/polls today, so our
selection of decision making (or utility measuring) algorithms should
cover also them.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 27, 2010, at 6:55 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 27, 2010, at 11:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Without the uneven strategy problem, "full-blown Range" would be,
hands down, the best (single-winner) voting system possible
On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
no, i think that if i can think up a negative number with greater
magnitude than anyone else, i should be able to single
not planned so by the campaign office and the
candidate). Cycles are thus maybe not a very common pattern but surely
possible in typical real life situations.
Juho
On Jan 31, 2010, at 10:51 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On Jan 31, 2010, at 9:18 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
.
2010/1/31 Juho Laatu
here
some strategy would clearly work in a large real life Condorcet
election.
Juho
On Jan 31, 2010, at 11:38 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/1/31 Juho
One more addition / clarification.
I wrote:
> The three candidates just happened to plan their campaigns so that
they generate a cy
atrix only should be classified as one specific subset of
Condorcet methods. Some methods may add e.g. an explicit (approval)
cutoff to this, but in most cases this kind of additions are still
"nicely summable".
Juho
On Feb 3, 2010, at 11:31 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
hough probably there will be quite a number of identical
ballots (and some space could be saved that way). In Burlington there
were almost 9000 votes and out of these the sizes of the biggest piles
of identical votes were 800, 680 and 506. There were less than 400
different kind of ballots in Bu
lt;= m <= n, all
members of a n member Smith set are part of a m-cycle. For all m, 4 <=
m <= n, any two members of a n member Smith set are both part of one
of the m-cycles.
(All this is based on the assumption that there are no pairwise ties.
I hope I got the equations otherwi
On Feb 6, 2010, at 3:28 PM, Juho wrote:
On Feb 6, 2010, at 5:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Feb 5, 2010, at 10:24 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
robert bristow-johnson:
In a Condorcet election in which a cycle occurs, if there are
only three
candidates in the Smith set, or even if
most first preference votes unless it
is the Condorcet winner. This method will be non-monotonic when there
is no Condorcet winner.
Juho
On Feb 20, 2010, at 11:56 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Does nonmonotonicity in three-candidate IRV only happen when the
Condorcet winner is eliminat
other interests, maybe partly because
many didn't even understand yet what was good and what was bad in IRV.
(Another saying, truth doesn't burn in fire.)
So, was Burlington just one battle in an everlasting arm-wrestling
game or did the society learn something when going through this cycle?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
er cities could take steps forward
already now and support Burlington that way).
(I have to add that if people want to keep the USA as it mostly is, a
two party based system, then I must recommend FPTP :-). And if not,
then maybe also some additional (maybe proportionality related)
refo
On Mar 10, 2010, at 7:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Mar 10, 2010, at 7:08 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, keeping RP, Schulze in mind for later, what would be a "good"
scheme for resolving cycles by use of elimination of candidates?
what would
On Mar 10, 2010, at 11:35 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Mar 10, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Juho wrote:
Another approach to systems between proportional representation and
the
two-party approach could be to have a proportional method but use
districts
with only very few representatives (2, 3
On Mar 11, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Mar 10, 2010 at 10:12 PM, Juho wrote:
I didn't quite understand your question. The method could also be
non-party-list-based (like STV).
It depended on what you meant by 1/N of the votes. I was just
wondering if you were doing nat
On Mar 11, 2010, at 11:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Mar 10, 2010, at 7:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
I'm not aware of any sequential candidate elimination based
method that I'd be happy to recommend. One can however describe
e.g. minm
case (=> more
compromise oriented) (although such votes might not be very common??).
Juho
On Mar 24, 2010, at 9:16 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 6:14 PM, James Gilmour > wrote:
No, it is not at all like MMP in that. ALL the votes are party
votes. All the votes
andidates to be grouped so that they form a tree-like
hierarchy. Defeats to candidates in another branch would be considered
stronger than defeats within one branch. The simplest approach is to
elect the candidate whose worst defeat is smallest.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
nal in all
Condorcet methods when applied in typical political elections.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
has also scenarios that may be questioned)
(Note btw that in another mail I just mentioned also the possibility
of allowing B and C to formally team up so that defeats within their
team would not be considered as severe as defeats between A and the
team.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The story beh
On Apr 10, 2010, at 12:39 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 9.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in
this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is
a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The st
On Apr 10, 2010, at 1:55 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe
I think I already said most things that I had in my mind about the
character of winning votes and margins. There are however still plenty
of details in the answers and comments below (maybe already too many
for many :-).
