Mike Ossipoff wrote
What is it, that with all your namecalling and claims of superiority, you
need my definitions and the wv Condorcet class of methods that I proposed?
I know Mike Ossipoff advocates WV as opposed to WM for the completion of methods such as Ranked Pairs, Schulze, etc
Was he ac
Hello List
On 17th May 2005 British Columbians will vote in a referendum on whether to replace their current Plurality voting system with STV and also elect a new provincial legislature (using the old system for hopefully the last time).
I have created the following online STV poll featuring decl
In a message dated 31/01/2005 15:29:28 GMT Standard Time, Mike Ossipoff wrote:
Yes, I know, this is off-topic. True, I'm not the proper topic of EM. But
anyone who is the topic of as many long postings as I've been has the right
to reply, not to communicate with the poster, but to correct thin
Hello James
You wrote:
>Any comments? Any suggestions for alternative methods for proportional ordering? >Keep in mind that this procedure does not entail the massive computational cost of >an ordinary CPO-STV tally, because the vast majority of possible outcomes are >excluded from consideration.
In a message dated 24/09/2004 20:06:37 GMT Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I'm not sure of the best way to implement Borda with ballots that don't
rank all the candidates. Suppose that 4 candidates are running. With a
ballot like:
A B C D
A gets 4 points, B gets 3 points and so o
Chris Benham wrote:
CB: I haven't yet made up my mind what the best ranked-ballot PR method
is yet, but if the ballots are symetrically completed,
and then those ballots that ranked A first are all fractioanlly
devalued by an amount that sums to a Droop quota (180/3 = 60),
then the winners are
James Armytage-Green wrote:
" However, I'm left with another question... What would happen in Meek if C
and D's votes were more evenly-distributed, so that no one had a surplus
right away... like this for example:
>
61: A
60: A>B
30: C>D
29: D>C
After round one, if you recalculated the quota
James Green-Armytage wrote:
>Are you sure that Newland-Britton elects AB? I'm not an expert on STVformulas, >but it seems to me that they both elect AC.
Yes, Newland-Britton definitely elects AB since Newland-Britton does not have non-transferrable as a transfer category.
A 61
AB 60
CD 50
DC 9
Hello list members
Recently I've been having a private discussion regarding the differences between the Meek and Newland-Britton methods of counting an election by STV.
With regard to the example:
A 61
A>B 60
C>D 50
D>C 9
for 2 seats, I'd be interested in knowing who list members think should w
I wrote:
>>What I'm interested in at the moment is going beyond IRV, Condorcet and
>>Approval towards a single winner system that gives high utility,
>>generally preferred winners.
James Armytage-Green replied:
>Sounds interesting. What do you have in mind specifically?
Ranked Approval
How yo
Hello Brian
The examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 90 > A 0
40 C 100 > B 10 > A 0
use a 0 to 100 cardinal rating scale ( no negative values ).
David Gamble
James you wrote in part:
>Let's match some names to the numbers, for fun...
>45 Bush 100 > Lieberman 10 > Dean 0
>10 Lieberman 100 > Bush 90 > Dean 0
>5 Lieberman 100 > Dean 90 > Bush 0
>40 Dean 100 > Lieberman 10 > Bush 0
>
> I imagine Joe Lieberman as someone who is not particularly liked by
Brian Bolsom wrote about the following examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 90 > A 0
40 C 100 > B 10 > A 0
>Yup. Both are decided by plain Condorcet, which only considers ranking
Hello James
You wrote regarding the examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 90 > A 0
40 C 100 > B 10 > A 0
>Yes, that is correct. In both of those examples, B is a Condorcet winner,
Hello James
You wrote:
>Tally:
>1. Pairwise tally, using the ranked ballots only. Elect the Condorcet
>winner if one exists.
