Edwina, John C., List: As I already pointed out, according to that quotation, every Sign/Representamen *has *an Object and *determines* an Interpretant; hence these are three *distinct *subjects, not three *parts *(or "nodes") of the Sign *itself*. Here is a passage that makes this even clearer.
CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A *Sign* is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (EP 2:290-291, emphases in original; 1903) A Sign indeed *functions*, and does so triadically (EP 2:429; 1907). We might even say that it *has *the function of standing *for *its Object *to *its Interpretant (CP 2.228; c. 1897). However, neither of these expressions is the same thing as saying that it *is *a function; i.e., the kind of thing that simply processes input to generate output. Notice also that Peirce twice characterized the Interpretant as "possible," which bears on something that Clark Goble and I were discussing in another thread; here is a second passage that touches on that. CSP: Namely, while no Representamen *actually *functions as such until it *actually *determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully *capable *of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever *actually *determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its *actually *having an Object. (CP 2.275, emphases added; c. 1902) My understanding is thus that every Sign/Representamen has an *Immediate *Object and determines an *Immediate *Interpretant, because those are real possibilities that are *internal *to it; but evidently there might be such a thing as a Sign/Representamen that has no *Dynamic *Object and/or (especially) determines no *Dynamic *Interpretant, because those are *external *to it. I wonder if recognizing these distinctions (possible/actual and internal/external) could be a way to reconcile "the Sign as triad" (with Immediate Object/Interpretant) and "the Sign as one correlate of a triadic relation" (with Dynamic Object/Interpretant). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term 'sign' > to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can become a > sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes - in that > case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of Peirce - that is > exactly what happens: a full triad becomes an Object. That is how things > develop, adapt and evolve in the Peircean framework. > > That is, there is no such thing as an existentially separate Dynamic > Object, or an existentially separate Representamen or an existentially > separate Interpretant. They are, in their definitions and functions of > DO/R/DI, operating as such only in that triadic interaction. And that is > the case even if they are each in a mode of Secondness. > > Something that is existentially separate in the sense that it is > observationally differentiated from an Other - does not mean that it > is semiosically separate. I can't think of a single thing that would be > semiosically separate - and that includes even a grain of sand. > > Edwina > > On Thu 30/03/17 4:10 PM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent: > > That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly > many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of > the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the > interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way > I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe > that is just my lack of imagination. > > > > John > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM > To: John Collier > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > John - thanks for the quotation. > > I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he > writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function > of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant". Therefore - the > sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must have that object. And, > to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an > Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a sign, even all by itself. > > That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because > none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the > FUNCTION of the triad. > > Edwina > > On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent: > > I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different > metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk. > > > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM > To: John Collier > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > John C., List: > > > > [John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing. > > > > Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce > used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of > the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such passages, I > would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them. > Would you at least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way > that I am advocating? > > > > [John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce > refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to > understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is > essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take > this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that > Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was > discussed on the list some time ago. > > > > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness > [R] | MS [R] 914:5-6 > > The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is > shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an > object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in > the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential > to the function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or > second correlate related to the object of the sign as the sign is itself > related to that object; and this interpretant may be regarded as the sign > represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the object, and as > it is in its own firstness. Upon these considerations are founded six > trichotomic divisions of signs… > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > >
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