Hello James,
Few remaining notes. No strong opinions but maybe some fun for
interested readers.
On Sep 10, 2005, at 03:30, James Green-Armytage wrote:
"Approval" and "consent" are synonyms.
"Consensus" may come from Latin (con-sensus) and be related to word
"sense" (=> joint opini
Hello Kevin,
On Sep 9, 2005, at 00:29, Kevin Venzke wrote:
But I'm also not very worried since the real (stronger, meaningful)
reasons for 2-party domination are elsewhere, not in Condorcet or
other
slightly big party favouring rules (e.g. d'Hondt method).
I'm confused.
I'm sorry for givi
Hi,
On Sep 8, 2005, at 22:14, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:58 AM 9/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the
best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination
Hello James,
On Sep 9, 2005, at 03:56, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Juho, you write:
I'm very much in favour of trying to achieve consensus on what
Condorcet methods to promote in public.
I don't see why this would be necessary. You don't need the consent of
self-selected internet li
Hello All,
I'm very much in favour of trying to achieve consensus on what
Condorcet methods to promote in public. I'm however afraid I have some
opinions that may make this process a bit more difficult ;-). Are there
any others on the mailing lists that feel that Smith compliance is not
a nec
y big party favouring rules (e.g. d'Hondt method).
BR, Juho
P.S. In range voting already voting A:100, B:90, C:0 would reduce the
chances of A to win.
Juho,
--- Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
On point 3. I have also an extra comment. If sincere range voting
preferences
On Sep 6, 2005, at 04:47, Warren Smith wrote:
So. from the point of view of US third parties,
1. all Condorcet methods plausibly lead
to 2-party domination, though we cannot be sure,
2. all are more complicated
than range voting, and
3. range voting apparently does NOT lead to 2-party dominatio
On Sep 5, 2005, at 23:13, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
The method consists of two rounds. If the first round produces a
Condorcet winner, the second round is not needed. Otherwise the second
round will be held and also the tie breaking method is u
On Sep 3, 2005, at 22:15, Andrew Myers wrote:
I would like to have a statement
about strategic immunity that doesn't rely on people judging the
difficulty of
creating a top cycle.
The best I can offer when it comes to freeing people of judging and
deciding strategies is the following method
Hi All,
What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
BR, Juho
On Sep 3, 2005, at 05:40, Andrew Myers wrote:
Hi all,
I'm writing a short p
Correction: I note that a1 was one of the 100 voters, so a1=b1, which
changes the results a bit, but not much, so never mind.
BR, Juho
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Aug 30, 2005, at 03:49, Warren Smith replied to Jobst Heitzig:
So you suggest that when candidate A gives $20 to 1 voter and
nothing to the other 99 voters, but candidate B gives $1000 to each of
the 100 voters, then candidate A should be considered best for society.
--YES!! (at least,
Hi,
On Aug 19, 2005, at 04:05, Warren Smith wrote:
Finally, it has been claimed that I make a lot of "unsupported
statements"
about range voting. (Which itself was an unsupported statement...)
If a list of such statements is brought to my
attention, I will try to back them up. In fact I have
Hello James,
I continued the chain of thoughts a bit.
On Aug 14, 2005, at 17:59, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 2:50 PM
Since then I have learned to respect also the good sides of
two-party systems like stable governments and ability to drive clear
policies
Hello Dave,
Few remaining thoughts on this chain of mailings. Maybe not that much
of interest to all anymore (this got already quite detailed), but here
they come.
BR, Juho
On Aug 14, 2005, at 17:49, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sun, 14 Aug 2005 10:24:48 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
See my
Hello Rob, Dave and All,
On Aug 14, 2005, at 03:20, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 18:48 -0400, Dave Ketchum wrote:
NOT at all clear that 2-party domination is as evil as some claim.
This is a really good point to consider. We probably need to discuss
the specific characteristics
See my comments in the mail below.
BR, Juho
On Aug 14, 2005, at 05:57, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sun, 14 Aug 2005 01:11:32 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
Hi Dave,
I think I agree with you on that in normal elections (e.g.
presidential elections) and for normal voters the described
additional
Hello Rob,
Thanks for the good and balanced postings!