So in the examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 90
Andrew Myers wrote:
>I implemented the PR-enforcing Condorcet algorithm I described in my recent
>mail to this list, as part of the CIVS voting web service. If you would like
>to try it out (and give me some testing!), visit the following URL and vote on
>the "ice cream assortment" election:
A
My ballot is as follows:
George W. Bush [43] [] [1]
Howard Dean [9] [X] [50]
Edwards [10] [] [48]
Kerry [8] [X] [55]
Kucinich [2] [X] [96]
Nader [1] [X] [100]
Sharpton [19] [] [30]
Jim H
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
Those all sound like good candidates, all a lot better than the ones who are
likely to win the actual presidential election, better than the expectation
for that election
On many ballot papers voters will find candidates whose views are deeply offensive to them. In order to p
Mike
I read with weary disgust the latest stream of insults you directed at me. The same tired rhetorical techniques of describing your opponents as stupid and ignorant and your familiar technique of criticising spelling and grammar were all employed as per usual. The content of your very long pos
There is one area in which I will acknowledge that Mike is Indeed an "expert" that of the partial presentation of facts combined with the use of certain rhetorical techniques to create a misleading impression that he is right.
Right let's see what he's come up with today.
I wrote:
For example i
Adam Tarr wrote:
>Axiom 1 - We're electing a legislature. There are three (perhaps more)
>parties. The "centrist" party is the weakest, in terms of first-place
>preference.
>Axiom 2 - Truly proportional, multi-member districts are not possible(*) but
>we want the overall results to have some
Various people have said that IRV has no real advantage over Plurality.
Consider a three party system like England ( or a four party system like Wales or Scotland). The third party In England the Liberal Democrats is consistently underrepresented in the House of Commons. In their book (The Britis
Marcus,
I wasn't thinking of your paper when I made that post as is hopefully evident from my reply to Mike. I (subjectively) find your paper objective. I also notice that you mention a criterion (participation) that Schulze, Swartz Sequential Dropping, Beatpath, call it what you will, fails and g
Mike wrote:
>The CW is the social utility maximizer.
I replied:
Not always. Please justify this statement
Mike replied in summary:
With 1 issue dimension, the CW is the SU maximizer, if disutility is
measured by distance.
Thankyou for this clarification. Issue space in most political systems
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>The CW is the social utility maximizer.
Not always. Please justify this statement.
>If the voter-median position is occupied only by that despised corrupt
>candidate, why isn't anyone else contesting that position? That seems
>suspicioiusly odd in a Condorcet election, wh
Eric Gorr wrote:
>Yes, I can invent numbers that show just the opposite.
Yes, exactly my point.
In the original examples only rankings, not rankings with utilities were given. Without information on the actual utilities the Condorcet winner might have the highest utility or might not. You just d
Eric Gorr wrote:
>Condorcet did not elect the wrong candidate. The voters were clearly
>split, but both of the larger groups preferred the third option over
>the primary opposition. As such, the highest utility candidate was
>elected by Condorcet.
>Why do you believe that the first place pref
Mike
In response to my post you gave the following example of an IRV failure:
50: ABCDE
51: BACDE
100: CDBEA
53: DECBA
49: EDCBA
This type of example is not unfamiliar to me ( it or something very like it ) turned up several times in a series of posts called " The Turkey Problem " and "Is Condor
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>Is that what happened in Australia? And don't say that IRV hasn't committed
>its failures in Australia. It wouldn't show up in the data that are recorded
>and published.
What are you saying here Mike? That even though you can find none of IRV's failures in recorded and pub
Forrest Simmons wrote:
>How good can we do with a simple rule of conversion of ranked ballots to
>approval ballots?
>Given a set of preference ballots, let n1, n2, ... be the numbers of top
>rank votes for candidates c1, c2, ... , respectively. (For now assume that
>every ballot fully ranks the c
Bill Clark wrote:
>Just the other day, I had a lengthy discussion in email with one of my
>friends over a hypothetical Cardinal Ratings vote between Gore, Nader, and
>Bush. He'd said that he would have voted Nader:10, Gore:7, and Bush:0.
>Nothing I could say could convince him that he should cha
Bill you wrote in part:
>> To gloss over lots of details it is generally presumed that voters
>> behave rationally and vote strategically to maximise the utility of
>> their outcome in an election.
>I think that presumption is almost undoubtedly false, in the general case.
>I suspect it's based o
Hello list
On the EM list there is much lengthy discussion of voting strategy, strategic voting and the like. To gloss over lots of details it is generally presumed that voters behave rationally and vote strategically to maximise the utility of their outcome in an election.