On Apr 10, 2010, at 7:20 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En
in most cases such sincere votes may exist
(there could however be also some strange vote sets that
might occur more probably due to strategic voting than dues
to sincere opinions).
So, why do you not produce scenarios showing that WV is not optimized
for sincere voters?
I gave some that were intended to be such.
...
I guess you think margins' incentives will stop people
from truncating without making them do anything *else* insincerely?
?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
and C are about equally strong since
then both could claim to be the leading candidate within the left wing
and both recommend truncation (=> A may win). Some supporters of both
of them may truncate for any of the reasons (attack, defence, revenge).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Apr 12, 2010, at 10:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:04 AM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
The end
result is also very unstable if B and C are about equally strong
since
then both could claim to be the leading candidate within the left
wing
and both recommend truncation (=> A may
On Jul 23, 2007, at 17:20 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> Margins vs. winning votes is another long term discussion topic on
>> this list. There have been many opinions and the final conclusions
>> may be more di
of a situation where the
methods have problems in real life would help estimating which
threats/characteristics are needed in real life.
> Juho says that Margins does better when voters are sincere. But
> I've posted,
> for Juho, examples in which innoncent, nonstrategic tru
Forgot to say, the simulations used minmax and in usually had three
candidates. (different voter groups sizes, e.g. 10% or less or more;
different probabilities of ties in preferences)
Juho
On Jul 27, 2007, at 2:22 , Juho wrote:
> On Jul 23, 2007, at 17:20 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
&
On Jul 27, 2007, at 11:51 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>>> It's possible that a coordinated strategy may not be feasible, but
>>> that
>>> is not the heart of the problem in my view.
>>>
>>&g
On Jul 22, 2007, at 6:58 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 08:17 AM 7/21/2007, Juho wrote:
>> I also think that Range is a good method in non-contentions polls and
>> elections. But in the statement above a competitive election was of
>> course the assumption.
>
> Why?
On Jul 29, 2007, at 2:51 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> Thanks for forwarding your old messages. I will comment on these
> first.
>
> In the first two posts you discuss scenarios where equally-sized
> factions
> vote according to a mentality of "never mind the
r than in situations where voters
already trust the method and find strategic voting unpleasant (this
does not require that the voters would not be very competitive).
Juho
On Jul 27, 2007, at 11:51 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>>
On Jul 29, 2007, at 21:17 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:51 AM 7/29/2007, Juho wrote:
On Jul 22, 2007, at 6:58 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 08:17 AM 7/21/2007, Juho wrote:
>> I also think that Range is a good method in non-contentions
polls and
>> elections. But i
On Jul 29, 2007, at 20:09 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 02:46 AM 7/29/2007, Juho wrote:
>> > 49 A
>> > 24 B
>> > 27 C>B
>>
>> The numbers of this example are so unlikely to occur in real life
>> that I modified the example a bit to get
strategically
> (approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters
> have the most
> black and white, polarized view of the world.
>
>
>
> General comment to everyone: remember that it is possib
r in the basic example where sincere opinions were 1000 A>B,
1000 C>D, 1 D>B (or 1000 A>B>C=D, 1000 C>D>A=B, 1 D>B>A=B). The rest
of the reactions/comments are embedded below in the mail.
Juho
On Jul 31, 2007, at 7:36 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> ---
On Jul 31, 2007, at 2:52 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:35 PM 7/30/2007, Juho wrote:
Yes, a more detailed analysis should not rely on one axis only.
I'm not sure how many Warren's simulations use, but the simulator
doesn't just do even random distributions, which
On Aug 1, 2007, at 5:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:48 PM 7/31/2007, Juho wrote:
>
>>>> The additional (utility/preference strength related) information
>>>> that
>>>> range style ballots provide is excellent information. The only
>>>&
the worst opponent of X or...).))
