Robert; List-
> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty wrote:
>
> You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in
> mathematics. For example, when Peirce names the classes of signs, he doesn't
> note that symbols are legisigns, any more than he mentions that the three
Jon, List,
One more effort ... if you take the definition of a mathematical category,
you'll see that you only need to "flatten" your diagram a little to get the
category O → S → I. To do this, we'll consider the abstract category X → Y
→ Z with three abstract objects X, Y and Z and not two but th
That's okay Jerry ... I'm just trying to stay within the framework of exact
philosophy as Peirce sees it :
*The doctrine of exact philosophy, as I understand that phrase, is, that
all danger of error in philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating
the problems as mathematically as possible,
> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty wrote:
>
> Jerry, List
>
> You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in
> mathematics.
>
Sorry, Robert.
Interesting but hardly compelling response.
Human communications in multidisciplinary forums such as this are open t
Jerry, List
You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in
mathematics. For example, when Peirce names the classes of signs, he
doesn't note that symbols are legisigns, any more than he mentions that the
three iconic signs are rhematic. Since my diagram represents a categor
List:
Here is a modified version of my EG with the two dyadic relations of
determining now included. Erasing them in accordance with the usual
transformation rules gives the other version of my original EG as posted on
Friday, its only difference from the one below being the convention for
where t
Ben, List
You are confronted with the mathematical notion of the composition of
morphisms. This notion appears as an axiom in the definition of a category.
Category theory is the study of mathematical structures and their
relationships. It's a unifying notion that began with the observation that
m
> On Jan 7, 2024, at 9:10 AM, robert marty wrote:
>
> It's clear, then, that the composition of the two determinations gives rise
> to the triadic relation for Peirce. That's why I've underlined "therefore."
> Consequently, the formalization is simplified considerably, without any loss
> of
Ben, List:
I share your concern about describing the *genuine *triadic relation of
mediating (or representing) with its three correlates (sign, object,
interpretant) as if it were reducible to dyadic relations of determining,
which could only be true if it were a *degenerate *triadic relation. It
Ben, list
I remember discussions on this list about that paragraph with follows the p.
271 warning in this text
“A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a
Third, called its Interpretan
Hi, Robert, all,
I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that you
quote in your message,
/The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a Second
should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness, both of which
are involv
Cécile, List
I present here, in the most condensed form possible, the merits of a purely
algebraic formalization of Peirce's semiotics, entirely indexed to the
history of its development.
*How do we distinguish the correlates of a triadic sign?*
*How do we formalize the triadic sign?*
This q
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