On 3/16/2010 4:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 05:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
The hypothesis is that it would have some effect, not necessarily that you
would feel a little pain. Maybe the effect is that a certain thought comes
into your consciousness, "I could have been re
On 16 March 2010 05:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
> The hypothesis is that it would have some effect, not necessarily that you
> would feel a little pain. Maybe the effect is that a certain thought comes
> into your consciousness, "I could have been really hurt if...".
Even if you were unaware that t
On 3/15/2010 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation
implies consciousness is not unitary but continually "splits" just as the
states of other quantum systems. So while these co
On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation
> implies consciousness is not unitary but continually "splits" just as the
> states of other quantum systems. So while these counterfactual states
> (realized in the multiple wo
On 3/14/2010 5:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 March 2010 08:43, Brent Meeker wrote:
(BTW the formatting for your last few posts looks odd when I read them
with Gmail. Would it be possible to revert to plain text?)
[Stathis]
Does that matter here? I thought the argument was that i
On 14 March 2010 08:43, Brent Meeker wrote:
(BTW the formatting for your last few posts looks odd when I read them
with Gmail. Would it be possible to revert to plain text?)
[Stathis]
> Does that matter here? I thought the argument was that if system A is
> capable of behaviour that system B is
On 3/13/2010 6:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 March 2010 11:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
The pathways are all intact and can spring into action if the person
wakes up. There is a continuum from everything being there and ready
to use immediately, to all there but parts of the system do
On 12 March 2010 11:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> The pathways are all intact and can spring into action if the person
>> wakes up. There is a continuum from everything being there and ready
>> to use immediately, to all there but parts of the system dormant, to
>> not there at all but could be adde
On 12 Mar 2010, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal
worlds, and
he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too.
In some worlds his car is a Toyota.
But he is old. He will not go faster than 60mi/h in the normal worlds.
Tp preve
On 3/12/2010 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive devi
On 3/11/2010 4:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 March 2010 10:46, Brent Meeker wrote:
[Stathis]
When a brain is not being consciously used at all, because the person
is in dreamless sleep, the counterfactuals are all still there;
[Brent]
Hmmm. Are they? Suppose instead of being asl
On 12 March 2010 10:46, Brent Meeker wrote:
[Stathis]
> When a brain is not being consciously used at all, because the person
> is in dreamless sleep, the counterfactuals are all still there;
[Brent]
> Hmmm. Are they? Suppose instead of being asleep the person is anesthetized
> and cooled so t
On 3/11/2010 2:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 March 2010 04:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
[Stathis]
We can do a thought experiment. A brain is rigged to explode unless it
goes down one particular pathway. Does it change the computation being
implemented if it is given the right input so
On 12 March 2010 04:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
[Stathis]
> We can do a thought experiment. A brain is rigged to explode unless it
> goes down one particular pathway. Does it change the computation being
> implemented if it is given the right input so that it does go down
> that pathway? Does it chan
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or
a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience
of a an actual comp
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive device in the actual
supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that
device.
On 3/11/2010 4:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 11 March 2010 13:57, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is u
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a
computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a
an actual computation currently not using that device.
I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems t
On 11 March 2010 13:57, Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons
>> could be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is
>> unknown. The conclusion is that if the artificial ne
On 11 Mar 2010, at 02:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Here's an interesting theory of consciousness in which
counterfactuals would make a difference.
The fat that the counterfactuals makes a difference is the essence of
comp and of the comp supervenience thesis. But that is the reason why
neith
HI,
2010/3/11 Jack Mallah
> --- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons
> could be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is
> unknown. The conclusion is that if the artificial neurons lack
> consc
On 3/10/2010 6:57 PM, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The
conclusion is that if the artificial neurons l
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
> be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The
> conclusion is that if the artificial neurons lack consciousness, then the
> brain would
On 3/9/2010 2:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 March 2010 09:06, Jack Mallah wrote:
If consciousness supervenes on the physical realization of a computation,
including the inactive part, it means you attach consciousness on an unknown
physical phenomenon. It is a magical move which
On 9 March 2010 09:06, Jack Mallah wrote:
>> If consciousness supervenes on the physical realization of a computation,
>> including the inactive part, it means you attach consciousness on an unknown
>> physical phenomenon. It is a magical move which blurs the difficulty.
