[PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

sage - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 10:01 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, List: With all due respect--I am not lecturing you, I never sugg

[PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

ginative capacity enables us to eventually deny that it's 'due to the witch', and develop a vaccine or whatever. It's a difficult burden - to have the capacity-to-imagine. Edwina - Original Message ----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard To: Edwina Taborsky Sent:

[PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Edwina, Helmut, List: Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object *exists*? As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it falls under Firstness (possibility). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lut

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

act is never isolate. Edwina - Original Message - From: g...@gnusystems.ca To: 'Peirce-L' Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2016 9:42 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, list, The reference you said you’d loo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Gary, Jon, List, I have not been following everything lately... but IO (or Semiotic Object) and DO are two important concept for designers. By the way I find that it is possible to understand: FIRSTNESS as monadic SECONDNESS as diadic and THIRDNESS as triadic And the Dymamic Object is exactly wh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, Clark, list, First, thanks for providing those many Peirce snippets on the three interpretants. May I ask, how did you do that, that is, find so many so quickly? Or, perhaps, you've been gathering them for some time? Or did you found them somewhere already groupoed together? So turning to yo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Gary R., List: First, thanks for providing those many Peirce snippets on the three > interpretants. May I ask, how did you do that, that is, find so many so > quickly? Or, perhaps, you've been gathering them for some time? Or did you > found them somewhere already grouped together? > I took me tw

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

from > internal 'bodies' [subsets] and internal output as well. etc > > Must go; again, thanks for the reference. That's also why I don't consider > that the Sign can ever be singular; it operates within complexity - even > the single semiosic act is never i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, list, You wrote: One of Peirce's definitions says that "the Immediate Interpretant ... is ordinarily called the *meaning *of the sign." But the passage above says that "the meaning of a thought"--which is a sign--"is altogether something virtual." Therefore, it follows deductively that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Gary R., List: GR: But the immediate interpretant is in my thinking associated with possibility, 1ns, that is, a possible meaning (mere "interpretability"). Mine, too; I even said as much ... JS: Skagestad's article that both of you linked states, "... as each sign is what it is by virtue of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

it's hard to fine tune one's discussions to use these terms in that way. I'm reminded of Peirce himself, who wrote; 5.312 that 'general must have a real existence'. Edwina ----- Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: g...@gnu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

er if the virtual is more akin to > Peirce's discussion of 'would-be' as differentiated from 'can-be' (which is > possibility or Firstness'. See discussion in 8.216. And 6.372 where he > suggests that the virtual is not the same as the potential. > > I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

mind- when his whole outline was that semiosic is universal, and Mind is universal. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca ; Peirce-L Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2016 7:54 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Edwina, List: I disagree with just about everything in your last message, but I really appreciate the discussion. We evidently read Peirce very differently, or perhaps simply adopt different portions of his writings as our own positions. Hopefully others will join in and provide additional persp

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, list, see my replies below 1) JON: It sounds like you take the view that the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants are the same as the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants. I have not definitively made up my mind about that, but lean more toward seeing them as distinct trichotomie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Edwina, List: We may just have to let our disagreements stand at this point, because I find your way of thinking highly inconsistent with Peirce's writings (as I read them) and wholly unpersuasive. Still, I am glad for the opportunity to sharpen my own thinking, and thank you (again) for the disc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

hasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, but to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Sund

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

t; > I use both terms: triadic semiosic process and semiosis - but I do want > to emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, > but to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and > interpretants. > > Edwina > > > > >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

ust 21, 2016 5:06 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, list: When you say, “I do want to emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, but to the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretant

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Fuhrman > *Sent:* Sunday, August 21, 2016 5:06 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > Edwina, list: > > > > When you say, “I do want to emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer > not to the Representamen, but

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jerry - I see; but I'm not a fan of Plato. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jerry Rhee To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 6:05 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Caus

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

My use of > the capitalized Sign INCLUDES these Relations; that is, again - my use of > 'sign' refers only to the Representamen. My use of 'Sign' refers to the > Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants. > > I use both terms: tri

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Signs. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 6:38 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, List: I think that we are still

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

men is in a mode of > Thirdness in 6 of these classes, in a mode of Secondness in 3 and in a mode > of Firstness in 1 class. And - yet, he defines them ALL as Signs. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* Peirc