BR, Juho
On Aug 14, 2005, at 03:35, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 19:13 -0500, Paul Kislanko wrote:
"Shortest computer program" is not a criterion that any voter would
care
about.
"Rules for voters" and "specification for c
meaning of each.
On Sat, 13 Aug 2005 12:52:32 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
Hello Dave et al,
On Aug 13, 2005, at 06:16, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I __do__ get to express my n x (n-1) / 2 pairwise preferences (part
or all, as I as a voter choose). I just am forced to be consistent.
If I vote A>B and
Hello Dave et al,
On Aug 13, 2005, at 06:16, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I __do__ get to express my n x (n-1) / 2 pairwise preferences (part or
all, as I as a voter choose). I just am forced to be consistent. If
I vote A>B and B>Z, then I have voted A>Z. If there is a C for which
I have given no e
Hello Jobst, James,
On Aug 10, 2005, at 14:02, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
James:
2. Does the Condorcet criterion plus the independence of
clones criterion imply the Smith criterion?
Rule a: Picks the Condorcet Winner if it exists, otherwise determine
which candidates are defeated *most* often and
Hello Forest,
Here is one thought for a situation where
- election is non-contentious
- small group of voters know well each others
First of all, in non-contentious elections basic rating based methods
work fine. For example in your second example of math hiring committee
we can maybe trust th
On Jul 28, 2005, at 07:01, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I think there is a trade-off between expressiveness and strategies.
Rating based methods are nice since they can express so much, but
they are too vulnerable to strategies and therefore unusable in most
(contentious) elections. Approval, as you no
On Jul 28, 2005, at 06:05, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I think the correct way forward would be to write those examples down
and then see what we have and estimate then relative vulnerability (of
winning votes, margins and pair-wise methods in general) to
strategies.
Seems a bit too a
Hello Eric,
On Jul 27, 2005, at 00:27, Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Remember that the topic is ties, rather than splitting up a district
with a fixed quantity of real voters. The district could have had
3000 real voters in 2 groups of 1500 or 3 groups of 1000 - or
whatever made the
On Jul 26, 2005, at 23:41, Dave Ketchum wrote:
...
My comparison of methods:
Nice description of strategies and summary of methods, thanks.
Condorcet margins - like above, but less apt to pick best liked.
Why less apt? I find the choices of margins quite ok.
Approval - its backe
Hello James,
Thanks for the comments.
On Jul 27, 2005, at 14:07, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi Juho,
Glad that you're still thinking about this fascinating issue (voter
strategy in Condorcet methods).
You have constructed an example in which margins is less vulnerable
than
WV. Ho
Hello Paul,
On Jul 25, 2005, at 01:42, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote in part:
(P.S. Number of "1000 supporter parties" could be also higher
than two,
and number of candidates in each party could be higher than two, and
the results/problems would stay the same.)
I'd
On Jul 25, 2005, at 01:24, Dave Ketchum wrote:
"Strategically" still turns me off. Voters who preferred B over A,
and had planned to vote accordingly, are gambling that they can get
better results by claiming, instead, to prefer A over B:
In some cases they can, unfortunately, succeed at
Hi All,
Here is another example that addresses exactly the same problem as the
previous example in this mail stream but gives another viewpoint to it.
This is an extreme example but it shows nicely the very different
behaviour of winning votes and margins in this type of ("never mind the
cand
Hello Dave,
On Jul 22, 2005, at 17:25, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 20 Jul 2005 21:36:00 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
- In raking based real life elections it seems to be quite common
that voters don't give full rankings. This example has only three
candidates and therefore full rankings
Hi All,
Here is one interesting margins vs. winning votes example for you to
consider. I don't remember having seen this type of scenario. But with
good probability someone has already analysed this, so please provide
some pointers if this has been discussed on the list or elsewhere.
The exa
Hi,
On Jun 14, 2005, at 12:46, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi folks,
I'm announcing this change as requested by the poll: I've changed the
"must"s on several questions to "should"s. I'll give a brief argument
for
the change here, but if the change is unpopular, others are free to
reve
Hello Ken,
Nice ideas. Correlation seems like a useful tool that could be applied
also elsewhere than with Borda. It sure is more natural (and wider)
than the normal clone definitions (unfortunately not as simple but of
course so are peoples' opinions).