>
> There is no new phy
On 08 Mar 2010, at 06:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman wrote:
computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that
consciousness supervenes only on realisations capable of
instantiating this complete range of underlying physical activity
(i.e. factual + co
--- On Fri, 3/5/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It is a different fading qualia argument, older and different from Chlamers.
> It is explained in my PhD thesis, and earlier article, bur also in MGA3 on
> this list, and in a paper not yet submitted.
Bruno, do you have the link? I searched the list a
On 08 Mar 2010, at 10:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's perhaps just a matter of definition but I would have thought the
requirement for a hypercomputer was not compatible with
computationalism, but potentially could still come under
functionalism.
Putnam(*) is responsible for introducing f
On 8 March 2010 16:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Fri, 3/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> If the inputs to the remaining brain tissue are the same as they would have
>> been normally then effectively you have replaced the missing parts with a
>> magical processor, and I would say that the
On 3/7/2010 9:46 PM, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman wrote:
computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that consciousness
supervenes only on realisations capable of instantiating this complete range of
underlying physical activity (i.e. factual + counterf
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman wrote:
> computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that consciousness
> supervenes only on realisations capable of instantiating this complete range
> of underlying physical activity (i.e. factual + counterfactual) in virtue of
> relevant physical
On 06 Mar 2010, at 23:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2010 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA,
and
one difficulty remains in the step
On 3/6/2010 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA, and
one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference between
a computation an
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA,
and one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference
between a computation and a description of computation. Due to
On 3/5/2010 1:29 PM, Charles wrote:
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key condition in my paper is that the
inputs to the remaining brain are identical to what they would have been if the
whole brain were present. Thus, the neural activi
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA, and
one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference between
a computation and a description of computation. Due to the static
character of Platonia, some believes it
> --- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key condition in my paper is that
> the inputs to the remaining brain are identical to what they would have been
> if the whole brain were present. Thus, the neural activity in the partial
> brain is
On Mar 5, 8:43 am, Jack Mallah wrote:
> and in any case is a thought experiment.
The term seems particularly appropriate in this case!
Charles
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On 04 Mar 2010, at 22:59, Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, I hope you feel better.
Thanks.
My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
Why would I think so?
Now I am warned.
--- Bruno Marchal wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you just have to
assum
On 5 March 2010 06:43, Jack Mallah wrote:
>> similarly in your paper where you consider a gradual removal of brain
>> tissue. It would have to be very specific surgery to produce the sort of
>> delusional state you describe.
>
> I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key condition in my pape
Bruno, I hope you feel better. My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
--- Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> > Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you just have to assume
> > that counterfactuals count. No one but you considers that 'prescience' or
> > any kind of pro
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> > For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain has
> > counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper:
> > http://cogprints.org/6321/
>
> I've finally come around to reading this paper. You may
On 12 February 2010 03:14, Jack Mallah wrote:
> That's not true. For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain
> has counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper:
> http://cogprints.org/6321/
I've finally come around to reading this paper. You may or may not be
On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:33, Jack Mallah wrote:
I finally figured out what was happening to my emails: the spam
filter got overly agressive and it was sending some of the list
posts to the spam folder, but letting others into the inbox. The
post I'm replying to now was one that was hidden th
2010/3/2 Jack Mallah :
> I guess by 'physical supervenience' you mean supervenience on physical
> activity only. That is not what computationalism assumes. Computationalism
> assumes supervenience on both physical activity and physical laws (aka
> counterfactuals). There is no secret about th
I finally figured out what was happening to my emails: the spam filter got
overly agressive and it was sending some of the list posts to the spam folder,
but letting others into the inbox. The post I'm replying to now was one that
was hidden that way.
