no issue for Symantec (the company) to be an affiliate of the USG FPKI and to operate CAs mutually cross-certified with the USG FPKI. Additionally there is no issue with Symantec (or anyone else) to operate CAs included in

Re: Amazon Root Inclusion Request

Andrew, Thank you for your review of our CP and CPS. Please see our responses inline. Thanks, Peter > On Aug 10, 2016, at 3:12 PM, Andrew R. Whalley wrote: > > Here are the notes from my read-through. I commend Amazon for the clarity > of their CP and CPS. > >

Re: Other Curves

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-03 needs to move forward first. It is currently in working group last call. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032 is now published, which replaces I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa, so that removes the last dangling reference from curdle-pkix. We also need to

Re: Useful Heuristics

On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 5:50 AM, Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote: > On Monday, 30 January 2017 23:48:51 CET Peter Bowen wrote: >> See notes inline about known cities with numbers in their name. >> >> On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 10:39 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbo..

Google Trust Services roots

A couple of weeks ago, Google announced Google Trust Services (https://security.googleblog.com/2017/01/the-foundation-of-more-secure-web.html) and also announced that they have acquired two roots that are in Mozilla trust store. As discussed in this group previously, Mozilla does not have a very

Re: I found some SHA-1 certificates issued by Symantec

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Richard Barnes wrote: > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 10:48 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: >> >> This helpful spreadsheet shows that they were removed in Firefox 47 and >> 51 respectively: >>

Re: Question about Baseline Requirements section #7.1.4.2

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 8:05 AM, Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org> wrote: > On 24/01/17 15:48, Peter Bowen wrote: >> I think it would be completely reasonable for Mozilla to require a >> commonName in an update to the policy. I thought it was there, but a >> CA pus

Re: Question about Baseline Requirements section #7.1.4.2

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 3:32 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > Does section 7.1.4.2 of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements only > apply to end-entity certificates? > > If yes, where does it specify that in the document? > > This has come up in a few CA requests, due to

Useful Heuristics

While it is very hard to validate the subject content of certificates outside of DNS names, there are a number of heuristics that may be useful to trigger a deeper check to ensure that the data is accurate. A couple of these that I've found useful are: 1) If stateOrProvince or Locality type

Re: Question about Baseline Requirements section #7.1.4.2

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 12:28 AM, Inigo Barreira wrote: > Yes, I´m also agree. This was also taken into account when writting the ETSI > standards, and for the CA certs, the minumun is what Peter has indicated > plus the common name. We indicate that "... shall contain at

Re: Policy 2.4 Proposal: Define how quickly audit reports must be provided

> On Jan 18, 2017, at 7:18 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > > On 17/01/17 23:33, Jakob Bohm wrote: >> How about "_and versions and strong (>= 256 bits) hashes_", > > Do people think we need to go this far? > > If we do, we'll need them to specify filenames, not just document >

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:37 AM, Richard Wang wrote: > We finished the CT posting, all 2015 issued SSL certificate is posted to > WoSign CT log server: https://ctlog.wosign.com, total 101,410 certificates. Richard, Based on CT logs, I have seen certificates from the CAs

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

(forgot the list) On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 7:55 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:37 AM, Richard Wang <rich...@wosign.com> wrote: >> We finished the CT posting, all 2015 issued SSL certificate is posted to >> WoSign CT log serve

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:11 AM, Richard Wang <rich...@wosign.com> wrote: > Yes, we posted all 2015 issued SSL from WoSign trusted root. > > On 2 Sep 2016, at 22:55, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Based on CT logs, I have seen certificates from the CAs below, a

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 5:04 PM, Richard Wang wrote: > From the screenshot, we know why Percy hate WoSign so deeply, we know he > represent which CA, everything is clear now. Richard, With all due respect, many of the people who participate in this dev-security-policy group

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

, Richard Wang <rich...@wosign.com> wrote: > We will check this tomorrow. > Now our time is 23:32 at night. > > > Regards, > > Richard > >> On 2 Sep 2016, at 23:20, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:11 AM, Richar

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 6:08 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > Several incidents have come to our attention involving the CA "WoSign". > Mozilla is considering what action it should take in response to these > incidents. This email sets out our understanding of the situation. > >

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

hanks, > > Regards, > > Richard > >> On 4 Sep 2016, at 12:12, Matt Palmer <mpal...@hezmatt.org> wrote: >> >>> On Sat, Sep 03, 2016 at 02:18:44PM -0700, Peter Bowen wrote: >>> Can you also please check the following two certificates? It looks >

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 9:00 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Wed, August 31, 2016 10:09 pm, Richard Wang wrote: >> Thanks for your so detail instruction. >> Yes, we are improved. The two case is happened in 2015 and the mis-issued >> certificate period is only 5 months that we

Reuse of serial numbers by StartCom

In reviewing the Certificate Transparency logs, I noticed the StartCom has issued multiple certificates with identical serial numbers and identical issuer names. https://crt.sh/?serial=14DCA8 (2014-12-07) https://crt.sh/?serial=04FF5D653668DB (2015-01-05) https://crt.sh/?serial=052D14BA553ED0

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