The very word *means *signifies something which is in the middle between two others. Moreover, this third state of mind, or Thought, is a sense of learning, and learning is the means by which we pass from ignorance to knowledge.
There are three kinds of signs. Firstly, there are *likenesses,* or *icons* Secondly, there are *indications,* or *indices* Thirdly, there are* symbols,* or general signs *Let us consider the various uses of these three kinds of signs more closely.* Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm 1) *Symbols* which directly determine only their *grounds* or imputed qualities, and *are* thus but sums of marks or *terms*; 2) *Symbols* which also independently determine their *objects* by means of other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity, become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, *are* *propositions*; and, 3) *Symbols* which also independently determine their *interpretants*, and thus the minds to which they appeal, by premissing a proposition or propositions which such a mind is to admit. These *are* *arguments*. http://www.peirce.org/writings/p32.html Of course, a Peircean who knew of what Peirce meant would already know this and everyone else would be a fool. Best, Jerry R On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:10 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly > many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of > the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the > interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way > I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe > that is just my lack of imagination. > > > > John > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM > *To:* John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > John - thanks for the quotation. > > I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he > writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function > of a sign that it should determine an *Interpretant".* Therefore - the > sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must *have* that object. And, > to *function as a sign* [gosh - does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an > Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a sign, even all by itself. > > > > That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because > none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the > FUNCTION of the triad. > > > > > > Edwina > > > > > > > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > *On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za > <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> sent:* > > I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different > metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] > *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM > *To:* John Collier > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > John C., List: > > > > *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.* > > > > Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce > used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of* > the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such passages, I > would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them. > Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the > way that I am advocating? > > > > *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce > refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to > understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is > essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take > this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that > Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was > discussed on the list some time ago.* > > > > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness > [R] | MS [R] 914:5-6 > > The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a *sign*; and it is > shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an > object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in > the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential > to the function of a sign that it should determine an *Interpretant*, or > second correlate related to the object of the sign as the sign is itself > related to that object; and this interpretant may be regarded as the sign > represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the object, and as > it is in its own firstness. Upon these considerations are founded six > trichotomic divisions of signs… > > > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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