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
Kevin Venzke wrote in part:
>> 2/ Lack of real world comparison data. I adjusted the votegenerator part of
>> the spreadsheet as a result of looking at the data sets it was producing and
>> comparing them with the South Australia state election of 1997 ( 3 parties-
>> Liberal/National, Labor an
Forrest Simmons wrote in part:
>More to the point of this thread (Testing 1,2,3) if we are going to
>compare various methods, some of which are based on CR ballots and some of
>which are based on ranked preference ballots, the simulations need some
>common denominator. Since it is easy to convert
A couple of points:
Bart Ingles wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>
>> Bart Ingles wrote:
>>
>> >But truncation is equivalent to equal last-choice preference for all of
>> >the methods listed below.
>>
>> Yes, it is equivalent but expressing an equal preference for two or
>> more candidates is
James you wrote:
>I know it is common in modelling exercises to assume that all electors vote "the
>party ticket", but that is not what a surprising number of real electors do in real >elections. I have looked only at the "ballot papers" for the Meath constituency of the >2002 Dáil Éireann STV-PR
James Gilmour wrote:
>I think there is another very real problem here. It is not clear from your original post >whether your model will modify the voting patterns under the 11 different voting >systems, but my reading would be that it would not. We know from practical >experience that real vote
Bart Ingles wrote:
>But truncation is equivalent to equal last-choice preference for all of
>the methods listed below.
Yes, it is equivalent but expressing an equal preference for two or more candidates is generally considered as different to not ranking candidates you don't like.
>> A>B means v
Bart Ingles wrote:
>There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
>this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for the
>A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve only
>A. This would make approval voting equivalent to Borda, at leas
James Gilmour wrote:
>David Gamble wrote:
>> I would like volunteers to test this model and give their
>> comments on it. If you would like a copy of the model to test
>No test is possible because you have not specified the criteria against which
>you wish to test the systems.
Basically the ide
Hello List
I've recently been working on a spreadsheet model to compare various different electoral methods. What it does is generate, for a 3 party election, sets of votes for 50 single member districts, based on an inputted set of preferences amongst the electorate and then calculate the results
Craig
In the past you have been extremely critical of IRV , currently you are being extremely critical of Condorcet. What single seat method do you support?
You also repeatedly criticise methods for giving "wrong winners". In the example given below who, in your opinion, is the correct winner?
T
Dear all
I find this "debate" about the Floyd Algorithm ( or more accurately who said what about who and when) extremely uninteresting and not very constructive.
Is it really that important to get the last word in?
David Gamble
Dear all
I find this "debate" about the Floyd Algorithm ( or more accurately who said what about who and when) extremely uninteresting and not very constructive.
Is it really that important to get the last word in?
David Gamble
PS This is the second time I've sent this E-mail have problems with
Craig,
Have you ever tried being nice to people?
David Gamble
Kevin Venzke wrote:
>I would guess that any single-winner method which produces proportional results
>on the whole, is actually producing garbage results, if you focus on any
>particular
>district. Consider Random Ballot to see what I'm getting at.
Yes Random Ballot, randomly selecting a ballot p
Kevin Venzke wrote:
>Are you looking to show that Plurality, for example, is more likely to be
>proportional
>than Condorcet? Random Ballot is easily more proportional than that. Better
>yet,
>put a PR method in your model.
The one thing the model has demonstrated clearly than anything else is th
Rob LeGrand wrote in response to my post:
>The short answer is that you're allowing the voters to adjust their votes
>only once. With repeated adjustments, the voters would be able to find the
>equilibrium
Thanks for the information. So am I right in thinking that strategy A gets to the Condo
Hello Rob and List
Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda, Condorcet and Approval) on the results of elections to a multi-member assembly elected in single districts.
I wanted to use in my
James Green-Armytage wrote:
>My school, which is a pretty bizarre place, uses a pretty bizarre voting
>method for student government: Borda!
>Christ, I wondered, how the hell did they end up using Borda?
>What's even weirder is that they use Borda for multi-seat elections. Have
>you ever heard of
James Green-Armytage wrote:
Does anyone know of examples where the largest remainder method using the
Droop quota produces results different from the highest averages method
using the D'Hondt divisors?