Juho
On Aug 1, 2007, at 2:27 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:11 PM 7/31/2007, Juho wrote:
>> I'm still wondering if you felt that D was the rightful
>> winner in the basic example where sincere opinions were 1000 A>B,
>> 1000
> is, quite simply, foolish. There is *strategy* for voting Range.
>
> If people don't use it but do normalize, they will not be harmed
> seriously.
I think you should refer to such normalization where at least one
frontrunner gets min and one gets max (or something close to th
sama with maximum strength.
> The basic rule (in the absence of strategies) in Range is to
> express one's sincere opinions.
Correct. The only problem is that the strategies can be applied so
often. In Condorcet the strategic opportunities can at least be
claimed to be rare.
Juho
On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:26 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 02:04 AM 8/2/2007, Juho wrote:
>> The votres' "stated preferences" are easy to collect but in a
>> competitive environment voters tend to exaggerate. I guess the basic
>> problem is the feeling you
chairman) or if the
deliberative process should still continue (for one or more rounds in
election technical terms).
Juho
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essential parameters that are needed to
define the simulation set-up
Juho
On Jul 27, 2007, at 11:51 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
2) There are as well cases where winning votes are more
vulnerable to
strategies than margins. So the question is not one-sided.
However, it is pretty clear that
On Aug 5, 2007, at 23:09 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>>>> 1000 A>B, 1000 C>D, 1 D>B
>>
>>> Yes, I do think D is the proper winner.
>>
>> I have many times said that it is possible to supp
On Aug 6, 2007, at 1:28 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote:
On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
of approval voting, while still
tegic/exaggerating voters more
power then it is best to describe it like you did, as an Approval
like election with option to use also less powerful values than the
(generally used) min and max values are.
Juho
On Aug 8, 2007, at 3:42 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 05:44 PM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote:
>> On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is
>> > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval el
d runoff too, so why not in Condorcet. The strategies are
a bit different but maybe not that much different.
> I don't especially want to promote other methods here, but it seems
> reasonable to note that my ICA method precisely intends to bring as
> much Condorcet efficiency to App
iate for
them. Nobody will be "cheated" to cast weak votes. If they do so,
they will do that for some reason.
(Also the people that make decisions on what voting methods to use
should get all this information.)
Juho
o,
and in addition to that accept the Approval style voting as a
secondary less good option. With this I think we are back in the
original claim that Range may create a mess if some voters vote
sincerely (and maybe are guided to do so) and some s
ort). Maybe you'll find another
better set of numbers. Sorry for commenting the problems one by one.
I don't have a complete theory and analysis available to present.
Juho
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The all-new Yahoo!
es
> mean that the voter is more likely, perhaps, to stay home in a
> runoff, but that is not guaranteed.)
It seems you recommend not to normalize the estimated frontrunners to
min and max.
>> With this I think we are back in the
>> original claim that Range may create a m
wide spread strategic voting and
>> marginal strategic voting on the table. Answers to the first question
>> in these two environments may be somewhat different.
>
> If you assume sincere voting then
assumed only that some voted strategically and some gave their
sincere opinion. It is possible to rate a candidate at 100 but not
care too much about who wins.
> Let me point out, first of all, that the R2 supporters are clearly
> not Republicans, period.
They were intended to be s
On Aug 10, 2007, at 6:08 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:09 PM 8/9/2007, Juho wrote:
>> I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their
>> personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't
>> like the word "uti
Here are some remaining comments and responses to the questions. No
new material, just confirming the presented viewpoints.
On Aug 11, 2007, at 4:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 05:03 PM 8/10/2007, Juho wrote:
>> In the light of this example it doesn't matter how the &quo
definition.
> Now, in a real election, this voting pattern is extremely unlikely.
Yes, the voting pattern in the example is exaggerated. Casting "weak"
votes is possible in practically any set-up and they may influence
the outcome in many.
> Juho has asserted that these are s
.