Borda has some problems with strategic
On Jun 9, 2005, at 07:45, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
Which is better, a winner supported by half the voters plus one, or a
winner with the largest approval rating?
What is needed, I'd say, is consensus, not regarding the "best
method," but simply upon the characteristics and likely -- or
pref
Hello Ken,
On Jun 10, 2005, at 19:07, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
So, CIBR appears to be less than ideal, which stems from the fact
that the weakest candidate isn't necessarily eliminated first.
I'm not sure what the negative effect of not eliminating the weakest
first are. But I just want to point o
Hello Anthony,
On Jun 7, 2005, at 08:06, Anthony Duff wrote:
The pertinent question is whether people here have wildly exaggerated
the importance of strategic voting, and whether simple minmax
methods, such as PC or MMPO are good enough.
This is a good question. Strategic voting may be a big
Hello Stephane,
Yes. Electoral methods should aim at electing the candidate that is
best for the planned period (based on the will of the electors as
expressed in the ballots). Repetitive mutinies are thus something one
need not normally prepare for.
If the community can agree what the "util
Dear Curt, Daniel and All,
On May 3, 2005, at 02:06, Curt Siffert wrote:
You cannot derive, from a Condorcet ballot collection, how much
percentage support each candidate got. You can't give each candidate
a share of 100% in a way that all candidates would agree on. If you
can, I'd love to
Hello James,
In the pirate example one could take a step in the direction of
proportional representation and give up the original idea of single
winner elections. It is the captain that is to be elected, and there is
a tradition of having only one captain on a ship. In this situation one
coul
Hello James,
You already know my arguments but maybe I'm able to add some more value
and/or structure to the old discussions.
On May 27, 2005, at 13:02, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I'd like to
briefly argue that minmax methods in general are very significantly
inferior to methods that pass th
Hello All,
I'd like to get your opinions on this method, or actually a family of
methods.
One short characterization (not an exact definition) of groupings is
that instead of trying to identify clone sets or other groupings from
the votes it could be better to let the groupings identify themsel
Hello Kevin,
On Apr 27, 2005, at 00:14, Kevin Venzke wrote:
And if one changes the winner based on a false clone
assumption, then one may violate the rights of the candidate that
would
have won without the clone assumption.
I think this is kind of silly. What "rights" could be violated?
What I mea
On Apr 26, 2005, at 13:15, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I have written on practical election situations since it seemed to me
that that area has not been covered sufficiently on this mailing list.
You'll have to define "practical"
With practical election situations simply referred to the large publ
Hello James,
See embedded comments below.
Best Regards,
Juho
On Apr 17, 2005, at 13:19, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi Juho. Here is a reply to your April 4 post, where you suggested
that
large scale strategic manipulation in Condorcet methods will be
unlikely.
I like your professional wrestler
On Apr 17, 2005, at 21:58, Kevin Venzke wrote:
plurality
That doesn't work unless you count the total number of people "who
think
that the winner is not the first choice of the most voters." Otherwise
you have everyone revolting who doesn't get their first choice.
Yes. I'm just trying to demonstr
Hello Michael,
This is maybe not what you were looking for, but self-organizing maps
(or other corresponding approximating methods) could be useful (and
computationally feasible) in this kind of classroom problems.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organizing_map
http://www.arch.usyd.edu.au/~r
Hello All,
Sorry about trashing the email list with duplicate mails. Please ignore
all others but one (reply to Kevin's April 16th message). I sent some
of mails the mails from a wrong email account and they should not have
gone through. Thanks to whoever put also those mails on the email list
(I resend this message because my first try was I never got back. My
previous mail was a copy of an old post, please ignore.)
Hello Kevin,
On Apr 16, 2005, at 06:21, Kevin Venzke wrote:
If approval is chosen as the SVM => B should win. If margins is chosen
as the SVM => A should win. If wv is cho
Hello Kevin,
On Apr 16, 2005, at 06:21, Kevin Venzke wrote:
If approval is chosen as the SVM => B should win. If margins is chosen
as the SVM => A should win. If wv is chosen as the SVM => B should
win.
