Part of the problem with the analogy is that rushing out of the theater when
someone shouts Fire! is a justifiable response by those in attendance. If
the shouter is telling the truth about the fire, then they ought to try to get
out, and no one is to blame. If the shouter is not telling the
In defense of Justice Breyer, I don't think he called into question
first amendment doctrine as it might apply to Q'ran burning; the
reported text of his remarks suggests only that he was speaking with
the prudence of a Justice talking about a legal issue that might some
day come before
How does burning the Koran differ from burning the flag? I thought we had
been through this debate before and find Justice Breyer's comments strange,
to say the least.
Marci
In a message dated 9/16/2010 11:27:09 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
con...@indiana.edu writes:
In an
I think Breyer was attempting to demonstrate his approach to constitutional law
interpretation — thinking out loud to show how he would work through the
material in an idealized, judgely fashion. He's absorbed in the subject of
case-by-case adjudication and how carefully everything needs to be
While I believe that desecrating sacred objects is protected speech, I'm not
sure that I'm persuaded by the argument that the critical issue is whether the
response of the audience to speech is justifiable or not. In the South, 100
years ago, spreading a false statement that an African-American
For those list participants near DC, ACS is hosting an interesting RLUIPA
anniversary panel next week, featuring at least four list participants. For
those not near DC, seeing Marci, Doug, Marc, and Roman on the same panel
debating this issue may be worth a plane ticket.
Eric Treene
I hope ACS is planning on putting the program on line or making a tape of it. A
lot of us out of the area would like to have access to it.
Alan Brownstein
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of eric treene
According to
http://newsbusters.org/blogs/scott-whitlock/2010/09/14/george-stephanopoulos-should-threat-koran-burning-make-us-rethink-fi#ixzz0zZkDHzwW,
here's how the exchange went:
STEPHANOPOULOS: You know, when we spoke several years ago, you talked about how
the process of
As I understand it, there has been some debate about this issue (though
generally as to lost business and social opportunities, not as to violence) in
libel law. For instance, as I understand it there has been some controversy
about whether falsely claiming someone is black is
Sounds to me like he's saying the Court needs to think about it. Not that
Koran burning is unprotected or even that he is leaning that way, but that
there are some new facts and new arguments here that require reconsideration
of the question.
And weren't the flag-burning cases 1989 and 1990?
The issue Alan raises has come up in the debate over defamation of religions
because many European countries have laws regarding incitement to racial or
religious hatred, many of which were designed during the post-war period to
respond to Nazi tactics against Jewish Germans. These
This case is easy if one accepts the legitimacy of regulating and in
some instances curtailing hate speech.
I know Eugene does not.
Sent from Steve Jamar's iPhone
On Sep 16, 2010, at 3:02 PM, Marie A. Failinger mfailin...@gw.hamline.edu
wrote:
Per Sandys' and others' remarks, it seems to
I agree that my examples do little to resolve the burning of sacred texts
question or reactions to true statements or statements of opinion. I just
wanted to make the point that the justifiability of the audience's response
shouldn't control the analysis.
I think there is a question as to
Response of the audience is relevant in fighting words and defamation,
no?
Relevance does not always equal control.
Yelling fire in a crowded theater is audience mediated, no?
Sent from Steve Jamar's iPhone
On Sep 16, 2010, at 3:24 PM, Brownstein, Alan aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu
wrote:
I
Eric is certainly correct that the First amendment protects the expression of
ideas -- even if they have the tendency to make audience members so angry that
will react violently to the speech. European countries are far less protective
of speech.
The connection between other kinds of speech
I'm surprised no one is talking about (speech) market failure. False cries of
fire in a crowded theater, incitements of your audience to imminent lawless
action, and face-to-face fighting words are classic examples of likely market
failure. In the Terry Jones example, the market was producing
I'll bite: the argument against prohibition is prudential, ie, the social costs
are too high (as with drugs and, argably, guns), not because there is a
constititional right to drink or, even after Heller, possess a habdgun outside
one's home.
Sandy
From:
Maybe it means that although we have a globalized market in goods, we don't
have a globalized market in speech? How many Kashmiris watch Anderson Cooper?
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Ira
I indeed believe that people should be free to express hatred of
the Koran, or of Christianity, or of America, or of Israel, or of Iran, or of
whatever else. And I think the suggestion that people could be punished –
maybe even sent to prison, yes? – for expressing hatred of the
Sandy,
I agree. I should have made my point more clearly, which is that many
people (like the poster to whom I was responding) seem ready to abandon freedom
of speech, and other civil liberties, at the thought of even one death,
while even thousands of deaths don't cause them to consider
I basically agree with Art. As Dworkin argues, it is the very meaning of
taking rights seriously that one is willing to accept very real costs (which
go beyond simply the cost, however real, of feeling demeaned or insulted).
My point was simply that the very likely costs of allowing the burning
If I could add a hypo to Eugene's question:
Should the families of the people who died in the Kashmir rioting (or the
Catholic school that was firebombed) be able to seek redress from Pastor Jones
for tort liability?
If so, on what basis?
Would it matter whether Pastor Jones had ever heard
Art, I guess we should not make driving intoxicated illegal under your
theory. Or do you mean to suggest we don't go far enough already?
Many can play the absurdist game. From many sides.
Sent from Steve Jamar's iPhone
On Sep 16, 2010, at 4:35 PM, artspit...@aol.com wrote:
Sandy,
I agree.
Not every camel's nose under the tent leads to the collapse of the tent.
Sent from Steve Jamar's iPhone
On Sep 16, 2010, at 4:43 PM, Sanford Levinson
slevin...@law.utexas.edu wrote:
I basically agree with Art. As Dworkin argues, it is the very
meaning of taking rights seriously that one
To my ear, “in a sense, yes. In a sense, no” is Justice Breyer speaking in a
characteristically intellectual style that the elites in his environment find
charming and endlessly thoughtful. I hear it that way myself. It's as if
Stephanopoulos is a novice in law, and Justice Breyer is giving him
Well, so if he thought he was yelling fire because there really was a
fire, then is he innocent even if there wasn't a fire? :-)
On 9/16/2010 2:11 PM, Steven Jamar wrote:
Can you give me the rule that supports not yelling fire? Or how to
distinguish fighting words in all cases?
Context
The trouble is that if we’re worried about the well-being of the
tent, we need to know a bit more about the creature whose nose is coming in.
Is it a mouse? A camel? A horde of army ants? So far, in this thread – and,
if my memory serves me right, in the other threads where
And then next we will have people arguing that women should have to wear burqas
in certain neighborhoods of American cities because of the anticipated reaction
of certain of the inhabitants. Or in all parts of the US, because our
licentious customs stir up anger that leads to terrorist attacks.
If I may offer a brief response to Eugene's initial question, which was not
about whether the state can *prohibit *such conduct, but instead whether a
public employer can discharge a public employee for conspicuously engaging
in such public conduct . . . . (Of course, if the conduct can be
29 matches
Mail list logo
