On Wed, 3 Sep 2003, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote:
...
> Suppose one voter only sincerely approves and ranks 1 candidate, and another
> voter does 5 candidates. Unless the method goes down to the fifth rankings,
> the second voter is not able to make all the compromises he might've been
> wil
Dear John B. Hodges,
the following example demonstrates that Bucklin is
vulnerable to "compromising" (i.e. insincerely ranking
a candidate higher to make him win).
Example:
4 A > B > C
3 B > C > A
2 C > A > B
The unique Bucklin winner is candidate B.
However, if the 2 CAB v
Dear John B. Hodges,
the following example demonstrates that Bucklin
violates consistency.
Situation 1:
4 A > B > C
5 B > C > A
6 C > A > B
Candidate C is the unique Bucklin winner.
Situation 2:
4 A > B > C
5 C > A > B
Candidate C is the unique
Dear John B. Hodges,
I wrote (2 Sep 2003):
> Situation 1:
>
> 2 A > B > C
> 3 B > C > A
> 4 C > A > B
>
> The winner is candidate C.
>
> Situation 2:
>
> Replacing C by C1, C2, and C3 gives:
>
> 2 A > B > C2 > C1 > C3
> 3 B > C3 > C2 > C1 > A
> 4 C1 >
John,
Permit me to offer some answers:
--- "John B. Hodges" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Subject: RE: [EM] Query for one and all
> >JBH asked:
> >> My question, for one and all: I
From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Query for one and all
Dear Kevin,
you wrote (2 Sep 2003):
I think MCA meets Clone Independence and Participation,
but I'd like to hear reasoning to the contrary.
Situation 1:
2 A > B > C
3 B > C > A
From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: [EM] Query for one and all
JBH asked:
My question, for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that
any single-winner method has, that this method does not have?
Two problems.
1. Your second and subsequent preferences co
Markus,
--- Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> you wrote (2 Sep 2003):
> > I think MCA meets Clone Independence and Participation,
> > but I'd like to hear reasoning to the contrary.
I agree that the below shows a failure of Clone Independence in the method
as it was described by Jo
Dear Kevin,
you wrote (2 Sep 2003):
> I think MCA meets Clone Independence and Participation,
> but I'd like to hear reasoning to the contrary.
Situation 1:
2 A > B > C
3 B > C > A
4 C > A > B
The winner is candidate C.
Situation 2:
Replacing C by C1, C2, and C3 gives:
--- Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Dear John B. Hodges,
>
> you wrote (1 Sep 2003):
> > This method has been called "Generalized Bucklin", and AFAICT
> > could also be called "Majority Choice Approval". My question,
> > for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that any
>
Dear John B. Hodges,
you wrote (1 Sep 2003):
> This method has been called "Generalized Bucklin", and AFAICT
> could also be called "Majority Choice Approval". My question,
> for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that any
> single-winner method has, that this method does not have?
Cond
JBH asked:
> My question, for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that
> any single-winner method has, that this method does not have?
Two problems.
1. Your second and subsequent preferences count against your first preference.
2. If more than first preferences have to be counted, the v
Consider the following single-winner method. Voters submit ranked
ballots, ties allowed, truncation allowed. (Only one vote allowed for
each candidate.) First-choice votes are tallied; if anyone gets a
majority, the one with the largest tally wins. If no one gets a
majority of first-chioce vote
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