Alex Small alex_small2002-at-yahoo.com |EMlist| wrote:
If my intuition is born out by the complete proof, what I'll basically
show is that only 1 ranked method satisfies strong FBC, sometimes
referred to as "Top 2 Voting" or "Anti-Plurality Voting": Each voter
ranks the candidates and the top 2
>FBC is a great example of a Mike-style criterion that does nothing but >complicate the idea it attempts to express. Why did Mike create this >"criterion"? Probably because he didn't understand that other election >method criteria are based on cast and tally rules votes only.
That's not entirely tr
Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ,
You wrote (Sat.Feb.26):
"A more useful criterion is the normal (as opposed to Mike-style)
criterion taken from Blake Cretney's website:
Name: Secret Preferences Criterion: SPC
Application: Ranked ballots
Definition:
If alternative X wins
Kevin Venzke wrote:
>Thanks to information from Forest, I was able to write a program that plots winners>in a pyramid (a slice of which can be viewed at a time), for three candidates and>4 of the 6 ballot types at one time.
I'd be interested in trying that program if it's available.
>In my prog
> Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2005 17:33:39 -0800
> From: Russ Paielli
> Subject: [EM] optimal Condorcet truncation
> After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
> (see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
> Condorcet voting also.
> If this has been sugge
For us newcomers, I suggest that Mike and Russ co-author a joint paper
and provide operational definitions of voter strategies (based on
observing voter behaviour), plus criteria, terms and methods, using a an
easy to read programming language, e.g., Modula 3 or Spark Ada, and Mark
act as the e
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ said:
Some of those criteria were Mike-style criteria and some were normal
criteria. However, looking back at it, I see that we had the Condorcet
criteria defined in terms of true preferences, with the stipulation that
the voters voted "since
Kevin Venzke stepjak-at-yahoo.fr |EMlist| wrote:
It seems to me that Mike's criteria aren't ambiguous, but it can be hard to
decide
for certain whether methods satisfy them.
FBC:
By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite, a voter should never gain
an outcome that he/she likes better
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ said:
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also. The Approval formula simply says to approve any
candidate that is above the
Alex,
--- Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Let's stick to 3 candidates and ignore equal rankings, to keep it simple.
> There are 6 possible
> types of voters, and so there are 6 variables to consider: The fraction of
> the electorate with
> each possible preference order. These var
Dear Markus,
--- Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> FBC:
> > By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite,
> > a voter should never gain an outcome that he/she likes
> > better than every outcome that he/she could get without
> > voting a less-liked candidate over his/her f
...no, this is not the name of another voting theory hero but the
working title of my latest method design, inspired by Forest's
suggestion to use Random Ballot on the Smith set:
"Random Ballot Most Approved Cover in the Smith set"
(R.B.MacSmith)
is a method designed to be a compromise bet
Dear Mike,
I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
> Well, you proposed MinMax(winning votes). But you didn't
> propose a general concept that could also be used for
> other methods than MinMax. Therefore, it cannot be said
> that you proposed "winning votes" in general.
You wrote (28 Feb 2005):
> You say that I
Dear Mike,
you wrote (28 Feb 2005):
> Markus and some others may prefer that "prefer" not
> be used in definitions of criteria, but expressing
> that preference isn't the same as showing that such
> criteria are ambiguous, unclearly-defined, or not
> well-defined. (...) Markus, you keep saying tha
Russ said:
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also. The Approval formula simply says to approve any
candidate that is above the expected value of the entire election. The
same rea
Russ said:
What we have here, it seems to me, is confusion cause by a failure to
distinguish between two fundamentally different classes of criteria.
Consider the basic voting process. It starts with the voters' true
preferences, then the votes are cast, then the votes are tallied and the
winner is
Markus--
You said:
Dear Mike,
you wrote (26 Feb 2005):
But he [= David Gamble] didn't ask who first defined
the Schulze method. He asked who first proposed the
wv Condorcet methods. I'd proposed the wv Condorcet
methods, and wv Condorcet methods were popular, long
before you joined EM, and long bef
Comments on approach 1a:
To clarify what I meant by approach 1a, it's as if the writer of a criterion
failure example preceded his statement of his scenario or example with the
following introductory paragraph:
"If what is said in the following paragraph (I'll call it the scenario
paragraph)
Dear Kevin,
FBC:
> By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite,
> a voter should never gain an outcome that he/she likes
> better than every outcome that he/she could get without
> voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite.
Suppose your sincere preference is A>B>C>D>E. Suppos
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