Yes. But my point was that you don't seem to offer much guidance as to
what an "ideal" winner c
My first mail today was a copy of and old message, please ignore.
BR, Juho
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hello Kevin,
On Apr 16, 2005, at 06:21, Kevin Venzke wrote:
If approval is chosen as the SVM => B should win. If margins is chosen
as the SVM => A should win. If wv is chosen as the SVM => B should
win.
Yes. But my point was that you don't seem to offer much guidance as to
what an "ideal" winner c
Hello Kevin,
On Apr 2, 2005, at 21:23, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Why do you feel that WV methods aren't sensible when voters are
sincere?
I don't think sincere votes would be problematic to WV methods. If I
have understood the history of WV methods correctly, they have been
introduced primarily in ord
On Apr 13, 2005, at 21:33, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Ok. You refer to practical voting methods here. Using random selection
could be possible is SVMs too, but that would mean that there is no
"complete SVM" (= method that would be able to always pick the winner)
behind but only a set of sincere criteria
On Apr 13, 2005, at 18:44, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I don't see a difference. What you call "majority defending
modifications"
in e.g. winning votes is nothing more, nothing less than the use of a
defeat strength measure that inherently views majority-strength defeats
as being stronger than sub-majorit
Hi,
On Apr 4, 2005, at 20:21, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
We know of course that most often
one can easily find two measures which do not agree on which candidate
is "best", so we're left with deciding which measure is most important.
But what if no measure is "most" important but each is important in
so
On Apr 4, 2005, at 23:32, Eric Gorr wrote:
one cannot assume that just a single population will vote
strategically to obtain the best outcome from their point of view.
once one population begins strategically voting, others will do so as
well and I have yet to see a compelling argument that it w
On Apr 4, 2005, at 23:38, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Maybe you have in an earlier post argued that majority rule (in this
sense)
is not as necessary in a "sincere method." But I doubt I can be
convinced
of that.
I'm not sure if I understood all you wrote, but anyway, if one
sincerely thinks that majori
Hello James,
On Apr 3, 2005, at 01:35, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
If someone is interested, I would be happy to see examples e.g. on how
the "SVM: MinMax (margins), PVM: MinMax (margins)" case (this one
should be an easy target) can be fooled
Hello Kevin,
On Apr 2, 2005, at 21:23, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Why do you feel that WV methods aren't sensible when voters are
sincere?
I don't think sincere votes would be problematic to WV methods. If I
have understood the history of WV methods correctly, they have been
introduced primarily in ord
On Mar 30, 2005, at 02:53, Gervase Lam wrote:
Should I thus read your comment so that you see MinMax (margins) as a
sincere method (the best one, or just one good sincere method) whose
weaknesses with strategic voting can best be patched by using Raynaud
(Margins)?
Roughly speaking yes, but not ex
On Mar 31, 2005, at 03:38, Gervase Lam wrote:
Schulze(Margins) (also known as Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping
and Beatpath etc...) is possibly another reasonable method. See the
recent "LNHarm performance" thread.
Thanks, I'm already familiar with this one. My opinion briefly: nice
design
On Mar 30, 2005, at 02:53, Gervase Lam wrote:
Should I thus read your comment so that you see MinMax (margins) as a
sincere method (the best one, or just one good sincere method) whose
weaknesses with strategic voting can best be patched by using Raynaud
(Margins)?
Roughly speaking yes, but not ex
Hello James and All,
On Mar 26, 2005, at 14:05, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Yes, but you've not yet understood the virtue of cardinal-weighted
pairwise and approval-weighted pairwise. I request that you read my
cardinal pairwise paper, as most of the arguments used therein apply to
AWP as well.
ht
Hello Chris,
I have one generic comment on evaluation of different voting methods.