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Just to reinforce Jon’s post just now, here is the full text of CP 6.24 (or EP1:292-3, 1891): [[ 24. The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

sentamen is not identical with Thirdness. As you can see in the ten classes of Signs, [8.341] the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of these classes, in a mode of Secondness in 3 and in a mode of Firstness in 1 class. And - yet, he defines them ALL as Signs. Edwina - Original Mess

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

arately from the other. > > His Objective Idealism is not the same as idealism because of this > entanglement of Mind and Matter. For 'there cannot be a General without > Instances embodying it" 4.551. [Now, that's pure Aristotle right there!!] > > Edwina > > --

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

epartment of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 9:48 PM To: Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

sage - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 10:01 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, List: With all due respect--I am not lecturing you, I never sugg

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

chical laws are >> primordial'. I don't see him separating the two, Mind and Matter - and to >> posit that psychical laws are primordial - requires a separation - which he >> rejects. He acknowledges that Mind and Matter are not identical; after all >> - his whole set o

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 22. august 2016 15:19 To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, List: I try to be careful to use appropriate disclaimers when I am expressing a subjective opinion, but the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 22. august 2016 15:19 To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, List: I t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

sage - > *From:* Søren Brier > *To:* 'Jon Alan Schmidt' ; Edwina Taborsky > > *Cc:* Peirce-L ; g...@gnusystems.ca ; > lbr...@pucsp.br ; Lucia Santaelle Braga (lbr...@pq.cnpq.br) > > *Sent:* Monday, August 22, 2016 12:22 PM > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, this is quite an elaborate project you've laid out for us! I'm eager to see what comes out of it, but at the same time I feel the need to take it in small steps (anyway that's all I will have time to do). It seems to me that a pragmatic classification system always begins with a perceived

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

; 'Jon Alan Schmidt' Cc: Peirce-L; g...@gnusystems.ca; lbr...@pucsp.br; lbr...@pq.cnpq.br Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Dear Soren: Thank you for your comments - I agree; I think that the debate on 'which is first' rests within our d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, Gary F., List: Some of my first posts had to do with the order of determination of the ten trichotomies, so I welcome this discussion--although I continue to hope for some feedback on my suggestion that the Immediate/Dynamic Objects and Immediate/Dynamic/Normal Interpretants might alternativ

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, list, I don’t see any advantage in “Virtual Object” as a replacement for “Immediate Object”; the difference between virtuality and immediacy is too great to use them as equivalent. But I’m still pondering the concept of “Virtual Interpretant” and haven’t made up my mind about that yet.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

CP 2.94, also see 4.10) --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 6:41 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

nusystems.ca Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 11:17 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Jeff, this is quite an elaborate project you’ve laid out for us! I’m eager to see what comes out of it, but at the same time I feel the need

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 11:17 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > On your suggestions, let's make some smaller steps. You say: "Now, as others > have pointed out, Peirce did not introduce the distinction between immediate > and dynamic object until around 1904, and I think his clearest expla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > First, thanks for providing those many Peirce snippets on the three > interpretants. May I ask, how did you do that, that is, find so many so > quickly? Or, perhaps, you've been gathering them for some time? Or did you > found them some

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > ET: I don't see that the Immediate Object is internal to that external > Dynamic Object! Not at all. > > Again, no one is arguing otherwise. Clark's comment was that the Dynamic > Object virtually contains the Immediate Object, w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> As for Clark's comment 'that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the >> Immediate Object' - I still don't see this, for how could the Dynamic Object >> determine how I, or the plant or the insect' FEEL its effects - and the >> Immediate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, List, Thanks for the search tip. You wrote: I’ll confess that the list founder, Joe Ransdell often had the best [quotes]. So often it’s to his messages I check first. I completely agree that Joe Ransdell's list messages are a rich source of relevant Peircean quotes on many an issue taken

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:45 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > While he doesn’t make this distinction clearly until the 19th century I tend > to think it is there in his earlier thought latently. Especially in his > notions of continuity with signs. The connection between synechism and > thirdness/sig

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, List: Great stuff. Just a couple of quick questions for now. CG: In this case the dynamic object sets at the start of semiosis but contains within it virtually all the ways it can be represented. Now the actual mechanics of that representing are of course unique and tied to chance. But i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent assignment of > "Dynamic" to the actual Object and Interpretant, rather than the possible > (Immediate) Object and Interpretant? Because the possible objects and inter