(I just spent some time in another mail stream on this list trying to
promote the idea that one needs to clearly state the voter opinions
and actual votes and avoid leaving that unclear.)
Juho
__
FOR votes, they are
> elected. If someone has more than half of the AGAINST votes, they are
> disqualified. Then the second round is between the two candidates with
> the most FOR votes who have not been disqualified.
I'm always a bit careful with the "against" votes. If th
as some
other methods are but there are some risks e.g. in the following
example. There are three candidates with first place support 40 A, 30
B, 30 C. Later preferences are not strong. B supporters notice that
if the final round will be between B and A it looks qui
somewhat since the approval cutoff is at a fixed position. A free
cutoff location would allow the voter to express also preferences
between the non-approved candidates. Maybe you didn't allow that for
some strategy resistance reasons (as usual :-).
Juho
On Aug 15, 2007, at 1:10 , C
er needed in
practice and if the complexity can be justified with the achieved
benefits.
Juho
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of use." - PC
In the last October case also equal ranking was allowed in addition
to the other strengths of preference.
Juho
On Aug 16, 2007, at 7:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 03:24 PM 8/15/2007, Juho wrote:
>
>> Last October I wrote about ranked preferences, i.e. ballots like
>
July 29th I drafted also one example that was intended to be more
realistic than the 1000 1000 1 scenario.
Juho
--excerpt---
Here's another version of the example - longer, but now the numbers
could be from real life. There seems to be a consensus (within both
of the two parties
noting anyway.
An example with two parties, ABC and DEF. The voters have zero
information. But the strategy of the DEF party pays off and they will
win. Not an easy strategy to implement but it sometimes works.
30 A=B=C>D=E=F
10 D=E=F>
.0 + 45 * 1.4 = 63.6
C = 55 * 1.0 + 45 * 1.0 = 100.0
Juho
P.S. You didn't tell what the method should do with 55: A 100, C 20,
B 0, 45: B 100, C 20, A 0 :-)
On Aug 22, 2007, at 9:55 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
The goal: Make sure
x27;m not advocating these methods,
except as challenges on this list. The most obvious problem is
clones, e.g. one candidate from the Democrats and two from the
Republicans. From this point of view one could require that votes 55
A>>C>B 4
On Aug 30, 2007, at 2:30 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Juho!
>
>> How about the weighted Borda that I described earlier? Square root
>> weights would give 0, 1 and 1.4 points instead of 0, 1 and 2.
>
> I'm totally sorry -- I just have forgotten that you proposed this.
quot;near perfect information"
assumption. Probabilities depend on the level of "nearness".
Juho
P.S. I assume the challenge is now to elect only "good" compromise
candidates
On Aug 30, 2007, at 16:37 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
Forest W Simmons wrote:
Below where I said
sions to the single-winner theme. (What would be the reason
to do so? Often single-winner and multi-winner systems are
alternatives to each others => both needed to cover the field properly.)
Juho
On Sep 21, 2007, at 18:22 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
I know that this list is primarily si
Second try
Begin forwarded message:
> From: Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: September 22, 2007 1:23:31 GMT+03:00
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Measuring power in a multi winner
> election
>
> Some random observatio
the period between elections. If
some party in on the losing side in some vote by 5% margin it could
still veto and use 5 of its veto votes to do that (maybe all losing
parties would use some of their veto votes).
Juho
__
d then
estimate which function is better. And of course one has to add to
the final election method evaluation also the other factors (e.g.
performance with sincere votes, ref. the 1000 A>B, 1000 B>C, 1 D>B
example).
(A third explanation to the actual votes would btw be that the ac
severe lack of polarized
Nader supporters.
How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters
giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their
favourite (Gore) the winner?
Juho
___
Try th
rategic"
assumes only consideration of different voting alternatives.
It is also possible that they are asked to consider their strategic
options and then vote strategically. In this case the two terms can
differ a bit. One could say that the voters are now sincere but
strategic.
Juho
exercises. (The method should tolerate/allow some
ticking errors to avoid losing the votes of people who are not that
familiar with using the method.)
