At 17:53 19-10-10, Mark Delany wrote:
In a DKIM world a list server could reasonable use DKIM to bypass this
confirm sequence and make your life a bit simpler. Perhaps it relies
on Authentication-Results or somesuch. In any event such a list server
is actually *more* vulnerable than it is today if
On Mon, 18 Oct 2010 18:06:14 +0100, Murray S. Kucherawy
m...@cloudmark.com wrote:
-Original Message-
From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org
[mailto:ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of John Levine
Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 7:14 PM
To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Cc:
On Wed, Oct 20, 2010 at 01:41:03AM -0700, SM allegedly wrote:
At 17:53 19-10-10, Mark Delany wrote:
In a DKIM world a list server could reasonable use DKIM to bypass this
confirm sequence and make your life a bit simpler. Perhaps it relies
on Authentication-Results or somesuch. In any event
On Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:23:39 +0100, John R. Levine jo...@iecc.com wrote:
good signature - good message.
Don't you mean
Good signature - authenticated message (that is, someone
accepts responsibility)
I think it needs to mean
Good signature - authenticated message (that is, someone
On Tue, 19 Oct 2010 14:18:45 +0100, Wietse Venema wie...@porcupine.org
wrote:
My preference would be to enforce this within the existing protocol
(that is: send h=from:from:subject:subject...),
But that only copes with some of the scams that are possible; for full
protection you need
...
On Mon, 18 Oct 2010 20:18:16 +0100, Murray S. Kucherawy
m...@cloudmark.com wrote:
This is no more presumptuous than expecting that MUAs will adapt to
consume the output of DKIM as it stands now.
In another message I indicated that I don't presume either, but assert
that there's no middle
--On 20 October 2010 15:12:47 +0100 Charles Lindsey c...@clerew.man.ac.uk
wrote:
When I said good, I meant credible, not just one that mechanically
validates. I hope that we all agree that a signature from a domain about
which one knows nothing is not usefully different from no signature
--On 19 October 2010 07:31:58 -0700 Michael Thomas m...@mtcc.com wrote:
On 10/19/2010 06:18 AM, Wietse Venema wrote:
valid signature + good signer
+ no suspicious unsigned content - good message
Has nobody learned that good signers from good authors
can still be evil? I mean come
--On 19 October 2010 11:35:53 -0400 John R. Levine jo...@iecc.com wrote:
True, but there already are UI designs that indicate when a From header
is DKIM verified.
So you're saying that all a spammer has to do is to put on a throwaway
domain's signature, and the MUA will highlight at least
-Original Message-
From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org]
On Behalf Of Charles Lindsey
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2010 3:52 AM
To: DKIM
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] ISSUE: 3.6.2.1 - Working with other TXT
records
By the way, has everyone
A reputation service can only say that a domain is
BAD
GOOD
or NO EVIDENCE AVAILABLE EITHER WAY.
I think the last case has to be treated pretty much like GOOD, otherwise
newcomers to the internet will never even get their messages accepted.
Heck, no. Treat it like there's no
-Original Message-
From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org]
On Behalf Of Mark Delany
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2010 5:53 PM
To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] double header reality check
Any filter or agent that makes any
-Original Message-
From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-
boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Murray S. Kucherawy
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2010 1:55 PM
To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] double header reality check
SNIP
There has been
MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote:
-Original Message-
From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-
boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Murray S. Kucherawy
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2010 1:55 PM
To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] double header reality
Here's another batch of spam with extra From or Subject
lines. I see the same thing as last time, the extra
subjects are all the same, and the extra From lines look
like bugs, not attempts to evade filters.
The spam with 6,981 From lines is impressive in a wacky way.
R's,
John
On 10/20/10 9:30 PM, MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote:
-Original Message-
From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-
boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Murray S. Kucherawy
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2010 1:55 PM
To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim]
John R. Levine wrote:
Here's another batch of spam with extra From or Subject
lines. I see the same thing as last time, the extra
subjects are all the same, and the extra From lines look
like bugs, not attempts to evade filters.
The spam with 6,981 From lines is impressive in a wacky way.
On 10/20/2010 01:31 PM, Rolf E. Sonneveld wrote:
On 10/20/10 9:30 PM, MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote:
Seeing as the M in DKIM stands for Mail, we don't have to put a but
only when used in the email context clause. If a DKIM like approach is
used for other protocols then we might reasonably
On 10/20/10 10:55 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
I think a lot of this discussion conflates protocol specification
with implementation. I'm focused on the former. I maintain that
including wording intimating that a DKIM implementation is
non-compliant if it fails to do mail format
On 10/20/10 8:10 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
--On 19 October 2010 11:35:53 -0400 John R. Levine jo...@iecc.com
wrote:
True, but there already are UI designs that indicate when a From
header is DKIM verified.
So you're saying that all a spammer has to do is to put on a
throwaway domain's
On 10/20/10 3:19 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
[]
I totally agree that that's an important distinction to make, document,
highlight and shout from the rooftops. But... Does it *have* to use RFC2119
normative language?
Here's maybe a better way to frame the question: Should we empower
On Oct 20, 2010, at 3:19 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Validating mail syntax belongs in the specification for the mail
components and DKIM work belongs in the DKIM components.
That's why, layer violation or no, I think it's important to distinguish
between format errors that are likely
Here's maybe a better way to frame the question: Should we empower ourselves
to label a DKIM implementation that doesn't do format enforcement as (a)
non-compliant, or (b) low-security/low-quality?
The latter. Hey, we agree. I think I always said SHOULD rather than
MUST.
The DKIM spec is
On 10/20/2010 04:36 PM, Steve Atkins wrote:
On Oct 20, 2010, at 3:19 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Validating mail syntax belongs in the specification for the mail
components and DKIM work belongs in the DKIM components.
That's why, layer violation or no, I think it's important to
Michael Thomas m...@mtcc.com wrote:
On 10/20/2010 04:36 PM, Steve Atkins wrote:
On Oct 20, 2010, at 3:19 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Validating mail syntax belongs in the specification for the mail
components and DKIM work belongs in the DKIM components.
That's why, layer violation or
On Oct 20, 2010, at 6:08 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
Michael Thomas m...@mtcc.com wrote:
On 10/20/2010 04:36 PM, Steve Atkins wrote:
On Oct 20, 2010, at 3:19 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Validating mail syntax belongs in the specification for the mail
components and DKIM work
-Original Message-
From: John R. Levine [mailto:jo...@iecc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2010 5:08 PM
To: Murray S. Kucherawy
Cc: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] double header reality check
Here's maybe a better way to frame the question: Should we empower
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