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, list: Finally, some sanity! You said: “The idea of something, like say Sherlock Holmes, can be a dynamic object if that is the object of discussion. Again because of our culture’s more nominalistic tendencies, we often want some core material entities as dynamic objects.” Plato sai

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, List: Thanks for the response. CG: Because the possible objects and interpretants are determined by this original object. So the potential is in this original. Since the original object *determines *the possible objects and interpretants, would it not be more correct to say that the *vi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, List: JD: Jon, do the alternate terms you are recommending "virtual object" for immediate object and "virtual interpretant" for immediate interpretant work equally well for each of the three strata (i.e., the level of possibles, actuals and necessitants) that Peirce describes? I honestly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, I'm curious. What would you have if you find the answers to those questions? it appears even if you find the right answers, there'll still be the problem of communicating it correctly to others, since we won't even recognize its correctness. If you know it just to know it...well...*shrug*.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

r examples. Mine are falling short of what I was hoping to make clearer. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 7:15 PM To: Jeffrey

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

bject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation > On Aug 23, 2016, at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent assignment of > "Dynamic" to the actual Object and Interpretant,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

es this complexity. Edwina - Original Message - From: "Søren Brier" To: "'Clark Goble'" ; "Peirce-L" Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 8:15 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation 'Semiot

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

_ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 11:17 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Jeff, this is quite an elaborate project

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, Jon, list, In the "Minute Logic" (CP 2.176) Peirce says that whatever a bee or ant does "is determined by virtual reasoning. He uses reason to adapt means to ends-that is, to his inclinations-just as we do; except that probably he has not the same self-consciousness." In other words, the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, List: My attempted summary--virtuality is possibility *with *efficiency, while potentiality is possibility *without *efficiency--is based on this passage, which is the first one cited by the online Commens Dictionary as Peirce's definition of "virtual" (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Gary F., List: FYI, Peirce's entry for "virtual" in *Baldwin's Dictionary* is also reproduced as CP 6.372. GF: The formula is that a “virtual X” acts like an X, performs the function of an X, without being an X. I guess the question is whether "acting like an X" and/or "performing the function

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 4:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: Because the possible objects and interpretants are determined by this > original object. So the potential is in this original. > > Since the original object determines the possible objects and interpretants, > would it not be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 10:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > What makes something virtual is that it has potential--it possesses the > possibility of realizing certain capacities--but it is not actually or really > a thing of that kind. I’d say one has to be cautious with the “not rea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:15 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > 'Semiotic realism' is good - could we extend it to 'triadic semiotic process > realism' ? While some see semiotic just as thirdness I think typically those using it consider all three categories are always at work. But I agree that there’

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

GOBLE To: Peirce-L Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 7:32 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:15 AM, Søren Brier wrote: 'Semiotic realism' is good - could we extend it to 'triadic semiotic process r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how > anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition > of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'undue privileging' [??] but >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how > anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition > of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'u

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

as the categorical mode of Thirdness but I think that the other two modes of Firstness and Secondness are absolutely vital and necessary modes in that development. Edwina - Original Message - From: CLARK GOBLE To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 1:53 AM Su

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, List: CG: Since the semiotic process is continuous there’s virtuality all the way back. JS: Just to confirm--is that a "yes" to my question, "Would it then be accurate to say that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the Immediate Object, which virtually contains the Sign, which virtual

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 6:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1) Continuity is an integral component of 'community'. I've never heard of a > 'finite community, at least in the natural world. The artificial world that > includes 'identity politics' and their 'finite communities' is a different > s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, list - see my comments below - Original Message - From: CLARK GOBLE To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 9:34 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation On Aug 25, 2016, at 6:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 1

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

____ From: g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 7:53 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Jeff, list, I agree that Peirce’s post-1903 distinctions are semeiotic developments of more basic lo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

To: 'Peirce-L' Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 10:00 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Gary F., List, You make an interesting point that I will need to think about more. The interpretative question is: where is the need for

