Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comm
who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re:
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> To: John Collier
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] se
, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1]
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John
Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> *To:* John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is
]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John - thanks for the quotation.
I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he writes,
"
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John C., List:
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing.
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce used "sign" to mean a
Jon, List,
Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!
30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final
Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this
list
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is
the object as a final study would show it to be.
I think that the key word here is *would*. The idea is that the real is
that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after
indefinite
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothe
com>
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its
iso
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions.
But Peirce wasn't focused on that.
Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and
Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have
Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to
List,
Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and
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