--- On Sun, 2/14/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> From: stath...@gmail.com
> Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 20:23:55 +1100
> Subject: Re: problem of size '10
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> On 23 February 2010 04:45, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> >> It seems that these thought experiments inevitably lead to consi
Last post didn't show up in email. Seems random.
--- On Tue, 2/23/10, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> -even if there was a one-to-one relationship between distinct computations
> and distinct observer-moments with distinct qualia, very similar computations
> could produce very similar qualia,
Sure. So y
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 10:40 AM, Jack Mallah wrote:
> My last post worked (I got it in my email). I'll repost one later and then
> post on the measure thread - though it's still a very busy time for me so
> maybe not today.
>
> --- On Mon, 2/22/10, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > OK, so you're suggesti
. I'll try resending from my gmail account and hopefully it'll work
better!
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 11:41:38 -0800
> From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
> Subject: RE: problem of size '10
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> Jesse, how do you access the everything list?
. I'll try resending from my gmail account and hopefully it'll work
better!
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 11:41:38 -0800
> From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
> Subject: RE: problem of size '10
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> Jesse, how do you access the everything list?
My last post worked (I got it in my email). I'll repost one later and then
post on the measure thread - though it's still a very busy time for me so maybe
not today.
--- On Mon, 2/22/10, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> OK, so you're suggesting there may not be a one-to-one relationship between
> distinc
On 23 February 2010 04:45, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>> It seems that these thought experiments inevitably lead to considering a
>> digital simulation of the brain in a virtual environment. This is
>> usually brushed over as an inessential aspect, but I'm coming to the
>> opinion that it is essential. O
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 11:41:38 -0800
> From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
> Subject: RE: problem of size '10
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
> recieved my own posts in my inbox, nor have ot
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 08:42:17 -0800
> From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: problem of size '10
>
> Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> >
> > > Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
> &
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my own posts in my inbox, nor have others such as Bruno replied. I
use yahoo email. I may need to use a different method to prevent my posts from
getting lost. They do seem to show up on Google groups though. Th
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 08:42:17 -0800
> From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: problem of size '10
>
> Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> >
> > > Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
> > > From: jackma
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
> From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
> Subject: Re: problem of size '10
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> --- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Jack Mallah wrote:
> > --- On Thu, 2/11/10,
> Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800
> From: jackmal...@yahoo.com
> Subject: Re: problem of size '10
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> --- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Jack Mallah wrote:
> > --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal
>
--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On reading the first page of your paper a thought occurred to me. What
> actually happens in the case of progressive Alzheimer’s disease is a bit
> different from the idea that I get from the discussion.
Hi Stephen. Certainly, Alzheimer's disease i
ember the joke about spherical cows, could this be
happening here? Seriously!
Onward!
Stephen
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Friday, February 12, 2010 11:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Su
On 13 Feb 2010, at 19:48, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal
MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute
consciousness to a movie of a computation
That's not
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal
> > > MGA is more general (and older).
> > > The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute consciousness
> > > to a movie of a computation
> >
> > That's not true. For partial repla
On 11 Feb 2010, at 17:14, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low
measure; it's a brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously
no - it would not be a zo
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low measure; it's a
brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously no - it would not be a
zombie. Stop abusing the language.
We know that sm
On 11 Feb 2010, at 06:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread
(which is actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch wrote:
What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, and
the ot
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread (which is
actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch wrote:
> What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, and the other
> half were twice their normal size? How wou
On 28 Jan 2010, at 02:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a
different issue than the others have. My reply to the main "measure
again '10" thread will follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would also not
On 28 January 2010 12:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
> I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different issue
> than the others have. My reply to the main "measure again '10" thread will
> follow under the original title.
>
> --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I would a
On Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 7:46 PM, Jack Mallah wrote:
> I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different
> issue than the others have. My reply to the main "measure again '10" thread
> will follow under the original title.
>
> --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > I
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different issue
than the others have. My reply to the main "measure again '10" thread will
follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I would also not say yes to a computationalist doctor, because my
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