Likewise, does anyone know of examples where the largest remainder method
using the Hare quota
Bart Ingles wrote in part:
>If this was a response to my post, then you ignored my point. Why do
>you consider "majority" to be more important that all other criteria?
I feel majority to be more important than all other criteria because the idea of majority rule is pretty central to democratic go
Bart Ingles wrote:
>I think when mentioning criteria, it's a good idea to also state why
>those criteria might be important. For example, to me criteria such as
>FBC and Participation are important because they relate to a voting
>system's immunity to the Duverger effect.
>Approval meets both of
Eric Gorr wrote:
"What are these essential standards you speak of?
In my mind there is only a single essential standard:
Can the method reliably find the group preference?
For any method that is not clone-proof, the answer is no.
For any method that is not monotonic...I would guess the answe
Personally I'm very suspicious of some of the lists of "objective" criteria to assess electoral systems which appear on various websites. Some of them are anything but objective. For example a particularly biased and unobjective list of ' objective criteria' can be found on the ElectionMethods.org
Bart Ingles wrote in part:
>> 12 out of 76 members of the Australian Senate belong to parties other
>> than National, Liberal or Labour.
>That's my point-- PR in the Senate should, if anything, lend strength to
>3rd party candidates in the House. If IRV was conducive to electing
>third-party and
Simon Gazeley wrote:
>Dear List Members
>This is not a contribution to the current threads, but I thought someone
>might be able to help.
>Does anyone know how the New Zealand voters who used it reacted to STV?
>In particular, were there any complaints about lack of transparency in
>the computer
Donald wrote in response to the example:
> 49 A>B
> 3B
> 48 C>B
>For B to win in this situation she/he must have a minimum utility of 0.92 to A>B >voters and a minimum utility of 0.96 to C>B voters. To win B has to be highly liked >(approved?) by everybody.
> 49 A1.00 > B0.92
> 3 B1.00
> 48 C
Bart Ingles wrote in part:
>On the question of IRV vs Plurality, I would like to first point out
>that pure first-past-the-post is not really the norm for U.S.
>elections. For nonpartisan local elections, the question should really
>be IRV vs. Runoff. And for partisan state and federal elections,
Kevin Venzke wrote in part:
>Instead, try RP(wv). Instead of locking defeats in order of the greatest
>margins, lock them in order of greatest absolute votes received by the winner.
>> For the example:
>>
>> 45 A
>> 6 B>A
>> 5 B>C
>> 44 C>B
>>
>> A versus B 45 v 55 margin 10 winner B
>> A versu
Hello List
Before I came up with CRCLE ( Cardinal Rating Condorcet Loser Elimination ) I'd never paid much attention to the various methods of resolving Condorcet cycles. CRCLE is considerably more prone to developing cycles than plain Condorcet so I looked at various websites promoting Condorcet
Donald and list
The Condorcet v IRV debate on the EM list increasingly reminds me of the a description of debates in the Stormont ( Northern Ireland ) assembly between Unionists and Republicans- " not so much a debating chamber more a gladiatorial arena for the restatement of entrenched positions
Kevin Venzke wrote:
>David's method gives me a similar, simpler idea that would seem to be an
>improvement over IRV. The method would be:
>1. The voters rank the candidates they would be willing to support, and also
>place an approval cutoff. (Alternatively, all candidates ranked non-last
>could
Dave Ketchum wrote in part:
>In public elections we need to have the voters understanding the method
>well enough to vote intelligently, and to be able to accept declared
>winners as appropriate to the vote count totals (which I claim should be
>public knowledge shortly after the polls close). Not
Rob Speer wrote:
>Didn't we hear this same debate, oh, a week ago? And the week before
>that? It seems like every thread on this list eventually turns into
>"Weak centrist!" "Condorcet winner!" "Weak centrist!" "Condorcet winner!"
>Unless someone's providing some new information (like, say, the r
Eric Gorr wrote in part:
>>45 A>B>C
>>6 B>A>C
>>5 B>C>A
>>44 C>B>A
(snip)
>The entire population would rather have B then the apparently primary
>opposition.
>So, B should win.