Juho Laatu
On Nov 19, 2007, at 20:50 , Diego Renato wrote:
> I've read in this list that possibly the worst electoral system
p the
algorithms here.)
One more rather simple technique to solve this problem is simply to
ban the coalitions (this is under discussion in Finland). This change
could be accompanied by increasing the size of the (smallest)
districts in order to keep also the current smallest pa
incere votes (possibly
slightly random and marginally strategic).
Juho
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oretically).
Juho
On Dec 3, 2007, at 17:43 , Steve Eppley wrote:
Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal
option a
few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote
strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere
winner
could withdraw if ne
tentional. This kind of an
arrangement guarantees the representatives a more steady basis for
work and makes it possible to make decisions that are not very
popular among the voters (e.g. taxes) (but that might be better
understood among them by the n
On Dec 10, 2007, at 16:40 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:12 AM 12/5/2007, Juho wrote:
On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably
also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is
actually
efer
deterministic voter decisions though.)
I'm still missing an example where the withdrawal option would bring
clear improvements (on problems that are likely to appear in
elections) and would not introduce many problems itself. One big
problem is also the quite possible perceptio
tegic cases can be
seen as exceptions to this main rule).
I don't fully agree that "the whole purpose of specifying NOTB is to
allow us to ignore those rankings". It think in this case it is good
t
take also the "tail preferences" somehow into account.
Juho
On Dec 13, 2007, at 4:59 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> I don't fully agree that "the whole purpose of specifying NOTB is to
>> allow us to ignor
mited number of options to choose from
- puppets (instead of individual thinkers)
No parties
+ less hidden cabinet decisions
+ free opinions
+ also minority opinions present
+/- less group power (coordinated voting according to majority
opinion of the party)
-
haviour
(benefiting of popular but not so sensible themes)?
Juho
On Dec 18, 2007, at 22:41 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Dec 18, 2007, at 10:58 AM, Juho wrote:
>
>> No parties
>> + less hidden cabinet decisions
>> + free opinions
>> + also minority opinions pre
e multi-party systems.
One more observation that I forgot from the list is:
No parties
- numerous candidates (unstructured mass) to wade through in order to
pick the best of them
Juho
___
All ne
o ideologies) but a weak discipline. The party
structure could be e.g. hierarchical. The social democratic party
could have well announced left and right wings, a green section etc.
Juho
___
Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail.
r is not guaranteed though (also unwanted
filtering could occur and filtering could pass information that is
more marketing/bluff than what the receiver would want).
> DP and Asset Voting are not dependent upon parties
One could use also e.g. STV without parties.
Juho
to what one wants.
In short, different methods for different needs. Some methods are
good for many types of elections but not necessarily for all.
Juho
On Dec 20, 2007, at 22:37 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Rob!
As you may expect, I am not at all of the opinion that majority
rule is
s in the case of multiple (discrete, not linearly
related) alternatives. It is also possible to use methods where
candidates would put themselves somewhere in a map of various
numerical "coordinates" (we might find quite many centrists though ;-).
Juho
_
but I don't claim it would be very suitable for typical
contentious elections.
> Sorry if it just confused people.
No confusion (no more than what is normal in email discussions).
Juho
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ner. I
> seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where
> vote-splitting is rampant.
>
> So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made
> up for
> by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty
> und
serious in typical elections (large scale, public, without strong
tendency to vote as told by some strategy planners). Some steady
would should eventually pay off.
Juho
On Dec 22, 2007, at 8:22 , Juho wrote:
> On Dec 22, 2007, at 1:05 , Ian Fellows wrote:
>
>> Markus,
>>
>
oo) if one wants to give one equal vote
to everyone (a rather good democratic principle).
Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the
optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint)
but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical
method
On Dec 23, 2007, at 22:52 , rob brown wrote:
On Dec 23, 2007 10:49 AM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the
optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint)
but majority vote may well be considered to be th
On Dec 24, 2007, at 1:16 , rob brown wrote:
On Dec 23, 2007 2:00 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places
might agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three
homes. Or they might select a place that minimizes t
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