On Friday 02 Aug 2013 19:12:31 Peter Todd wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 12:36:34PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > > Basically the security model is now an attacker has to outspend the
> > > defenders in terms of Bitcoins sacrificed. Not perfect, but it may be of
> > > value, especially in co
On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 12:36:34PM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > Basically the security model is now an attacker has to outspend the
> > defenders in terms of Bitcoins sacrificed. Not perfect, but it may be of
> > value, especially in conjunction with other protections. They do have
> > potent
On Thursday 25 Jul 2013 07:48:39 Peter Todd wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2013 at 03:18:32PM -0500, Robert Hailey wrote:
> > Judging from a business-process perspective, if it were up to me (and it's
> > not!) I would elect to do these two options.
> >
> > Direct paypal
> > for those that want it
On Mon, Jul 22, 2013 at 03:18:32PM -0500, Robert Hailey wrote:
> Judging from a business-process perspective, if it were up to me (and it's
> not!) I would elect to do these two options.
>
> Direct paypal
> for those that want it now (and they likely have a paypal account). I
> presume this
> One problem with the yubikey thing is it takes time to deliver them.
> Hence the need to be able to just buy an invite e.g. with BTC.
I agree that yubikey can't be the only way to introduce core nodes.
There should be a (near) instant method as well.
> On the level of tunnels - what I would con
On Tuesday 23 Jul 2013 09:32:31 Victor Denisov wrote:
> > One problem with the yubikey thing is it takes time to deliver them.
> > Hence the need to be able to just buy an invite e.g. with BTC.
>
> I agree that yubikey can't be the only way to introduce core nodes.
> There should be a (near) insta
> Exactly my point... why, then, does the common case need freenet.
It doesn't. This is bad how?
VD.
> But let us not forget what I consider to be more common use case (for
> which we are not optimized and has nothing to do with child porn)...
>
> I have a friend, and would like to communicate with him/her
> "securely" in an email or instant-message like way.
This is trivial without Freenet - ju
>> 1. Paying for becoming a "VIP" Freenet node is not out of the
>> question (people buy invites to elite torrent trackers for sizable
>> amount of money), but the benefits must be *very* obvious.
>
> There's no point if it's only the handful of elite nodes. It needs to
> be the bulk of the networ
> 2) Most people on Freenet have no real enemies and so care far too
> much about their friends' feelings and not enough about their actual
> enemies, compared to our threat model.
I think it's slightly different. Let's imagine I'm a passive pedophile;
a stranger sees me watching child porn in the
A number of somewhat-connected observations from someone who had been
following Freenet since early 0.3 days:
1. Paying for becoming a "VIP" Freenet node is not out of the question
(people buy invites to elite torrent trackers for sizable amount of
money), but the benefits must be *very* obvious.
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 2:57 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
> * If we use direct paypal, the paranoid will avoid it like the plague (paypal
> records!)
> ...
> * If we use vanilla yubikeys, the impatient will eschew the whole process by
> a wide birth, and the project doesn't get the funding.
On 201
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 2:22 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> One problem with the yubikey thing is it takes time to deliver them.
Depending upon the expected use case and average psychology (patience), that
might be the only critical issue... and yet, it would be an issue with *any*
hardware sol
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 1:21 PM, Victor Denisov wrote:
> [Point to point communication] is [relatively easy] without Freenet
Exactly my point... why, then, does the common case need freenet.
--
Robert Hailey
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 12:53 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
> It may be that Freenet cannot "win" in the p2p paranoia market until it makes
> that [communication] workflow trivial
At the risk of diverting attention away from (or confusing the ideas of) my
former discussion of using yubi for opennet
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 12:32 PM, Victor Denisov wrote:
>> 2) Most people on Freenet have no real enemies and so care far too
>> much about their friends' feelings and not enough about their actual
>> enemies, compared to our threat model.
>
> I think it's slightly different. Let's imagine I'm a
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 19:00:03 Victor Denisov wrote:
> >> 1. Paying for becoming a "VIP" Freenet node is not out of the
> >> question (people buy invites to elite torrent trackers for sizable
> >> amount of money), but the benefits must be *very* obvious.
> >
> > There's no point if it's only the
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 19:11:05 Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 12:53 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> > It may be that Freenet cannot "win" in the p2p paranoia market until it
> > makes that [communication] workflow trivial
>
> At the risk of diverting attention away from (or confu
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 11:01 AM, Victor Denisov wrote:
> If I'm correct and an attacker will
> need to roughly match the network size for a successful attack, then
> matching a network of 100K nodes, each of which had paid, say, $5 to
> join, would require $500K - heck, even I, being a (relative
On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 9:32 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> ...almost everyone argues that darknet is impossible.
I wonder if this is really b/c "hermits don't have friends", or if there is
something between the theory and practice for which we have not accounted.
I have put much thought into a
On Mon, Jul 22, 2013 at 9:32 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Since Eleriseth announced he was leaving and we should focus on
> speed/usability, then opennet security, and only then darknet, I have been
> looking into options for securing opennet, and discussing this with various
> people.
>
I agre
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 18:32:39 Victor Denisov wrote:
> > 2) Most people on Freenet have no real enemies and so care far too
> > much about their friends' feelings and not enough about their actual
> > enemies, compared to our threat model.
>
> I think it's slightly different. Let's imagine I'm a p
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 18:08:57 Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Monday 22 Jul 2013 16:57:35 Ian Clarke wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 22, 2013 at 9:32 AM, Matthew Toseland > > wrote:
> >
> > > Since Eleriseth announced he was leaving and we should focus on
> > > speed/usability, then opennet security, and on
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 17:01:08 Victor Denisov wrote:
> A number of somewhat-connected observations from someone who had been
> following Freenet since early 0.3 days:
>
> 1. Paying for becoming a "VIP" Freenet node is not out of the question
> (people buy invites to elite torrent trackers for siza
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 17:22:40 Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 9:32 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > ...almost everyone argues that darknet is impossible.
>
> I wonder if this is really b/c "hermits don't have friends", or if there is
> something between the theory and practic
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 16:57:35 Ian Clarke wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2013 at 9:32 AM, Matthew Toseland > wrote:
>
> > Since Eleriseth announced he was leaving and we should focus on
> > speed/usability, then opennet security, and only then darknet, I have been
> > looking into options for securing
On Monday 22 Jul 2013 17:22:40 Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On 2013/07/22 (Jul), at 9:32 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > ...almost everyone argues that darknet is impossible.
>
> I wonder if this is really b/c "hermits don't have friends", or if there is
> something between the theory and practic
Since Eleriseth announced he was leaving and we should focus on
speed/usability, then opennet security, and only then darknet, I have been
looking into options for securing opennet, and discussing this with various
people.
The main attacks here are:
- MAST: Listen for a predictable request/ins
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