Continuing our study of NP Chapter 3:
§3.2 outlines the extension of the Dicisign concept — i.e. the range of
semiotic phenomena to which it is applicable — and lists several “merits” of
the concept (p. 52). The first of these is the one of greatest interest in
biosemiotics: “it allows for
Ben, Gary, R., Gary F.,
i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of the society
"rewarding diciplines" and this sheds a light on your idea of sociology
in this discussion. Your sociology consists of conscious actors who
reward, strive for power, wealth or status. This is more a r
I'm confused by this argument.
My understanding of 'symbol' is that it refers to a singular and specific
relation; that between the Representamen and the Object - which can be
'iconic, indexical or symbolic'.
The dicisign, on the other hand, is the full triad, a dicent symbolic legisign
- i.
Jeff, I think what you have in mind here is a more 'advanced' stream of our
seminar, i.e. for those who are " trying to work more systematically through
his philosophical position." But since we expect that many of those
following this seminar are not trying to do that, it's likely that those who
a
Peircers,
As I read, read again, and scan ahead through Frederik's book, I find the issues
it raises very stimulating and its overall perspective very "amen"-able, if you
will, from my customary spot in the amen corner. If I appear too often or only
critical, it is probably because I don't no
> On Sep 24, 2014, at 6:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
> But as Frederik points out in his footnote (p. 51) about “degeneracy,” not
> all Dicisigns are symbols — only propositions are. Does this mean that
> non-symbolic Dicisigns — or “natural propositions” — are degenerate in some
> sense? And
Edwina, lists,
In Peirce, “dicent sign” is synonymous with “dicisign”. A dicent symbolic
legisign is a proposition; as Peirce puts it, “a proposition is, in short, a
Dicisign that is a Symbol. But an Index, likewise, may be a Dicisign”
(EP2:282). So for Peirce, the dicent symbolic legisign i
One other brief thought.
Something I’ve not seen discussed much in the literature is the relationship
between mathematics and propositions. (This may just because admittedly I’ve
not sought out such discussions) Propositions are usually taken as linguistic
with fairly strict boundaries on what
Peircers,
Here is the first passage I wanted to single out for further reflection, from
“3.2. The Extension of the Dicisign Concept”. I have broken out the separate
points of the long paragraph to facilitate study and discussion. As always,
please let me know if you find any typos in my tran
Howard, lists,
I regard math's effectiveness in idioscopy, especially in physics, as
wondrous but _/not unreasonable/_, probably because I don't regard
either mathematical theory or the mathematical subject matter itself as
the mere creation, free or otherwise, of the brain of _/homo sapiens/_
OK - yes, I know that three of the ten classes have the relation with the
Interpretant in a mode of Secondness and thus, are termed 'dicent'. Their other
relations may be in a mode of Secondness or Thirdness (never, of course, within
Firstness). I was under the impression, from my as yet unfini
Gary F., Jeff, Clark, lists,
I've been reading the passages you pointed to from *Kaina Stoicheia* ("New
Elements") in EP2, Gary, and I tend to agree with you that, while I too
will be very interested in the special direction that Jeff would like to
take the discussion of this chapter of NP, that f
> On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest
> and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the way
> that in the proposition "Socrates is wise," for example, that ". . .it is not
>
Chapter 3.1
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14236
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14249
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14264
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14265
GF:http://perm
Jon, lists,
Would you say that Peirce, is in such a passage as this one (of which I
could quote several), guilty of your putative fallacy of misplaced essence?
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of
a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates
Just to go along with those last comments of mine, the following quote is be
useful.
The logic of relatives furnishes the solution, by showing that propositions
usually have several subjects, that one of these subjects is the so-called
Universe of Discourse, that as a general rule a proposition
Stefan, Gary R., Gary F., list,
I'm not sure how much there is in what you say that I'd disagree with.
I'd point out that I wasn't attempting to describe social influences on
research in real depth, but just to indicate that I believe that they
exist and that I had given them at least a little
Chapter 3.1
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14236
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14249
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14264
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14265
GF:http://perm
At 02:11 PM 9/24/2014, Benjamin wrote:
[snip]
I'm just saying that if one regards mathematics mainly as a neural
activity, then mathematics would seem absurdly effective in physics
and other special sciences, as if an average child by doodling had
invented a rocket ship.
HP: I do not see anti
Jon, lists,
Just a few interleaved remarks for now.
JA: I read Peirce the same way I read anyone else who puts forward a
description or a depiction of anything. I observe a principle of
charitable interpretation, which means that I seek an interpretation of
what they propose that does not result
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