Examples that include both sincere votes and altered votes nicely
demonstrate the possibilities of strategic voting, but when the voting
method gets a pile of ballots to be counted, no knowledge of which
votes are
Hello Gervase,
On Mar 24, 2005, at 03:00, Gervase Lam wrote:
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 09:15:52 +0200
From: Juho Laatu
Subject: [EM] Sincere methods
I already gave some support to seeing MinMax (margins) ("least
additional votes") as one potential "sincere method" (criticism
r
Hello Jobst,
Good viewpoints. I think I agree with most of this.
To me the limit of useful information for voting is quite close to "rankings can be taken into account". I could add something small and leave some problematic strategic ranking cases out but these are just details.
I think vote
Hi,
This is a response to James Green-Armytage's mail
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015125.html
You asked me to read the mail after I had defended the margin based methods. Now I did - or actually I had read the mail ealier but only now find so
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I would think that if votes are sincere, the best voting method would not be> Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a number of points to> each candidate representing the utility they ascribe to that candidate. The> candidate with the largest total ut
something stupid that doesn't help anyone. In the latter case the strategies may be considered just noise.
Best Regards,
Juho
Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:> Hello All,> > In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best > Condorcet
Hello All,
In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury
of sincere votes. I would appreciate your comments on this. Possible
answers could be e.g.
- one method that is best for all or most single winner
Hello James,
Some further comments on the two tracks (= two scenarios on what mutiny
may mean in elections). Sorry that the mail is long (maybe too long and
difficult to read for those who have not followed the discussion).
Best Regards,
Juho
On Mar 19, 2005, at 04:38, James Green-Armytage wrot
Hello James,
Sorry about causing some gray hair to you. I think the problem is that
we drove into two alternative tracks in the discussion and my text,
when trying to address both of these, was not clear. I hope this mail
improves the situation a bit.
The two tracks that I see are one where we
s and maybe with some
opinion surveys.
Best Regards,
Juho
On Mar 17, 2005, at 17:02, Eric Gorr wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
This is interesting. I believe that when Condorcet based methods are
taken into use there really will be large number of people who will
put the strongest competitor of their favour
Hello James,
You wondered how familiar I am with different strategies etc. I have
studied the voting methods for quite some time and I have visited also
Blake Cretney's web site. I think I know most of the basic stuff but
unfortunately have not had time to follow all the details of the
disc
Hello James,
Thanks for the excellent mail. I still found some points where
different definitions lead to different conclusions. See (lengthy)
comments below.
BR, Juho
On Mar 17, 2005, at 09:51, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I suggest that most public elections will fall within the region of
"som
Hello James,
As more or less promised, here are some comments on the rest of your
mail.
BR,
Juho
3. Condorcet and strategies
Condorcet is close to a dream come true in the sense that it almost
provides a perfect solution that eliminates all strategies from
elections and frees people to giving
Hello Mike,
Thanks for the comments. I agree with most of the stuff. Few comments
follow.
Best Regards,
Juho
You continued:
This is based on the assumption that strategical voting is not that
easy in real life, at least not in elections where the number of
voters is large.
I reply:
It happens
Hello James,
I wrote a long mail. Sorry about that. No need to reply on everything
word in it. I however felt that it is worth writing all the text, just
in case it would trigger some useful thoughts. Simple answer "thanks
but I'm not convinced of the merits of non-Smith-set candidates yet" is
Hello Forest,
Least Additional Votes (like Approval) has the advantage (over many
other methods) of being able to tell the losers by how many votes they
missed winning the election.
Yes. Ability to understand what happened in the election is a good
requirement for any election method - not a man
Hello James,
Here is some feedback on point 1. I didn't find yet time to write a proper answer also to point 3 but I'm planning to comment also that.
1. Majority and Smith set
Yes, one should respect the majority opinion. My thinking however goes so that in some situations some majority opinio
Hello James,
I think your first guess ("A single ballot that lists this candidate as the first choice, with all others tied for last") is enough to do the job.
In the example I gave I was thus thinking of additions like
101: a>b>x>c
101: b>c>x>a
101: c>a>x>b
100: x
2: x
or
101: a>b>x>c
1
James Green-Armytage presented a number of number of good tools and arguments that could be used when trying to achieve consensus within the community on the best single winner method. I didn't consider the Smith set as critical as he did, and as a result I'm leaning in a somewhat differen
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