RE: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-28 Thread Frank Bulk
tions; ipv6@ietf.org Subject: Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ? >So perhaps the changes required would be mostly limited to - > >- DADs to all-nodes rather than solicited node addresses >- nodes receiving the DAD use that to create a

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-18 Thread Joel Jaeggli
On Jul 17, 2011, at 4:54 AM, Sander Steffann wrote: > Hi, > >> I think the same applies to hosts with lots of VMs: maintaining a potentially >> large number of NC entries for a single MAC address is unlikely to scale. >> This is what routing is designed for. > > Then why are there 64 bits in the

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Joel Jaeggli
On Jul 17, 2011, at 4:44 PM, Fred Baker wrote: > > On Jul 17, 2011, at 1:53 AM, Philip Homburg wrote: > >> In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 11:32:37 +0930 you wrote: >>> The quite novel technique of allocation transient addresses to >>> applications/processes to assist with firewalling als

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Fred Baker
On Jul 17, 2011, at 1:53 AM, Philip Homburg wrote: > In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 11:32:37 +0930 you wrote: >> The quite novel technique of allocation transient addresses to >> applications/processes to assist with firewalling also takes advantage >> of IPv6's large address space and tha

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Mark Smith
Hi Christian, On Sun, 17 Jul 2011 16:09:29 + Christian Huitema wrote: > >So perhaps the changes required would be mostly limited to - > > > >- DADs to all-nodes rather than solicited node addresses > >- nodes receiving the DAD use that to create a neighbor cache entry > >- NUD takes care of

RE: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Christian Huitema
> From: ipv6-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipv6-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of > Daniel Roesen > On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 04:09:29PM +, Christian Huitema wrote: >> The basic idea is that remote parties should only be sending to >> addresses that have already been discovered in the local subnet. > >

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Daniel Roesen
On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 04:09:29PM +, Christian Huitema wrote: > The basic idea is that remote parties should only be sending to > addresses that have already been discovered in the local subnet. Breaks with any VRRP setup. Best regards, Daniel -- CLUE-RIPE -- Jabber: d...@cluenet.de -- dr@

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Ray Hunter
Subject: Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ? From: Philip Homburg Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2011 15:37:00 +0200 To: Mark Smith CC: ipv6@ietf.org, IPv6 Operations Precedence: list References: <5022da1a-2dad-412f-9742-0780389d8...@bogus.com> <

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Sander Steffann
Hi, > As a defense against remote attack, I'm thinking that routers should limit > the percentage of their ND caches that are associated with nonexistent hosts. > I suspect there are circumstances when it makes sense to have "passive" > hosts, perhaps even large numbers of them, which the loca

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Keith Moore
On Jul 17, 2011, at 12:09 PM, Christian Huitema wrote: >> So perhaps the changes required would be mostly limited to - >> >> - DADs to all-nodes rather than solicited node addresses >> - nodes receiving the DAD use that to create a neighbor cache entry >> - NUD takes care of maintaining the vali

RE: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Christian Huitema
>So perhaps the changes required would be mostly limited to - > >- DADs to all-nodes rather than solicited node addresses >- nodes receiving the DAD use that to create a neighbor cache entry >- NUD takes care of maintaining the validity of those entries >- ND NS to all nodes with an unspecified tar

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Philip Homburg
[I dropped v6ops] In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 23:41:05 +0930 you wrote: >Good point, there would need to be a message to solicit addresses. An >NS to the all nodes address with an unspecified (::) target address >perhaps. > >So perhaps the changes required would be mostly limited to - >

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Philip Homburg
In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 22:48:40 +0930 you wrote: >Actually, that level of change might not be that necessary. If the >destination address for the Duplicate Address Detection probes was >changed to the all-nodes rather than the solicited nodes multicast >address, then all receving nod

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Philip Homburg
In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 21:53:20 +0930 you wrote: >I think the ultimate root cause is that the creation of neighbor cache >entries is triggered by data plane traffic, rather than created by a >control plane protocol i.e. a neighbor registration protocol. I think >that means that what

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Mark Smith
On Sun, 17 Jul 2011 15:37:00 +0200 Philip Homburg wrote: > In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 22:48:40 +0930 you wrote: > >Actually, that level of change might not be that necessary. If the > >destination address for the Duplicate Address Detection probes was > >changed to the all-nodes rather

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Mark Smith
On Sun, 17 Jul 2011 21:53:20 +0930 Mark Smith wrote: > On Sun, 17 Jul 2011 13:54:06 +0200 > Sander Steffann wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > > I think the same applies to hosts with lots of VMs: maintaining a > > > potentially > > > large number of NC entries for a single MAC address is unlikely to s

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Mark Smith
On Sun, 17 Jul 2011 13:54:06 +0200 Sander Steffann wrote: > Hi, > > > I think the same applies to hosts with lots of VMs: maintaining a > > potentially > > large number of NC entries for a single MAC address is unlikely to scale. > > This is what routing is designed for. > > Then why are there

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Sander Steffann
Hi, > I think the same applies to hosts with lots of VMs: maintaining a potentially > large number of NC entries for a single MAC address is unlikely to scale. > This is what routing is designed for. Then why are there 64 bits in the IID? And I don't think it has anything to do with the MAC addr

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-17 Thread Philip Homburg
In your letter dated Sun, 17 Jul 2011 11:32:37 +0930 you wrote: >The quite novel technique of allocation transient addresses to >applications/processes to assist with firewalling also takes advantage >of IPv6's large address space and that hosts can have multiple >addresses at once. It'd be a shame

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-16 Thread Mark Smith
On Sat, 16 Jul 2011 10:38:45 -0700 Fred Baker wrote: > > On Jul 15, 2011, at 6:31 AM, RJ Atkinson wrote: > > > I apologise for being unclear. The document I was trying to propose in the > > quoted text above was NOT about protocol changes, but instead would focus > > on extant mitigations --

Re: [v6ops] Best venue to begin addressing the "/64 ND DoS" concerns ?

2011-07-16 Thread Fred Baker
On Jul 15, 2011, at 6:31 AM, RJ Atkinson wrote: > I apologise for being unclear. The document I was trying to propose in the > quoted text above was NOT about protocol changes, but instead would focus on > extant mitigations -- so the document I was proposing would more obviously > seem to fi