>>Actually neither myself nor those who disagree with me can be
>>certain as to whether B is really a low util
Hello everybody
My favourite type of example to post on this list is the following:
45 A>B>C
6 B>A>C
5 B>C>A
44 C>B>A
I argue that B shouldn't win because he/she is very likely to be a low utility compromise- the least worst.
Many people on this list disagree with me and feel that B should win
James G-A wrote in part:
"True, but if we can get some really good and accessible shareware voting
programs out to people, methods that require computers will not be
impossibly hard for people to use."
Some very (in my opinion) user friendly STV counting software is freely available from the Elec
James
I think a ban on publishing opinion polls in the run up to elections ( freedom of information legislation allowing) would be a lot easier to enforce than a ban on political organisers directing people how to vote. How would you prove this or define 'a political organiser' ?
Dvaid Gamble
Eric Gorr wrote in part:
"Considering that all elections methods can be manipulated in some
form or another, what good is it to remind us that society can break
down and make the election method irrelevant by subverting the
process?"
I (quite surprisingly) find myself agreeing with the first h
Adam Tarr wrote in response to the realism of Eric Gorr's example being evaluated:
"Oh, that's the problem. Great. Now that that's cleared up, let's make a
realistic example:
10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLef
Eric Gorr wrote:
>James Green-Armytage asked for people's opinions regarding IRV
>versus Plurality.
>
>Not surprisingly, and for reasons I've already stated and won't
>repeat here, I feel IRV is greatly superior to plurality ( and
>Condorcet and approval).
I am always interested in why people
Adam Tarr wrote in response to my comments on Approval voting:
"A few responses:
1) People aren't idiots so they will probably only approve one of the front-runners in a race. Understanding this isn't any harder than understanding the LO2E problem, which most people are capable of."
If people
Alex Small wrote in part :
"At various points it has been brought up that Condorcet's virtual
guarantee of centrist victory (when issues are arranged on a 1D axis) is a
guarantee of monopoly. I later observed that IRV would allow left and
right to compete in a 1D world, but would almost guarantee
Why the unrealistic example is unrealistic:
40A
35C>B
30B
This example is not realistic because it is extremely unlikely that all the supporters of one party would express a second preference whilst none of the supporters of the two other parties would.
Why this example is not that unrealistic
Olli Salmi wrote
"A quote from "A review of the ERS97 rules" by B A Wichmann, Voting
matters, Issue 10, March 1999
"5. The calculation of the quota and the recording of
transfers appears to give the impression of
undertaking computations to one hundredth of the
vote. However, this is not achiev
James Green-Armytage asked for people's opinions regarding IRV versus Plurality.
Not surprisingly, and for reasons I've already stated and won't repeat here, I feel IRV is greatly superior to plurality ( and Condorcet and approval).
David Gamble
James A-G, Chris and everybody else,
James, I've checked your calculations and they are correct.
Whilst Condorcet Loser Elimination's lack of monotonicity is not a great concern to me ( I don't believe that monotonicity is the be all and end all of an electoral system) the fact that it can prod
Hi Chris, James A-G and everybody else
The example:
300 votes
3 seats
Droop quota = 75
74: A, B, C, D, E
39: B, A, C, D, E
75: C
39: D, E, C, B, A
73: E, D, C, B, A
seems to be attracting a lot of comment from various people.
Under Newland-Britton counting A,C,D or B,C,E are elected depen
I ( David Gamble) wrote:
"Adam could you provide a description of the method for a system of proportional approval voting that needs the above criteria? I've made several attempts to devise such a method and must admit failure."
Sorry! substitute the word MEETS for NEEDS.
David Gamble
In response to my post on open and closed lists Alex small wrote:
"Your goal here is to protect voters from themselves. I think it's pretty
clear that when voters divide their votes among lists they run the risk of
electing a less preferred candidate from one of the lists."
No, I wouldn't say tha
Recently their have been a number of posts regarding the merits of open versus closed lists for list PR. I dislike closed lists and feel that voters not parties should decide which individuals on a list are elected. However the fact that in an open list system a vote counts both for an individual
Reply to Kevin Venzke and Rob Speer
Whilst using an electoral system ( for example Condorcet) which will tend to over represent the median voter is not the worst idea I've ever seen posted ( unlike "giving a veto to every voter in a certain central chunk" taken as read) it is still a pretty poor
John,
Personally I don't like MMP (or AMS as it called in the UK ) much as a proportional system.