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

tention to) but they lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 25-Aug-16 08:48 To: CLARK GOBLE Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > EDWINA: I understand your point but I'll have a problem with the > identification of 'community' only in the present tense. The very nature of > Thirdness is its focus on the future existentiality of the 'type' - a type > developed wi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:20 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — (as > in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the > Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the specific > ex

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

e the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE > objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they > lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. > > > &g

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

htm Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 7:53 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subje

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

na University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 8:04 AM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Gary F., List: JS: For example, the Immediate Object is not a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

st 25, 2016 8:19 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Jeff, list - Hmm - Perhaps I'm digging deeper into misunderstanding you ..but it seems to me that you are indeed referring to the separation of mind and matter - after all, the 'sh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

question: "What sort of day is it?" > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > -- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Thursday, August

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somewhat, however, not consistently. Many interesting thoughts and wondering how they would apply in situational case scenarios. So I have a question: How would you apply some of these Peirce "Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation" ideas to a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Gary F., List: JS: For example, the Immediate Object is not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual O

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 9:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > > GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

on't think that there should be a 'clear separation' between the questions and answers in each area. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jeffrey Brian Downard To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 11:40 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:24 AM, wrote: > > in the case of Peirce’s conversation with his wife about the weather, the > immediate object of his reply (“the notion of the present weather so far as > this is common to her mind and mine”) will partially determine what words he > will choose to r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:06 AM, Bev Corwin wrote: > > Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somewhat, however, not consistently. > Many interesting thoughts and wondering how they would apply in situational > case scenarios. So I have a question: How would you apply some of these > Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Thanks, very useful. However, water cannot self-identify since it is non sentient as far as we know, however, a human can self-identify and sentient. What would change in the water model if water were sentient and could self-identify - or as initially presented in the "self-identify" of the broader

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, List: CG: The immediate object would be the environment of speakers relevant to the use. How do we reconcile this with the Immediate Object being internal to the Sign? CG: Likewise semiotically water the substance determines water the universal which in turn determines all these things

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 12:53 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:24 AM, wrote: in the case of Peirce’s conversation with his wife about the weather, the immediate object of his reply (“the notion of the pres

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: The immediate object would be the environment of speakers relevant to > the use. > > How do we reconcile this with the Immediate Object being internal to the Sign? I don’t see the problem. Don’t confuse the sign with the sign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My outline of the same situation brings in the categories, where > > 1) The Dynamic Object is the existential nature of the weather - which > interacts with my eyes [both are dynamic objects]; both are interacting in > the Mode of S

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

nses. Edwina - Original Message - From: Bev Corwin To: Jon Alan Schmidt Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 12:06 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somew

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Thanks Edwina, Perhaps for personal identity. But isn't this a bit of a stretch for self-identify? Wouldn't the ability to self-identify require consciousness or sentience? Can dynamic object really work in this case? Best wishes, Bev On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 1:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Bev

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

- Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 1:46 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: My outline of the same situation brings in the ca

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

nard ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 1:52 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Thanks Edwina, Perhaps for personal identity. But isn't this a bit of a stretch for self-identify? Wouldn't the ability to self-identify require c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, List: CG: Don’t confuse the sign with the sign-vehicle. I generally avoid the term "sign-vehicle," because Peirce did not use it. The closest I could find was in CP 1.339 (undated), where he wrote, "A sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

na > > - Original Message - > *From:* Bev Corwin > *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L > > *Sent:* Thursday, August 25, 2016 12:06 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > Hello e

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, Jon, Gary, Jeff, Edwina, List, Concurrent with following this most interesting and valuable discussion, I'm reading a new book by the *New York Times* critic, A.O.Scott: *Better Living Through Criticism*. Some of what he says here about "subjective universality" may be useful in getting a c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

ses. Edwina - Original Message - From: Bev Corwin To: Jon Alan Schmidt Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 12:06 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Hello ev

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

dwina - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 3:02 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Clark, Jon, Gary, Jeff, Edwina, List, Concurrent with following this most interesting and v

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

ve of that unreachable Dynamic Object. I then > mediate it..to produce an Immediate Interpretant [an understanding of > 'cloudy'] and articulate in the word 'cloudy'. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Gary Richmond > *To:* Peirce-L

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

ina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* Bev Corwin ; Jeffrey Brian Downard > ; Peirce-L > *Sent:* Thursday, August 25, 2016 3:02 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causa

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