I've never seen the virtues of using single member districts and having one constituency member to represent you. If you approach your one member with an issue that concerns you and your one member
Kevin Venzke wrote in part:
"On a different subject, I'm wary of PR generally, because I'm not confident that
the median voter is likely to be represented... Do "median parties" really
exist?
I want the electoral (and constitutional) method to guarantee that the median
voter
has a veto. (If it w
Alex Small wrote in part:
"1) Elect the Condorcet winner, or the winner of the Condorcet completion
method (from now on I'll use "CW" to denote either the Condorcet winner or
the winner of the Condorcet completion method, just to be succinct).
2) As in STV or PAV (Proportional Approval Voting) af
Adam Tarr wrote:
"Doesn't that suggest that arguing that Condorcet is bad because it fails to produce proportionality, is sort of missing the point?"
No not exactly, Plurality and IRV in single seats can give a party 70 % of the seats for 35- 40% of the vote. This is a bad thing.
Condorcet in
Eric Gorr wrote:
I don't understand what your problem is with electing candidates who
are the most preferred by the majority of people. Isn't that the
point of single-winner elections?
Or is your real problem with single-winner elections as you would
rather see everything move to PR?
The a
James Gilmour wrote:
"All that David's post confirms is that NO single winner system should be
used to elect a mulit-member committee, council, assembly or parliament
if that body is supposed to be representative of those who voted in its
election. If that is the objective (one I would strongly s
James Green-Armytage make two postings in support of Condorcet. The subject of the second posting ( centre dominance ) is the principle reason I consider it a flawed method. I realise that I've probably made every criticism that can be made of it in the course of the last month but my principle ob
Adam Tarr wrote in part:
Rather than vote for candidates you like more than average (if that is what
approving means) the more reasonable strategy is to vote for the candidates
you like more than your expected return from the election. The only time
that means "vote for better than average" is
Rob
As well as Tideman CPO-STV see also Sequential STV I D Hill & S Gazeley, paper 4 Voting Matters 15 at the Electoral Reform Society website
http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/publications/votingmatters/15P4.htm
This paper sets out a solution to the 'eliminate the lowest' problem of STV and
Firstly my example, yes Adam and Kevin your analysis is correct. A casting a second preference for B serves only to defeat C and elect B and vice versa.
The collective result however of these two strategies under Condorcet is that neither A or C supporters get their first choice. If both A and C
Adam Tarr wrote
A>B>C 42%
B>A>C 5%
B>C>A 7%
C>B>A 46%
So here we have a more realistic "turkey" scenario. A candidate with a
core support of only 12% manages to win an election. Compare that, if you
will, to the nightmare scenario of IRV:
10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
10% Right>F
Dave Ketchum Wrote
I am inclined to rank Libertarians in the middle - wanting government to
do less of what the Republicans promote, AND less of what the Democrats
promote
Point agreed. As a result of my posting I was helpfully sent an E-mail by a list member directing me to the Libertarian
Kevin Venzke Wrote
In other words, campaigns become about personality instead of policy. I
don't think that's necessarily a bad thing. Whatever policies the elected
representatives enact, they still need to get reelected.
I have to disagree with this . Campaigns about personality as opposed to po
Dave you wrote
First note: Condorcet considers ALL preferences in pairs simultaneously,
though often in two steps:
If one candidate is preferred over each and every other candidate,
that is the winner.
This is exactly what I meant. Condorcet simultaneously compares all pairs of candidates.
Eric
AC 498 A>C 498
BC 497 B>C 497
CA 3 C>A 3
CB 2 C>B 2
In an election comparing A with B and ignoring C result A 501, B 499
In an election comparing A with C and ignoring B result A 498, C 502
In an election comparing B with C and ignoring A result B 497,
--- Begin Message ---
Hello List
Recently there have been a large number of postings regarding something called the turkey problem- indifferent/poor candidates winning as the least worst choice in a condorcet ballet.
Due to the nature of the Condorcet method- which considers lower preferences b
100 matches
Mail list logo
